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THE

WORDS OF THE LORD JESUS.

BY

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VOLUME FIFTH.

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BY THE

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

JOHN III. 10, 11.

Σὺ εἶ ὁ διδάσκαλος τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ, καὶ ταῦτα οὐ γινώσκεις; Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω σοι, ὅτι ὃ οἴδαμεν λαλοῦμεν, καὶ ὃ ἑωράκαμεν μαρτυροῦμεν· καὶ τὴν μαρτυρίαν ἡμῶν οὐ λαμβάνετε.

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PREFATORY NOTICE.

The Translator must once more remind his readers that he is not responsible for the opinions of his author. There will be found in the present volume, as in the last, passages (in his judgment) either erroneous or of erroneous tendency: such, for instance, as the germs of speculation about the intermediate state which are to be detected in the exposition of Lu. xvi., and the sacramental theories deduced from the third and sixth chapters of St John. It is sufficient to say that the author is a Lutheran divine, and vindicates on all occasions the higher ecclesiastical views of his communion; but this does not, in the Translator's judgment, impair the value of the work, as a whole, to the thoughtful and catholic reader who keeps that fact always in view.

For himself he may add, that while it would have been much more satisfactory to his own mind to send forth his labours without any such caution, the profound study of our Lord's words which such a translation requires and assists, has been to him a blessing for which he is deeply thankful.

HULL, 1856.

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THE GOSPEL OF ST JOHN.

CONVERSATION WITH THE WOMAN OF SAMARIA, THE WATER OF LIFE; WORSHIP IN SPIRIT AND TRUTH; THE MESSIAH COME.

(Ch. iv. 7—26.)

Immediately after his prologue, the Evangelist gave, first of all, the witness of John the Baptist, then followed the commencement of the revelation of Jesus on the reception of His first disciples, then the manifestation of His glory in its grace at Cana, in its severity of truth at Jerusalem, in mutually supplementing contrast. He then introduces *two testimonies of Jesus concerning Himself*, similarly connected together, in which He committed Himself to two very different persons—Nicodemus and the woman of Samaria. The introduction to these is found in chap. ii. 23—25, by way of antithesis: He did not commit himself to these, but to others He did, as He knew what was in them. Nicodemus, a ruler of Jerusalem, the only one of his order till now; the Samaritan woman, who had many like herself.

Before, however, the *counterpart* to Nicodemus is entered upon, the Evangelist inserts a supplementary illustration of the relation of Jesus to the Baptist, in a *final* testimony of the latter, which remarkably accords with the testimony given to Nicodemus.[1] The literal expressions may in individual cases have

[1] We prefer this distribution to Luthardt's threefold arrangement (Lut. i. 271). The scheme which He has drawn out at such length does not exclude other views of the order of the discourse.

been here and there departed from,[1] but as a whole we have the authentic words of the Baptist from the 27th verse to the end of the chapter. As Jesus, before His redeeming death, was a prophet for Himself, so did He connect His own ministry with the function of the Baptist which closed all prophecy; but He baptizes only through His disciples, the least in the kingdom of heaven being greater than the greatest without. Thus do the preparation for Jesus, and His actual coming, continue to run side by side, even after He had actually come. The Baptist's position was acknowledged by Jesus himself, and gives a key to the history of His church. Generally speaking, chaps. ii.—v. of St John's Gospel contain the record of the *transition time*, in which Jesus in conjunction with John, in part baptizes, in part already bear witness like him. He does not as yet preach, that only commenced when John retired.

What follows ver. 31 in the third chapter, is clearly a continuation of the former discourse. The Baptist testified in the first part—I, who must decrease, have, as man, my measure and degree. In the second, he continues—But He, as the Son of God, receives everything without measure, *takes* nothing from heaven, is Himself come down from above! Thus it was very necessary, not only that John should send away men from himself, but that he should strongly affirm the dignity of Him who had been misunderstood, and point all men to Him. He now knew full well all that he witnessed: he knew Him as the *Lamb*, and as the *Bridegroom*,[2] and, indeed, since the revelation at the baptism, as the *Son of God*, chap. i. 34. What he adds, ver. 34—36, was received at that revelation, to which the δεδομένον of ver. 27 already alluded. The "phraseology" about which the learned have so many objections, is first that of the *Spirit* and the matter itself, and only thus the Evangelist's. The *names* of Christ sig-

[1] We should not, however, dare to translate back again from the Evangelist's into the Baptist's manner of speaking, as Ebrard does, p. 335. Comp. Luthardt i. 173, &c., who sees, with myself, only a faint trace of the subjectivity of the Evangelist in the *expression* given to the Baptist's thoughts.

[2] Luthardt's coincidence Baptistæ verba in memoriam nobis revocant nuptias Canenses (De Compos. p. 27), we must leave undetermined, especially as the Baptist certainly had Scriptural authority for His representation.

nificantly advance in dignity, in contrast with the ἄνθρωπος with which the whole began. In ver. 8 ὁ Χριστός, but still a man, to whom God giveth the Spirit—in ver. 29, the νυμφίος who will unite Himself with us—in ver. 31, the ἄνωθεν, ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἐρχομενος—so in ver. 34, ὃν ἀπέστειλεν ὁ θεός in an eminent and special sense, down from and out from Himself—then in ver. 35, the *Son* God of God. He who receives this testimony sets to his seal, that God is true; as he himself receives the seal and assurance of this, so is he a seal also to others. (2 Cor. iii. 2, 3). The Baptist, and every one who stood without with him, could not give the epistle and seal of the Spirit: it was for them to appeal to another—He will bring it! All the prophets spoke upon earth with their expectant eyes fixed upon heaven; he that believeth on Him who came down from heaven, hath the witness of God in himself, as the seal of the fulfilment of all, and can consequently give testimony to others from this inward experience. (Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 2). The Son indeed *speaketh* ἐν ὁμοιώματι of men and prophets, (ver. 34), but His λαλεῖν alone is, at the same time, a perfect μαρτυρεῖν in the highest sense. He does not speak merely ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, but τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ θεοῦ, that is, the Son speaketh all the words which the Godhead hath for us (ch. i. 18).[1] Thus hath the Father given all things into His hand, who is ever ἐπάνω πάντων: this being neuter in ver. 31, as the concrete idea of οὐρανός, מָרוֹם. In that the Father giveth His beloved Son to us, He gives His Fatherly love to the Son also to us. Christ is the redeeming arm of God's power, but also the bestowing hand of God's love; He is Himself both gift and Giver to *faith*. Hence faith or unbelief towards Him decides for life or death. It is with this final word of promise and word of terror from the Old Testament, that John, as Lange says (iii. 578), closes His prophetic function to bear testimony to Christ.

The Lord now bears the same witness to the unlearned woman at Sychar, which He had borne to the Master in Israel: the same to the ignorant schismatic and sinner, as to the sanctified Pharisee. The object of His testimony is to reveal Himself as

[1] The same was signified of old in Deut. xviii. 18, 19; in the pre-eminent sense of a final, most special fulfilment.

the gift of God (or the medium and giver of that gift). The great theme is—*the gift of God*, ch. iii. 16. More particularly the true gift of God is this, that I, as the Messiah now come, give to all who ask it the true water of life, in order to bring in the time of the worship of the Father in spirit and in truth.

The conversation divides itself into *two main parts:* one more general, and one more particular. The *more general* portion is *preparatory and figurative:* the *more special* is then *drawn out in detail* and in *plain* expressions. The former sets out with the paradoxical and awakening testimony:—*There is* a water of life! and this is the true gift of God through Me! We must observe here the point of connection, and the transition. The *connection* is with the present, earthly gift of God, the water which supplies the figure. Ver. 7. (First turning-point:—the woman becomes attentive to the speaker, and enters into converse with Him). Then follows the transition to the true or spiritual gift of God—the same in its source, contrasted in its worth: not without allusion to the end of the whole colloquy—*He Himself who was speaking!* (second turning point: the woman does not understand, and opposes). Then follows a *plain designation*, though as yet in figurative, preparatory words, of the spiritual gift; and its worth is shown in relation to the permanence of its satisfaction, vers. 13, 14. There is first another antithesis—he who drinketh *this* water shall never thirst: then comes the plain declaration—*springing up* into everlasting life! (third turning point: the woman *begins to understand*, but her notion being obscure, she can only speak *evasively*).

The Lord now commences the second part of His discourse; speaks plainly to her and without figure, though only pursuing into detail what the former part had prepared for. *Salvation* cometh to sinners *by Me*, the Messiah of the Jews, whose design is to establish the universal worship of the Father in spirit and in truth. Here, again, there is first the evidence of her own need, which is brought home personally to her conscience, and admits no evasion; and then the most plain and ample exhibition and offer of the gift of God. The woman is at once apprehended, by the bringing to her conscience of her present *sin*, ver. 16. (Fourth turning point:—she is more keenly smitten, and already makes half a confession.) Her confession is with

gracious severity dwelt upon, and the sin of the whole life made manifest to her by its last sin, vers. 17, 18. (Fifth turning point: —she silently confesses; discerns, finally, *the Prophet;* and then, after her own manner, asks concerning true worship.)

Now, finally, comes the explicit and full offer! First, as necessarily opposing the error of the questioner—the one great end of the great Future now beginning (ver. 21), and the original point of difference in the present relations of Jews and Samaritans (ver. 22). Hereupon is indicated and offered us the gift of Jesus—*the Spirit* given in order to the true worship of the Father—*this* is the water of life: the *Messiah* (the Son of the Father, though the Samaritan women knew not this as yet), who brings and imparts that Spirit, is—*Myself!* The necessity wherefore only such are the true worshippers whom the Father seeketh to worship him, ver. 23. Its *ground* in the *nature of God,* with at the same time an intimation that that spirit can be a *gift from God alone,* ver. 24. (The sixth critical moment in the colloquy:—the woman thinks now of the promised Giver and Mediator of this gift—almost regards Jesus as being He.) The Lord then concludes with a seventh saying, returning back to the first:—Now recognise the gift of God, know who it is that speaketh with thee, that thou mayest make thy petition to Him —*Ἐγώ εἰμι!* ver. 26.[1]

Before we enter upon the detailed exposition of this most mar-

[1] In the first collection of my "Andeutungen" I showed how in this most distinctly historical presentation the process of conversion in many souls is reflected, and may repeat it from a work now laid aside. First, there is imparted an obscure, indefinite, and general knowledge of the need of sustenance for the *soul.* This is at first a figure, in the beginning not understood; then are we constrained to mark it well, but will not. God comes closer and more keenly with the discovery of personal sin: then follows the half-denial, yet half-submission to the authority of God's omniscience, and finally repentance! Now comes the inquiry for the true service of God, confused as we are concerning it by the tradition of vain "worship" from our fathers. Then follows the right understanding of worship in spirit and in truth, with earnest desire after Him who brings light and power required in order to offer it. He now places Himself openly before us, the pitcher of earthly pleasure is left standing, and we go at once to magnify the great Giver to our brethren.

vellous conversation,[1] thus preparatorily sketched, we must just spend a glance upon its scene, as the Evangelist, vers. 1—6, exhibits it to us. After the parenthesis of John's words, he takes up the thread of ver. 26 again. He himself terms Jesus *the Lord* (just here for the first time, when He is retreating before the Pharisees!) and then introduces, with the names *Jesus* and *John*, what the Pharisees had heard. The more gracious of these two was the more attractive to the people, and besides this John, with constant earnestness, directed all to *Him:* hence naturally the concourse around Him, in which, however, according to chap. iii. 32, there was but little true faith exhibited. To the Pharisees, on the contrary, the legal John was more acceptable or more tolerable: their enmity began to rage against the Lord, who penetrates, and perceives it without being informed concerning it in any human way. (The ἔγνω rises somewhat above the ἤκουσαν). In connection with the baptizing, the Evangelist interposes the important circumstance that Jesus did not Himself baptize,[2]—and this, as being a manifold presumption of common people, provoked the Pharisees still more. Suffice it that the Lord, avoiding these Pharisees, left Judæa, and turned towards the chosen and predicted sphere of His main activity, towards the more susceptible *Galilee*. He went naturally by the shortest way, for it would have been a sanction of Pharisaism in Him to have avoided the Samaritans, which only the most bigoted Jews were in the habit of doing. But St John adds an ἔδει which has still deeper significance: not that it refers to any special circumstances constraining Him (such as the presence of Herod in Peræa?); or any extraordinary *haste* on His part (with which

[1] How many such colloquies may have occurred in the life of Jesus, which are not written down!

[2] Not because He could not baptize into Himself, for this was not as yet a baptism into His name. And not directly for the reason which von Gerlach suggests—to render impossible any future self-exaltation over others on account of being baptized by the Lord. But rather, as Schleiermacher says, because much baptizing would have withdrawn Him from that high work of preaching in which the disciples could not have been His representatives. Sacrament is still less than the Word (comp. 1 Cor. i. 17; Acts x. 48)—especially this preparatory baptism of repentance. At the same time He laid the deep foundation for the recognition of the services of others as valid under His commission (as Rieger remarks); and (as Bengel) caused his disciples to begin their ministry first as deacons.

ver. 40 afterwards does not accord),—for Jesus was under no constraint at all in going the way which He might purpose;—nor is it a mere geographical note that Samaria lay between, for such a degree of information might assuredly be presumed in his readers;—what then does it signify? We think that it means rather *He should* than *He must*, that is, it was an inward call, it was according to the counsel of God, that this preparatory saving salvation should now take place in Samaria. The other interpretation, viz., that He could not otherwise than take the directest road on this occasion is inharmonious, because it rests on the assumption that Jesus would have otherwise avoided Samaria. This no Galilæan would be anxious to do, and no Jew indeed under ordinary circumstances, as we have said before. Whether this inward voice was connected with any internal, conscious impulse of Christ's will, is another question; and Luthardt may have some ground for saying that the expression excludes any thing like a *designed* visitation of Samaria, in order to exert His energy there. It is enough that the Evangelist uses this ἔδει of Divine providence, in a manner which must awaken attention and thought, in order to introduce his narrative of that memorable circumstance which took place in the passage through Samaria, and which was a prophetic allusion to the second transitional stage of evangelical preaching,—the preaching to Samaria, as it is impressively announced in Acts i. 8.

The Lord now came into the neighbourhood of a city (either εἰς is *prope*, or πόλις, according to Grotius, is equivalent to civitatis territorium): that one, namely, which in the time of Alexander the Great had become the capital—Συχάρ or Σιχάρ, according to the correct reading, though Jerome would correct it to Συχέμ. (Acts vii. 16). That Sichem is meant which was in the neighbourhood of Mount Gerizim, Josh, xx. 7; Judg. ix. 7. We can scarcely regard it a merely Greek termination, but very probably an opprobrious change introduced by Jewish scorn;[1]

[1] On account of their Idolatry, after שֶׁקֶר, Hab. ii. 18, which Sir. l. 27 (28) may have had in view. Or it may have been from שִׁכּוֹר, drunken, taken from Isa. xxviii. 1. The reference of Hug, which Wieseler, Lange, and Sepp sanction, to סוֹכָר or סוּכָר burying-place, is more far-fetched, since there could be no desire to change the name

but this phraseology was not simply "harmlessly retained" by St John, still less (as Hengstenberg thinks) now first introduced by him, but it was an intentional intimation of the relation and position of things between Judæa and Samaria, designed for intelligent readers, like other such premonitory hints which we shall find. The topography is given with the immediate object of laying the foundation for the woman's saying in ver. 12, but the mention of Jacob's well was enough for that; the notice of the χωρίον which Jacob gave to *Joseph* as a portion before his brethren (Gen. xlviii. 22, comp. xxxiii. 19 and Josh. xxiv. 32) should, as we think, awaken yet further thoughts, such as John and probably also our Saviour himself would entertain in the stillness of this locality. As Pfenninger (jüd. Briefe) puts into the mouth of the disciples, and the allusion in all its force applies to the Lord himself—"Joseph obtained a better resting-place than his brothers were disposed to give him." In connection with which one may reflect further upon the typical significance of Joseph! St John assuredly designs to fix our thoughts upon the holiness of the place,[1] and to remind us of the former consecration of a scene now so dishonoured:—Sichem was the very first place of which Abraham gained possession (Gen. xii. 6), and it was further consecrated by an altar which Jacob raised, see Gen. xxxiii. 18—20. Jacob's well (πηγή equiv. to φρεαρ ver. 11, but not a mere cistern) is, lastly, a pleasing figure or type of such ancient consecration, from the remembrance and blessing of which may be again drawn edification. It was a quarter of an hour south from the city, is still called by the Arabs Bir-Jacob, and by the Christians the Well of the Samaritan woman. Thus (as Baumgarten-Crusius referring to Lightfoot, and with him other expositors, perceive) Gen. xlix. 22 had a distant allusion, and with a symbolical meaning Deut. xxxiii. 28 a yet more direct allusion, to this Jacob's well in the good portion of Joseph.

of a place with a memorial and hallowing intention. Luthardt's view, however, who regards it with Hug as a place distinguished from Sichem, appears to be altogether doubtful. We will say nothing of Bengel's reference from Hiller's Onomasticon to שָׁכָר, reward (spoil of victory, Gen. xlviii. 22), to which the Lord is afterwards supposed to allude in ver. 36!!

[1] Which Nonnus has well seized—ἐς πόλιν ἀρχαίην.

Jesus now, weary with this wandering, sat thus by or upon the well; comp. Ex. ii. 15, ἐπὶ τοῦ φρέατος. The οὕτως, though omitted by the Syriac, is not plane otiosum et illativum, but to be taken as an emphatic anaphora of the participle κεκοπιακώς. Erasmus has it—μιμητικῶς, ut gestus exprimat hominis lassi, vel *sic nempe*, quia fatigatus. The illative anaphora may, indeed, as Fritzche objects, put an enclitic οὕτως before the temp. fin.; but as certainly may it have a stronger signification in this, and in the two places of the Acts. We need not, therefore, be content with that other exposition—*thus*, without any further ado, upon the first seat that He found (Euthym. and Chrysos. ἁπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε, Grot. incuriose, ut se locus obtulerat)—which would indicate the ἄτυφον of Christ, His humility and lowliness in lower things.[1] The *weariness* which is expressly mentioned, has more importance to the context, being closely connected with the intimation that it was *noon*. We cannot turn this sixth hour, with Rettig, into early morning (after a night's travelling); nor with Ebrard into evening: for the whole hypothesis of the Roman measurement of the day, as used by St John, is quite repugnant to our views.[2] The time of the year permitted travelling till towards noon, for it was at the end of December. Why the woman (whom Neander makes a "poor woman," we know not why) came just at that critical time to the well, is an idle question, which might have endless answers: but the question as applied to the Lord is full of significance. He does not go Himself into the town, for the time was not yet come for him to offend the Jews by such free intercourse with Samaritans; and He would be quite alone, also, and rest awhile. It was mid-day: therefore He is weary, therefore the disciples go for bread, and there is no reason to apprehend any concourse near the well at that hour. There comes, however, a Samaritan woman (Σαμαρείας does not signify the town itself, so much as the land mentioned in ver. 4; and thus the description is equivalent to Σαμαρεῖτις, ver. 9): and as He was prepared for Nicodemus in the dark night, so is He now prepared to disturb His mid-day rest: see afterwards ver. 34. In this particular, also,

[1] Berlenburger: heut zu Tage müssen die Herren fahren!

[2] See Lücke S. 580, and Lange S. 473.

the two narratives are counterparts. As soon as a soul to be won comes near Him, His thirst becomes the opportunity for calling the wanderer to Himself. The woman does not observe or greet Him, being in fear of the contemptuous regards, perhaps the mockery, of this Jew:[1] but the Lord is not deterred by her external expression; He begins immediately that conversation with this common woman, which has been so useful to the salvation of multitudes.

Ver. 7. As this whole narrative is a complete example of mission-wisdom, so in particular is this commencement, which not obviously but surely, leads to the designed end. He who lives in the spirit of Christ should never be at a loss for some point of introduction, should ever know how in simple brevity to hit the right mark. The woman might have naturally thought —this traveller desires to drink, water would be welcome to him; but she was no accommodating Rebekah, at least towards Jews. She draws water quietly for herself. After *she has drawn*,[2] the Lord asks her to give him to drink; thus naturally, unostentatiously, does He begin His words to her, expressing His own most natural and human feelings, for He was sitting at noontide on the well very weary and thirsty. But by this very means He has approximated to the human sympathies of this Samaritan woman; He has obviated her prejudice and mistrust, and awakened her attention. A *request* (and the Lord did speak the language of request, as the αἰτεῖς afterwards testifies) always appeals to the existing good will of the person requested; we despise not him whose service we ask. This is the external sense of the word; it, however, contains figurative and awakening antithesis—here is water, as the gift of God, and I have a better gift for thee! The Lord addresses this woman specially in contrasts. By this He at once applies to her a test, as when (Gen.

[1] Lightfoot and Witsius in the Dekaphylon, and Sepp also, ii. 450, give examples of similar conversations of Jews passing through Samaria.

[2] Which Nonnus forgets not to insert. It is not so written, but it cannot be supposed that the Lord would otherwise have so abruptly put the question. He addresses the woman who had come before, whom He had attentively observed and watched for a while—just as *she was coming*.

xxiv. 45) one was similarly to be invited out of Nahor's family to Abraham. For it is to be understood that the Lord's design goes further from the very beginning; that, seeing this soul presenting herself at so apt a time for private conversation, He immediately laid His plan to secure it. He experiences in human weakness thirst, but He is far from being confined to that consideration; He yields even thus oppressed to the longing to do His Father's work. This slight word is thus no less than the truest utterance of His own spiritual desire—refresh my soul's love, thou poor sinner, I am seeking thee, be found of me!

The Evangelist tells us parenthetically that the disciples were gone away, and thus explains how it was that the Lord asked for His own refreshment, and the reason, generally, of His holding this intercourse with the woman.[1] Schleiermacher's observation here is strangely out of place :—"we cannot suppose that they would leave him altogether alone; doubtless one or other of the disciples was with Him." This is a strange method of reading what is so plainly written. The astonished woman recognised the Jew, rather by his clothing (after the manner of the Rabbies), than by His softer dialect, which would scarcely have betrayed itself in so few words.[2] Such intercourse as necessary purchase of food in travelling was expressly excepted from the general prohibition;[3] but to *ask* to drink, and then to drink out of her pitcher, transgressed this limit, and approached very near to the forbidden *συγχρᾶσθαι*. The artless woman, whose thoughts are already upon her lips, puts the question which follows, not *merely* out of curiosity (according to Nonnus), but from the slight feeling of elevation which such a woman—

[1] Not, however, signifying that *they* would otherwise have drawn for Him: certainly not "that they had taken the *ἄντλημα* with them!" If we did think about their baggage at all, we should not suppose that they would carry it hither and thither. The disciples were not so forgetful of their Master's earthly need: if they had had this *ἄντλημα* (*κάδον ἑλκυστῆρα* Nonn.) He would have asked *them*.

[2] If the Samaritans, like the Ephraimites of old (Judg. xii. 6), were still distinguished by lack of the sibilant in their pronunciation, the words which were probably spoken הַשְׁקִינִי נָא or תְּנִי לִי לִשְׁתּוֹת would have been enough.

[3] If Jesus had sent the disciples into the town, contrary to custom, in order to break down prejudice, why did He not go Himself?

not held in very high honour in the town! would naturally feel on being thus humbly requested by a stranger, and a Jew. Though Lange's words, "her national feeling is flattered by being thus appealed to for help," may be too strong, yet we cannot but agree with Lücke and Klee that there is something of proud or capricious bantering in her answer, which seems, instead of bestowing the favour, to protest against it. Her curiosity must first know why he, contrary to Jewish custom, put such a request to her; she defers till He has explained that. (Thus Luthardt excellently.) And Klee adds, "if the good-natured woman had not been somewhat satirical in her disposition, she would have granted a thirsty man the water which he longed for at once; but she must at all costs gratify her humoursome spirit." Instead, that is, of doing what was so naturally to be expected, and reaching out the pitcher to the traveller (Nonnus—*ξεινήϊον ὕδωρ*, hospitalis aqua)! The Lord, who penetrated her natural disposition, foresaw this. Wondering, as she did, what manner of Jew he could be, He had yet more astonishment in store for her. The water is untouched, however, at least till the end of the conversation, when the pitcher remains behind; He thinks not of that, does not say—let me drink first—but goes on to *answer* her.

Ver. 10. The Lord's words hasten, without any pause, to the mystery of the spiritual gift which He offers. The critical point of exposition here is to ascertain what is now meant by the *gift of God;* but expositors will never satisfactorily deal with it, while they refuse to admit the essential and natural *fulness of meaning* which this wonderful word suggests. It is therefore unwise and injudicious to say, as even some of the best of them do, that the Lord's own person cannot be meant, because this is referred to afterwards in the *καὶ τίς ἐστιν!* More properly, the Lord advances and develops the deep and comprehensive meaning of this first word, step by step, up to the *ὕδωρ ζῶν*. That gift is, first of all, the water itself which was asked for refreshment: and this water is seized by divine wisdom, and made a similitude and point of connection for the discourse of higher blessings. This has been strangely overlooked by most expositors, with the exception, however, of Pfenninger, who interprets the Lord—"*this* water is the gift of God to all who thirst." The words convey

a slight reproach that she should for a moment have denied to him a gift of God which was intended for him and for all: but its immediate effect would be to raise her thoughts out of the narrow and customary circle, to the contemplation of God as the giver of every thing needful for bodily life. It is the same point of connection as in Acts xiv. 17. Man receives his bread and rain and earthly good of every kind as the "gift of God," but does not *think* of it as such, till it is brought solemnly and impressively before his thoughts.

It is, therefore, primarily this water which is the gift of God: but the woman must acknowledge it as such, that is, understand it still further in its *limitation*, ver. 13, and its true *significance*, ver. 14. Discerning God's love in such gifts, we should be led in thankful uplifting of our hearts to seek His higher salvation. We should be deeply sensible both of what these earthly gifts *can* supply, and what they *cannot:* should be led to expect that the gracious giver of these may also have supplies for the soul's necessity, and thus come to regard all perishable good as being but a similitude and type of something higher. He who does not thus rise from the gift to the *Giver, discerns* not the gift itself, *knows* not wherefore it was given. Coming and going to draw water, reflect upon the deeper thirst of thy spirit![1] Wherefore, indeed, do we thus eat and drink? Simply that we may live awhile in constant alternation of desire and its transient gratification, and then? what is the design of *this life*, which God by meat and drink is constantly renewing, and what should be its aim? To know *Him*, who giveth all things; and whose will is to give Himself to the soul which sprang from him, and in its deepest principle thirsts for Him again. Then we might have expected His words to continue—"and who that *God* is, whom thou ignorantly worshippest, what His will is, and what thou mightest receive from Him." But *instead of* this, the Son of man who was speaking to her, most impressively and significantly puts Himself in the place of the great, unacknowledged *Giver!* This, then, is the second stage in His meaning—*and Who it is!* She may well have already perceived that this person, who expressed his need in

[1] "Man is full of hunger and thirst: in this is the element of his heaven, and also of his hell." Rieger.

so uncustomary and illegal a manner, was no ordinary Ἰουδαῖος or ἄνθρωπος, and thus have heard the answer to her own question. But still further, thirdly: *that saith to thee, give me to drink!* Let it be noted here how the Lord in His dignity elevates her expression αἰτεῖς into λέγω σοι; in order to put the αἰτεῖν more appropriately into her own lips. It already anticipates His subsequent ὁ λαλῶν σοι, ver. 26. It seems to signify—who hath yet more both to give and to say to thee. Thus then the gift of God is properly enough made to signify this "opportunity of hearing, and deriving good from Jesus:" but this is neither the first nor the last meaning, as the ἔδωκεν ἄν σοι attached to the δωρεά, evidently shows. Jesus has not merely somewhat *to say*, but somewhat thereby and therein *to give*; and emphatically because *He himself is* the Gift of all gifts for us. This innermost point of the meaning is well seized by Brandt's Schullehrerbibel—"What God's will is to give thee now," but it fails to say—*through Me!* Hadst thou before known what I will now tell thee, thou wouldst have anticipated my asking (ἤτησας, Vulg. forsitan petisses, Winer § 43)—and He, who is now a petitioner to thee, and whose request thou mistrustest and dost hesitate to grant, *would have given thee living water!* Here then is, in conclusion, the full meaning of the gift of God; comprehending in one the two sayings of the Lord, vers. 5 and 16, in His conversation with Nicodemus. Let the designed *double meaning* of this word, as used by our Saviour, be observed: He knows, for it is indeed His design, that she who hears Him will understand His words according to the ordinary usage of מַיִם חַיִּים for spring-water. (Gen. xxvi. 19; Lev. xiv. 5; Cant. iv. 15). His meaning is that which in the prophets is often expressed by this figure: but He cannot appeal to them in speaking to a Samaritan; and aims therefore to excite her desire by an enigmatical word, which itself is afterwards to be explained. He completes all, and renders His testimony applicable to all future times, by laying down the condition of *prayer* in order to His *gift*. By the supposition that she would have asked, if she had *known*, He graciously softens the reproach of her ignorance. It is in infinite love that He expresses His desire to make Himself known. (Lu. xix. 42.)

But she knows not nor understands as yet. Her second re-

joinder, which seems to have a more diffuse character, bubbling up more in the style of women's talk at the well, as exhibited 1 Sam. ix. 12, 13, carries on the former thus:—how should I, a Samaritan, ask from thee, a Jew, water which could be better than that which our own Jacob's well gives us? Her words are incomparably picturesque in their echo of His. The first impression of the marvellous stranger, and His mysterious words, extorted from her the *Κύριε*, which was more than the *Ἰουδαῖος ὤν* with which her suspicion had previously measured Him, and seemed to flow immediately out of His own *τίς ἐστιν*. For though that word might have been the ordinary appellation of any dignified stranger, and used modestly even to one unknown (ch. xx. 15), yet *this* woman had been by no means so complaisant, her first word to the supposed "Jew" was the bare and simple *σύ*. Now, however, in the *unconscious* depths of her *feeling* there is doubtless some presentiment which corresponds with what Euthymius rather too hastily infers—*νομίσασα μέγαν εἶναί τινα*. But instead of proceeding onwards from this impression, and improving upon it, she sinks back into the ordinary level of mere common remark again: she does not follow it up by saying—*Κύριε, καλῶς εἶπας, οὐκ οἶδα, ἀνάγγελλέ μοι*. She looks fixedly at this *κύριος*, and with increased boldness alleges to Him the folly, and, as it appears to her, impossibility of His promise. (The stages of her thoughts as they progress, are marked by the anomalous *καί* after *οὔτε*.) Thou hast nothing to draw with, as I have[1]—indeed, it was by reason of this that He had first asked water of her, afterwards speaking of some other water. But this *other*—it must be *water*, and therefore she adds—and the well is *deep*:[2]—thou canst not penetrate to the spring below, if thou meanest water different from mine, in being immediately fresh from the deep fountain; whence then *hast thou*

[1] It was not the common public well of the city, which was at some distance, hence no mechanical provision for drawing the water was made. It was only honoured as Jacob's well—and the woman did not necessarily come from the city direct. So Robinson.

[2] According to recent travellers, one hundred and five feet deep, with only five feet of water now in it. Moreover, there were many springs round Mount Gerizim, the holy mount of the Samaritans, besides this,—according to the popular saying three hundred and sixty-five.

that "living water" (mark the double article!) so as that thou *wouldst have* given it to me, as thou sayest? *Or* dost thou refer to some better well, ignorantly holding this for a mere cistern? This leads to what now follows, the proud vindication of Jacob's well; so that the whole of what she says appears more and more, especially at the last, zealously and warmly spoken.

Thus only can we rightly apprehend her rejoinder. It is impossible to ascribe, with Schleiermacher, any spiritual conception of the subject to the woman as yet. This actually misleads him in his preaching to interpret as if the woman only wondered, in the Old Testament sense, at the fact of the better water which Jesus brought being attainable without trouble and without any direct instrumentality, and only through prayer! That makes a very beautiful application, but fails to hit the exact meaning of the words. The woman does not suspect as yet (as Klee also thinks) that water essentially different was signified in the promise, the increasing contradiction of ver. 12 is quite inconsistent with such a thought.

Dost thou throw scorn upon *us* Samaritans and our Jacob's well? Hast thou joined thyself to me as a *Jew* to reproach and mock only? Lange speaks strongly his idea, "it probably was essential to the orthodoxy of the Samaritans, that the water of this well should be better than that of all other springs." Certainly it is not without something of contradicting pride that she assumes a right, equal to that of the Jews, to say—*our* father Jacob. And indeed here where he dwelt, with yet stricter right.[1] The Samaritans, called by the Lord himself, Lu. xvii. 18, ἀλλογενεῖς, (if not ἀλλόφυλοι, Acts x. 28), and designated by Josephus ἀλλοεθνεῖς, claimed nevertheless (according to Joseph. Ant. ix. 14, xi. 8) to have sprung especially from *Joseph*—hence she says *gave us*, because he gave this χωρίον to Joseph. (Robinson—he dug the well, though there were other springs in the neighbourhood, in order to show his proprietorship?) This already explains the ἔδωκεν, unusual concerning a well, but it contains also something like an antithesis to the previous "gift of God," though vaguely, as was necessary in such speaking.

[1] Lange:—She claims the father Jacob so strictly for the Samaritans, as almost to deny him to the Jews.

As soon as the customary language concerning the gift of God is used earnestly, and further instruction begins to be founded upon it, the protest is uttered and the discourse is lowered to subordinate givers. Our father Jacob was a skilful shepherd and agriculturist, and knew well the value of good water. His well has ever given wholesome water, and *sufficient* for man and beast. He himself was contented with it—and his children *and his cattle!*[1] Marvellous simplicity which provokes the question —can *such* water, then, be the sufficing, adequate gift of God for *men?* Here is reflected the wretched contentedness of the natural man, who takes offence at the offer of any thing better, and "resents it as if he lacked nothing." (Berlenb. Bib.) Let this—*art thou better?* be compared with that other in chap. viii. 53. And let it be further applied to the evidence of similar complacency in derived advantages from ancestry, which is every where so common.[2] Finally, let it be borne in mind that the dulness and lack of comprehension in this poor *Samaritan woman*, is by far less guilty than the same blindness of understanding in the rulers of Israel.

Ver. 13. The Lord does not blame and reprove in return; He wisely and graciously does not commit Himself to any discussion of the interjected question μὴ σὺ μείζων εἶ, "to any comparison of His own person with the patriarch Jacob's dignity,[3] but He adheres closely to the matter itself, and continues to impress the claims of the great gift offered to man's need. The second question concerning the person rested upon the first as to what kind of water it could be; that again was founded upon a total lack of comprehension, and the Lord reveals *this*, in order to give her full explanation. He embraces the whole of

[1] Θρέμματα, Vulg. pecora, similarly Syr. and Nonnus. The interpretation "domestics" admits of no clear demonstration; for the general alumni see Lampe after Majus, but this indefinite generality does not suit the woman's language, as Lampe himself thinks. On the other hand, it does seem to be a falling off in her lofty language, to descend from father Jacob's sacred person to his cattle.

[2] Hiller in Leben Jesu:—yet Samaria remained no more than Samaria, though Jacob dwelt, and Joseph was buried, there. What avails it to have the mere relics of saints?

[3] Although Lampe, without any true propriety, says of what follows —demonstrat, se revera majorem Jacobo esse!

the woman's hasty and enforced thoughts in one, seizing and firmly holding her mind, which already began to discern the difference, almost amounting to a *contrast*, between the one water and the other, and had been constrained to apply the marvelling *πόθεν* to this marvellous other water. Just so did the Lord desire to lead onward her thoughts, and therefore says emphatically first—*this* water which is also for the cattle, *this water* does not satisfy you *men!* Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again—this is the most simple and certain experience, which every man admits, without reflecting upon that which is latently confessed with it! This first sentence already hints at the following, and prepares the way for the full and absolute contrast. For this common experience assuredly gives its intimation, and bears its witness, that *this* water is in reality only the water of death, that is, that it cannot avail to hinder death and after it an eternal thirst or famishing. This the Lord expressly declares afterwards in connection with the manna, which could never be the true bread of *life*, chap. vi. 49, 58. The word which the Lord here utters to the woman of Samaria is a very apt superscription for the well—and for every other place which the people frequent to draw from, every other merely human *school*, with all its fulness of application. For the Lord, in speaking thus concerning this water, only regards it as a symbol and similitude of every human satisfaction of every human need both in body and *soul*—else would the contrast, which the Lord continues to expand, fail of being all-comprehensive. Human language generally has adopted thirst as the common expression for desire of every kind—hence we find it in holy writ, *e. g.*, Prov. v. 15, ix. 17. All carnal pleasure, such as this woman lived in; all that fleshly and unfruitful knowledge which so many men pursue; all delights and all enjoyments which the earth, *this world* may offer, can satisfy our thirst with a brief and transitory gratification alone, such as only in reality increases the thirst-sickness which it professes to allay.[1]

Ver. 14. Our Lord's word here has nothing to do with the Rabbinical phrases, "to drink water out of any man's well," that

[1] Lampe quotes a Jewish proverb to that end:—כל אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁתֶּה מֵהֶם יוֹסִיף צְמִיאָה.

is, to be his disciple: but it does coincide fundamentally with all those references to a heavenly and real water, to which we alluded on ch. iii. 5. The water which the Lord gives, is spirit and life; yet apprehended under a material form, for the exhibition of which we may refer to ch. vii. 37, 38. No earthly well supplies this, no Father Jacob or Father *Luther*, no Doctor or Professor—but the Lord, who again offers it at the close of Scripture, Rev. xxii. 17, graciously promises it here by a repeated δώσω, a future tense which involves, however, the before-imposed condition of prayer. Ὃς δ' ἂν πίῃ—not merely, who drinks thereof a little, but a continual, earnest, full and thorough drinking is signified. (Hence Wesley says rightly—provided he continue to drink thereof). It is to such drinking that the superabounding promise is given, of never thirsting again for ever; comp. ch. vi. 35. It is in the highest degree probable that the Lord's thoughts refer—though not to the woman's apprehension—to an apocryphal utterance of the son of Sirach in ch. xxiv., ver. 19 of which (in von Meyer, ver. 21, Luther, ver. 25) is echoed in Matt. xi. 28. In ver. 21 of that chapter, (von Meyer, ver. 23; Luther, 28, 29), wisdom promises—οἱ ἐσθίοντές με ἔτι πεινάσουσι καὶ οἱ πίνοντές με ἔτι διψήσουσιν, but that has its truth in the *Old Testament* more imperfect expression and meaning, which the Lord very significantly intensifies and reverses. For what the Old Testament exhibits and points to in the distance for the inexhaustible excitement of an unceasing seeking and endeavour, becomes now in the present fulfilment of the new covenant, an immediate satisfaction, pouring already into time the satisfaction of eternity.[1] He only, however, is for ever satisfied, who has perfectly and to the end drunk of this water. That water is near and at hand, it is with the man and in himself, but the drawing and drinking must nevertheless still continue. Ubi sitis recurrit, hominis non aquæ defectus—says Bengel very beautifully. For it must be ever remembered that we ourselves are not the spring, but the gift of God within us. We must add that *this* thirst is not a painful, uneasy impulse, but the serene and contented receiving from grace to grace. So that the most direct and literal meaning of οὐ μὴ διψήσῃ is—he shall never more thirst for earthly water, shall never know the delusive vicissitudes of apparent

[1] See upon this Ullmann in the Stud. u. Krit. 1828 iv. S. 791.

satisfaction, but has attained and enjoys, though in progressive degrees, the unexhausted and full satisfaction of the true life. If the emphasis be laid upon εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, it runs—he shall *one day* thirst no more for ever.

Thus has the Lord clearly explained how He will have the figurative ὕδωρ ζῶν understood, comp. Ps. xxxvi. 10; Jer. ii. 13, xvii. 13. *Water*, which produces and imparts eternal life! But we may doubt whether in this figurative discourse, which in its relations must not be too strictly interpreted, He designed to distinguish (as Luthardt thinks) the ζωὴ as a property and energy from the independent, substantial ὕδωρ itself: we may perceive this distinction in the words, but it could scarcely be intended by the Lord on such an occasion for such a hearer. Spiritual *life* out of God who is spirit, is a πηγή, a fountain in the most distinctive sense, in contrast with which all the fountains of earth are no better than φρέατα: the true *spring*-water is only that which is spiritual, and which becomes itself a permanent *fountain*. The streaming forth of spiritual life from believers towards others is not *here immediately spoken of*: the emphasis lies upon the fact that he who drinks has truly the spring ἐν ἑαυτῷ. Ὕδωρ ἁλλόμενον is ζῶν in the *first* meaning of the figure, according to Hesych, ἀεὶ ῥέον ἢ βλύζον, that is, not drying up, but as a permanent fountain springing or bubbling up (with a verbum *amœnum*, as Bengel says, without Latinism); the addition of εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον first of all strengthens the previous εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα (altogether perennial, and never more drying up), and then opens up the *second*, and most internal meaning of the word ζῶν, that is, ζωοποιοῦν. (Nonnus: φυσίζοον ὕδωρ.) "The word *life* is one by which man's conscience may ever be convinced" (Berlenb. Bib.). All the fountains of worldly pleasure and worldly wisdom, however vigorously and joyously they may spring, flow only in *this* life, in this transitory and mortal life, and thirst in death must inevitably ensue. Oh that men would take note in time of the manifest signs of approaching failure in the sources of their joy, before the end comes when *to them* the great cistern will be broken, and they shall find out to their own bitter sorrow that they have only been swallowing its draughts unto eternal woe! But he who has received in himself the living fountain shall enter with it into the fulness of

eternal life, into that boundless ocean, from which is derived and to which returns, the spring within his soul. Thus it is *not merely* (as Luthardt thinks, comparing ch. vi. 27) εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον as a spring which flows *towards* eternal life, and finally leads to its bestowment, but *that life is in it*—the eternal flows back to the eternal again!

He who would discern nothing more in the next rejoinder of the woman than an inconsiderate desire to put an end to a matter which becomes more and more incomprehensible to her,[1] does her great injustice, and can scarcely harmonise with such a notion her subsequent undoubted conversion. How stands it then? She has either attained now a spiritual apprehension of the Lord's meaning, or she has so much misunderstood it as to suppose Him to mean a miraculous, and as it were, magical water for physical thirst. Let us investigate this dilemma. In the former case two things are possible. If she had *altogether understood* Him, then she must be considered as either entering into the Lord's figurative meaning, and using similarly *figurative* language; on which supposition her words μηδὲ ἔρχωμαι ἐνθάδε ἀντλεῖν would signify—that I may no more foolishly and vainly seek my satisfaction in earthly things. But this seems to us evidently *beyond* her capacity at that time! And then the new reference to her sin in ver. 16 would be unnecessary, and even incomprehensible. *Or* she spoke the latter strange words because she would *feign herself* not to have understood, falling however into a strange contradiction in her words. But this is not admissible, for it opposes the artless character of all her sayings (ver. 17 is only a half untruth, a timid half-confession). There remains the second supposition of an entire misapprehension, as if the Lord possessed some supernatural water which would for ever quench all bodily thirst. But we think this also quite inadmissible, for the Lord had already spoken of *eternal life*, and she has a consciousness of His meaning which appears presently to be deeply stirred. Hence we cannot escape from the solution which ascribes to her the same internal position of mind which was detected in the ob-

[1] J. G. Müller (vom Glauben der Christen, i. 136) gives the climax of this:—"The woman cannot comprehend the matter at all, and answers petulantly: she seems to have been but little disposed to know the true meaning of His words."

jection of Nicodemus, chap. iii. 4: She does not clearly know what she says or would say, she wavers between the dawning apprehension of the higher meaning, and the clinging of her mind to the lower. Just, in the same way, we think, the natural man commonly acts in similar circumstances, when the testimony concerning spiritual blessings is brought home to his conscience. *Τοῦτο τὸ ὕδωρ* testifies that she had apprehended the *difference* between this water and the ordinary water which any *ἄντλημα* might any where draw; however dull of understanding she had been when the Lord first spoke, His second saying had effectually opened her ears. Thus she now *asks*—*δός μοι*—as the Lord had desired. But as to the addition concerning not coming thither again to draw? In this we perceive an intermixture of the former mind, which cannot yet detach itself from the earthly and visible: behind it there *lurks*, though without any conscious *dissimulation* on her part, an imperfect apprehension which was not yet perfectly accessible to the Lord's influence; and her words are strictly parallel with that equally strange request for the bread in eating which man should not die, chap. vi. 34. There is much well-meant aspiration for spiritual comfort, yea much supplication disertis verbis for "the Holy Spirit" among Christian men, which very little differs from this; he who offers it often knows as little what it imports as this woman, having only a vague and carnal notion of an indefinite and mysterious good, as it is well expressed by the Berlenberger Bible—"if Thou canst set me free from all the harassing conditions of this life, so that I have no longer to labour and toil, it will content me well." Yea, verily, they would be glad enough to have such bread and such water without trouble, and without the uneasiness of recurring desire, but they do not truly know what is signified by the words, and how the intended blessings are to be made theirs. Schweizer is right in saying that there is a glimmering of *doubt* in the paradoxical conclusion of her words, and we can scarcely deny the faint appearance of something akin to it like *irony*:[1] but we must protest against any

[1] Lampe: sarcasticum quid subesse videtur—which he then expounds,—ad minimum *tentare voluit audacula*, quomodo Jesus præstita petitionis conditione promissum suum executioni daturus esset. According to Nonnus, whose apt and striking thoughts must not be over-

imputation of frivolity or *bantering* as such.[1] This is all over with her. She would fain apprehend the Lord's meaning, but she cannot; hence she diverges into gross misapprehension, falls back into carnal ideas and expectations, just as the natural man ever does when beginning in his own way to understand the *promise* of evangelical gifts and grace. This divergence, however ingeniously it expresses itself, takes place without any design and calculation. The first gracious presentation of the gospel which only offers a positive comfort and salvation, finds no fit place in the heart of man until the *conviction of sin* is produced. Yet it is not in vain that the promise leads the way, for it loosens and softens the ground of the heart, and prevents the gracious severity which follows from being proudly repelled.

Ver. 16. The remark of Grotius upon this passage—non satis decorum est, nuptæ beneficium conferre marito inconscio—of course refers to the *apparent* connection which these abrupt words might be thought to have with the previous remark: he does not intend to deny the obvious and only design of our Lord to penetrate by them into the secret and sinful life of the woman. Every sincere reader and expositor has been contented with this view from the beginning; no other has ever been sought. Baumgarten-Crusius with his objectivity, which is often laudable enough, while he gives us to understand that he does not lay much stress upon the minute historical accuracy of these accounts, yet appeals to a simple feeling shared by all, when he says, "it is evident that, according to the Evangelist's design, this *φώνησον τὸν ἄνδρα σου* must be regarded as a concealed question put to the woman." So, indeed, it is evident, but also evident that such as the Evangelist exhibits it was the Lord's design.[2] Bretschneider has been very severe upon this "dis-

looked in his tumid diction, the woman speaks as *ἀγκυλόμητις* concerning the promised *βιοτήσιον ὕδωρ* in opposition to the common *βεβιημένον ὕδωρ*.

[1] Luthardt discerns such a tone in her request, as if she would then think herself well provided for; it may appear in the *form* of her words, which conceal nothing that is in her heart, even the most secret thing: but if so it must be assumed with design, for in her heart there is now no trifling!

[2] Euthymius—*προσποιούμενος ὅτι χρὴ κἀκεῖνον κοινωνῆσαι ταύτῃ τοῦ δώρου.*

guised question;" we cannot, however, perceive in such a human, and as it were ironical, turn to the conversation, any the slightest disparagement to the Lord's dignity: but we do perceive much that is quite inharmonious in every other view of the train of thought which would regard Him as intending in simple earnest to have the husband called. He has already broken through the Jewish and Rabbinical rules for conversation with women, and continues to break through them by calmly pursuing His colloquy with this woman without her husband. What Lange has lately advanced concerning the crisis having occurred, which would require the presence of the presumed husband, is in the highest degree forced and unnatural. "Now first she has shown herself inclined to become a disciple of Jesus, and to enter into a nearer relation with Him"—but this is a strange interpretation of ver. 15. "It is according to the highest and most scrupulous sense of social propriety, that just at this crisis the woman should call her husband"—and Lange finds force in this, notwithstanding his pre-supposing the Lord's knowledge of the relation in which this "husband" stood. But then rises the much more harsh necessity of assuming that the Lord for a single moment acknowledged him as her true *husband:* He would then have spoken with less propriety than the woman herself.[1] Apart from the inappropriateness of applying such human proprieties to our Saviour in His redeeming work, so dissonant from His sacred freedom, and dignity, and purity; we must assume that the Son of God in the flesh would act as God has ever acted, teaching and converting to Himself women without any constrained reference to their husbands. *Such* decorum as would not permit this, is in the highest degree opposed to His higher and divine propriety![2] If it is supposed

[1] Which objection is not refuted by Lange's reply (iii. 581.) His example from the minors being made Roman Catholics without the knowledge and consent of their parents is not to the point, inasmuch as a woman in matters of ecclesiastical and spiritual right is not under the authority of a husband, as a minor. No evangelical preacher would first seek the concurrence of her husband, before the conversion of the wife.

[2] The limits which propriety draws, on account of our liability to temptation, if any such are worth considering, have no place here. This flashes upon us immediately when we read Hezel's coarse and

that the Lord did in reality bid her summon her husband, we must be driven to the notion which Lücke, appealing to some of the fathers, openly espouses—that the woman's answer first awakened His prophetical gift, and came *unexpected* to Himself. But this, as Lange felt, is most unsuitable, and not to be thought of: that would be a most erroneous supposition after such long and testing spiritual intercourse with this woman! We shall in vain look in the Gospels for any similar example of mistake: He may indeed be regarded as *not knowing* some things external, and inquiring concerning them (as Mar. v. 30); but it was utterly impossible that he should *think* any thing to stand differently from the reality, or that he should strangely presume the woman to have a husband when she had none, as it was not necessary that she should be supposed married at all. And this too in the midst of the most vital communion with her penetrated soul:—for we find in general that His prophetic glance through the spirits of men and all the circumstances of their life, is not first excited by critical and abrupt conjunctures, but goes parallel and is one with the spiritual conviction which He works in them. Thus He has progressively been seizing upon the conscience, and piercing the spirit of this woman, from the very beginning; and we cannot tolerate the thought that He could err at this point in any thing concerning her life. When the time has come to detect and reveal it, He knows every thing full well.

As it regards the ability of the pure Son of man, in whom dwells the word and light of God, to penetrate, independently of the Divine omniscience, the secrets of the human heart, especially in the case of humanity standing in His presence, we have often already expressed our views: on this point we almost entirely agree with Lange, apart from his strange, materialising notion that the woman exhibited to the Lord traces which He could decipher of the individual influence of each of the five husbands upon her spirit, just as the circles of the tree betray its age to the forester![1]—Enough that the Lord knows—and from

bold remark—"um ihr auch die schwache Vermuthung, als habe er auf sie als Frau Absichten, zu benehmen!"

[1] Pelt also takes exception (in Reuter's Repertorium 1849. Jan. S. 32) to these wood-marks—and Lange defends himself again in the Preface to his Dogmatik.

this point He proceeds anew—that the woman has now no proper husband. Under the appearance, assumed for a moment only at the furthest, that He knows not this, and would for propriety's sake have the husband present,[1] He connects in a striking manner His ἐλθὲ ἐνθάδε with her μηδὲ ἔρχωμαι ἐνθάδε, and seemed to say, as she might have understood Him—"Now must thou first truly come *hither, to me,* to draw the water of life; but in order to that go at once, as thou wert until now, and come back other than thou wert—*bring with thee thy sin,* that we may then proceed to speak further together!" Just so does He ensure to her her request, and opens a free path to her endless satisfaction even while He is reproving and drawing her to a full confession. How graciously does He dispense with the long "preaching of condemnation," and yet how directly does He seize and disclose her guilt! "He lays His finger on the wound, but with so tender a touch as if He feared to aggravate her woe." (Berlenb. Bib.)

Vers. 17, 18. "Husband"—no one else probably had ever thus designated to herself him with whom she now lived.[2] So that she contradicts it; not however with a bold denial, but with a smitten conscience, suddenly and unexpectedly awakened. Her rejoinder slowly echoes and emphasizes this ἄνδρα, half in the tone of *confession,* as if she had said—"I *have* indeed some one, but not as a *husband.*" We are not only required by the psychological view of the whole so to interpret it, but we presently find that the Lord (certainly not contrary to the truth) so interprets it. Indeed He goes further; He only gently intimates and with the slightest possible irony, by the *first* "καλῶς" in connection with which the ambiguous ἄνδρα is placed first, that He perceives the hesitating falseness of her half-confession; but He then instantly proceeds, and thereby gives us an example for all

[1] No more than this! For He might have uttered the word with such a look and tone as to convict the woman at once, and this is to us more probable. There lay also in the background of this ostensible request a requirement, which would echo afterwards from it in the woman's ears, to call also her lover to the mercy of Christ.

[2] Although the Lord so spake, using only for the moment the careless language of sinners, in order to her condemnation; and ver. 18 sufficiently vindicates His meaning.

similar cases, to draw out affectionately into the light the inward self-condemnation which lay concealed in her diffident words, and accepts the half-acknowledgment as if it lacked nothing. Hence the two-fold καλῶς εἶπας, ἀληθὲς εἴρηκας, although τοῦτο in the second case has in it something of reproof—*this time* thou hast told the truth,[1] thou hast not always. With this there was associated that most gracious look, which plainly told her that His design was not that of simple and continual condemnation of her offence, and which encouraged her to the further questioning of vers. 19, 20.[2]

But now as to the *five husbands*—what is their relation to the history, and what do they signify? Thy are first of all mentioned for the sake of bringing them into plain *contrast* with him who was *not* her husband. But then the number *five* (not merely several or many already) would show her that the penetrating eye of the Searcher of hearts reached to all the *specialia* of her past manner of life, and all the detail of her sins:—I know thee and everything connected with thee, all that thy commerce with these five husbands involves—God knoweth the whole! For that the question is here of manifold guilt on her own side, is made very plain by her own word and open confession—εἶπε μοι πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησα, ver. 39. Even if the men had all died by their special misfortune, we could not avoid imputing evil to a widow so often remarried. But this is the least probable supposition among all that may be made;[3] it is likely that many methods of dissolving the nuptial bond had concurred here; in any case there is indicated an immoderate passion in this woman which could not be extinguished by any repetition of separation or widowhood. "Thou *hast had* five husbands already, thou wilt know my meaning, I will speak no further of that—although thou seest that I know all—how thou

[1] Properly—*this* word as a truth, for τοῦτο is object, and ἀληθές predicate.

[2] Ὃν ἔχεις, which is only taken from her ἔχω, is groundlessly pressed to mean that she held him to herself, as it were, through unbridled desire! See the note in Lampe from Pseudo-Athanasius.

[3] Chrysostom's strange notion (in Psalm xiii.) that she had lived with the five in similiar illicit intercourse, is altogether out of the question, since the Lord opposes the five externally at least lawful husbands, to the sixth.

hast loosed thyself from the one, and bound thyself to the other!" We think immediately "through divorce, death, impropriety" (Meyer's note)—other and worse suppositions are indeed *possible;* not merely that one or another could not permanently remain with her, that she gave just cause for divorce, or was guilty of living in connection with more than one, and so on. For the remark is not unimportant, that while according to the Jewish law a woman might, without any personal fault (apart from the continual re-marriage) be put away by five consecutive despotic husbands, the Samaritans did not entertain the Pharisaic extension of the Mosaic law of divorce, as we find it expressly laid down in the Tract. Kidduschim in relation to the "Cuthites."[1]

Thus, after one lightning glance through her whole life which lighted up to her all its evil, the Lord seizes the sinner's conscience by her last, then existing and current sin, laying hold upon it as the crown and consummation of all former sins. So far had she gone, that after five marriages she could live in carnal intercourse altogether without marriage. For even if the οὐκ in οὐκ ἔστι σου ἀνήρ might be made to stand for nondum,[2] there yet remains in ἔχειν the guilty anticipation of intercourse. But οὐκ ἀνήρ itself is strongly condemnatory; and the σοῦ which precedes might even be regarded as signifying—he is not *thine*, but another's husband! It does, however, and this is all we can say, distinguish this poor woman from a πόρνη *vulgivaga;* she adhered to one man, as if he were her husband. But the connection is that of the flesh, and there does not enter into it any love of the soul, for when converted she avoids at first this com-

[1] We unhesitatingly protest, with Lücke and Lange, resting upon the historical simplicity and truth of the whole narrative, against the allegorical reference to the fivefold idolatry of Samaria, and its present half-worship of Jehovah (so that the woman becomes a representative of her land, as Sepp asserts again of the adulteress in Jerusalem, Jno. viii.)—an allegorical reference which Hengstenberg first broached, and which Dr Bauer and Strauss have made a bad use of. There is nothing allegorical here (although both Origen and Augustine have mystified the number five), no Jewish proverb concerning the Samaritans referred to the woman, but a simple concurrence of circumstances without anything peculiarly remarkable in themselves.

[2] Witthof opusc. the first treatise de muliere Samaritana, sexto viro *desponsata.*

panion of her sin, and says nothing, ver. 28, to this "husband" whom the Lord's word, ver. 16, had thus associated with her.[1]

We have already intimated how it came to pass that she could abruptly change the theme, and proceed to further questioning. Most expositors discern here nothing more than an insusceptible, yea even recalcitrating *repulsion* and *evasion* of the subject. According to J. G. Müller it is with woman's dexterity and cunning that she passes from the shameful subject to a politico-theological discussion; but this would indicate too much wickedness, and then her first words, "Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet" would involve such a degree of hardness of heart, and capricious thoughtlessness, as is quite at variance with the result of the whole colloquy. But we do not find, in the most modified sense, any thing like *diversion* or *evasion*.[2] Supposing her to be the subject of an impulse of true repentance—and we cannot suppose it otherwise after such a piercing revelation—she could not have voluntarily and deliberately broken off the matter at that very point. If she had, as we believe, already uttered a half-confession, why should we be loth to admit that she designs to complete it now? She herself indicates to us afterwards, ver. 29, the mighty force of this critical moment as having awakened her to *faith*. The strong θεωρῶ which she declares, is proof sufficient of the earnestness with which she beheld in this Jew, whom she had never before seen, but who nevertheless knew so well her own, a Samaritan's, life and family history, and who had spoken such marvellous words to her, a man of God, a *Prophet;* but who could trifle immediately with a prophet thus solemnly acknowledged, who could put petulant controversial questions to such an one, or harshly lay before him sudden "scruples of conscience!" Consequently we must regard her question about the true place of prayer, as equally earnest with

[1] Hence Pfenninger has improperly interwoven this.

[2] Ebrard: "Profoundly ashamed, and brought to a piercing sense of sin, she is disposed in the natural whirl of her thoughts, to break off the present subject." Hase: "She seeks by her question as to the religious differences between Samaria and Judah, to divert his penetrating inquisition into the abhorred relations of her life." Braune: "She at once, with great tact, diverted the conversation from herself, and turned it to the question of, &c." De Wette: "For she would, with the customary skill of woman, avoid an unpleasant disquisition."

her declaration that she perceived Jesus to be a prophet. To Nathanael the Lord disclosed his secret prayer, to this woman her sin. Without having recourse to any supposition of designed evasion, we may take it for granted that her thoughts, after no slight pause during which the Lord's wonderful word would exert its operation upon her soul, would revert to the *Person* of Him who had spoken; for from the first τίς ἐστιν this must have been the leading idea of her mind, influencing all others,—who and what is this man? "Yea, Lord, I *am* a sinful woman," is the solemn undertone of the avowal that Jesus was a prophet; and that she does not utter it outright, is "perfectly in harmony with the character of such a woman." It is confession enough that she does not contradict, especially in matters upon which *shame* would instantly arise to set a seal upon her lips. The whole previous conversation warrants her confidence that the Lord's design is not her utter condemnation, but that He will help her to the attainment of eternal life; and she equally well knew that it was not His purpose then to push the examination and inculpation further. What, then, is His immediate design? To bring her back to God, to transform her from a sinner to a true worshipper of God! This being so, reverence and the beginning obedience of faith would almost compel her to turn the subject whither her words actually led it. But it arises directly and spontaneously from her heart. "The question with her is confession of sin and forgiveness." (Luthardt). The uncertainty of her soul as to the vain conversation of the past, and as to her hereditary religion (ver. 12), is the first fruit of her contrition and repentance;—and well for those who have only come so far, as to ask with such earnestness as this woman now shows! Now she begins in very deed to *thirst* for the water of life! How often had she gone, thoughtlessly content, to the mountain of her fathers, joining in their προσκυνεῖν, notwithstanding all her sins, just as she drank of their well,—but this is past, all over at a single stroke! She marks the true difference. She is very far from encountering Him again with—art thou greater than our fathers? She begins to discern in this Jewish prophet argument of the truth lying on the side of the Jews; their cause is justified in Him, and she is constrained to yield. Till now, her προσκυνεῖν, as she still speaks, had been a neuter verb with-

out an accusative case; she knew not, nor reflected, what or who was concerned in it (ὃ οὐκ οἴδατε, ver. 22)—but now she begins to perceive that it signified the drawing water from the fountain of God, the Holy Spirit. There is something of her ancient ignorance, indeed, (and *here* lies the involuntary diversion) in the enquiry as to the *place;* she asks about the external *where* instead of the internal *how:* yet is she in this partly justified, as the Lord's subsequent declarations show, since in the first coming of salvation, all depends upon *whence* it comes, in what chosen and sanctified place His holy waters may by us be drawn.

This mountain is *Gerizim*, concerning which we can only give a few brief remarks—copious learned disquisition may be found elsewhere. The son of the high priest Joiada (Neh. xiii. 28), whom Josephus calls Manasseh, and whom Nehemiah had chased from him because of his marriage with a strange woman, was received into the protection of Sanballat, his father-in-law, the Persian deputy over Samaria, who also built for him in contempt of the Jews, a temple for himself upon this mountain (2 Macc. vi. 2). Alexander the Great (according to Josephus, though the statement and the chronology are contested) gave permission, by a decree and its confirmation, for the establishment of a high-priesthood in connection with it. When John Hyrcanus afterwards destroyed this temple, the Samaritans still regarded the mountain with veneration as the place of sacrifice and prayer in opposition to the claims of Jerusalem; and the most embittered enmity continued ever after between them and the Jews. In the passage of Moses, Deut. xxvii. 4, the one read Ebal, the other Gerizim, and alleged mutually against each other falsification: it is now sufficiently plain that the Samaritans were guilty of the corruption. They further appealed to the most ancient places of the Patriarch's sojourn, lying in their country, as we have above seen. This latter fact the woman seems here to have in view in speaking of the fathers:—our fathers, that is, our *common* ancestors, Abraham and Jacob, worshipped on this mountain. Although this does not seem to be exclusively intended; the expression passes over into the more general signification—the ancients whom *we* follow. And *ye* (already something of a frank confidence towards the Jewish prophet) maintain, on the con-

trary, (as it appears to my people, without foundation, against the custom of the fathers?) that in Jerusalem is the place[1] ordained —which of the two is right, and where shall I from this time turn? This is the question which she designs to put, but St John does not expressly mention it, either for brevity, because it was self-understood, or more probably because the woman herself left it unfinished, being suddenly silent before the Lord's countenance, penetrated by a profounder feeling, and stirred by returning shame, just at the moment when she was about to relapse into a more superficial tone, to a deeper question than that concerning the place. The Lord gave her time to say all that she had to say, before He gave her his far-reaching and sublime reply.

Ver. 21. New and tumultuous thoughts began now to arise in the mind of this woman, excited as she was by the impulses of that good thing which now possessed her mind and soul. This was the question which she now prepared to propose, or, which stirred in her heart:—Assuredly the Jews, who have the prophets, must be right in their Jerusalem, but must I therefore go over to them? Can I only thus obtain help?—In the midst of these unexpressed presentiments the Lord now apprehends her secret thought, and enchains her mind by His next words. First of all, He graciously responds to her confidential "*ye*" by His "*believe me!*" the only time recorded as thus falling from His lips. This condescending form of speech, however, here occupies the place of His "Verily I say unto thee!" since no prophet had ever thus introduced his utterances. It is not—believe *us*, that *we* worship in the right place! O no, the "Prophet" at once passes far beyond this, in a revelation for which this poor Samaritan woman was more susceptible than any one in Judea. The *time cometh*, or the hour, or the days, —the customary formula of prophetic announcement, which in St John's gospel we often find recurring in the Lord's mouth. *Neither* in this mountain, *nor* yet at Jerusalem, that is,

[1] *Τόπος* הַמָּקוֹם, the term used in the law, concerning the unity of the place to be chosen for the service of God, Deut. xii. 5. No place was determined there by name, and the Samaritans adhered only to the Pentateuch. But that there *must* be a definite *place* was taken for granted by Jews and Samaritans alike, on Old Testament principles.

obviously, the same as if He had said—*both in one and the other.* For it is only the exclusiveness which is revoked, so that the δεῖ προσκυνεῖν shall no longer be bound to any particular τόπος. What an instructive contrast to that exacting zeal for the yet standing and yet acknowledged house of the Father, which the disciples might have expected, most assuredly in *Samaria*, when the question should arise! The Lord has indeed in view the great, and equally free prediction of Mal. i. 11 (בְּכָל־מָקוֹם), after which His word, proceeding from Gerizim and Jerusalem, stretches out to embrace the whole earth. *Ye* shall worship—that is, not merely the Samaritans,[1] but all mankind is before His view, all people after the exclusiveness of an external election is withdrawn. Thus does He break down the contention of the woman's *ye* and *we*, while He reconciles them in passing far beyond them both. Every one must feel that He could not intercommunicatively say—*we* Jews and Samaritans together, we of the human race; but it is necessary to press this again and again against all Rationalism, and ask how it comes to pass that He never thus spake, but everywhere when speaking of man's relation to God, maintains His own dignified distinction from all humanity. The same unity and separation of His own person lies also in that great word, quite new to the Samaritan woman —τῷ πατρί. He is the true Father, not father Jacob, ver. 12, or the fathers, ver. 20. (Which tacita oppositio Calvin also remarked.) Here for the first time the general expression is well-night equivalent to *My* Father; but it then passes over into the wider meaning which is developed in ver. 23.

Ver. 22. When, and not until, His far-sweeping glance has gone forward to the demolition of the partition-walls of a preparatory dispensation, there follows that assertion of the priority of the Jews, with which every other but He would have rigorously begun! We must supply for the connection an interpolated and retrospective *truly* or *although*; since it is His intention to obviate all misunderstanding by giving the true decision upon the con-

[1] Brücker, the respectable, though in many instances not very penetrating, editor of de Wette, maintains this against Baumgarten-Crusius, as if the Lord here specially predicted the conversion of the Samaritans! But the comprehensive "neither—nor" clearly decides against him.

tested question. He cannot disguise it from the Samaritans, that they are Samaritans and living in the error of their own self-chosen deception, and that their worship of God rests upon no sure foundation in the Divine choice and appointment. The προσκυνεῖτε ὃ οὐκ οἴδατε—inverted, alas, in Luther's translation—may indeed rightly be termed a *mos loquendi plane singularis*, and has given great trouble to expositors. As the Lord retained this expression as used in the woman's saying in order to elevate it to its right meaning, He at first carries her indefinite προσκυνεῖν without an object a little further in the mere *dative* τῷ πατρί (twice, again in ver. 23), until He finally introduces the only correct and conformable manner of speaking in the twice-repeated αὐτόν of vers. 23, 24 (comp. Matt. iv. 10). Are we then to take ὃ οὐκ οἴδατε as the object of their prayer? As the neuter does not seem suitable for this, many have been disposed to understand it more generally: either as referring to the worship itself—ye worship as ignorant, since ye do not understand what the significance and meaning of *this your worship* is (*and exercise yourselves*, therefore, in what ye know not); or as instead of καθ' ὃ, in a manner, and with circumstances, which show that ye do not understand the right *how and where*. We do not think that this is a sufficient explanation of the paradoxical formula, which assuredly refers to the significant want of an object in the woman's words, and aims convincingly to detect this to her apprehension. The neuter then signifies to her that the living reference to a personal God, and the well-grounded consciousness of His acceptance, was wanting to their worship; and that, indeed, because they had failed in their self-chosen place and ceremonial of prayer, to stand in the obedience of His hitherto-uttered will. It is then said all the more plainly concerning the Jews—ὃν οἴδαμεν, but only as continuing the previous formula by way of contrast.[1] The Lord here most impressively draws the character of every form of departure from the appointment and institution of God, which was pretypified in this

[1] Luthardt gives the meaning otherwise, and perhaps better. "The neuter is used here of God, because it is not that the Samaritans, in contradistinction to the Jews, knew not God in and of Himself; but they knew not what *man may hope from Him*, namely, that He is a God of *salvation*, a God of Redemption."

Samaritan worship; of every since-existing lapse of the church through ἐθελοθρησκεία. It is the obscuration of all clear perception, of all sure consciousness concerning the way and manner which God Himself has shown and commanded, whence there must practically follow the ever-increasing darkness and emptiness of so-called worship; for the real blessing of the living God is withdrawn in punishment from the self-imagined mountain of blessing to which these self-willed worshippers pertinaciously repair. All Heathenism itself is on a parallel with this apostate Samaritanism. But, again, this extends, as does the gentle word which immediately follows, (reminding us of ver. 10), to the individual who is involved in such apostasy as a sort of excuse, in as far as the προσκυνεῖν which yet remains in him, intends and seeks in the sincerity of a sense of need, the true God. (Hence in Acts xvii. 23, the ἀγνοοῦντες, and in ver. 30 the ἄγνοια winked at).

Previously, when contemplating the New Testament futurity, the Redeemer, who as the Son come in the flesh, revealeth the Father, necessarily preserved the distinction between Himself and mankind, and could only say *Ye;* but now when He speaks as sprung from the Jews, as their Representative, maintaining their rights, and fulfilling the promises made to the chosen Israel, it is befitting that He should say *We.* All this is explained and consummated in the last Ἐγώ εἰμι, ver. 26. It is not appropriate to regard this ἡμεῖς (with Semler and Henke), as embracing the Lord and His disciples, being the only present true worshippers; for the position laid down immediately afterwards in proof mentions the *Jews. Such* a special collocation of Himself and His disciples would be unseemly, while the avowal retained its deep truth as it regards the people of God, from whom He sprang, and whose essential heart He Himself only was. Let it be observed here, how the Lord, who well knew to reprove and correct the apostasy and blindness of Israel when standing in their midst, nevertheless honourably makes Himself to those without their representative, as far as they were the elect people of God, and entrusted with the treasures of His revelation! In this ὁ οἴδαμεν the Lord acknowledges all the truth of the orthodox doctrine which might lie in any Pharisaic οἴδαμεν. Having then the genuine prophetic word, from which every one who would *might* have learned and known the truth;

and their temple having been really consecrated by the glory of God, having been in truth the Father's house during all the ages of preparation; so much greater was their guilt in going no further than an empty, blind, and proud "saying, that *this* is the place" in enmity to all Samaritans and Gentiles.

The ὅτι which follows is assuredly, as Baumgarten-Crusius rightly remarks, not simply a consequence (therefore can the Messiah only come from among these who know aright, who abide in the true sphere of revelation), but the *cause* of their better knowledge. *Salvation*, here an abundantly pregnant expression, equivalent to the salvation of God among the prophets (let the appeal of the dying Jacob be brought to mind, Gen. xlix. 18, which in the deepest sense refers back to ver. 10); thus it is, even as the Samaritans afterwards, ver. 42, rightly term Him ὁ σωτήρ, the manifestation of the promised *Messiah*, who testified of Himself even as the prophets had done, that He would bring in the powers of the Father's universal worship. *This* is the *understanding-point* of the Old Testament in which the Samaritans were wanting, for they held not the prophecy which came after Moses. Only those who *have Moses and the prophets* attain unto it; they only know the true foundation of worship, the aim and the spirit of the service of God. The idea itself, to which the Lord here gives utterance, is already found most clearly and simply expressed in Ps. cx. 2; 50, 2; Isa. ii. 3. Oh that all to whom in our day the offence of Judaism is almost, as it was to Celsus and Julian, become the offence of the Cross, would humbly hearken to this one great Jew, who, while so spiritually asserting the worship of all nations in spirit and in truth, yet stedfastly maintains the divine appointment of this Jewish people, as the issuing-point of this salvation for the entire world![1] Would they but learn to bow down before this ἐκ τῶν Ἰουδαίων ἐστίν, which the great *fact*, immediately proceeding from the divine counsel, and incontrovertibly fulfilled for now

[1] Dieffenbach and Schulthess, indeed, would have the entire ver. 22 to be an interpolation which disturbs the connection—this, however, is nothing but the mischievous folly of a so-called criticism. Bahrdt has delivered himself from the obnoxious verse in another fashion, and thus expounds—*we* Jews know *now*, that God is the *Father*, since Providence has brought it to light by me!

eighteen hundred years, attests.[1] This ἐστίν in the present, announced to the Samaritan woman the then beginning commencement; in order to obviate the ὅταν ἔλθῃ of ver. 25, and to prepare the way for the immediately following καὶ νῦν ἐστίν.

Ver. 23. After this careful distinction between the rights of the Jews and the Samaritans (which, however, was nothing "transitory," but altogether an essential point), the discourse goes back to ver. 21, more plainly expounds the "neither—nor," and turns, with the revelation of the coming, or rather already come, salvation, to the true worship of the future age. Thou, a woman of Samaria, needest not to go to Jerusalem, for behold the new time is opening through Me, with whom thou now speakest. The open vision does not merely extend wider and further, but pierces ever deeper also; the veil of shadows falls away, the sanctuary and reality of the New Covenant is opened. The true people of God are gathered from all nations;—those, namely, who are the ἀληθινοὶ προσκυνηταί, the true and genuine worshippers; according to the requirement of the word, now first finding its complete meaning, the *Father*-worshippers, for such is the character in which the Father will be sought by those who are προσκυνοῦντας αὐτόν. This repeated αὐτόν must receive the strongest emphasis, as it now takes the place of the indefinite ὅ; and then it is that real and consummate worship which receives its perfect expression in the closing words of ver. 24, where all is included that was lacking in ver. 20. Τῷ πατρί —*now* designates the common Father of these προσκυνηταί, equally near to all who worship Him, in the freedom of His spirit and of His truth; but this is something very different from the rationalist "universal Father" of Nature, and without any qualification. That God is our Father, rests here, as in the whole New Testament, upon a presupposed new birth through faith in Him, whose Father He is in the only proper and essential sense. Thus before Christ came, faith in Him as coming, faith obscure in its perception, but the same in heartfelt experience, and exciting the yearning for a future fully revealed

[1] God's will is so firmly fixed to assert His election of the fathers, that yet once again in the coming futurity the full salvation of the Gentiles will proceed from the Jews. Rom. xi. 12—15; Zech. viii. 23.

salvation, was the kernel and spirit of all genuine worship; in proportion as this was found in any sincere worshipper, was his worship that of *πνεῦμα καὶ ἀλήθεια*, the anticipating presentiment, if not the full knowledge, of the Father. When the Son now comes and reveals the *name* of the Father, all who are sincere fall down—sooner or later—before Him, to receive out of His newly-opened fulness. All others show by their unbelief that they are not, and never were, *προσκυνηταὶ*.

In spirit and in truth! In order to seize the meaning, in any approximate sense, of this amazing and inexhaustible expression,[1] which admits not of easy paraphrase in any dry form of words, we must of course set out with the antithesis to the Samaritan, and even Jewish *προσκυνεῖν* in any one particular *τόπος*, which is first of all indicated. That *προσκυνεῖν* considered God as having a limited dwelling-place (but see, on the other hand, at the Consecration of the Temple, 1 Kin. viii. 27, and in the Prophets also, Isa. lxvi. 1, 2), and, according to the fundamental meaning of the word itself, was limited to a mere הִשְׁתַּחֲוָיוֹת, a bowing down, prostration, and offering of certain ceremonies. Consequently, *ἐν πνεύματι* is, first of all, *internally;* see the prayer of Manasseh, ver. 11. But the two-fold expression must not be resolved with Storr by a *ἓν διὰ δυοῖν* into *ἐν πνεύματι ἀληθινῷ*, that is, *ἐν ἀληθινῇ καρδίᾳ*, Heb. x. 22, according to which it would amount after all to no more than the Mosaic *ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ καρδίᾳ σου*. But at the very first the profounder idea arises—that the worship must be offered in the inner being of man's God-related Spirit, comp. Rom. i. 9. And *from that follows* the *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* which in itself is deeply significant. He only who approaches God in his inmost being, and from his inmost spirit, offers Him acknowledgment, prayer, supplication, praise, and thanksgiving, worships Him *sincerely and in truth* (*ἀληθινοί* has already hinted at this)—see Ps. cxlv. 18 בֶּאֱמֶת Sept. *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ*, for which Luther has translated correctly *with earnestness*. For it is only in the Spirit that there can be the earnestness and the truth of a being corresponsive to the Su-

[1] So little understood by some of the fathers, that they did not even retain the *unity* of the whole, but gave *ἐν πνεύματι* to the Jews, *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* to the Samaritans.

preme. At this stage of our comprehension we may safely paraphrase the formula by πνευματικῶς καὶ ἀληθῶς, *inwardly and sincerely;* and this gives us a necessary protest against every system of *mere* ἔθος, and the ψεῦδος which invariably lurks in it. This is manifestly here, at ver. 23, the first and most obvious meaning;[1] a wider and deeper one will be opened up in the repetition of ver. 24, which gives the foundation and reason of the whole.

Such does the Father seek to worship *Him*. To translate, however, this ζητεῖ (with Luther's "will haben") as if it simply meant that God requires, and according to His essential nature will tolerate no other worship than this—is too definitely to anticipate the words which follow. It does, indeed, involve a preparatory transition to the final δεῖ of ver. 24; but here there is evident reference to a direct, and self-manifesting *search* after such worshippers, and our German Bible lets slip a point of critical moment in not literally preserving the expression of this. For the καὶ obviously points to that meaning, constraining us to put the question—who then seeks *as well as the Father?*[2] Who but He is now speaking, and who thus gently announces Himself to her as the Sent of God, yea, as the *Son of this Father* in the essential equality of nature and of operation. The whole conversation had, indeed, more and more powerfully excited the conviction in the soul of the woman—this marvellous man, this man of God, this prophet *is seeking me*, is seizing my inmost conscience and heart, *for God!* To this conviction the Lord now attaches His word—even as I, in the name of *the* Father, first *mine*, and then through me thy Father also, am seeking thee now.[3] But what the great *God seeks* first and fore-

[1] Lampe cites the strikingly analogous words of the heathen Cato: Si Deus est animus, nobis ut carmina dicunt, hic tibi præcipue sit purâ mente colendus.

[2] My critic Münchmeyer thinks it more simple to understand that the Father *seeks*, requires us to do this—as if καί were to be construed with ζητεῖ. But then the two words would be more closely connected; in the text the καί, preceding as it does, has evidently a peculiar emphasis.

[3] Roos, who indeed translates "not only I, but the Father also," adds too strongly, "without doubt the Samaritan woman felt, while He was speaking, that He who spoke was equal with the Father!" Yet

most among men,—Samaritans even, *worshipping* after their manner, and Jews going up to worship at Jerusalem—is but seldom and not at once to be found; and this is the further significance of His impressive saying. The ἀληθινοὶ προσκυνηταὶ are at the present time but few, they must be sought out and brought to light and collected. This great work of God begins now through Me, and will go on gloriously in the days which have now begun: though even now the few whom He has found are far from being all.

Ver. 24. And now, finally, comes, thus prepared for, the last and conclusive word, in which πνεῦμα καὶ ἀλήθεια are seized in their yet profounder meaning, and placed upon their deep foundation. Such words and such sentences as this are never to be understood in their ample significance by that exegesis which refuses to recognize *the progressive unfolding of their fulness of meaning*, but insists upon always restricting the same expression to the same unalterable formula. It was assumed in the former passage, as the foundation of the Lord's declaration, that πνεῦμα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; thence, if man will pray ἀληθῶς, it can only be by his praying ἐν πνεύματι αὐτοῦ. But now the Lord's meaning reaches higher when He utters His sublime Πνεῦμα ὁ θεός[1]—before the absolute emphasis of which the γάρ which our thoughts would supply, disappears and is lost. From that great position there arises a strict and peremptory δεῖ, which is set over against that external one in ver. 20. Herder says very aptly on this passage—"according to *His own* nature, the nature of prayer, and the nature of humanity, God can only have spiritual worshippers." And Joh. v. Müller as well—"Without the shadows of ceremony, without hypocritical observance of merely external things; a connection is established in worship analogous to their reciprocal nature."[2]

In chap. iii. 8 the most general and material fundamental idea of πνεῦμα was set out with, but now we have its most profound

there is something of truth in this as far as concerns the interpretation on the part of our Lord who thus confidently speaks of *the Father*.

[1] The Lord, with this design in view, could not have gone on to say (as Roos well reminds us)—The *Father* is spirit.

[2] In the remarks of his broth. Joh. Geor. at the close of his "Blicke in die Bibel" communicated by Kirchhofer.

and final meaning at the opposite extreme, the keystone of all its other significations.—In Ackermann's Tabelle (Studien u. Kritiken 1839. 4) this *πνεῦμα ὁ θεός* is strangely absent after *πνεῦμα θεοῦ*, although the author very exhaustively discusses the whole in his treatise. And on this point we do well to begin with the negative side: God is an *ἀσώματον* and *ἄμορφον*, as was expressly declared by the prohibition of images in Israel, in opposition to all the gross idolatry of heathens generally, and all the refined idolatry of their philosophers. Hence no mere external *προσκυνεῖν*, as was said before, can correspond with His nature, and be acceptable to Him. But what is the positive meaning of this the profoundest word in human language, when it is used to express the nature of God? Invisibility (the consequence of incorporeity), omnipresence (that is, again, only illimitableness), even eternity (that this, the negation of time), like unity and unchangeableness are themselves only negations and abstractions, and can carry us no further than the notorious nothing and void of a certain philosophy. In all our cognitions of faith we must set out *from ourselves*, from our own God-derived and God-related nature; and hence we protest against Ackermann's axiom—"*Νοῦς* is an anthropological, *πνεῦμα* a cosmical idea, that is, in the former is ruling *intelligence*, in the latter *energy*." Rather we think, (though there is this much truth in it that it makes the energy of *life* come before and in the intellect) that it is nevertheless an *anthropological* idea, inasmuch as no idea of God is possible to us, which does not take its rise in ourselves His creatures and similitude. Assuredly our Lord's *πνεῦμα ὁ θεός* is *more* than Cicero's mens soluta et libera, than Seneca's mens universi, or even totius ratio—for all else that language means by *πνεῦμα* is here comprehended, by way of similitude, *according to its full completeness in man*.[1] We may simply say, for catechumens, that the German expression "*ein* geist—a spirit" does not befit the idea, but is rather misleading; inasmuch as, taken in its plain sense, it would class God among spirits, just as we say—a man, an angel, an animal. Thus it is

[1] Lutz says correctly (Bibl. Dogmatik S. 45) first—we must proceed from man in defining the nature of God—but he presses and restricts (S. 46) this rather critically as it regards *πνεῦμα*, and reckons this also among customary anthropomorphisms. The case is not thus.

otherwise than as creatures are spirits that we are to understand it,[1]—God is, in His single, incomparable being, absolute, perfect, the only pure Spirit, that is, energy, life, understanding, will, and activity.[2] *Energy*, the impulse which can move another object from a principle in itself, is the lowest and most general analogon in nature, and points already to an original almightiness; it then manifests itself still higher in organic nature as *life;* as *understanding* life in man, to whom, therefore, is ascribed *spirit* in a limited sense; life conscious of the I and the Not-I; and from this result the will and the action. Thus God is in the highest sense *living* in and of Himself; the principle of all *other life*, unlimited in knowledge and unrestricted in will, to which all limited analogies point. It is only by contemplating our own spirit (Eccles. xii. 7) that we can in any degree discern what that means—God is altogether and only pure Spirit.[3]

[1] Compare the early work ascribed to Novatian, de Trinitate, in Kahnis, Lehre vom heil. Geist. i. 307.

[2] As we have given the gradation in our catechism, Fr. 162 (in the shorter Leitfaden Fr. 34.)

[3] R. Rothe in the beginning of his theolog. Ethik has scripturally shown how, in the idea "spirit," the absolute self-demonstration and self-sufficiency of God finds its highest expression, and thus that our πνεῦμα ὁ θεός is only the nearest explication of that first ground-formula of all speculation וְאֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה. But we prefer, instead of the lonely methods of speculation, to advance upwards by the idea of "being, energy, life, perception," with reference to the corresponding stages in the universe which images God forth (existence, matter, organism, I); and, far from all obscurity of absolute thought and conception concerning God's being, to remain humbly content with the consciousness of our dependence upon creaturely images in all our perception and definition of God. To this Jesus points by His πνεῦμα (as Moses in the beginning by his רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים), that fundamental and wonderful word of human language, which embraces in one the first perception of an invisible, incomprehensible, and yet energizing presence which yet clings to material ideas, and the absolute feeling of a God which is in the ground of our own being. God breathes upon us, as generally in all naturâ creatâ the natura creans demonstrates its energy (the ἀΐδιος δύναμις καὶ θειότης), and then the most internal self-consciousness in our own soul is also only a breath of God Himself. In this πνεῦμα there is thus the absolute substantiality (corporeity) which lies at the foundation of all cosmical reality, as the absolute ideality which is postulated in all thinking. This πνεῦμα embraces actually "being, nature, and personality," and that with an ἐστίν inde-

And now for the consequence from all this? Those who really are προσκυνοῦντες αὐτόν can worship him in a manner worthy of Himself only when they acknowledge and perceive Him to be Spirit. By this we are driven in to the centre of our being, where His omnipresent energy, nearness, and influence, are felt and experienced. He dwelleth in us, who live and move and have our being in Him, even in our fallen nature; full and perfect worship can consist alone in recovering this truth, in the abolition of that sin which opposes it and estranges the soul from the life of God, in reinstating the indwelling of God in us, so that our πνεῦμα shall only know itself and live in the πνεύματι θεῷ. Augustine has incomparably expressed this, so that no expositor should omit to quote his words: Foras ieramus, intro missi sumus. Intus age totum. Et si forte quæris aliquem locum altum, aliquem locum sanctum, intus exhibe te templum Deo. In templo vis orare, in te ora. Sed prius esto templum Dei, quia ille in templo suo exaudiet orantem. This is the Holiest of all, here must the veil be rent.

The spirituality of God was assuredly the fundamental principle of the Old Testament revelation, the ground-truth which not seldom has direct expression (comp. upon this Hofmann Schriftbeweis i. 66 ff.); but this truth earnestly maintained against heathenism is yet bound up with externality, and in some sense concealed; not until the veil was done away was it revealed in all its immediate fulness and simplicity. Neander's words, written in the spirit of Augustine's, no less forcibly and with equally classic precision expressing the spirit of the entire Scripture, are as follows—"*Man is not born* as a temple of God, *nor can he make himself* one, but can only be restored to that eminence *by the Spirit, whom the Son of God communicates to his soul.*"[1] Luthardt also most truly says: Spirit, this

pendently of, above and before all ἐγένετο of creation; so that we have nothing to do with that abhorred and incomprehensible phantom to which the universal spirit of Hegel has been likened.

[1] The same Neander says again: "We must have recognised the personal God as Spirit, as He hath revealed Himself in Christ, and have entered into the fellowship of Christ's all pervading reverence of God in spirit and in truth, in order to be able to worship Him aright." (Deutsche Zeitsch. 1850. S. 203.) This is, indeed, not so clear and expressive as the above extract.

objective, real element, in which the praying man moves, is described as new; consequently it is not the human spirit of itself, the divine in man, but the Spirit which proceeded first from Jesus. Thus does the Lord here finally refer to that *need*, to which He in the beginning promised His *gift;* and the πνεῦμα, in which alone we should, and in which alone we can, pray, stands in the same opposition to *our* σὰρξ as in ch. iii. A new birth is required, of God the Spirit; only as His *children* can we worship the *Father* ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ. (Jude ver. 20; Eph. vi. 17, 18.) As the ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν (the correlative of the Lord's words to the Samaritan woman) presupposes that loving can only proceed and have its beginning from Him, not from ourselves; even so can the *Spirit* which makes the *truth* of our worship come to us only from God. Thus the beginning and the end of the conversation with Nicodemus are here combined once more. God again communicates Himself to men sunken through sin into flesh; because He is Spirit, He can do this, and because He is love, He will. "If they are Spirit born of the Spirit, then do they the truth; and hence can they worship their God in Spirit and in truth." (Von Gerlach.)

See then, how philosophy, with its empty, lying babbling about spirit, must submit to be put to shame before the truth as the Spirit of God imparts it; see it here plainly revealed that humanity must have a Son of God in heaven, if humanity would return to God again! The simple and edifying Gössner says: "Let men spiritualise their theology a hundred fold, let them refine their religion to the highest point, and put away every shadow of an image of God, let their worship be conceived as ever so intensely spiritual, after all there is no *Spirit* to be derived from human nature, and in all the most spiritual service of God all would remain flesh notwithstanding. The only means of obtaining that Spirit was—God became flesh, and whosoever is united to Him, becomes with Him one Spirit." Yea, verily; without the gift of a new life, which now in the fulness of time He who was made flesh hath brought to us—He who not only testifies of the Spirit, but purposes to bestow Him—this cheerless δεῖ must ever stand for the repulsion and despair of all προσκυνηταί, who will never find, either in their own independent *thinking*, or by *going* to any Gerizim or even *Jerusalem*, that

ἀλήθεια of προσκυνεῖν which will realize all their longing aspirations or fulfil all the promises made to man. The Nicodemuses tarry without, like the women of Samaria, until He, who has come to unite both in one, shall open to them the door, and remove the veil.[1]

His gift to us is πνεῦμα for the reawakening of our πνεῦμα; not merely *in order* to the ἀλήθεια of our worship,—it is also itself at the same time the ἀλήθεια, the reality of our worship of the Father. The ἐν ἀληθείᾳ in connection with ἐν πνεύματι referred in the deepest sense to the spirit in us as connected with the soul; for the spirit is one with the soul and pervades it throughout; that constitutes the truth of the whole man in his act. ("Spirit and truth are as much as spirit and sense: they are only distinguished by internal notes" Oetinger's Wörterb.) We thus reach the deep and full contrast with all that was before and independent of Christ, all that appertained to the old economy, and all that belonged to heathenism, in worship; that is, preserving the dichotomy of the expression, with all that is merely *rite* as well as all that in the rite is *type*.[2] Πνεῦμα is opposed to the external, sensible, bodily rite; the ἀλήθεια of fulfilment to the prophetic, preparatory type which stimulates anticipation of the reality and dimly points forward to it. (Comp. John i. 17.) Lücke's antithesis—ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ σκιᾷ meets the case precisely; since every restricted and limited service of God in the Old Testament, apart from the kernel of spirit preformed within it,[3] falls back in its externality and transitoriness into σάρξ;—upon this let the Epistle to the Hebrews be well studied, and compare Phil. i. 3 with our text. And wonderfully does the

[1] So also our speculatives remain without and worship, instead of the true ὁ ὤν, whom their thinking cannot find out, only an ὄν, ὁ οὐκ οἴδασι. An impersonal "*das* Gott"—as Jacobi says, and Jul. Müller quotes him; an original principle, into which they sink and lose themselves, and become nothing, instead of abiding for ever in His presence, worshipping before His *face*. O that they would humble themselves to the way marked out—Salvation is *of the Jews!*

[2] Nonnus: οὐκέτι μύστιδι τέχνῃ, with significance, and further: μιμηλὴν τελέοντες ἀληθέος εἰκόνα μύθου.

[3] "All sensible worship, even that which God Himself has appointed, is but typical, and only reaches its full truth and meaning in spiritual worship: without this it is no other than false." V. Gerlach.

theme yet further change its application:—the fleshly and bodily form appears as the empty shadow, and that which is spirit becomes the true σῶμα of that shadow.

For it is to be understood that the service of God does not, through its spirituality and inwardness, reject all externality, all material, bodily presentation of worship, and transform the New Testament congregation into a meeting of Quakers, where spirits wait for the Spirit, or into that worse than Quakerism, where the influences of the Spirit are never even uttered at all. "The very nature of man imperatively demands that in all this the *body* should be used"—says Roos. And what is still more emphatic—let us once more impress it upon our minds—it is He who was made flesh that possesses and imparts the Spirit. From Him, and in Him is reproduced for the Spirit in the church the sanctified body of worship, filled with the truth, in which the creating Spirit, according to His nature, ever strives to invest Himself, and clothe His operation. He alone who bows the knees of his heart, will first bow the knees of his body also aright; and this will penetrate every thing external, so that all shall show itself to be, in deed and in truth, a *colere*, a προσκυνεῖν of the creature. While the solemn words of our Lord, with their rebuking, exhorting, promising δεῖ ever remain a standing corrective of the tendency, which we find even in the New Testament, to reduce worship to the ψεῦδος of a mere ἔθος.

Thus this superabundantly mystical statement—πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, (which Fichte declared to be *altogether useless* as a positive dogma, for the definition of the nature of God!) was not uttered to the *woman of Samaria*, with any design to direct her speculative perception;[1] yet it secures even to the speculatives the true and deep foundation for their principles, inasmuch as the conscience and awakening spirit of every man who seeks his God, and would worship Him aright, cannot be considered as being independent of his immediately living and practical understanding. The latter may be securely attributed to the former. For the Father seeketh τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας αὐτόν, that is, all

[1] Neander: "In uttering this sublime truth to an uneducated woman of an ignorant people, Christ overturns the aristocracy of culture, and the one-sided intellectualism of the ancient word. It is from *life* that the highest must spring, and for all men alike."

who worship Him, as τοιούτους; and is able, if they yield to be found, to make them such. Let us observe here the *hints* constantly thrown out, to attract, and guide, and secure the Samaritan's soul: Woman, believe *Me—the hour cometh*—it *now is*—the *Father* in heaven (whose fallen child every man's instinct feels himself to be) even He *seeketh* thee! And in effect He had found her. Allured onwards from that first κύριε, further and further, towards and into the mystery of the *person of Jesus*—how can we now regard her, when she refers again to the *Messiah*, as desiring to elude and escape from Him, the Prophet, who had announced the Father to her soul? We therefore regard *her* last word, which paves the immediate way for Christ's, notwithstanding its apparent digression and evasion, as no other than the most gently expressed question of her spontaneous presentiment—*Art Thou the Messiah Thyself?*

Her οἶδα involuntarily returns back to that first εἰ ἤδεις which it almost echoes; thus giving to the whole a rounded conclusion. She now produces and exhibits all that she, in common with the Samaritans, knows of religious things, the best that she had: that which had lain unseen and unused now wakens up to life. "His words had quickened the miserable germ of Samaritan Messiah-hope into life," Lange. It is as if she had said: Lord, I understand not fully that which thou now sayest: but thou speakest of a future which is dawning, when a better and more immediate knowledge of God will be vouchsafed in order to the true worship of God;—*this* I as a Samaritan can apprehend, for we also with you expect the Messiah. (For her ἡμῖν is now as comprehensive as in ver. 21, thus much has she already learned.) Her ἔρχεται, which has a future in its signification, seizes the Lord's ἔρχεται; in adding the ὅταν ἔλθῃ, which points to a near futurity, she gives involuntary expression to the influence of the Lord's καὶ νῦν ἐστιν. *All things*—that great far-reaching truth to which thou directest me, and all that I need in order to my apprehension of it—will the Messiah when he is come *tell us*—just as thou now tellest me, and just as thou almost appearest to me to be one who can tell me *all things*. (Matt. vii. 29.) This last lies in the back-ground of her presentiment, and she cannot yet rise high enough to give it expression; she seems rather to "take refuge in *delay* from the stern necessity of

an all-comprehending decision," but this final procrastinating evasion is almost without the slightest tincture of earnest evil. It is with her, generally speaking, as it was with Nicodemus; the folly of the past will not allow the present right meaning to betray itself, but draws over it a veil worse than the reality. Thus we are to understand the *ἀναγγελεῖ* which she obtrudes instead of saying as she ought—*δώσει ἡμῖν πνεῦμα καὶ ἀλήθειαν, τὴν δωρεὰν τοῦ θεοῦ.*

Most assuredly she is not now for the first time passing over to the Jewish expectation of a Messiah, and admitting that she now believed in that which he and the Jews hoped for and taught; in that case the *οἶδα* would be inappropriate and untrue, she would have used *πιστεύω* instead of it; in that case the Lord could not have reckoned upon her ability to understand the *σωτηρία*; ver. 22, and ver. 42 would be quite incomprehensible. We know nothing certain concerning the Messiah-idea of the Samaritans in the time of Jesus, (this history shows us very plainly that they possessed it in some way); but we may assume that with their pretensions to be the people of God, and with the Jews so near them, they would less and less restrict themselves to the revelations of their Pentateuch. With the same confused mixing up of truths, here and there appropriated (which had been their fundamental character from the beginning) they would lay claim now to the *Messiah*, even as their forefathers did to the temple-structure—His *name* and presentation generally were derived by them from the Jews, and then, if they wished to find any such warrant, they would inlay it into the promises of Moses. It is to be observed that the woman herself uses the expression *Μεσσίας*, which the Evangelist translates *Χριστός*; and does not, as Sepp very arbitrarily thinks, speak of the mere Samaritan Restorer (הַמְּשִׁיב), in which it was John who discerned the Jewish Messiah. As among the Jews the notion of the Prophet —as 1 Macc. iv. 46, xiv. 41 rightly interpreted show[1]—sometimes took precedence of that of the King, so that the people could use such language as we find in Jno. vi. 14, vii. 40 (comp. Matt. xvi. 41), so we find it quite natural here that the Samari-

[1] See Bergquist—an idea Messiæ in Apoc. V. I. sit obvia. Lundæ 1826, pag. 30, 31.

tan woman also, at a time when she is speaking of her own future apprehension of the truth, should make prominent this ἀναγγέλλειν πάντα in the character of Him who was waited for.[1]

Ver. 26. We know no reason whatever for supposing that the Lord hastened (as Bengel thinks) His revelation to the woman, before the arrival of the disciples; for the avowal of the men, ver. 42, was public enough, and the Lord could not have been very anxiously solicitous to conceal His ἐγώ εἰμι, and to prevent their hearing Him utter it with His own lips. We read in the ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ver. 27, first of all, thus much, that the disciples had already actually come at the *close of the conversation;* and not merely that the period of His being alone with the woman extended *so long.* We must accept, on the other hand, Bengel's other word, in the harmony: "His first saying had a very general tone—give me to drink! And the *seventh* was—I am *Christ!*" Nothing was more natural than that He should not *now* keep back, one instant longer, this declaration. The predicate must by a Hebraism be included in the εἰμί, as in the Hebrew conversely אֲנִי הוּא already contains the verb substantive in the אֲנִי. *I that speak unto thee*—thus does the Lord confirm with great condescension her expectation of the ἀναγγέλλειν, which in itself was quite correct—thou hast well apprehended that I was engaged in one work of the Messiah.[2] This loving, devoted *seeking* of this well-nigh found soul, impels the Lord forward to the utterance of this open declaration "which He thus *almost for the first time* promulges to a poor, sin-laden woman." (Lange ii. 1, 234.) That which He forbade His disciples in a later time to declare, He

[1] The *later*, much contested notions of the Samaritans about the Messiah, can have no value in connection with our history: they are decisive, however (as Gesenius maintained at last, see Baumgarten-Crusius) for the long continuance of such a tradition. And Deut. xviii. 15 must necessarily have made the notion of the *Prophet* in the Messiah prominent to the Samaritans. Luthardt, opposing my view, thinks this very uncertain; but I am convinced that just as the Samaritans lightly esteemed all other prophets, so their acknowledgment of Moses would all the more impress upon them the expectation of *the* Prophet in the highest and fullest sense. Compare my remarks in the second volume, on Matt. xxii. 31, 32.

[2] But if she could only discern the first work, the prophetic office of the Messiah, *we* can go further, and reflect—Yes, verily, He is the ἐξηγητὴς τοῦ θεοῦ the λόγος of the πνεῦμα.

now publishes without any prudential restraint, for He cannot deny and withhold Himself from her. There is some truth in the common remark, that there was not so much danger of His being proclaimed king in Samaria, and therefore not so much necessity for obviating the enmity of His foes; but it ought not to be forgotten, that the scandal of the report, which indeed was laid hold of in the end,—that He had proclaimed Himself Messiah in Sychar! might have been productive of much *worse* consequences. Suffice it, that the Lord now takes counsel of nothing but the simplicity of His love; He is only intent upon drawing the folds round a human soul that He has secured, so that He may not lose it again—*ask* now and *take* the living water, expectation is needed no more! Remarkable contrast! The dignity of His Messiahship which He does not proclaim in Jerusalem, He confidentially discloses to this poor Samaritan woman at the well. Most lovely earnest and prelude of that fast-approaching time of grace, in which He would cry to all people upon earth—*Behold me! Behold me!* (Isa. lxv. 1.)

ENIGMATICAL WORDS TO THE APOSTLES. THE HIGHER FOOD: THE SOWER'S LABOUR FOR THE REAPERS SENT FORTH, AND THEIR JOY TOGETHER.

(Ch. iv. 32—38.)

The disciples, who not till afterwards learned to estimate our Lord's freedom in attracting and recognizing the oppressed female sex, marvel greatly now at his confidential intercourse—first, with a *woman* alone at a public well, contrary to all Rabbinical propriety;[1] then, with a Samaritan woman; and finally, that the conversation is altogether spiritual. Did they hear and understand the last word and rejoinder concerning the *Messiah* (how impressively must this word alone have fallen upon their ears!)? I think *not;* their minds being pre-occupied with thoughts of food, they hear not distinctly at once; the fact of the

[1] Ne multiplices colloquium cum fœminâ—Tract. Erubhin fol. 53. 2. Ne colloquatur quis cum fœminâ in plateâ, imo ne cum propriâ quidem uxore—Joma fol. 204, 2.

woman's being with the Lord had altogether confused their apprehension of the character of the conversation. Otherwise St John would not have represented the general μετὰ γυναικὸς λαλεῖν as the ground of their surprise, and that they refrain from asking the unknown subject of the conversation. The ἐγώ εἰμι of itself might have told them more, but they go not beyond the mere λαλεῖν, as if they had caught just the *last* ὁ λαλῶν σοι.[1] But their accustomed reverence keeps back their curious questioning concerning the unaccustomed sight—what seekest thou of this woman? What talkest thou with her? Grotius: quid ab *eo poscis?* Cibum an potum? This is their first thought; but then rises their still more wondering reference to the λαλεῖν, for His words had seemed to them the close of a longer and more inward conversation—or dost thou teach her aught? Baumgarten-Crusius, having ζήτησις ch. iii. 25 in his mind, connects μετ' αὐτῆς with ζητεῖς also, and apprehends that they were thinking of some possible dispute upon the national question; but in that case λαλεῖν would certainly not have been in the second member of the sentence; indeed, the idea of the disciples' thinking of a Jewish dispute with the best of Samaritan women is in itself hard to conceive. It is better to say with Wesley, though in that there is an improbability, that no man asked *the woman* what she would have with the Lord at first, nor *the Lord* what He thereupon said to her. For the woman goes immediately away, when the disciples had been there but a very short time. The last word of the Lord did not induce her to depart, rather did it cause her to stand still in amazement; but now the confidential solitude is disturbed, the Jewish countenances are upon her, and she is thrown off the balance of her gentle self-possession. Her hasty departure is at first a flight; and then afterwards follows the narration of all; not, indeed, designed when she left, but occasioned by her meeting with others. We cannot, however, positively say with G. Müller, "that she forgets in her joy the object for which she had come,"

[1] Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτῳ notes this critical moment, hence the Peschito has—וְבַד מְמַלֵל while *He was speaking*. The Lord did not break off abruptly because of the disciples, but the disciples did not hear anything intelligently.

but this at least we may say, that her leaving the waterpot in the fervent impulse of her spirit moved by the Spirit, is somewhat analogous to our Lord's own forgetting to eat. She thus commits the apparent folly of undertaking the task of coming and drawing, complained of before, for nothing. *Scarcely*, as Richter's Hausbibel says, as a sign that she was coming again; for that would require her to have matured her plan at once, and in the first confusion of her timidity. Least of all did she reckon that the Lord and His disciples might drink the water drawn therein when she had gone! All this is unreal; but it is quite natural to suppose that in her natural and remarkable frankness of manner she would go to the first and best *ἀνθρώποις* in the city, with invitations and solicitations telling them of that *ἄνθρωπος*, who declared himself to be *ὁ Χριστός*. *Come, see!* That is her first word, as in ch. i. 39—46. The well-known sinner needed not to specify to the people more particularly[1] the *πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησα* of her past life. All that *ye* know—a stranger Jew without the city has told me all that ever I did! (For her conscience had heard all things disclosed in the disclosure of one). Come, *see*, that is, search into it, test, and experience, and *hear* like myself, whether this *man* be like other men, whether He be not what He declares Himself to be—the Messiah! The spiritual impulse which could induce this notorious woman to make so honest a confession (in which, as ever, the commanding power of her *testimony*, ver. 39, lay), and the wonderful paradox that the Messiah should announce himself here in Gerizim (which no Samaritan could *sincerely* expect), both concurred in impelling the people to follow *such* a woman to see *such* a man,—a man who could tell them all their sins, and yet make them so happy, as they already *see* this woman to be. At an unseasonable hour, many probably hurrying from their mid-day meal, they go out and in no small numbers (*πολλοί*, ver. 36). The woman has not provoked their contradiction by too bold an assertion, but with all her emotion has only summoned them to see for themselves; only intimating that He himself had told her all this, and that

[1] Very properly says Schleiermacher: "We see in what good estimation she was held by the men of the city from this, that they immediately went out at a simple word of hers."

she was constrained to believe. It is doing her great injustice to make this an example—as Braune does, pointing his condemnation against it—of a false way to faith, as if she required the judgment of her fellow-citizens to conform her *supposition*. Oh no, there is no more supposition in her case, she *knows* that the Messiah is *come*. It is, on the one hand, a gratuitous requirement that she should instantly betake herself to the company of the women who followed Jesus; and, on the other, it is equally incorrect to say (with Braune on ver. 42), that "she herself appears to have been no longer troubled about Jesus in Sichem!" Oh no, the Δεῦτε, ver. 29, means to say—come ye with me out of the city to Him! She herself assuredly comes again with the people, vers. 30—40,—to think otherwise is unnatural, disturbs the whole narrative, the fruit of which is just the winning of the woman, and then through her means, of the others also. Scarcely has she received a small measure herself, but she, like a female apostle, begins to invite others also, publishing her own shame before all the people to the honour of the Lord! And here, as in all New Testament preaching, the great essential point is His Person,—He is Christ, the Saviour!

In the mean while a very unseasonable interjection of the disciples, offering their earthly bread, gave occasion to the Lord for a second conversation with them; which, as it perfectly suits his plan, the Evangelist cannot pass over. As he subjoined, previously, to the conversation with Nicodemus, an "explanatory appendix on the relation of Jesus to the Baptist," so here a parallel offers itself on *the relation of Jesus to His disciples*. Thus is the Lord most significantly placed, at the commencement of the Gospel, between His forerunner and His apostles, according to a plan and purpose which the sacred narrator only follows in obedience to the development of the history itself, and which sprang directly from the facts which he related.[1]

Ver. 32. Though it is only said of the Lord Himself that He rejected food, we may suppose that neither did He *drink* of the waterpot left there; hunger and thirst had gone from Him; and the body of the second Adam lives and is nourished by the

[1] And we adhere to this, without being led astray by Luthardt's contradiction, who denies to the deeply-significant conversation with the disciples any thing like an "independent signification."

refreshing of the Spirit in the performance of the will of God. But the disciples, to whom the buying in a Samaritan city had been of itself distasteful, see with ever-increasing astonishment His neglect of the provision which they had brought. Master, eat thou—if only that we also may eat! Art thou then not hungry, like ourselves? And His sublime answer is ordered with deep precision; since He does not unconditionally repel the thought of this kind of eating (the time for it also came afterwards), but for the present by His dignified Ἐγώ and a general ἔχω, discovers to them that He in this matter was altogether different from them, possessed of different feelings, and under different relations. His words sound marvellously like those of the angel in the Apocrypha, Tob. xii. 19—yet they are not uttered with the same meaning, but with a designed and exciting tone of *mystery*, which would prepare the way for a further disclosure. As in the case of the Samaritan woman, He provokes their attention by figure and striking contrast. Ἦν ὑμεῖς οὐκ οἴδατε—contains in it no blame; it does not reproach them because generally they knew nothing or had experienced nothing of that spiritual sustenance which also invigorates the body (for that would not have been the truth); nor does it impute to them the fault of not thinking upon it in His case, for how could they have attributed such influence to spiritual intercourse, of the subject of which they had known nothing? But it is *graciously* spoken, like the former εἰ ᾔδεις, and means—Ah, that ye knew what sustains me now, that ye knew *my meat*, for then would ye also forget the bread! Now, since ye know it not, I will tell you what it is. (Properly speaking, βρῶσις is rather the present *nourishment* for the time being; and βρῶμα the *food* itself, the means of that nourishment). As the following words of our Lord point from the beginnings of God's work in the souls of men to its *consummation*, as it is the glance which he now threw into the *harvest* following the seed-time—the ground-thought of the following discourse—that satisfies His soul with *joy*, we must attribute to the οὐκ οἴδατε an undertone of meaning which the Schullehrerbibel of Brandt has well expressed—"this great end and aim was not yet recognized even by those who should be instruments in effecting it." Not sensual and fleshly-minded men generally are opposed to the Lord's Ἐγώ in this ὑμεῖς, but

rather these labourers in the harvest themselves who were already called and sent, but knew so little of the joy of seed time and of harvest rejoicing in hope, that He must now reveal it to their minds.

Ver. 34. His transition to this takes its rise from His own Person, but He immediately connects with that the *work* also, in which they themselves should be His ministers and co-operators. The natural man must first receive the gift, the power, the food of the Spirit, *in order to* do the divine will; the Son of God in humanity *hath* already *in* doing it the energy which goes in new and continuous works. For He alone can say in the fullest sense what in Ps. xi. 9, 10, was prophecied concerning Him.[1] His daily bread is, that the will of God should be done, His kingdom come, His name be hallowed. The repeated interlocution of the disciples—which, though they only venture to speak one to another, does not escape Him—hangs still upon this, that if He *had had food* (as if He had not said ἔχω only), there must have been some one, even if it were an angel[2] who brought it to Him, hungry as He assuredly was—and it is to meet this that He proceeds to speak plainly. Olshausen remarks that the ἵνα cannot, in this passage, be taken τελικῶς; but we agree with Lücke, in the critical distinction which he draws. "The sentence with ὅτι would say, that Jesus found His sustentation *in this*, in actually doing the will of God; the ἵνα includes the yet more subtle thought, that his sustentation consisted even in the *endeavour* to be ever doing the will of God." Only that we should seize the idea better by another word than the ordinary "endeavour." The fundamental thought is the joy which is experienced in doing with prospect of constantly doing; the

[1] The new man in Christ Jesus participates through the new birth in this possession and invigoration of the Spirit, and that according to the measure of faith; to this point forward all celebrations of spiritual satisfaction in the Old Testament, and of a joy which is insensible to hunger and thirst. But in the application of the text to ourselves, we ought not to forget the sole prerogative which is arrogated for Christ's own person in vers. 32 and 34. This Steinmeyer's Predigt in the Beiträge zum Schriftverständniss i. 185—which with all its beauty, contains much that is artificial—seems tous to do.

[2] For it was in the highest degree improbable that an ἐπιδήμιος ἀνήρ out of the city (as Nonnus says) had brought Him food.

looking forward from the beginning and at every step to the *consummation* of all labour: it is from this deep feeling that the *ἵνα, pointing onwards*, flows; and the Evangelist's fine feeling of its force retained it.[1] The preaching of the word was, in the Lord's first meaning, the will of the Father (Mar. i. 38)—but from this time onwards His glance goes further, for to regard the "ποιεῖν and τελειοῦν as standing together without any express significance," is a very false exposition. We cannot so easily exhaust the profound contemplation and intuition which are contained in such large and pregnant words as these. As in chap. xvii. 4 the redeeming death is included in the work by a sublime prolepsis, so here the meaning stretches still further, inasmuch as the seed-time is here viewed as preparatory to the full, and complete harvest at the distant end. We almost always find in the words of our Lord Jesus that the unconsciousness of what is to follow pervades his reference to that which is passing. He now terms His meat what He will presently term His joy, a joy which He will participate with His reapers; for He Himself, in His work of seeking, and calling, and sowing the seed, the first principles of the living word, already anticipates and rejoices in the joy of the future.[2] He thereby gives also an answer to the suppressed question of the disciples as to what He was saying to the woman —what other than that for which I am sent of the Father? And thus He inspires them with boldness to put further questions in the future about this definition of His work, and to expect to share it with Him. And thus, finally, He places Himself before them as a type and pattern of the true Missionary zeal, which always and everywhere is engaged upon that which will speed on the great work towards its glorious maturity.

Ver. 35. Luther's: saget ihr nicht *selbst?* say ye not *yourselves?* disturbs the sense, since the words do not simply involve

[1] Münchmeyer rejects this remark of mine, with allusion to the Winer philology; but he does not seem to understand it, and not seldom do subtilties and fine shades of meaning elude his perception.

[2] The Berlenburger Bibel is this time much too limited and narrow in its interpretation—"This then now is my meat, that I interrupt not the work of God in the soul of the Samaritan woman by my eating, for she will instantly return. My natural eating must give place, *till I am ready for it.* This great matter must be waited for and *completed.*

a comparison, but a *contrast* also. The Lord has before His eyes the χώρας between the well and the city; and that gives Him that comparison, prepared for by τελειώσω, between the work of God and that *husbandry* which requires the seed-time first before the harvest can be reaped. Besides this, the ordinary exposition from antiquity downward has assumed that the Samaritans were seen flocking towards the Lord: Ebrard allows this to be "not impossible," but to us the μεταξύ seems to indicate too short a time, and St John does *not* connect ver. 40 immediately with the conversation, but seems to imply an interval during which the meal was partaken of at the well. We think[1] that *the disciples* see merely the fields recently sown, and far from being yet white unto the harvest; but *the Lord's* clear view goes beyond, and sees in anticipation the people whom the woman would bring with her. Then would the requirement—*lift up your eyes*, become another mysterious enigma, which would soon find *its* solution in His words. *Behold*, I say unto you, I have now been sowing the word, and already behold a sudden harvest upspringing and ready—should not this be my meat and my joy? We may regard the four months' waiting-time as very probably a *proverbial* expression, and that because of the λέγετε which introduces it, for in ver. 37 we have another λόγος quoted, and its correctness this time, and, as it were, in contradistinction, approved of. Proverbs generally are to be taken with a free interpretation, and the meaning of this proverb indicates the utmost possible shortening of the time, as it is used for the encouragement of the waiting sower. *Only* so much longer! The Lord goes beyond the proverb in the same direction, but with a different application. Ye are accustomed to say—*in any case* only so long; but I assure you that the harvest in this instance (of that seed of *mine to which I refer)* will instantly follow, as an encouraging type and earnest to you. It necessarily follows also from the unqualified ἔτι and ἤδη,[2] that it must have been

[1] As de Wette with great propriety: "We must not assume with Chrysostom and almost all expositors, that Jesus pointed to the Samaritans as they hastened towards Him. The harvest was not so very obviously near as this; but in the hope of prophetic contemplation."

[2] On the position of ἤδη at the close of verse 35, see Lücke.

then the actual seed-time, that is, according to our chronology, the beginning of January before the harvest of the winter-seed in May. (Not, as Bengel thinks, that the Lord was speaking in Nisan, before the second or main harvest, absolutely so called.) Now the disciples saw no harvest-field, but they said and they thought assuredly—there must at least be four months yet! But the Lord sets before them a mystery and an enigma, and thereby would teach them to lift up aright the eyes of their faith.[1]

That the presupposed saying of the disciples already referred to the sowing of the word, as Schleiermacher, and Hezel before him, thought, appears to us altogether out of the question. The disciples had not apprehended that one word, ver. 34, with such clearness and largeness of view, as to be capable of thinking. But it will be long yet before any result will be seen from this day's announcement of the kingdom of God, or at least before any harvest will spring up among these Samaritan citizens! All this was far from their eyes of sense, and therefore the Lord, when He bids them look in another meaning, raises them to a higher and spiritual contemplation. He alone sees in anticipation the harvest, not only the present typical and restricted one, but that great and universal *harvest* which He contemplated in it, which was now drawing near; that harvest, of the final consummation of which Ps. lxxii. 16 prophecies, where it stands thick upon the tops of all *mountains*, and the people of all *cities* flourish like grass of the earth; when apostate Samaria shall be brought back, and the salvation which goeth forth from Jerusalem shall return back to the same renewed Jerusalem; when in the rich plenitude of the blessing poured forth, the ploughman shall overtake the reaper, and the treader of grasses him that soweth seed, seed-time and harvest being blended in one. (Amos ix. 13.) It is His purpose to teach them "how great a difference there is between *the eye of faith* and the eye of common experience" in the great husbandry of God; to make them partakers

[1] If this chronology must be given up as impossible (as Münchmeyer contends), then this *antithesis* of the spiritual harvest, and the harvest not yet near in the fields, as the essential ὀξύμωρον, would be disturbed. The longer continuance in Judea which I have assumed (see the tables in Vol. iii.), is justified throughout the whole harmony.

of the joy of His hope, if they can only embrace it, for their consolation in their future apostleship. And so far it is as if He had said for their *subsequent* understanding in *prophetic* words—probably an allusion to Isa. xlix. 18, lx. 4—"look upon the lands, into which ye will be sent forth; could ye but behold them, as I do, *with the right eyes*, ye would see that they are already white unto the harvest." (Berlenburger Bib.) We also should receive the same words and apply them to all cases in which the proverb is applicable. They will teach us, on the one hand to wait humbly and patiently; but they will teach us, on the other, to keep the joy of harvest in our view in the midst of the toil of sowing, for our invigoration and refreshment, that so we may be able to regard every exception of swiftly-ripening blessing as a promise and a type of full success.

Ver. 36. The second figure, to which the former paved the way, is at length altogether released from the present, and pursued as a pregnant similitude applicable to the whole period of man's labour in the kingdom of God. The Lord now looks beyond this preliminary and scanty harvest in Sichar, and contemplates in futurity all His harvest-men yet to come, whose representatives He beholds in these apostles, and to whom He promises *joy*. Baumgarten-Crusius thinks that the three verses 36—38 should, strictly speaking, have followed each other in an inverted order, and as far as it regards mere logical sequence he is right; but the profound, prophetic words with yet higher propriety reverse the natural order, in order to go backward step by step deeper and deeper into the fundamental principle of the whole matter. The first great idea is the *reward* of the labourer, that is, obviously, not the meting out of recompense for work done in the ordinary sense, but the reaping itself is the reward appropriate to the previous sowing. Therefore he who himself has sown (and in the *figure* from which the Lord's words take their rise, this is ordinarily the case) does not reckon it a toil to gather in his recompense. But in the second clause the words reach further, and indicate that He is *now* speaking only of the reapers in God's field. There it is far from true that every one who reaps has also sown; there he who reaps is not always the sower himself. Yet he who reaps *receiveth* as such what comes to his hand as prepared by divine grace, not having himself made

or procured it, and that is his first rejoicing. But then the higher joy is in his discerning the glorious design and destination of this precious fruit—he gathereth fruit, into the kingdom and church of Christ, *unto eternal life*, for that great consummation of God's great mercy to man, the fellowship of His redeemed and glorified! For we cannot think the meaning to be—he labours and reaps *unto his own salvation*, the εἰς in connection with the συνάγειν is too significant for this. In the fruit-gathering of this world the produce is nourishment unto a πρόσκαιρος ζωή; in gathering souls it is unto *the true, eternal life*.[1] The perception and assurance of this, is thus the reward of the labourer, his meat and his joy—so that we may regard the καί before συνάγει to be, as it were, a *vau exegeticum*: even in this he receiveth his wages. This is the answer to Peter's question, Matt. ix. 27; and a pregnant remembrancer in the spirit of the apostles, 2 Tim. ii. 6. Oh that all our co-operation with the Lord's great work could bring us this rejoicing! It is *this* which is the greatest joy, that we are *not* gathering fruit *for ourselves*, but as ministers for the heaven of the One, great Lord of the harvest! It is *this*—as the Lord therefore proceeds to say—which unites the sower and the reaper in one common joy, all selfish contention being by this extinguished. "When we reflect that neither did the sower sow in his own land, nor the reaper reap his own fields, but that the field is the Lord's"—we add, and the issue pure blessedness with Him—"then all strife is destroyed." (Gossner.) Thus must it be through the whole period of our labour, in which endless sowing and reaping alternate; both kinds of labourers already rejoice *together*, for they are but one in effect;—he who soweth anticipates in unselfish hope the joy of the reaper who will follow, he who reapeth responds back to the sower's joy,—for all serve the One Lord, and all that they do is only His. And what rejoicing will that be, when after the Pentecost feast of the first fruits (which the Lord had before His mind, as well in the figure as in His own meaning), the great feast of Tabernacles shall follow with the abundant and consummate gathering together of the completed harvest!

[1] For this is the meaning, and not here simply—"into the garner of eternal life."

(Ex. xxxiv. 22). Then will many a church be the joy and crown of rejoicing of many an apostle (2 Thess. ii. 19)—but all only the participated *joy of the Lord*, who Himself in reality sowed the whole! It is to *this last thought* that the Lord now turns: for in these words, the thoughts of which are so marvellously and profoundly interwoven,—as they broke forth from the deep fulness of His ever-widening contemplation—He discloses progressively some new meaning in each saying as He utters it. Rejoice together, however, *with Me*, the sower, oh ye my reapers, and forget ye also to eat!

Vers. 37, 38. For in *this* husbandry, the fruit of which is unto eternal life, and of which, as ye now mark, I speak, a second *proverb* is true, even as the former was untrue and inapplicable. We retain most confidently the reading ὁ ἀληθινὸς, and think, with Bengel, Winer, Meyer, Baumgarten-Crusius, that ἐστίν is the only predicate—*here holds good*; and that in the loftiest and only sense of its deep truth, the common saying, which (as Olshausen well adds) "is true, indeed, in many other relations." Hic locum habet vox illa vera. The form of speech is precisely parallel with that of 2 Pet. ii. 22, συμβέβηκε τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς παροιμίας. Lücke's objection does not affect the question; for it might possibly be that ἀληθινός was used for ἀληθής (see afterwards on chap. vii. 28); and if it is sought to apply St John's ordinary meaning of the word in other cases, the sense would then be very emphatic:—this word, which approves its truth in the various distribution of the labour of seed-time and harvest, maintains its truth in relation to Mine and my Father's kingdom in the highest and only proper sense, and it is therefore a *genuine* and *true* proverb, a similitude which penetrates to the very depth of truth, as all proverbs should do, but as they oftimes do not.

What follows now gives us an explanation of this its highest meaning, that in which the Lord now uses it.[1] All is already involved in the ἀπέστειλα—thus shall it be in your *future*

[1] This without prejudice to applications of other kinds, for every figure may bear various applications. Thus we find the sowing of man spoken of 1 Cor. iii. 7, 8, ix. 11. So in Matt. ix. 37, 38, the Apostles are *labourers*; and in Matt. xiii. 37, 39, *harvest* and *reapers* have quite another signification.

apostolical office, corresponding with your present calling. For the disciples had little or nothing to do directly with the harvest in Sichar; their Master was, so to speak, preparatorily, both sower and reaper.[1] *I have sent you*, as the Father hath sent Me, ver. 34—that is neither a mere prophetic future, nor an indefinite aorist (I *send* you); they were actually already called, and appointed to be His future messengers, and they assuredly understood this well, although the name ἀπόστολοι (which here begins, as it were, to announce itself) had not been expressly given to them. But the goal of their mission lay in the future, and the Lord here tells them so, adding—in this consists your ἀποστολή, that ye enter upon the harvest, after the preparatory work, the *labour* distinctively and pre-eminently, has been already done.

That is a great and profound word. It may probably contain an allusion to Josh. xxiv. 13 (as Alford confidently maintains); but more certainly a general typological reference to the New Testament field of grace, as a land not sown of itself. Yea it might be said even to the apostles, as the first labourers,—lift up your eyes and lift up your hands—ye are already in the midst of a joyful harvest, instead of mourning over the sad toil of sowing for a far distant harvest. Who, in that case, are the ἄλλοι, who had laboured and sown before? The common exposition among the ancients, which has been represented by Grotius and Bengel, and defended by Lange,[2] makes answer: the Old Testament is here to be regarded as the seed, the New Testament, on the other hand, as the harvest. Many—such as Klee (and earlier Lampe) and Luthardt—are disposed even to class Jesus him-

[1] Schleiermacher shows a lack of deep insight into the wide meaning of this prophetic word, when he thinks it necessary to assume that the Apostles were thus appointed to strengthen and confirm the beginning faith of the Samaritans, and to take an active part in securing the faith which had been excited in Sichar. Hezel imagines that the Lord found it here necessary to impose upon the Apostles the task of *baptizing the Samaritans!* But baptism cannot have any place here, for this would have been prematurely to place Samaria on a level with Israel.

[2] Ingeniously expanded thus: John, who had lighted up anew the hope of Messiah in Samaria, might have this consolation in his imprisonment; for that divine seed sown in Samaria, the sower of which no man knew, which seemed to be lost and dead, now suddenly springs up.

self and the Baptist with the old prophets—this which is thought to be the best view, is in reality the worst. We maintain with Baumgarten-Crusius, that to regard Moses and the Prophets as sowers, *would derange and disjoint the whole saying!* We may add that it is fundamentally and radically incorrect, for the relation of the preparatory Old Testament dispensation to the grace and gift of Christ revealed in the last days, is essentially different from that between seed and fruit.[1] That would require, as Olshausen rightly says,—*καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰσεληλύθαμεν*—and we instantly resent the impropriety of such words put into our Lord's lips. But Olshausen's escape from the difficulty by making Christ the Lord of the harvest, and not included either with sowers or reapers, is still less tolerable. Is He not to be classed among them who utters His *Ἐγώ* here with such emphasis, who had just been speaking of His own *ἔργον*, and who elsewhere exhibits Himself as *κατ' ἐξοχήν* the Sower?—Ever since I first read the Scriptures with opened eyes, and without ever having consulted any commentary, I have found Christ alone in the Sower of this passage; and I now find that such men as Herder, Tholuck, Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius agree with me. The *ἄλλοι* is used simply to pursue the proverb (with the same humble concealment of the *ἐγώ* which we often find in connection with its strongest and most impressive prominence in reality); the contrast is set forth in the plural, just as for the same reason *ὁ θερίζων*, ver. 37, is in the singular; in the application, however, there is but one sower, the others all reaped; for it is He only who *sendeth* them all, and appointeth them their labour. Previously in ver. 36 the various sowers and reapers are embraced in one in the kingdom of God, but that is only the first application to what had preceded; the same relation is now interpreted more profoundly, though such progressive *deepening* of

[1] I cannot retract this, notwithstanding Luthardt's express opposition, and must once more put it to him whether the general notion of "preparation" can possibly square with the profound conception here given of *seed* sown for a harvest. Even Sepp, though he does not forget to press the text into the service of his Catholicism—"The Mosaic economy is here represented as the school of Christianity, so that its priests are now merged in the priests of the new covenant"—yet abolishes his own exposition by his avowal—"yet that only *prepared the soil*, but Christ Himself was *the sower*."

the same figure Lange very unjustly terms a *medley* of various figures.

Christ Himself and alone is in truth not only the sower, but also *the seed* which yieldeth much fruit, the glorious *corn of wheat*, ch. xii. 24—to which passage Tholuck very properly refers, and Schleiermacher also, led to it probably by the passion-season in which he was preaching. As the Lord had already included in τελειώσω, ver. 34, a prospective glance at His coming *passion*, the decisive crisis of His work; so now it is of deep significance that it is even this agony of preparatory labour—the bloody seed-time of the future great harvest—that is the object of His anticipating *joy*. Schleiermacher says properly: "We may say, not only that He *was* sown, but as He voluntarily gave up His life, that He *did* Himself sow Himself; and of Him only in the fullest sense of the word, we may say that He *sowed*." How otherwise would the final *consummation* be His own, if all that we can do had not sprung from His perfect sacrifice of Himself? Yes, he alone had the great *labour* to achieve—the essential, and untransferable, and unmatched labour. Κόπος and ἔργον are closely connected together in this discourse, as end and beginning—just as they often are. Here we have the preparatory work κατ' ἐξοχήν, before which every other similar relation vanishes away. The more profoundly we carry back our investigations into the history of the spread of the Christian church, the more certainly are we convinced of a foundation of grace upon which every work has been built up; and which alone has rendered it possible to be accomplished; and the ultimate foundation of all this grace is the one great gift of grace which Christ has sown in humanity. And here there is another and final antithesis in the figure: it would *seem* to be true conversely that it is ourselves who would have the labour of sowing, but assuredly there must have been fruit, harvest-recompense of the Lord's great sowing, in order that apostles might be able to sow: the simplest prayer of a child—Thy kingdom come! is no less than the production of His spirit. From the time that His work was accomplished, there has been nothing but increase of the joy; they have joyed before Him according to the joy in harvest, and as men rejoice when they divide the spoil, Isa. ix. 3. All this will manifestly come to an

end at the great *rejoicing together* in eternal life. Before *this* transcendent sense of the words, which embraces in the apostles all future reapers, and extends over the whole period of the kingdom of God into the depths of eternity, that restricted application of them almost disappears—however true in itself—which refers the prophecy to *Samaria*, and that later and richer harvest in Acts viii.

Let us now glance over the whole, and dispose it in order. The subject of the testimony here uttered is the true gift of Christ to those whom He sends forth, or the *labour* of the Sower for His after reapers, who will finally *rejoice* together with Him. This is pursued by two *figures* (meat—seed and harvest), and through three *antitheses*.

First: Christ's *meat* as the Sower, springing from the food which had been offered Him, and which He instantly turns to a figure. This leads to the enigmatical, and awakening contrast or *antithesis* of ver. 32. Then the explanation, ver. 34, which thus paves the way for what follows:—This meat is my *joy*, to sow for an eternal harvest—now the word, hereafter my life itself. Rejoice *ye* (my companions in this work) with Me!

Secondly: The joy of those whom he sends with Himself, as the joy of *the reapers with the sower:* with the wider glance over the fields, which present an image as well as an *antithesis* of the great reality. Transitional starting-point, which has the *immediate present*, the coming Samaritans, only in the foreground: lift up your eyes *aright*, it is other than it seems! ver. 35. Then the solution of the mystery in that *universal* glance over the whole futurity visible to His eye—so shall *every* reaper one day rejoice with the Sower! ver. 36—and that holds good in the highest sense between Me and you, vers. 37, 38 (third antithesis with the sowing-labour of His sent apostles, which though it is real labour, yet turns into no other than the joy of harvest!)

THE TWO SAYINGS TO THE NOBLEMAN. THE DESIRE FOR SIGNS AND WONDERS BLAMED. ASSURANCE, NEVERTHELESS, OF THE MIRACLE WROUGHT.

(Jno. iv. 48, 50.)

The section of the Gospel which begins at chap. ii. 23, finds its appropriate general close, when the faith of the Samaritans is exhibited as an example of true *faith* in contrast with that of those who believed at Jerusalem on account of the miracles. This brings out a point of view in which Nicodemus (chap. iii. 2) and the Samaritan woman, are opposed one to the other. The preparatory faith *on the testimony of another*[1] is somewhat nobler and more spiritual, it leads immediately to the Lord Himself; hence St John, ch. iv. 39, anticipates εἰς αὐτόν as the result, and describes emphatically the μαρτυρεῖν of the woman, just as in chap. i. 7, 15. These put faith in a sinful woman, the Jews believe not even the Baptist! That faith in the word of man as such, (first, ver. 39, λόγος, but then recurring as λαλιά, before the λόγος αὐτοῦ, vers. 41, 42) could only exist for the interim; and in 1 Kin. x. 7 we find a certain wholesome impulse of unbelief derived from it.[2] The first fruit of it was the coming to Jesus Himself, to whom the testimony pointed; then follows, in the case of these sincere Samaritans (who appear, like guileless Nathanael, Israelites indeed) the true *experimental faith* in the *Saviour of the world.* This object of faith they did not so much derive from their books of Moses (Gen. xlix. 10, according to Grotius), as from the words of Jesus to themselves which are not recorded. The addition ὁ Χριστός is to be rejected from the text, according to Lachmann and Tischendorff: the Samari-

[1] As St Augustine very justly laid claim to Jno. iv. 39, 42, on behalf of instruction from *authority.*

[2] Thus much is true of the distinction between λαλιά and λόγος. But Braune certainly goes too far when he understands the former as a word of depreciation, as if the woman's words were described as talk without connection, mere gossip! For they confess themselves to have *believed* her words, which is very different from disregard. The woman "disappears from the evangelical history," but only as all other subordinate persons disappear. Her conversion is not thereby denied.

tans do not utter this word at once, although the woman's testimony had included it. The Lord Himself had given them His own greater and deeper ἐγώ εἰμι, reserving, however, the actual name of Messiah.

Another, and a new section follows in the Gospel, extending to the close of the sixth chapter. Jesus as the Son, who is equal with the Father, is Himself life, and gives life to all who believe on Him! This is testified by three miracles, and their accompanying discourses. In connection with the first (and building immediately upon the foundation already laid) the mere desire of seeing wonders in opposition to the heartfelt impulse of need, and the apprehension of the real purpose of the *signs* which flows from that sense of need, is strongly condemned. In relation to the second miracle, the Lord Himself interprets the *miracle* as a *sign*, announces the spiritual *quickening* influence of the Son in the unity and likeness of the Father, and refers to the *testimony of His works* to this in unison with other *testimonies* in themselves amply sufficient to faith. With the third miracle, finally, the seeking of mere wonders (misunderstood signs!) is sharply contrasted with the *inward need of man's heart, and its satisfaction in Christ*, testified in the declaration that He is the *bread* of life, which the Father gives to the world from heaven.[1]

Thus much we may at least premise for this general glance, which will shed its confirming light upon the exposition of the individual discourses. Jesus came once more out of Judea, where He had performed the miracles at the feast, into *Galilee*, where He had changed the water into wine at Cana. The Galilæans who had *seen* what, scarcely a year ago, He had done, receive Him with hospitality and with some sort of faith: this gives the point of view in which the Evangelist places what follows, the contrast, namely, between the Galilæan faith through miracles with the Samaritan faith of the heart. In *Cana*, where the Lord probably visited the wedded pair, He might be supposed to gather the harvest of the seed sown, but it is a very limited one. There comes to him a man, who painfully repre-

[1] We do not give up this self-justifying arrangement on account of Luthardt's, according to which ch. iv. should close the first great section, and our carrying on the last narrative to the following appears an entire misapprehension—but we will not earnestly dispute about this.

sents to him the Galilæan generally, and in addition to that, the man of eminence, the Herodian. *Βασιλικός* in the most common signification and its usage in Josephus, is a royal official (Syr. עַבְד מַלְכָא), in all probability of Herod who was styled *Βασιλεύς*.[1] He has a son, probably his only heir (Bengel—ut articulus videtur inferre), whose malady, according to all appearance unto death, drives him to the miracle-worker whose presence in Cana had come to his ears. This is assuredly a germ of faith though a very unsatisfactory one, and now we perceive how the wisdom and the love of our Lord aid this man to the attainment of a true and perfect faith. We read *two words* addressed to him: first, the *preparatory word of instruction*, on account of which St John records the incident; then the *accomplishing, miraculous word of power.*

Ver. 48. The Lord now, as ever, responds to the inward disposition of mind which He instantly penetrated; and, as often happened, under the appearance of severity, in reality made the applicant susceptible of much better things than he came to desire. We need not estimate von Gerlach's question whether the Lord was not now justified, after a longer manifestation of His power, in seeking and requiring a purer faith as the fruit of the signs which He had wrought; for however applicable this might be in general, it would scarcely apply to this courtier, who must be supposed to have been a stranger to our Lord's wonderful works. The most immediate ground of His reply must be sought, as His words indicate, in the sad perception He had of the difference between these Jews, especially Galilæans, and the Samaritans from whom He had just come.[2] To these latter the one *σημεῖον* of the word of a prophet disclosing the secrets of their heart and life had been enough; but in Galilee there must be *τέρατα* also. I freely concede to my recent critic Münchmeyer that the miracle is not to be despised, and that there is a *relative* necessity for them in order to our faith, since

[1] The regulus of the Vulg. which does not presuppose, but has occasioned the reading *βασιλίσκος*, appears to mean a royal prince. Why Nonnus has *ἰθύνων στρατιήν* in his paraphrase, does not appear.

[2] Pfenninger invents the circumstance of some sick having been healed at Sychar, but very unnecessarily, and in express contradiction to the enumeration in ver. 54.

the Lord acknowledged this by working the miracles; but I cannot admit, as he contends, that there is an *absolute* necessity, for the Lord Himself speaks elsewhere (ch. x. 38, xiv. 11), of a higher order of faith which rests not upon the demonstration of miracles, and gave the preference to that. I do think, indeed, that the word to the woman which so marvellously unlocked the secrets of her heart, was also a miracle —but it was no τέρας. The conjunction of σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα, which in St John is only found here, and in St Matthew and St Mark only once (Matth. xxiv. 24; Mark xiii. 22; and in both cases very noteworthily of the deceivers!)[1] is in the same sense to be understood as we find from Deut. xiii. 1 downwards in many passages of the Old Testament אוֹת and מוֹפֵת combined yet significantly distinguished: it is *here* and not in profane writers that the usage is to be sought and explained. We must refer, as Gesenius properly says, מוֹפֵת to the external side of the wonder—splendide, pulchre factum, portentum. The distinction which Klee cites from Origen very aptly hits the point: τέρας being the extraordinary manifestation in itself, but σημεῖον pointing to its internal significance; with which it well consists that things not in themselves miraculous may by the word of God become *signs*. We are astonished at τέρατα and marvel only, but when the wonder becomes a sign, we *believe*. Yet this believing as the result of seeing is an impure and undesirable faith, instead of which the Lord everywhere desired the faith of the sinner as springing from heartfelt need, and resting on His word without the necessity of miracles. This is the profound truth which the saying now uttered discloses, a saying which of itself and alone indicates the true meaning and the right position of the miracle. That the man who receives this word is a Jew, follows necessarily from the *Ye* in which he is classed and included. Ye Jews generally, ye Galilæans in particular, thou and all thy fellows, and more than this as Rieger preaches—"Ye men of the world," or with Oetinger—"ye

[1] As Luthardt mentions against Schweizer's criticism of the "unjohannean" expression. We add, that τέρας or τέρατα alone, never occurs in the whole of the Gospels, and only in the New Testament at Acts ii. 19 as a quotation.

courtiers and politicians!" The Jews require a sign (1 Cor. i. 22), as we see that they did at Jerusalem (ch. ii. 18); and a condemnation of this *seeking after miracles* is evidently the general and primary starting-point of our Lord's word (in Nonnus μῦθος νεμεσήμων); nor can we succeed in evading this, though the more direct application to the case of this βασιλικός penetrates deeper. Ebrard says that "Jesus did *not* condemn his desiring a sign, but *only* that he did not believe on Himself before he came to the point of being constrained to ask it," but we must be permitted to say instead of *not* and *only*—that Jesus *not merely* condemned the former, but also the latter *in addition*. For where else would be the included reference to the others, who must be the Galilæans as opposed to the Samaritans? And indeed the Lord does not at first concede to the slight and need-enforced faith with which the man sought the last Physician and demanded a sign, the character of faith at all, for He says—οὐ μὴ πιστεύσητε. There was something like this in the nobleman's meaning—"if thou restorest my son to health, *then* will I believe in thee!" Thus without a sign he would not—and even when they saw signs and wonders, even then the Jews believed not! chap. xii. 37. Hence Schleiermacher keenly remarks that the Lord took care not positively to say, contrary to experience—signs and wonders will draw you to faith. We note the progress of the sense thus—unless ye have *signs*, and even *wonders*, and even these to be *seen* by yourselves. For there are other signs than wonders, and other wonders than visible. Thus this word in the beginning is similar to that final word to Thomas, chap. xx. 29.

It confuses these plain words, to interpret unnecessarily the Lord's saying as blaming this man's supposition of a necessity on the Lord's part to come down in person in order to the healing of his son.[1] Mary and Martha even thought that if the Lord had been there, He would have helped; and Jesus wondered at and celebrated the peculiar faith of the centurion, Matt. viii, 8; we cannot therefore suppose that He blamed, what He after-

[1] Pfenninger—"Unless I stand before you, to perform signs and wonders before your very eyes!" So Luther in his sermon—"His faith does not reach so far as to believe that Jesus could give healing, not present."

wards yielded to, for He goes down as requested. A "rebuke of the unbelief which distrusted His healing at a distance,"[1] cannot be reconciled with the Lord's benignity, which never too soon required too much. It is quite another thing to interpret the thought, not actually expressed in the words but lying at their foundation—and if *thou*, in particular, hadst not been driven by *need* to seek the last aid, which might possibly be granted, from Me, the worker of miracles, even thou wouldst hardly have asked it of me! We may take it for granted that this man required this earnest saying; that with all his right feeling he took it ill, not that he found the Lord so disposed to look back upon the conduct of the Samaritans, but that knowing his heart so well, He should, notwithstanding, not suppress these words. Lange's view is altogether too harsh—"He certainly could not place Himself at the command of great rulers, who might suppose that *in their necessity they could employ Him as a wonderful Healer*, without declaring themselves in His favour and submitting to His influence." For such folly as this could hardly have entered the mind of any man; and if that had been the thought of this ruler, he would have been repelled with "Man, who made me your wonder-working physician?" Whereas the Lord can presently kindle the spark of his faith into a clear flame for all his family. Lange's other remark is better, and has its value for many similar incidents in the evangelical record, that the Lord opposes to the precipitate excitement and haste of the man, His own supreme self-possession and tranquillity. Compare, on this point, Matt. xiii. 26, where He first replies to the cry for help by words of tranquil instruction.

Let the folly for ever cease—which even Sepp stigmatizes as "Protestant"—of attempting to make this history and that of Matth. viii. 5—13, only two several accounts of the same circumstance. If that centurion of Capernaum was strong in faith, this nobleman's is so weak that the Lord at first speaks of him as having none at all. But He does not forthwith extinguish the glimmering flax (see Luther's translation of Is. xlii. 4); He rather unveils and condemns His unbelief in such a manner as to provoke him to a more energetic and striving faith. He has not

[1] Seiler, über die bewundernswürd. Thaten Jesu u. s. w. S. 41.

denied absolutely the signs and wonders for its help; He purposes only to tranquillize and humble the petitioner, to aid him to a proper consciousness of his position, and then to lead him by the ample and astounding help of His power, to a higher and nobler faith. It might seem that at first His words did not find access to his heart; for the nobleman continues to urge his impatient petition, concealing this time unbelief and doubt; it must be as he thinks, Jesus must be a physician on the spot, *else his child dies.*[1] But the influence of His word had seized upon the centre of his soul; not only will it recur in due time, but it gives him at once a very different impression of the serene, heart-testing, essentially heart-seeking might and majesty of the great worker of miracles, from that scanty measure of hope and trust which he had brought with him. The Lord's second word would scarcely have been responded to by faith had it been the first, but now the way is prepared for its effect.

Ver. 50. We cannot concur with Schleiermacher, that the Lord would not go down with the nobleman according to his wish, simply because it was contrary to His present plan, and He would not be diverted from it by such a request. His plan was no other than to be always ready to succour and to save, wherever and whithersoever He was desired; many a time did He give up His present purpose when a simple petition intervened. It is not in Himself but in the petitioner that we are to seek the reason of His thus and not otherwise responding to his prayer for healing. Lange assumes, contrary to the evident truth of the narrative and the analogy of all other such sayings of our Lord, a critical pause between the πορεύου and the ὁ υἱός σου ζῇ, so that the word falls into two words, the first of which plunges the man into the abyss of the reflection—He rejects me, He will not come down and help me! Oh no, the Lord has no other thought than to grant his desire. He does, indeed, make His word correspond with the twofold cry of the nobleman, but only that He may mightily stimulate and raise him to higher faith. *Go thy way*—I come not down, that is not needed! Thy son *liveth*—not *dies*, as thou in thine anxiety didst think! I know

[1] But that is a good token that he does not take ill the severe answer, does not make a petulant reply.

this better than thou! The Lord repeats the word of Elijah, 1 Kings xvii. 23, but without the *behold* of the then present and visible accomplishment. Not in the imperative *let him live!* for He meekly conceals His own might, as if it might be interpreted—Thou deceivest thyself, I know that he will recover. (Against which assumption, however, the Evangelist protests in the whole record down to ver. 54.) Nor in the future—*he will live*—for that might, on the one hand, have sounded too much like deferring the assurance of the boon, and on the other might have included too much in the promise for the future.

The result attests the wisdom, love, and power of the Lord. That the son at home is healed in the self-same hour in which the great word ζῇ is spoken at Cana is the lighter thing; the greater takes precedence, that the faith is secured before the miracle is wrought; the greatest of all, which crowns the whole, is the *faith*, in the last and fullest sense of the word, which only seldom is produced by any experience of miracles.[1] The man believed *the word*, it is said now as in ver. 41. The same words which the Lord had spoken meet him from the lips of his servants, assuring him of their accomplishment, and before the servants suspect the cause. The believing man asks another question, though he does not doubt, and only that he might enjoy all the more the assured reality—it was the self-same hour of yesterday.[2] A mere fulfilment of his request according to his own meaning and will would have scarcely made *this man* a disciple, but now and in the Lord's way not only is he, but his whole family with him, are healed of their sins.

[1] It is in order to pursue the process of unbelief overcome to its final point, that the Evangelist narrates all this so carefully; while Strauss only sees an anxiety to adjust the time "in order to establish the miracle."

[2] This *yesterday* is not an indication of the delay of a night in returning, but of the great speed of his going thither, since he had time enough left on the same day for part of the journey back. That χθές is said merely after sun-down (though Brückner admits it) we cannot possibly consent to.

THE THREE SAYINGS TO THE IMPOTENT MAN AT BETHESDA: AWAKENING, HELP, WARNING.

(Ch. v. 6, 8, 14.)

The nameless feast was that of Purim, as we have before asserted our conviction;[1] the visit to the Purim-festival on our Lord's part sprung from the same principle as the visit to the pool of Bethesda, that is, must be understood by reference to the same disposition of our Lord's mind. We are convinced that if Hengstenberg had gone as deeply into the entire problem of the evangelical harmony, as he has into the seventy weeks, he would not have so stoutly opposed the general consent of critics in favour of this being the feast of Purim. Wieseler shows very convincingly how contradictory it is to the established usage of the Evangelist in indicating the festivals, to understand the *Passover* here;[2] we add, moreover, that we cannot see how the Evangelist, after naming this indefinite ἑορτή (for it remains at least uncertain whether the certainly spurious article before it may be found in the τῶν which follows), could immediately again in ch. vi. 4 mention the *following* passover. It was just the enmity which was excited against Him in the days of the Purim, which induced our Lord not to remain in Jerusalem until Passover. But this omission of even one Passover shows us already that we must not regard the Lord's attendance upon the feasts in the external and legal point of view, and as

[1] The entire investigation is out of place here. Most of the ancients thought it the Pentecost—Cyrill., Chrys., Euthym., Theophyl. Then Erasm., Calv., Beza, Bengel, &c. Iren. assumed a second Passover, followed by Luther and many, especially Scaliger, with more recently Süskind, Paulus, Tholuck, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hengstenberg. Not to mention other suppositions, the Purim has been decided for by Keppler, Petavius, Lamy, Hug (more lately Lücke), Olshausen, Anger, Winer, Wieseler, Ebrard, Lange. It is out of the question, however, to leave the feast undecided.

[2] Though Neander defends this "most ancient view" on grounds that seem at first sight tenable, and the mystical and confused Sepp maintains it with great confidence.

part of the "fulfilling of all righteousness." He felt himself under the constraint of pure love at some time to participate in every feast and festival of the *Jewish people;* and it is more than probable that the Pentecost was not left altogether unregarded. Hence we can very well understand in general—however "strange" it may appear to Luthardt—that He should once (not by way of *preference!*) give His presence even to this feast, which Baumgarten-Crusius rather too unscrupulously stigmatizes as "crude in its *idea* and celebration." The position of the Book of Esther in the canon warrants us in recognizing a fundamental element of good in its original foundation, notwithstanding all the coarseness which gradually crept into its subsequent celebration. In attending this feast our Lord did not manifest any peculiar "respect and recognition" of the revengeful and extravagant spirit which animated it, but merely a frank kindness for every thing that concerned the Jewish people as such. Yea even the debauched manner in which these days of excess were spent,[1] contrary as it was to His affectionate feeling, would dispose Him once at least in His mercy, for compassionate intercession and blessing, to visit this melancholy caricature of a holy festivity.[2] Finally it was nowhere to be altogether avoided, and in Jerusalem first might it be connected with its original and true foundation. It was regarded as a "festival of the poor," hence it is quite in keeping that the Lord especially seeks out the place of the afflicted during the days of the feast; and we may safely say, in a typical reference, different from that according to which Hengstenberg (following Apollinarius of old) interprets the thirty and eight years of the impotent man like the five husbands of the Samaritan woman, that His visit to the Purim festival, and His visit to the pool of Bethesda are strictly connected together. Comp. Esth. ix. 22.

We will not, moreover, as we are hastening to *the words* of our

[1] We must not, however, attach too much weight, in that age, to the saying of the Talmud, that people were to drink till they could not distinguish any longer between the אָרוּר הָמָן and בָּרוּךְ מָרְדְּכָי (Buxt. Synag. cap. 29. pag. 559).

[2] If not also the lofty opinion of the Jews concerning this feast, which was afterwards thus expressed—the Thorah and the Megilleh of Esther alone will not be abolished by the Messiah.

Lord, permit ourselves to be led into any diffuse investigations as to the pool itself, and its attendant angel. The ἐστί (as Lücke has rightly acknowledged, comp. also Guericke's Introd.) gives no sure ground for supposing that this Gospel was written *before* the destruction of Jerusalem; although it stands strikingly enough between two preterites, contrasting with the κατέβαινεν, and yet seeming to say—the pool is still there, but the angel comes no more.[1] It does not affect the question, whether we supply after προβατικῇ (not reckoning the various readings), according to Nehemiah πύλῃ, or ἀγορᾷ, πλατείᾳ, χώρᾳ; the omission of πύλη, however, seems harsh, and we prefer to assume a market or open place, always connected with the sheep-gate. But the addition of the *angel* we cannot permit ourselves to give up, without far better proofs than any yet brought forward.[2] "This angel and his operation, which is altogether unscriptural, because not induced by any particular occasion, but fitful and capricious, we are happily rid of," says even Ebrard rejoicingly; but we are disposed rather to rejoice in a scriptural recognition of the profound doctrine of the influence and instrumentality of angels, fitful or not, in nature; a doctrine which Hofmann recently (Schriftbeweis i. 283 ff.) admits, with reference to this passage. We have only to refer, in order to vindicate the scripturalness of our text, to the word of Elihu in the ancient book of Job, ch. xxxvi. 32 (see v. Meyer's correction, and also his Bibeldeutungen S. 76, 77); as well as to the angel of the waters, Rev. xvi. 5.[3] A becoming reverence for Scripture will never admit that John wrote simply in conformity with the

[1] The ἐστί scarcely indicates (as Lange thinks) a much later period, when Jerusalem was in part restored again.

[2] The Syriac, Latin, Æthiopic, and Arabic versions have it; similarly the Fathers, such as Tertullian, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Cyril, Augustin; and even Lachmann holds it firm. Not only does ver. 7 absolutely require the *whole* addition; but it alone makes the whole intelligible. De Wette's reasons for its genuineness against many otherwise respected opponents, Brückner confirms and strengthens, although, alas, He only makes the Evangelist defer to a popular opinion.

[3] Luthardt's protest (Ev. Joh. i. S. 13, 14) is nothing decisive, for he only contends, through misapprehension, against the opinion (not maintained by me) that all individual impulses and energies of nature are connected with angels.

popular faith; this remarkable declaration seems rather to be an incidental disclosure of that great mystery, hidden from the people—the high power of the Son of God over the powers and energies of God's ministers in nature, themselves relatively miraculous (in Nonnus: *ἀγγελικαὶ δυνάμεις.*) A right discernment would probably, in many cases, speak even now of a true genius of the healing waters, to which multitudes resort, which could be detected by no chemical analysis.[1] It is remarkable, too, that *this* water healed diseases of *every* kind, yet, again, only in the case of those who first stepped in at the crisis of its bubbling forth; similarly the *κατὰ καιρόν* by no means indicates any thing periodical, and which might surely be anticipated, else why the long lying and waiting of the sick? Thus there are strong and plain indications in that part of the text which is uncontested, of something uncommon and profoundly mysterious.

The helping mercy of Christ, that working which like the Father's is incessant, is limited to no particular time. This Healer had visited the "house of mercy" in pure compassion; but no man appeals to Him for aid, the report of Him had not penetrated to this neglected place of mercy, or no one there yet knew His person. Yet the All-merciful cannot go away without leaving some *witness* of His power and of His love. Whom then does He choose out among many? There are some who think that the mystery of election is here shadowed forth; we only see that the most miserable and helpless is the selected one. He was a *man* (this expression, since ch. ii. 25, we find specific in St John) who had passed thirty years in sickness; though he had not lain there so long. Jesus *knew* this as soon as he *saw* him lie. Though St John leaves the thirty and eight years (as St Luke xiii. 16, the eighteen) indefinite in the simple *πολὺν ἤδη χρόνον*, yet, on the other hand (as in ch. vi. 15), he also connects the indefinite *γνούς* so closely with the *ἰδών*, as to leave no room for any information or detail of the period in the interval. It cannot be that he "came to know," even if we dispense with the addition *αὐτός* or *ἐν ἑαυτῷ* which Lücke thinks necessary. For

[1] This is not, however, mere "personified energy of nature," as Martensen's Dogmatik has it; against whose doctrine of angels we must be more on our guard than his critic Schöberlein seems to be, who deals out his praise with only slight qualification.

there were none others present, at this feast-time, than those who cared for their sick,—the ὄχλος, ver. 13, had only been called together by the rumour of the healing; now every sick man would have cried out for himself or his friend for him, this particular helpless one had to mourn that nobody cared for him. But he himself could not have yet told his own tale to Jesus, for St John gives us specifically the *beginning* of the conversation. The unprejudiced reader can find no place for information given to the Lord, between these ἰδών, γνούς, λέγει all compacted together in one. The Evangelist further connects this γνούς so closely with the following λέγει, that we cannot but interpret it—Although he knew that, He put the strange question; for He knew something more which afterwards became manifest; He perceived in His spirit his whole history, and the secret disposition of the man's mind.

We have now three words addressed to him by the Lord—the preparatory word which arouses his soul, ver. 6; the word of His mighty power, ver. 8; the ensuing word of exhortation, ver. 14, in which the Lord at the same time revealed Himself as the worker of miracles on the sabbath day against whom the Jews had protested.

Ver. 6. All who are here are waiting intently and longingly for their healing! Yet the Lord addresses to the man a question, such as never had been heard in this place before. It could not be spoken in mockery, and therefore must have been understood at first in its more obvious sense, afterwards disclosing its deeper meaning. We take the word according to the progressive stages of its meaning in His intention, just as we must ever do in such pregnant and condensed words of our Lord. First, in the ordinary sense of the appeal—wouldst thou not, art thou not here with an earnest desire to be made whole, thou unhappy man? So far it is only analogous with all those wondrous introductory words by which the Lord brings to consciousness the sense of need, and awakens faith by giving the presentiment of cure. But in connection with this, whatever the frivolity of folly may say against it, there is the aim to give beforehand all its importance to His help; for *Jesus*, in all healing whether of soul of body, must make *His own person* prominent, for His own honour as well as for man's salvation. But here was a man, who

in an especial manner needed to be aroused; and *in his case*, the three emphasized words which follow, profoundly studied, acquire a specific meaning. First—*wilt* thou in very deed? For, although we may not agree with Lange who characteristically says that "the man bore in his very *aspect* the stamp of a feeble will, of entire self-abandonment and prostration of mind," yet we must think that such was his character as penetrated by our Lord's glance. Hence Schleiermacher (Homilien über Joh. S. 323), sharply reproves him for having remained so long inert, instead of wholesomely using what little strength yet remained to him; which reminds us of the famous beggar of Woolston and Paulus, to whom the Lord in anger restored his legs. We do not think that it is intended to be intimated that our Lord rebuked his hopeless lying and waiting: yet he was a sluggish and dull-minded man (Richter—the opposite of that quick-witted one, ch. ix.), who, though he has in ver. 11, for once an appropriate word in his own defence, yet afterwards, ver. 15, deals in a manner half well-meaning, half thankless. Thus it is with emphasis—*Wilt* thou? And that *now?* Hast thou always willed it? *Thy will was* concerned in thy becoming thus, thou hast long atoned for that—hast thou now honestly done *all that thou couldst?* That might also mean—hast thou sought help in penitent prayer to God, who giveth this water? The answer seems to apprehend it all in an external sense, but it shows that the sting of conviction has been planted.[1]—If we go further, and emphasize the second word—*whole*, then does it *awaken* in the man, even if understood of bodily healing, a deep sense of the full idea of what a restoration from so long-standing a calamity must be; and thus the point of the question would be (though his dull mind might not apprehend it)—hast thou courage, confidence, and hope enough to admit that thou mayest be actually once more a sound man? And strong faith in order to that help which is now not far from thee? Finally, we may be sure that *the Lord Himself* would also silently think of that spiritual soundness which was alone worthy of the name; and might well therefore be supposed to emphasize also the last word γενέσθαι

[1] We are quite at one with Steinmeyer's excellent sermon on "*Wilt* thou be made whole?" at least in its substance.

(not ἰᾶσθαι), just as His final word closes the whole, ver. 14, pointedly referring *to this*.

The man, sunk into abject, despondent resignation to his fate, is somewhat stimulated by the question, but "his answer does not amount to a categorical desire to be cured" (Lange). Yea, not even to an *expression* of his presentiment—Wilt thou then help me, by waiting here, and bearing me in, or in what other way? But he merely *excuses himself*, and that with complaints against his neighbours, which though apparently not wanting in right, are passed over by the Lord without any recognition. (Steinmeyer). With depressed resignation he seems to say—Alas, with me it is all one, I *can* not be made whole. Every one here thinks only of himself or of his sick charge, but, wretch that I am, I *have no man*, who will without special friendship, and for nought but love and charity, take pity upon me![1]

Ver. 8. It is upon this utter helplessness of prostration, in the faint expression of which we can assume no more than a minimum of responding faith, that the thunder-cry of Divine power suddenly bursts in from the mouth of Jesus! A glorious type and prelude of that great saying, afterwards uttered—the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God and live! As in Matt. ix. 7, the arising and taking up of the bed is commanded—as an evidence to himself and to others of perfect cure, as a symbolical expression of victory over sickness (which is thus made a show of, as Ps. xli. 4, כָּל־מִשְׁכָּבוֹ הָפַכְתָּ), and, at the same time, in this case as well as in that other, to intimate the propriety of not all at once forgetting, in the midst of the highest joy, the bed upon which he had so long lain, and on which he had endured so much sorrow. Thus the Lord in this case suppresses the *leaping* which, inappropriate here, was quite in place at Acts iii. 8. Then, and only thus, is he to *walk;* ever mindful of his bed, that he be no more cast down upon it. We feel that in each of these three words there is a new element of secret exhortation; indeed without forcing the sense we may see the three words addressed to him at the first, reflected in these now

[1] Tesehendorff very inappropriately imagines that he was loathed and avoided by all on account of the notorious punishment of his sin! And with still less probability he puts into his mouth the sobbing outcry—"Alas, I justly suffer!"

spoken. *Rise*—corresponds with the first arousing of his will, ver. 6. *Take up thy bed*—is the index and expression of the present healing; and *walk* already points forward to that exhortation for the time to come which we find in ver. 14.

The Lord commandeth and it is done. But another consequence of the miracle appears among the ill-disposed Jews who, though they see the sign, yet will not believe. The Ἰουδαῖοι (in St John, as is well known, either οἱ ἄρχοντες simply, or something similar), reflect upon the man that was healed the violation of the Sabbath! Upon the man, however, who had been most *wonderfully* enabled to rise up from a bed of long-sickness, as he himself and all the people, attest—else would they have more sharply rebuked him than by the simple οὐκ ἔξεστί σοί. Upon the man who had been healed *by Jesus*, as these reprovers would easily suppose,—else would they very probably not have reproved him at all. For prophets and workers of miracles had from the beginning possessed a recognized command over the Sabbath. Now although the healed man might not know the precise ordinances which prescribed their immunity, he replies to the unexpected objection and counter-command as if in the high impulse given to his whole being his understanding had seized it, and refers to a prophet's authority as a matter of course. He that *made me whole* (not who healed me—but who as the further result of His mighty word made me a sound man again) the same said unto me, and with the same command—take up thy bed and walk! *This* was the mighty word which made me whole, thus he commanded me to *rise up*, and should I continue to lie there? Should I not hearken to such a worker of wonders and witness to his work? Is not that without further ado account enough of it? The Jews feel how incontrovertible the plain answer is, they desist from any farther reflection upon the healed man, and proceed to turn their attack upon the original cause of this wrong. They assume to be quite unfamiliar with His person, speaking of Him as ὁ ἄνθρωπος, whereas it was perfectly well-known to every one that no man but Jesus of Nazareth performed such wonderful works. They malignantly leave out the main point when they *omit* to say—what man is that which *made thee whole*. *They* knew very well who it was, but the healed man knew not; for as the ὄχλος

accumulated on occasion of the cure the Lord withdrew Himself; the man was at the first moment busy about himself and his bed, so that his helper did not meet his eye. None of those who stood around would say—it was Jesus, as Teschendorff this time well observes.

Ver. 14. The Lord understands all this, and will not now withdraw from the accusation; it was for the sake of this public acknowledgment of His ἐργάζεσθαι, as well as for a retrospective exhortation to the man himself, that He uttered His third word. He findeth him in the temple, a circumstance which might indicate that the man's mind was turned to God in gratitude; yet was this feeling not firmly rooted enough, it needed to be encouraged. Roos remarks very pertinently that Jesus could not further reveal Himself to the healed man, inasmuch as He perceived in him none of that capacity and fitness for it which He discerned in the blind man; He therefore only gave him "the general exhortation" which we read. We may observe, however, that this exhortation, when deeply studied, has nothing "general" in it. The first word of it does not simply run as in the German, siehe zu! look to it! so that a warning would be sounded in the midst of his new happiness,—in that sense we find ὅρα, ὁρᾶτε, βλέπετε. But the ἴδε points first, in the sense of a graciously confirming הִנֵּה, to the healing which he had experienced; but then passes over presently into a warning, which is spoken with a three-fold progression of profound, symbolical, and far-reaching meaning. Thou art physically "made whole" through great mercy, even as through earlier *sinning* it was thy will to be sick; sin no more, lest, in relapsing into bodily infirmity, a *worse thing* come unto thee, that is, first of all, the sharper, bitterer experience which a severer punishment of heavier guilt would entail upon thee, after having tasted the blessedness of health. The second punishment might be harder than even the first to bear! This is the first meaning, to which, however, we cannot be content to restrict it, any more than the man who heard the words afterwards did. See, this is soundness of body which thou now dost so joyfully experience; thy sickness came from thy *sinning*, it is sin that makes sick, it is itself the *worse sickness of the soul.* Guard then against that; that would be a much worse thing, even if thy body remained

sound, especially the relapse into sin after so much discipline and grace! That would be much worse than thirty and eight years' bodily suffering, which, indeed, thou canst not again undergo! and thus we arrive at the last meaning, which makes the whole say, with its commencement included, a symbolical word for every saved and converted sinner—just like that to the adulteress, ch. viii. 11. It graciously recognizes the man's thankfulness towards God, which prompted him to go to the temple, as a spiritual cure, and confirms him in it; but by that critical χεῖρόν τι (comp. Matt. xii. 45) it points to the frightful relapse which must here be cautiously guarded against. Further, observe these two things—that the Lord knows the man's life of sin before the sad thirty and eight years began; and also the gentle lamentation in the μηκέτι (not μὴ πάλιν, δεύτερον) over his continuance in "sin" throughout his long sickness;[1] thus showing that *now first* in his unmerited physical cure, is his *soul made whole.* (Then might it have been more appropriately said to this sick man—See, in and by this sickness thou hast been made whole!)

TESTIMONY TO THE JEWS: CONCERNING THE OPERATION OF THE SON, IN THE UNITY OF THE FATHER; IN QUICKENING AND IN JUDGMENT; THE PUNISHMENT OF UNBELIEF IN THE FATHER'S TESTIMONY; APPEAL TO THE SCRIPTURES AND MOSES.

(Ch. v. 17, 19—47.)

In vers. 15, 16 we see the harmlessness of a weak mind, and the malice of self-willed wickedness, set one against the other. For it is a marvel to us how Schleiermacher can make his pointing out Jesus to the Jews an evidence of the man's "hardness of heart and utter reprobation of mind." We cannot even agree with the Berlenb. Bibel in thinking it a very "suspicious circumstance" that the man, instead of cleaving to his benefactor, goes

[1] Not, as Teschendorff prematurely interprets the Lord's meaning,—what fruit these thirty-eight years might have borne!

straightway to the Jews to curry favour with them. We rather think it quite in harmony with his character, as exhibited in the whole narrative, that he thus exhibits a combination of good intention and weakness of mind. The ἀπῆλθεν intimates some slight disapprobation of the inappropriateness and inconsiderateness of the act, but nothing more. It is evident from his indirect saying, that his intention was not to denounce Jesus: it is not,—He that commanded me to take up my bed is Jesus, but —He that *made me whole.* He thus holds fast to his first justification, ver. 11, but does not observe, in his shortsightedness, the symptoms of lurking enmity which threatened his benefactor: he now, as in his first answer to Jesus, has only himself and his own justification in view—now they must settle it with this Jesus! And as soon as he openly declares what the questioners knew very well already, the enmity already existing in their hearts, bursts out in an actual διώκειν. It comes in, as the issue and aim of the whole introductory historical narration, and as the preface to the subsequent great testimony of Jesus—Therefore did the Jews persecute Jesus, and sought to slay him, because he had done *these things* on the Sabbath day.[1] The ταῦτα with the διὰ τοῦτο are set down by the Evangelist not without ironical allusion to the folly and audacity of the Jews in merging this most eminent and notorious miracle into a mere ποιεῖν ἐν σαββάτῳ, compare the τοῦτο in Acts iv. 7. But this only brings into more glorious relief the sublime wisdom and long-suffering love of our Lord, which does not instantly chastise their perverseness, but entering into their objection repays their malignity with words of superabounding grace, unfolding to them all that they needed to know in order to their salvation (ver. 34), though He full well knows that they will not yield to Him, and that they will not believe. May we assume here any previous questioning of Jesus, or any thing like a judicial inquiry? Lange supposes some official forms, with a probable summons before the lesser Sanhedrim; and appeals to the ὑμεῖς ἀπεστάλκατε, ver. 33, which however is not decisive, for it might be said of the members of the Sanhedrim in their private capacity. We agree with Lücke

[1] Roos thinks that they were disposed to deal gently with the healed man, because of his imbecility of spirit—but that is too strongly expressed, for he had justified himself in his way with much intelligence.

that what follows does not by any means favour the supposition that Jesus was standing before a tribunal. And the *διώκειν*, even if in the Greek it occurs *sensu forensi*, would be here when connected with the *μᾶλλον ζητεῖν ἀποκτεῖναι* but a strange expression to designate a judicial procedure; and, moreover, the Lord would scarcely, in the presence of the official Rulers, have spoken in a style which omitted all recognition of their office, with so much direct attack upon their consciences and rebuke to their hearts as individuals simply. Assuredly He stood and spoke here *in statu confessionis* before the constituted authorities and representatives of the Jews, but nothing more. Finally, we do not even think it necessary to assume that these *Ἰουδαῖοι* opened the conversation by any direct challenge; that they urged their questions and complaints by referring to the rest of the Father Himself on the Sabbath. If any thing of this kind had preceded which would explain the first clause of ver. 17, St John would not have omitted to mention it; according to our conviction the *ἀπεκρίνατο* only records an *anticipatory* commencement of the attack on the part of Jesus.[1]

Ver. 17. This word at one stroke lays bare the inmost heart of the question at issue, or to speak with Neander, "grasps the very roots of the error." Very far now, as ever, from opposing the Sabbath as an institution, or giving the slightest hint of an approaching abrogation of it, the Lord rather penetrates and clearly exhibits the true, scriptural idea of the Sabbath, in opposition to the blind externality of the Jewish interpretation, that, namely, which could give rise to the contention between the schools of Hillel and Schammai—as to whether the sick might be comforted on the Sabbath! He goes up at once to the foundation of the Sabbath, and the principle of it in God's rest after creation, as given by Moses in the beginning of the Scripture: but He is very far from correcting, much more from contradicting, this Mosaic word—as some shortsighted expositors have thought. We know with what respect He ever quoted and expounded the holy words given at the beginning of things—see for example Matt. xix. 4. But He corrects that childish misapprehension

[1] See the second volume on Matt. xii. Whether this allegation of Sabbath-breaking was the *first* which had occurred, cannot be absolutely settled, but it is scarcely probable.

which could imagine inactivity in God, and thence adhere so rigidly and stiffly to entire inactivity in the Sabbath of man, of which God's Sabbath was the exemplar. The designedly chosen expression ἐργάζεσθαι, undoubtedly, first of all indicates "id quod sabbato vetitum;" but only, that is, what the Jews had falsely forbidden, and therefore charged against Jesus, by no means what God had expressly forbidden to Israel. The first fundamental thought is rather a protest against the folly which would absolutely exclude all ἐργάζεσθαι, all *activity* or energy from the Sabbath. We must at the outset make a threefold distinction, if we would penetrate the Lord's word thoroughly:—first is the *Jewish* Sabbath proper, which as a portion of the types and shadows of the intermediate ritual law, must cease; the Sabbath of *the decalogue*, which with the decalogue itself retains all its inviolability for all mankind, and only in Christianity can find its full perfection as an external ordinance working from within outwardly; finally, the *paradisaical* Sabbath of man before the Fall, which was most directly related to the archetypal rest of God, although appointed by the Creator in conformity with man's nature even there, as a needful alternation of the inward with the outward, and of rest with labour. The first and second the Lord leaves untouched, for their own domain and time: He only slightly connects His words even with the third, in order to rise immediately to that *Sabbath of God* which began with the end of creation, and from then ἕως ἄρτι has continued, in order to vindicate for *it* and with *the Son's right* for Himself, an unbroken ἐργάζεσθαι. For *here* utterly disappears all antithesis of work and festival which held good in creaturely life, whether under the labour-curse of sin or in the time of grace; here the Father keepeth His Sabbath by His very energy in all His works—generally in conservation, and after the Fall in saving and restoring. The rest of God is no mere inactivity; but, to speak in the fashion of the Jews (and thus to demonstrate their error by their own words) He himself *breaks* continually His great Sabbath. Bengel: si non operatur, ubi esset ipsum sabbatum? Braune: if God had rested as the Jews rested on the Sabbath—no sun would have shone, no flowers would have bloomed, all creation would have languished, and the universe been dissolved. He "imparts to nature her invigorating forces," as Herder expresses

it, causes the rain to fall and fruits to grow, yea even the waters of Bethesda to bubble forth on the Sabbath, so that no Jew might have been held unrighteous in descending for cure, yea, even would have waited for it on the Sabbath-day. And with more immediate reference to the present case:—He doeth good and maketh sound, else must the sick man whom God's help, sought or experienced on the Sabbath, has healed, tarry upon his sick couch still. And in addition to all that we have already embraced, there arises the great thought which, though not expressed and only *indicated*, brings out the profoundest contrast with the Jewish misconception, that this working *of God* does not by any means break or disturb the divine rest.[1] The incontrovertible principle is thus established for *our* Sabbath, for the Jewish in some sense, but much more for the Christian, that a mere οὐκ ἐργάζεσθαι can never be the meaning and design of the institution, but—as every copy must harmonize with its exemplar—that the Sabbath is ordained for all kind of work that man can do in imitation of God. For this is the goal to which the saints must aspire, to enjoy in God the ceaseless rest of worshipping festivity, and to do in God the unresting work of goodness—like the four living creatures around the throne, in Rev. iv. 8. The *main point*, however, to which the Lord's words hasten, through all these meanings, in the first clause, is this alone:—that He marks *Himself* out as the *Son* from the rest of mankind, who, relatively speaking, must yet rest; and with a transcendent and unshared right arrogates to *Himself alone* for the present the deep, full truth of the Sabbath rest, that sublime unity of a festal labour in God, which, while it transfigures and glorifies, abolishes the Sabbath. This is the σκάνδαλον of His words, too high for their Jewish mind, but which they must hear—My Father, *and I also!* With equal right, in the same manner, unrestingly doing the works of God

[1] Thus much is true. But the favourite formula of *philosophy*, that "creation and preservation cannot be separated in God," following which Bruch, for example (Stud. u. Krit. 1848. 3. S. 566), interprets the Lord's words to mean that God's creation is an eternal work, is *false*, for in that case the rest of God from and in His works, of which Heb. iv. 10 so profoundly speaks, would have no reality. It is not a mere anthropomorphism, but our great σαββατισμός is a copy of the Divine.

in the world. (Chap. ix. 3, 4.) Teschendorff well says: "Can the Sabbath be better sanctified than in doing the works of God? and was it not proof of its being a work of God, that the healed man took up his bed and walked?" And because this work already gave its testimony, sign, and proof, the Lord could, though in the mildest form, administer reproof to His opponents; and then preserving silence concerning it, pass on to simple *assertion* and maintenance of the truth. Do ye not see that I work even as the Father, that the Father in me hath wrought this work, and therefore that I am *the Son?* Thus does He perseveringly connect His own great testimony with the conviction which was already wrought, and only opposed through unbelief—this man Jesus calleth God His Father, He is the expected Messiah, the Son of God come among men! By this He once more lays down the *thema* of the discourse which He now enters upon, as of all His testimonies concerning His own person; if they yielded to this κἀγώ as flowing from the πατήρ μου, there would be no more contention about breaking the Sabbath, but the question would be their own salvation, and all would be won. *The Father* and *the Son* in personal distinction, but in indivisible unity of nature—is the theme that runs through the whole of the discourse thus occasioned by their enmity, and the whole is but the continuation and expansion of the first sentence. "The Father remaineth Father, and the Son His Son, each maintains His dignity," but at the same time—the working and the honour of the Father and of the Son, *are but one*, even as the Father and the Son are one.

The Jews—darkened as were their minds—understood this luminous word full well; infinitely better, indeed, than a certain philosophy of our own day which is for ever in vain spelling out the mystery, or rather throwing disguises over it, and has never yet discovered *who Jesus was.*[1] They take their πατέρα ἴδιον (in the personal, incommunicable and unshared sense, as in Rom. viii. 32) from His πατήρ μου, their ἴσον τῷ θεῷ rightly enough

[1] In which theology we do not class the orthodox Scripture-interpretation of Hofmann, although in "Son of God," and ἴσον τῷ θεῷ in this place, we would fain find very much more than he admits (Schriftbeweis i. 116).

from His κἀγώ.[1] But now comes in their *self-willed* and perverse *misunderstanding*, for they begin with ἔλεγε, but instead of continuing with λέγων they go on to say ποιῶν—and it is in this word that the pith of their contradiction is to be sought. For, as the Lord sets out from the assumed testimony to the truth of His λέγειν, so they set out from that axiom which their unbelief is bent upon holding fast—*that he was only man.* (Chap. x. 33). And under this determined prejudice everything that He says rises or is perverted into a presumptive blasphemy, of which stoning was the due penalty. The vindication of himself was to them incomparably worse than the original offence, the λύειν τὸ σάββατον.[2] They place in the ἑαυτόν a created man in full antithesis with God; they pass over altogether the υἱός which sprung out of the πατήρ; they regard the ἴσον τῷ θεῷ, if I may so speak, in a Swedenborgian sense, as it were a Deus-homo; and elevate the plain λέγειν into a horrible and blasphemous ποιεῖν ἑαυτόν. We must leave it undecided whether the ἐζήτουν ἀποκτεῖναι only indicates the rising of their murderous desires, or whether with Tischendorff we should supply some outcry—"Stone him! stone him!" We prefer the former supposition, since in the latter case the Evangelist would not have omitted to mention it, as the taking up of stones in chs. viii. 59 and x. 31. Amid such opposition and misunderstanding the Lord proceeds to make His first word the text of a continuous discourse, which, if not immediately depending upon it, yet certainly followed immediately upon it as its development; and it is a marvellous circumstance "that the Lord could go through so long a discourse, which would hardly be tolerated in the consistorial courts of our day."[3] Pfenninger makes his Nathanael relate, that "all, evil and good, were constrained to listen to Him, and let Him go on uninterrupted. And yet they were so filled with malice as to make us fear that they would not suffer Him to say a word!"

[1] In which the Lord did by no means *merely* "claim for Himself an equal right over the Sabbath!"

[2] But we must not say that then "they let go the first charge quickly enough"—for that would imply their acknowledgment of the justification given.

[3] As the Berlenburger Bible naively remarks.

That most venerable father in Christ, Inspector Zeller,[1] calls this discourse "a testimony of Jesus to Himself which is without parallel in the evangelical history," and then goes on to bear his own testimony thus:—"that which Jesus knew in His most internal divine self-consciousness, and uttered thus out of His perfect knowledge, we must receive in our hearts and let *ripen there* into the ever-increasing light and power of a living apprehension; not by any developments of the ideas which our own understandings may elaborate, but by receiving the living impressions of His single works and of His entire working, the living impressions produced by a believing perception of the full harmony between the testimony of God in Scripture and the whole personality of Jesus; thus arriving at the great mystery of blessedness—God manifest in the flesh." We take these noble words of a theologian, who, though belonging to no academical order, is yet taught of God, as the norm and *limit* of our humble exposition. We rejoice that at least in a certain degree the time is come for unbiassed hearing and reading the sayings of our Lord, even in scientific theology, and that we are free in some degree from rationalist and dogmatic tormenting of words alone. Yet there is misunderstanding enough left; and it is our endeavour to remove this, and to lead *hearts* and *consciences* to experience, through right understanding, the living ἐξουσία of the testimony which lies before us. We seek nothing more; for who could think of exhausting a chapter like this, which gives us the whole true dogmatic concerning the person of Christ, the full plan of salvation for every individual soul, as well as the entire history of the world and the church down to the last day, the confirming aggregate of all the testimonies of the Father to the Son in work, and word, and Scripture, the fundamental and radical exposure and conviction of all unbelief?

Ver. 19. The *Son* who worketh in the unity of the Father, this *Son of man* who before our eyes testifies of Himself as the *Son of God*, doeth generally (in a continual Sabbath) *no other than the works of God*. Many signs like this last had He exhibited to them, as and because the *Father* had showed and given

[1] Monatsblatt von Beuggen, 1844, in which Numbers 11 and 12 expound the whole discourse. Would that many of our theologians would give heed to the expositions of this Monatsblatt.

them to *Him*. But these preliminary signs are slight in comparison of those *greater* works, which should and will indeed excite your wonder. This is the commencement of His words, provoking them to a wholesome marvelling and belief, arousing their hearts and understandings by a most exciting, yet clear and serene, declaration. But He allows no time for questioning; His answer prevents their thoughts, and overwhelms all comparatives in one great superlative. Do ye ask what are the greater works? They are those two *greatest* works of God, strictly connected together for mankind, and which you look for in the Messiah,—*Resurrection* and *Judgment!* Otherwise, indeed, than your expectation thinks, each of them heralding itself beforehand in bodily resurrection, but essentially and pre-eminently preparing its way in spiritual quickenings—for the raising of the dead even now goes on, and with it the judgment. Finally, at the end of the days, the resurrection and the judgment of the human race by *My* voice, that voice which ye should now listen to in faith, in order now to receive *life* according to *My* sayings which even now in mercy judge your *unbelief* in Me. This is the general outline of the former part of the discourse, which is defensive in its immediate, and most mighty maintenance and assertion; until in ver 30, taking a new commencement, it expressly *appeals* to the *testimonies* which His words had received and should receive.

With all His loftiness of assertion, which, designed to excite their astonishment, alas would only be an additional *offence* to the unbelievers, the humble Son of man softens the indispensable testimony as much as it was possible and right to do. He does not set out by laying down, undisguisedly, and at the outset, that most decisive ἕν ἐσμεν with which He is constrained to close His words in ch. x; but He gives such a turn to this introductory testimony to His own unity and equality with the Father, as to make prominent first the most easily intelligible side of the relation, that which was strictly analogous with mere human doing of the works of God—the perfect *subordination* of the Son, who carries on and continues that which was given, or shown to Him, of the Father. The contradiction of these sinners — which He must contradict — had represented the essential nature and the highest climax of presumptuous sin to be

—the desire to make itself equal with God; and He now in strict opposition to that Himself exhibits complete *obedience*. He thus distinctly connects His words with all that was correct in the Jewish teaching—"that the Messiah would do nothing of His own will, but everything simply according to the will of God."[1] But that it is only as the Son that He can do this, was concealed from their darkened understanding, or perverted by it; therefore He must explicitly add this declaration; thus He adheres with His Ἀμὴν Ἀμὴν to the great word—*The Son!* He never retracts that; but as far as they have been able to understand it He makes it a foundation; from it He deduces all that He has further to say. To do any thing *of himself*, in the sense in which the Jews meant it, who even charged him with ποιεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἴσον τῷ θεῷ, would indeed have been sin and blasphemy. "In this *self* lies the sting and venom (of their allegation); and it is this which He gathers out and rejects"—as the Berlenb. Bib. says. For He comes not to them in His own name, but the Father's (ver. 43). He speaketh not a lie, of *his own* (ch. viii. 44), but the truth of God—otherwise He *can* not speak or act.

This is a most mighty οὐ δύναται (to which afterwards, ver. 44, the πῶς δύνασθε ὑμεῖς corresponds), as it here stands at the head before ὁ υἱός. Expositors vainly and needlessly perplex themselves—whether orthodox or heterodox—with trifling discussions upon the plain truth of this expression. Assuredly their meaning is *first*—the Son can do nothing independently, presumptuously, sinfully, in the manner of sinful men who have fallen from God, because and in that *He will not*, because His will as that of a personal man is entirely subject to the will of the Father who sent Him, as we find in ver. 30. But the words instantly demand another application, and sinking deeper, we are constrained to admit that this moral impossibility, so to speak, has its root only in a natural, essential impossibility; and the expression is so far the true interpretation of that name of the Messiah which the Jewish doctrine did not thus discern—*the Son*. For every creature can as creature pervert its freedom into independence against God, even in the case of the angels who abode faithful, and whose fidelity is confirmed, apostasy is possible and

[1] Majus, theol. jud. p. 130.

imaginable under one aspect; but the Eternal Son standing in unity of being with the Father, even now that He is become man, can not *as the Son* sin, break the Sabbath, arrogate to Himself anything unrighteously; He can only do such works of power and love, as shall constrain every one to confess—He could not do these things if God were not in Him![1] What He doeth, that He seeth the Father do, by His perfect, most inwardly-contemplative knowledge of Him and of His divine action; just as in some sense analogously sinful man may in some slight sense see what the Father doeth in the world, in nature, and in history; may behold the incessant works of God in quickening, healing, helping, blessing, as also in judging and casting away. The concluding clause of the verse declares the same thing positively which had been declared negatively; it is not, however, on that account tautological, but the γάρ indicates it as the *ground* of His reply to their contradiction, referring to the Sabbath-work which they had just seen—Is it not so, have I then done anything different from what the Father doeth? An ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ in your sense is impossible to Me; my humanity, in which I place myself—κἀγώ—on an equality with the Father (yet only as *Son*, the express image of the archetypal Father) is not an individualized humanity, having in it an independent self—therefore He adheres to the ὁμοίως ποιεῖ. That was my meaning in my former words—ver. 17—and that is the truth! Their opposition had seized and exhibited the head of the offence in the πατέρα ἴδιον, and the Lord in His considerate condescension omits this one expression now at the first, instead of pressing it

[1] The other side of the question, that the *Son of man* as such *could* in the nature of things sin (see my Hebräerbrief i. S. 51), may have its own vindication; but as that is not the point *here* we need not enter into the discussion of it. The analogous relation in the regenerate (1 John iii. 9), is a problem which baffles our full comprehension; it is a mystery that, on the one hand, while we daily sin, the impossibility of sin in the child of God is asserted, and yet that the possibility of sin in the Son of Man should be maintained. At a critical moment like this in John v. the Lord speaks, with perfect correctness, of an imaginable ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ which is at the same time declared impossible; not however speaking with an "indistinct and onesided reference to the human," but with perfect precision. (See de Wette 4 Aufl.) In Gethsemane, again, there rise out of His obscuration the rejected and resisted ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω, τί ἐγὼ θέλω, τὸ θέλημά μου with a marvellous positive-negative reality.

further, as He might have done and afterwards did, even to the full ἕν ἐσμεν; He accommodates Himself to their point of understanding, without surrendering the full truth, in the softened ὁμοίως, "which might be perverted, as the Arians have perverted it, taking it merely for *resemblance*, in their down-hill course" (Berlenb. Bib.) But the whole of the subsequent discourse takes care of the truth, and shows us most plainly that full unity and equality of nature must be understood as underlying this expression. And so it is also a retrograde and false restriction to understand here the οὐδὲν, ἐὰν μή τι,—ἃ γὰρ ἂν, ταῦτα as merely meaning—*only* that which the Father doeth, not *all* that the Father doeth. For if the former only is expressed by his condescending design, yet in the unity of this testimony with all the rest, the latter must also be included. Listen to the next words, and in ver. 20 this rejected πάντα is plainly heard, just in the spirit of the Prologue:—πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ ἕν.

Ver. 20. Stroke follows stroke, so that no Arian, whose ears are disposed to hear, can deny the Athanasian confession of our Lord. The *present* ποιεῖ, which in the previous verse connected itself with the individual works, such as that which had then taken place, now becomes the Present of the divine eternity, in which *all, all* the works of God from the Creation to the judgment are exhibited at once. In this lies a grand transition to absolute universality, from which then naturally follow the promised μείζονα τούτων. That the eternal Father hath an eternal Son, to whom He showeth all His works, gives Him to do them, and through whom He doeth them, has its foundation in *love*, for love is the essence of God. The common exposition only passes rapidly over the middle term, with Bengel's qui amat, nil celat; but to us it seems more proper to pause upon this equally simple and inexhaustible "ὁ πατὴρ φιλεῖ[1] τὸν υἱὸν," which is once more announced with γάρ; and to dwell on it profoundly, until we

[1] On the other hand, ἀγαπᾷ in ch. iii. 35, which hence is also a various reading here. It is hard to say whether the two expressions in St John are to be distinguished. The Greeks indeed distinguished them, similiarly as amare and diligere in the Latin; but the Hellenists do not appear to have preserved the distinction. Yet the Syriac has here the more inward רחם.

have discerned in it the most essential mysterium trinitatis. The Berlenburger Bibel here once more puts to shame our modern most learned commentaries, for it does not pass by this depth of meaning, "God cannot possibly be an unfruitful and solitary unity, because God is love. Even if we had not been created by God, God would still be a *Father;* this name depends not upon the creature, but flows out of the eternal love of God. In the divine essence there is a Father, so there must be a Son, so must there also be *love,*[1] and a fellowship. The Father hath *nothing* alone and for Himself but that He is Father; but He could not be that, were there not a Son. *As the Son doeth nothing without the Father, no more is the Father secret to the Son,* or keepeth back ought from Him, but He showeth Him *all things* that himself doeth."[2] Yes, this is here the inmost kernel of the word: passing far beyond the possible comprehension of its first hearers, and giving a testimony to the church of all futurity —an essentially supplementing correlative to that first word concerning the love of God to the world, ch. iii. 16. Whom did the Father love before, and independently of, the world? Himself in the Son, through whom and in whom alone His entire φιλεῖν as all His ποιεῖν flows forth. This helps us to the profound meaning of the humanly-spoken δεικνύειν; which we must not understand as if the Father had ever previously performed a work of Himself alone, which He then set before the Son, completely done, for imitation. Such a view draws the expression downwards, instead of going up with it, as its condescension to our need designed, to the heights of its meaning. The *shewing* of what He doeth is manifestly the *giving over* to Him to do; an essential participation, by which the Father doeth nothing alone, but all things by the Son; a revealing in the act. Assuredly, according to human ideas δεικνύειν may be equivalent to διδάσκειν (as the Lord Himself, in chap. viii. 28, speaks in a yet more accommodated sense, with regard to His λαλεῖν)—hence it corresponds

[1] Fr. v. Baader says:—"The idea of *love* is that of the trias, that of uniting distinction and distinguishing unity."

[2] We pressingly recommend the exposition of the speculative portion of St John's Gospel by a German mystical theologian of the fourteenth century, edited by Engelhardt. Neustadt, 1839. See, for example, in pages 19 and 20, just what is said above.

in 1 Sam. xii. 23, LXX., to the Hebrew הוֹרָה; and the teaching of antiquity, wiser and profounder than our modern, may have introduced the learner to the mysteries by symbols, and the gradual unveiling of hidden things;[1] but all this affords but a weak analogy with the mutually corresponding *seeing* of the Son and *shewing* of the Father, that uninterrupted fellowship of reciprocal contemplation which the incarnated Son coming from the eternal bosom of the Father hath brought still with Him, and of which He now speaks. All the works of God were before their coming into act in time, existing as eternal ideas; but as they took place in time, the *Son of man truly seeth* them successively, as they are progressively *shown* to Him in, and in order to, their being done; yet always by that same contemplation as the eternal Son, and as the Son of man which is in heaven. Philo platonizes, upon the unpenetrated ground of the Cabala, concerning the Logos:—*μιμούμενος τὰ τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅσους πρὸς παραδείγματα ἀρχέτυπα τὰ ἐκείνου βλέπει*, but this is far from reaching to the sublime depth of that simple *φιλεῖν καὶ δεικνύειν*, of which the Logos incarnate Himself speaks. Here there is less room for speculative interpretation than for penetrating contemplation:—if we thus reverently contemplate this truth it may be *shown* to us also.

Ye shall see *greater things* than those which I have already done—thus does the Lord speak to the Jews, as to the first disciples, chap. i. 50. For the Father gives and shows to His Son ever greater and greater things, even to the full consummation of those two *greatest* works of God—the final quickening and the judgment, which all must most assuredly see at the last. We are free to admit some truth in the view which Schleiermacher does not omit to bring prominently forward, that there may be reference in these words, first of all, to the ever-increasing insight of the Son of man into the future development of His work, or rather the future unfolding and manifestation of His own Person;[2] but we shall feel it necessary to modify this,

[1] As Schwarz, in his Jahrbuch (1825 Juli), remarked on Lücke's commentary, at this passage.

[2] For "the work of Jesus is the unfolding of His Person." We cannot be too earnest in carrying along with this fundamental axiom of Christology (by Ebrard v. Abendm. i. 203 so strongly maintained), the fact that the inexhaustible consequences systematically unfold themselves.

if we remember that foresight of the future greater things, that prospective view of His whole work which Jesus had from the beginning, and which is testified in this saying itself. In the whole working of Jesus before and *after* His Resurrection there is manifestly a continual upward progression; so that according to Acts i. 1, all that was accomplished in the flesh and upon earth was but the *beginning* with reference to the new commencement at Pentecost.

We must carefully mark, preparatorily to the whole discourse, that ἔργα here passes far beyond the narrow notion of mere σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα. The miracles, in their more restricted sense, are only the beginning and symbol of His proper works; it is not of the former that the Lord speaks merely, but His ἵνα ὑμεῖς θαυμάζητε extends onwards to the amazement of the judged at the last day, the transport of those raised to eternal life; in these first sentences all is grandly summed up and announced, that is to be pursued into subsequent detail in the discourse. Again, however, we may apply the words, their sense being so comprehensive, to the miracles themselves; and then, without making the ἵνα to be ἐκβατικὸν, they seem to say:—This is the first aim of the miracles, to excite in those who behold them a wholesome marvelling, so that proceeding from them to the still greater which are to come it may further be said—μὴ θαυμάζετε τοῦτο, ver. 28. Comp. chap. vii. 21; Acts iii. 12.

Ver. 21. If, as is quite right, we hold fast the connection of these words with the event which had just occurred, with the ταῦτα proceeding from which the μείζονα are pointed to, then we have the very simple meaning at once—Not merely the healing of the sick, but the *raising of the dead.* When we go a verse further, and find the *judgment* immediately following, it appears plain that both these regalia Dei are in their most universal comprehensiveness attributed to the Son. (God was called, in the beginning, the Judge of all the earth, Gen. xvii. 25, comp. Ps. cv. 7; and Jas. iv. 12 refers to Him alone all saving and destroying. Similarly He alone can kill and make alive—see, *e.g.*, Deut xxxii. 39; 1 Sam. ii. 6; 2 Kin. v. 7). It is most pitiable, however, to find the best commentators interpolating—Greater works, *as examples* of the resurrection and judgment. For

these two works are not merely the *greatest* simply, but they are in fact, though but few observe it, the *inclusive summary* of all divine working. There is absolutely no work of God which is not either a producing, sustaining, restoring *Quickening*,[1] or a deciding, rejecting, destroying *Judgment;* and the goal of all these works is the full manifestation of their great result at the last day. The dualism corresponds immediately to omnipotence and omniscience; and then more profoundly still, to *Love* which works in omnipotence, and to *Right* which omnisciently tests and decides the state of everything. This is indisputably true, and so far the word of Jesus concerning ζωοποιεῖν includes in its principle all quickening energy in nature and humanity, and, indeed, in the whole world; but to expound it of this *pre-eminently* is manifestly incorrect, for the meaning which the word would suggest first to those who heard it, must be the *first* meaning. Proceeding from individual raisings of the dead (according to our harmony the daughter of Jairus, and the widow's son at Nain, had both experienced this already, and hence it is not ζωοποιήσει), and promising more and more public examples (as in the case of Lazarus), the Lord's word embraces here in one the bodily and the spiritual sense, in order that He may afterwards, vers. 25 and 28, separate them, and dwell upon them individually. The ζωοποιεῖν after ἐγείρειν is only a progression in the significant expression; it is not that the former is negative ("to scare away death!"), and the latter positive; for the quickening from death manifestly includes already the impartation of life.

"The *spiritual* energy of the Son, as quickening, life-imparting, and life-sustaining," or rather life-restoring, becomes special subject of discourse first, at ver. 24; it is so closely wrapped up in our present passage that the Jews, who expected in their Messiah the raiser of the dead, would and could evidently think of the physical miracle alone. But it is not correct to assign, with Lange, a *threefold* progression to the discourse on this subject; regarding this at first as referring *only* to the "*miraculous energy* of Christ during His sojourn upon earth upon *individual*

[1] Even the Creation falls under the same category, according to Rom. iv. 17.

cases"[1]—so that He preliminarily "quickens only *some* whom He chooses out, in restoring to them their soundness;"—then afterwards that He quickens many by His preached Gospel; and finally all men. For τοὺς νεκρούς stands here at the very beginning; and taking into account the full and absolute tone of the ἐγείρειν τοὺς νεκρούς as it primarily fell upon the ears of those who heard it, we cannot put upon the following οὓς θέλει anything like an electing or restricting meaning. Rather has it a designed *extensiveness* of meaning, opposing (as Lücke says) all Jewish exclusiveness—not merely Israel, but Gentiles throughout all the world. But the most simple sense which the words bear is, to our feeling, that of a strong intimation that the Son, *like the Father*, in His own independent power, quickens by a will which can never fail of its purpose.[2] *Because* He will, and *if* He will, He also can; and this, asserted at first with such an emphatic generality, admits of a manifold application and reference. It distinguishes between those isolated quickenings of the dead which individual prophets obtained from God in wrestling prayer, from the spontaneous and immediate—I say unto thee, arise! Come forth! which we find in the resurrections of the Son. We must understand His οὓς θέλει and ὅπου θέλει in relation to all His miraculous acts and working generally, in the same sense as that in which He so speaks concerning the Spirit, ch. iii. 8. He thereby majestically intimates to us, as far as He is speaking of the bodily dead, that as it regarded His *power*, it were a light thing to Him to awaken all the dead instead of any one individual—if His wisdom could have *willed* it in harmony with His Father's will. And, finally, He thereby tells us—if *we* may give a prospective application to the spiritually dead—that He seeks indeed the salvation and life of all, but that He *wills* only the life of those who *believe* on Him, according to the sacred right and the fundamental nature of the case. *This* is the only limitation which is to be found in the expression; it is not, how-

[1] And above with a refinement of generality:—As the Father exerts a manifold, endless energy in giving life to the dead throughout the world, for example, by the fountain of Bethesda, so is it also the Son's delight to quicken and diffuse life everywhere!

[2] Bengel: Nunquam ejus voluntatem destituit effectus. And this is also predicated of God. (Ps. cxv. 3; Dan. iv. 32.)

ever, the restriction of absolute decree—but with Him as with the Father.—All that He will He can, but He cannot *will* everything. Here we find the transition to judging, and the connection between quickening and judgment.[1]

Ver. 22. For it is assuredly in the κρίσις, as the γάρ shows, that we are to find the ground and the explanation of the οὓς θέλει. If, on the one hand, the visible quickenings of the dead as signs of the power and dignity of the Son of man gave *proof* that He was appointed to be Judge of the quick and dead, and therefore that He might truly testify this of Himself; so, on the other hand, *more profoundly understood*, this proof approves itself as it points to the judgment which has already taken place in the quickening itself. Only let us apprehend both these pregnant ideas of the divine working in their entire fulness and depth, as they are intended to be understood here, and as is indicated in the τὴν κρίσιν πᾶσαν which introduces the latter of them! That is not merely the final judgment at the end of the world, which comes forward afterwards in ver. 27, but the entire deciding, separating, and excluding process which, as the preparation for the great winding up, goes on in, and in connection with, the beginnings of the process of quickening. The κρίσις is not merely (according to Ebrard) the withholding of life (least of all in the predestinarian sense); nor is it merely (according to Schleiermacher) the distinguishing between the earlier and the later, the selection of what shall now be quickened from what shall be progressively quickened down to the πάντες of ver. 28; but it is, at the same time, no other than the merciful judgment of the Spirit, in order to the cutting off of sin, which cannot be pretermitted even to believers, for their salvation's sake. When in ver. 24 the more restricted idea of spiritual quickening comes forward, then, as the contrast, the κρίσις also is referred, in a more restricted sense, to condemnation and exclusion from life.

It is almost self-evident, further, that in this compressed dis-

[1] If we were, with many, to lay emphasis upon the connection of οὓς θέλει with ζωοποιεῖν alone, and not with ἐγείρειν, there might be found a profound truth in such a position of the word. But this only holds good in the deeper meaning of ζωοποιεῖν, and it does not exclude the fact, that even then the Lord raised from bodily death whom He would, and because He would.

course, which is not unfolded in a strictly logical form, the Lord does not design to say that the Father judgeth no man absolutely, but that He is continuing His former manner of speech, and following up His former *words*—even as He immediately quickeneth no man, but *both*, as all His works, only through the Son. Thus we may translate *οὐδέ*—so also not, or, even not. But it is wisely and designedly so expressed, since it might be said that the Father quickeneth the Son according to His humanity, but judgeth Him in no sense at all. He hath *committed* to the Son all judgment, that is, (with Calvin) *the entire work*, the *ruling* and *ordering* of His kingdom (so that in this sense even the raising and quickening are included in it), its whole prerogative and power—which expression now fills up the meaning of the previous "showing," and probably contains an allusion to Ps. lxxii. 1—4.

What is the end and aim of this committal to the Son—which indeed involves no retirement on the part of the Father, but is the most essential manifestation of Himself in His own express image and likeness? The *honour* of the Father in the Son! As the world was first created that the glory of the eternal Son might be shown forth in it, so is the same end contemplated in the entire redemption of fallen man. The *καθώς*, taken alone, does not, indeed, constrain us to interpret this of a strict equality of divine honour—any more than the *ἐστί* in the institution of the Lord's supper proves the mystery—but it is most evident throughout the whole discourse, from its beginning to its end, that it speaks of nothing less. If the Father doeth nothing without the Son, if the Son *works* in all things even as the Father, then it follows in essential fitness that equality of honour must be the consequence of equality of working, yea, that unity of honour must be the consequence of unity of working.[1] And this is the very meaning of the next clause, which goes on to add that the honour of the Son severed from the honour of the Father, is not to be thought of, just as if it should say—for the Father will and can no otherwise be honoured. Pfenninger says that this "holds good even of those who are sent by a King with full cre-

[1] Reference has been rightly made to Hos. iii. 5, where the term of divine honour דרשׁ is used both of the Lord their God, and of David their king.

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dentials;" but this, though well intended, demands infinitely too little, for here there is more than the mission of a Representative "for a limited time. Baumgarten-Crusius lets his Rationalism appear in that most arbitrary saying—"but the honour of the Son is *not* the honour paid to His *person*, but to His *relation and work*;" we who believe know, however, and not only we but the Rationalists themselves know it well enough in their secret conscience, that there is no relation and work of Jesus *apart from* His *Person*. He has said it and He will make it good; He will so reign and rule that *all* shall finally be constrained to honour Him as Lord, even those who till then have refused that honour —either as the Lord who raiseth to eternal life, or as the Judge who doometh to everlasting damnation. Even in the earlier Old Testament dispensation it was cared for and so ordered, that no one could long conscientiously worship a God and Father of the world, without acknowledging Him in the Jehovah, the God of Israel, consequently also in Christ, the fulfilment of the old covenant, the Son of the Father. The question is not here of those who know Him not; the μὴ τιμῶν τὸν υἱὸν is only he who *denies His honour* to Him who is *sent* to Him, as the manifested and attested Son. Sincere heathens unconsciously honour the Son, whose light faintly shines into their darkness; Christians who *oppose themselves* to the living God, to Him who testifies Himself the Father of Jesus Christ, undermine the testimony of the Son concerning Himself and the Father by taking away the Old Testament, and yet would retain the Father still—like the modern Jews who have stolen that name from us;—but the progressive error of such doctrines of lies has been but too often made manifest and mourned over, as it is described in 1 Jno. ii. 23; 2 Jno. 9.[1] "They begin by opposing Jehovah, and end with the système de la nature." (Joh. v. Müller.) Neither do they succeed, finally, who, like Herder formerly, would separate the eternal Son, idealistically understood, from Jesus the Son of man; against which Kleuker has well written: "We cannot see how it is possible to bestow upon Jesus

[1] And that which Origen (de princ. 1, 2, 10) expressed as the only possible trinitarian *speculative* knowledge of God—Pater non potest esse quis si filius non sit.

Christ the Son of God, an honour which should not and may not be bestowed upon Him as the Son of man; since in truth neither this Son of man apart from the Son of God, nor the Son of God apart from the Son of man, has to us any subsistence." We shall in the process of the discourse which we now enter upon find superabundant assurance of the inseparable unity of the Son of God and the Son of man. Jesus the Son of man is no Saint, to whom we, like good Catholics, offer an invocatory worship, distinguished from prayer; but God is manifest in that flesh which His eternal Son has assumed, and the same God who will not give His honour to another, nor His praise to graven images (Isa. xlii. 8), *has* in fact and indeed in giving all His works over as the Father to the Son *given* to Him all His honour likewise—and He will *require* it! He will make the enemies of His son His footstool!

Ver. 24. In this second "Verily, verily, I say unto you"—out of which a third immediately afterwards springs—begins the strengthening *confirmation* of the lofty assertions to which the Son had given utterance, and the clear exhibition of the grounds upon which they rested. From ver. 30 onwards, the *testimony* for the conviction of *unbelief* is made prominent, but now a *demonstration* is specifically promised in order to attract *faith*, the *experimental evidence* to be enjoyed internally now and externally hereafter. He who by faith gives to the Son, and so to the Father in the Son, His honour, *experiences in the full sense, to his own salvation*, the two greatest, all-comprehending and distinctive works of the Son:—the dead *live* in the full meaning of the word, having even now eternal life; and they come not into the judgment of condemnation, but ever stand in the *judgment of the Son of man*, in the full meaning of *that* word; that is, under the judgment of His mercy and grace.

Here could not have been substituted—he that beholdeth my works. For although the works of Christ, Matt. xi. 2, 5, even after the term of His manifestation in the flesh, are ever more and more wonderfully exhibited in the history of the world and of the church, and although once afterwards, ch. vi. 40, the *seeing* of the Son stands for the recognition and acknowledgment of His personal dignity, it is nevertheless true that with respect to the universal experience of believers from age to age, the hearing

of His *word* is the great test and condition. All the words which He spake, and which He has been pleased to transmit to us in such a manner that in reading we may hear them, and much more in *hearing* may read them, are one great word; and every individual word which I truly accept may be to my faith an introduction to the whole fulness of His teaching. The ἀκούειν receives from the appended πιστεύειν, the pregnant sense of a genuine hearing in the obedience of faith—and such also is the meaning of οἱ ἀκούσαντες in ver. 25. "In this hearing begins man's agency in his awakening (that is, susceptibility for awakening impression), in faith it ends," says Fikenscher half-truly; for as it regards its ending with faith, it must never be forgotten that the faith which must mature towards finished fidelity never reaches its end below.[1] But it is observable that our Lord does not use here the customary πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ, but instead thereof τῷ πέμψαντί με. This is not to be merely resolved into—he who believeth that I am sent of the Father (ch. xvi. 27, 28, xvii. 8), in my Mission, in God as having sent Me,—but it once more brings into high prominence the complete oneness between the Father and the Son, just as His final words to the Jews declare it, ch. xii. 44;—He that believeth in Me, believeth not on Me (as a man, independent of and another than God), but on the Father in Me. Finally, it is in the utmost condescension that the Father Himself to be believed in Christ is placed *in the dative*, just as a man might be worthy to be believed; for this is the majesty at once, and the grace of the testimony of God, that it is victoriously convincing, and yet ranks itself only as if it were the highest of human testimonies. See and mark attentively in relation to this, 1 Jno. v. 9, 10. Here also, as in that chapter vers. 11—13, follows the assured inward witness confirming and sealing the faith which is put forth; the mighty power of God in the bestowment of a new life, which is itself a resurrection (Eph. i. 19, 20), yea, the true and complete resurrection of man dead in sins; whereas, without this internal principle and beginning of life, the bodily

[1] With all honour to the word of the Apostle, 2 Tim. iv. 7 (which, however, plainly hangs on ver. 6, and is not for our imitation), the truth remains as we have set it forth on Lu. xviii. 8, in the fourth volume of this work.

resurrection itself will but reveal and consummate the work of death. The ἔχειν ζωὴν αἰώνιον, without the article, already approaches the idea of ver. 26.

But what shall we say of the not coming into judgment? We have already in a preparatory way of explanation given our acceptation of the word. We might by various philological means extract its meaning, not, however, without leaving some kind of κρίσις remaining even for believers. Many have laid stress upon the ἔρχεσθαι εἰς, with allusion to the prayer against temptation:—he comes not so deeply into condemnation, as to remain in it, and no more to come out. This is the most artificial method, and quite inconsistent with the analogy of Scripture and scriptural language. For the whole expression is ordered with reference to human notions, as referring to the coming before a tribunal where first the decision is made between right and wrong. Thus Deut. xxv. 1, (προσέλθωσιν εἰς κρ.), Job ix. 32 (ἔλθωμεν ὁμοθυμαδόν). If it be said that we shall indeed all stand *before* the judgment-seat for the revelation of our character (2 Cor. v. 10); but that this is not a coming *into* judgment, since the decision is not then first judicially made, but the ancient absolution only confirmed and rendered final;—then we can only reply that the phraseology here is directly opposed to this sense, and that the same might be said of the damned, since the condemnation already passed upon their unbelief, chap. iii. 18, is no more than confirmed and consummated. We would express the meaning thus: —he cometh not any more, any further, into *any other* judgment than that merciful judgment of the word and spirit upon his sin, under which he has already placed himself in hearing and believing the truth. Ver. 30. That is quite in harmony with the matter itself; and thus exhibited, we may found upon it the simple assumption that the Lord *now* as in chap. iii. 17, 18 takes κρίσις from the comprehensive idea of it given in ver. 22, and uses it in a more restricted sense (Erasmus: in condemnationem). And this more restricted sense of the same phrase occurs throughout the earlier Scriptures in those passages which speak of the being brought to judgment, with guilt presupposed and doom assured; for instance in עַל־תָּבוֹא בְמִשְׁפָּט Ps. cxliii. 2 (μὴ εἰσέλθῃς), יְבִיאֲךָ Eccles. xi. 9, although in

Eccles. xii. 14, it passes over into the more general signification again. Thus the words coincide most impressively with the epexegesis which follows:—because he hath life through believing he cometh naturally no more into that condemnation *of death*, in which he lay, and from which he hath been drawn forth.[1] The present ἔρχεται (which Nonnus has diluted into ἵξεται) with its fulness of promise and encouragement, is followed by the ampler μεταβέβηκεν, which must not be perverted into the future *transiet* of the Vulgate, but is no less than the full and pregnant perfect, as we find it again in 1 John iii. 14. It is the transition to the καὶ νῦν ἐστι of the following verse, and θάνατος obviously means ex vi oppositi that inward, spiritual death of the sinful soul, which is the true death in death, and without which the mere physical dying were no death at all. Chap. xi. 25, 26. When the one decisive *step* has been taken in *faith*, and the great transition effected (that step, however, as the Berleb. Bib. remarks is not a *leap*), all the rest follows surely, with the resurrection of life. These μεταβεβηκότες are the true "Hebrews" —and this allusion to the mystical meaning of עִבְרִי we would rather accept with the child-like "triflers," whom the Lord condescends often thus to "trifle" with, than the allusio ad typum hujus rei, *i.e.*, pascha which Grotius after Augustine maintains, or even Lampe's reference to the עבר between the two pieces in the כרת ברית.

Ver. 25. Every believer at least, who looks at the connection with what has preceded, must—having himself passed from death into life—apply a spiritual signification to these words also, and without hesitation regard them as describing an internal resurrection. But the expressions here used being so similar to those of vers. 28, 29, expositors have been much divided upon this point; and their divisions have made the exposition of this chapter one of the most fruitful in warnings that the history of exegesis furnishes. Men have rushed to both extremes with needless contention, simply because they will not understand the

[1] Wesley thinks it necessary to add—unless he make shipwreck of the faith. But this is needless here, since in πιστεύων the perseverance of faith unto the end is presupposed.

[2] Not vivificatio fidem antecedit (!) but ipse fides est transitio i.e. acceptio vivificationis.

combination of the internal and external in the teaching of the Holy Ghost: and it is hard to say which is the more arbitrary, to understand in ver. 25 only a bodily resurrection, or in vers. 28, 29 only the previous spiritual quickening of all believers. The latter *seems* the worse, but the former is bad enough. Assuredly, in ver. 21, the Lord had spoken to the Jews with such plain reference to their Messiah-expectation, that they could not otherwise than understand Him of a bodily resurrection; but how can we suppose that *He* would speak continually of the External, without having in His thought the Internal which lies at its foundation, and which in everything external is either shadowed forth or plainly revealed; and how can we suppose that He would not lead his hearers in that direction? Even the Spirit in the prophets applies it thus (we find it so used in Isa. xxix. 18, xxxv. 5, 6, lxi. 1, 2);[1] in Ezek. xxxvii. the resurrection of Israel has this application; and surely the Lord Himself would still more distinctively bring it into prominence. Again, as we cannot accept the great symbolical pledge in Ezek. xxxvii. as figuring something actual by something unreal, and which could not be literally possible; but must regard it as pointing to that real resurrection which is openly announced in Isa. xxvi. 19, and Dan. xii. 2; so shall we find it here—the real and external resurrection is not simply *supposed* in this most open testimony, but is further expressly announced in the subsequent declaration of vers. 28, 29.

Yea verily, I am He whom ye wait for, the Son of God, the Raiser of the dead—thus begins the Lord anew with His third Amen, Amen—but I have just told you before, and now tell you again, that this quickening of the dead by the voice of my word begins now in the souls of believers, and *that* is the true Resurrection of *life*, without which there can be none in any future time. We cannot understand how Olshausen can make good his assertion that "the formula ἔρχεται ὥρα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν cannot be used concerning spiritual resurrection, for this is supposed to be already effected and present;" it is as if he had never read the strictly analogous word of ch. iv. 23. Yet all the quickening,

[1] And it could not be otherwise, compare our observations upon Matt. xi. Vol. ii.

and all the life of the few who believed in Jesus at that time was indeed only the faint beginning, it was scarcely indeed the bursting germ of that full power of life which only after Pentecost came and still comes into the death of all the world, Jews and Gentiles alike (Eph. ii. 1; Ps. cxv. 8). The article in *οἱ νεκροὶ* attaches itself immediately to the previous *τοῦ θανάτου*; indeed all the expressions here are significantly chosen *differently* from ver. 28. There is even some meaning in the fact that here it is the voice *of the Son of God* which is made emphatically prominent, while there in connection with this it is the voice of the Son of man appearing for final judgment; for it is only faith that can now discern the voice of the Son of God who calleth. But more important, and indeed decisive, is the *καὶ οἱ ἀκούσαντες* which is added; for this brings out that actual limitation and election which was dimly expressed in *οὓς θέλει*, that election which depends upon faith. (Almost as if it had been said instead—*οἱ θέλοντες* comp. ver. 40). To understand this as a mere corroborating repetition—and as, even as soon as, they hear, they shall all live[1]—is altogether inappropriate. Baumgarten-Crusius remarks here very acutely and correctly that it is not *καὶ ἀκούσαντες*, the *article* intervening takes out a certain number of those who hear, those namely who hear aright; so that the *ἀκούειν* has a different meaning in the two clauses—the voice is heard by all, some among them accept and yield to its call. *This* was prepared for by *ἀκούων καὶ πιστεύων*, ver. 24, and in ch. x. 26, 27, we find the same saying in the same sense. The *πάντες* of ver. 28 afterwards is something very different from this. That the *λόγος* is now called a *φωνή* is not the least bar to our understanding the passage of a spiritual resurrection, although Olshausen strangely maintains that it should be: for *φωνή* is essentially distinguished from *λόγος*, and is here, as ver. 29 shows, no other than the creating voice which calls the dead to life! Does not *φωνή* belong necessarily to the figure so-called (rather most absolute reality), according to which the quickening of believers is termed a resurrection? Is not the Lord's word at least, when

[1] Grotius: et illi, simul atque audierint, vivent, ne quis audientes a non audientibus putet distingui! Or as others: so suddenly do the dead arise, that quickened in the twinkling of an eye, they may be said to hear the voice!

He calls us into life, an awakening voice, the cry of omnipotent creation to the inner man, lying in his death? (Eph. v. 14). Olshausen artificially supplies—*οἱ ἀκούσαντες*, scil. *τὸν λόγον*, those who earlier in their life-time *had heard*, and thus are prepared and capable of recognizing the *φωνή*; and in harmony with this interpretation understands the *καὶ νῦν ἐστιν*, with many others, of a *first* resurrection of believers already beginning when Christ appeared, and since secretly going on. But however true and harmonious with Scripture this first resurrection may be, the Lord is not speaking now publicly of such a mystery; a mystery so essential different from the expected resurrection of Israel in the Messiah's reign: He can not be supposed to have had allusion to that, and his hearers could not have so understood His reign. The first resurrection includes, on the one hand, according to Matt. xxvii. 52, some who had never heard the word of Christ in life; and, on the other hand, not all who were His believing people—but the expressions here used are inapplicable in either case. Finally, we cannot admit any reference in these words to those preliminary, individual resurrections, which took place as signs of the time that was coming; ver. 21 did in some degree connect itself with them, and the *πάντες* of ver. 28 points back to them again by way of contrast; but here between the two the *οἱ νεκροὶ* stands prominently first,—not individual dead, surely, but all who were constrained outwardly to hear the voice, though only a few would rightly and inwardly hear. The Lord *appeals* to this *hearing* and *willing*, which are followed by the internal experimental evidence of the true resurrection; and He further *calls* in order to produce them; and this is the *kernel* of His whole testimony—He that hath ears to hear, let him hear! All who suffer themselves to hear the awakening voice, *shall live:* this future now taking the place of the *ἔχειν* and *μεταβεβηκέναι* is a necessary complement of the sense, since the life received by believers at the outset is to go on progressively even to the consummate *ζήσονται* of the bodily resurrection also unto life—which is not to be excluded here as the ultimate goal. But what this *ζωή* in its *ground and principle* really is, we learn from the following verse, which is strictly connected with this:—the life in God and from God communicated by the Son.

Ver. 26. With God is the fountain of life, מְקוֹר חַיִּים, Ps.

xxxvi. 10; Jer. ii. 13. He hath life ἐν ἑαυτῷ and ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ. This His *Aseitas*, Αὐτοουσία, which is necessarily implied in the idea of God, is not so much asserted here as presupposed in the ὥσπερ, in order to tell us, that He communicates this His life through the Son, who like the Father is the independent fountain of life for us. Not as if we were obliged to translate simply—ζωὴν, that is, the vivifying power, though the clause tends also to that in its connection. It would not be proper, here as in the following sentence to say—ἐξουσίαν ζωῆς ἔδωκε, for the life of God is in itself already a vivifying power (ἐξουσία ζωογονεῖν, as Theophylact says here), and it should be carefully emphasized that the Son like the Father hath life ἐν ἑαυτῷ, is Himself *the life*. (Ch. i. 4, xi. 25; 1 Jno. v. 20.) Notwithstanding, He hath not as the *Son* life ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ like the Father, but from the Father; this trinitarian relation ad intra is an immovable boundary of definition in the well-measured words. Ὁ υἱὸς is here as everywhere the Son of God and the Son of man in the inseparable unity of both natures, and the ἔδωκε resolves itself into a twofold sense:—it applies to the eternal Son before time was, and He thereby most expressly declares Himself to be the *Firstborn* before every *creature*, inasmuch as the creature can have life only ἐν θεῷ; and as it respects the Son of man it is a yet more proper giving, as we find in Matt. xxviii. 18, but that was only rendered possible by His being the Son of God. The solution of the apparent contradiction between ἔδωκεν and ἐν ἑαυτῷ is to be sought in the incomprehensible mystery of the Father and the Son: we shall not pause, however, to dwell upon that, but proceed with the discourse which now passes over to our humanity, and speaks words pertaining to man's salvation.

Ver. 27. In this verse is finally summed up all that the Lord might say concerning the two great works of God, quickening and judging, in the strict oneness of their twofold character. The words are simple and plain for the first investigation of a rightly disposed mind, but they involve the whole unfathomable depth of the connection and relation between those two divine works from the Creation to the final Judgment, as they proceed ever in and by the Son. Their entire consummation alone will bring us to an adequate knowledge of their true harmony; now we can only study them in a very rudimentary way. Christ

gives *life* as the eternal *Son of God*, and He was from the beginning of things the principle and source of life to all creatures; but He *judgeth* as the *Son of man*, that is the end of God's dealings with fallen man upon earth. It is clear from the antithesis with ver. 26, that this most strikingly significant ὅτι υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐστι[1] without any article is designed to make emphatic His humanity. Allowing that the expression may contain a reference to Dan. vii. 13, 14, we must assume that there also בַּר אֱנָשׁ is used with especial relation to His mediatorial oneness with humanity, and there is no reason for understanding *here*—"because He is the Messiah." This, in such a connection, would be a meaningless addition, instead of that very deep thought which is in the expression, though short-sighted expositors too often pass it over. Von Meyer's note deserves respectful consideration: "because man should be judged by his fellow, by the most gracious and the meekest man, by man who hath borne the sins of mankind, and can have compassion upon his brethren—so that it is Mercy itself which judgeth." This is, verily, the judgment of the Son of man! He has Himself fought, if not with sin in Himself, yet with the sin of the world, and conquered; He knows by the experience of His own infirmity in the flesh, the precise boundary line between that which is inseparable from humanity and sinless, and that which is truly guilt; He hath exercised the most perfect compassion towards His brethren, the members of His own body, before the judgment and in order to turn away its sentence; and when the last judgment comes He will consummate that mercy in His believing people, by that final forgiveness without which even then not one of them could stand. He will then be a merciful and gracious Judge to His own, towards all whom He can recognize in that character. But he to whom this *normal and central Man, in whom all the history of mankind is representatively summed up*, can then judicially say—I know thee not, because thou wouldst never know me, will be with that purest justice which love will

[1] On the incorrect reference of this to ver. 28, see Lücke S. 61, 62, and Lampe ad h. l. Comp. also Brückner on de Wette at this passage, who allows force to the omission of the article, but then forgets it in a weak and superficial interpretation.

still and ever retain, *condemned*.[1] A Son of man the Judge of all the world, as God! This is the offence of blinded minds; but the Lord's words go forth to prevent it—Rejoice ye rather that the Father hath committed to His Son *as the Son of man* the judgment of you all!

This utterance reaches forward even to the great day when the κρίσιν ποιεῖν will be finally accomplished; but ver. 30 will teach us that, if we would then stand before this Son of man with acceptance, we must submit ourselves to His merciful judgment even now in this present time. All who believe, hearing now His voice, know in their own experience that the Son of God giveth eternal life, and that the Son of man compassionately judgeth—I condemn thee not; and both combine in the beginning to give assurance which the glorious future will confirm:—a very different doom awaits the unbeliever!

Vers. 28, 29. "Then did the Jews *marvel* at this unheard of doctrine, and even the Scribes and Pharisees appeared to be hurried away by the overpowering current of His words, forgetting for a while their hatred and their scorn, and standing in *amazement*." Teschendorff. But He seizes upon this their astonishment, and goes on to utter that sublime and serene μὴ θαυμάζετε which was yet more wonderful than what He had said before. Τοῦτο naturally means what had just been said:—Marvel not at this merely, rather believe, and thus experience unto salvation how I, the Son, as Son of man, judge, and give from God the life of God; for every man who abides till that day in *unbelieving* amazement, who hath been offended in Me, will *then be constrained* to experience that I have testified the truth. Few among you now hear My voice aright; but then shall *all*, those too who have been long in their *graves* (what, and wheresoever their graves unknown to man may be), be *compelled* to hear it! And then shall be the final and eternal decision, when all *come forth* and are revealed. Then shall there be to believers a judgment also unto life, to unbelievers a new life unto judgment.

[1] Being Himself the principle of life in humanity He can in the most perfect manner *distinguish* between men who are quickened to eternal life, and those who are fallen into death. So Lange very truly, but not sufficingly—the idea of judgment which it indicates being too restricted.

The unbelievers shall be *awakened*, but not to the *life* of the Son of God; *judged*, but not with that merciful judgment of the Son of man which had been offered in vain before. And then shall there be the *voice* heard—come forth! as it was prophetically heard at the grave of Lazarus. The Lord refers almost literally to Dan. xii. 2, but He extends, in *πάντες*, what there more immediately points by רַבִּים to a first resurrection, into a universality of final resurrection. For *ἀνάστασις ζωῆς* compare also *ἀνάστασις εἰς ζωήν*, 2 Macc. vii. 14. It is indeed true that He mentions the *works* first of all as judicial signs of faith or unbelief, and so far those who have done good are those who have persisted in faith and in the new life thereby received; those who have done evil are those who have persisted in unbelief or relapsed into it. But as the Lord Himself, in Matt. xxv. (see our exposition, Vol. iii.) teaches us, and so also the rest of Scripture, that there will be some who had never learned to know the *name* and *person* of the Lord Jesus (although they experienced in themselves the distinctive energy of the Logos), we are led to a profounder consideration of the reason why the Lord here, as in Rev. xx. 12, 13, mentions the works instead of faith or unbelief.[1] If those who had been partakers of a first resurrection already enjoyed the restoration also of physical life, so, on the other hand, the heathens mercifully accepted, receive by the first immediate voice of the Lord which *they* now hear, the full life of the inner man—the resurrection itself is their regeneration, just as to those who will be found alive and not come forth from their graves, their change will be a resurrection. Thus does the sacred word, even where it is not speaking directly of these and such like mysteries, yet leave room for them, if we collect together in one all that is afterwards said. Thus it may be understood how, in this special sense, the resurrection is to many a resurrection *of life*,—to con-

[1] We do not too literally understand here a consciously developed faith or unbelief in His person! My critic, Münchmeyer, who terms this position a false one, has entirely misunderstood me, for I do not by any means deny the value of works only as a proof of the internal state. That, nevertheless, the performance of good works "is dependent upon faith in the Redeemer," even where His word has not been received, Schleiermacher has rightly perceived, however otherwise erroneous his view of the last judgment may be. S. 360, 361 of his Homilies on St John.

vict and put to shame those to whom life was once offered in vain, and to whom the resurrection is now *of damnation* alone. Against Schleiermacher's trifling remark—we cannot, in the face of the solemn Scripture, find any better word for it—that there cannot be a resurrection into eternal death, since all condition of unbelief must pass away for ever, and that the resurrection, as the great severance, is not yet the full accomplishment of all God's will, every man, however much he may desire an Apocatastasis eternally proceeding, or accomplished at the last day, may find his defence in Matt. xxv. 46, and the current of the whole Scripture. The Lord does indeed *mean* in opposito a resurrection *of death*, but He does not expressly so term it, partly because such an *ὀξύμωρον* would savour too much of the bitterness of contempt in the lips of Him whose love is now bent only on winning all, and is therefore withheld; partly because in the whole circle of the ideas of this discourse *life* and *judgment* are uniformly antithetical.

Ver 30. Here begins the second part of this discourse. After the Lord has, consistently with His own dignity, *vindicated* Himself, though by only stronger and stronger assertion of His divine works, He now proceeds, in a certain sense, to give *evidence*. It is not so much, however, evidence, as a *reproof of their unbelief* appended to it, their unbelief being condemned by the collected body of *witnesses* in their progression and unity; just as the self-evidencing *works* were previously held forth for their condemnation, which thus themselves in reality coincide with the testimonies. For in divine things there is for man no other evidence for conviction than this ἔλεγχος πραγμάτων for the opening of the eye of faith. We shall see that the several testimonies to which the Lord appeals, are esteemed by Him to be but one connected *testimony of the Father* and that in conjunction with His own *self-testimony*.

We see this at once when our Lord, at the outset of the proving part of His discourse (as it is improperly called), only *repeats* this first assertion at ver. 19. We may exhibit the arrangement of thought thus:—as He has hitherto defended the first matter

[1] As also the Jews distinguish between תְּחִיָּה and תְּקוּמָה, see Buxt. lex. Rabb. p. 745.

of accusation, the ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐν σαββάτῳ, the λύειν τὸ σάββατον, His ἐργάζεσθαι, and that only by the λέγειν, which is repeated against the second greater accusation, that He was the Son of God—so He now defends this λέγειν itself specifically, in still continuing it, now however placing *His* λόγος in conjunction with *every* λόγος *of the Father*, which the Jews had already received (ver. 38). He has hitherto spoken of the Son, the Son of man standing before them, in the *third person* (with the exception of ver. 24, in connection with that most central λέγω ὑμῖν); He now begins and continues to give full prominence to the *first person* of His κἀγώ. Thus He repeats, first of all, in ver. 30, the declaration from which He set out in ver. 19. But this second οὐδέν now more distinctly embraces all that has preceded, from the Sabbath-work which they had blamed to the judgment of the last day; He retires back again, as it were appeasingly after the great declaration of vers. 28, 29, to the position of subordination to the Father, and connects directly His *now proceeding* word and judgment with His final judicial utterances. As I *do* nothing of myself, so also I *speak* nothing of myself—that is the progress of the thought. But He terms His speaking to the world a *judging*, in immediate conjunction with the final *judgment* just mentioned (comp. afterwards ch. viii. 25, 26); and thereby declares two things, confirmatory of our previous exposition of the comprehensive and frequent κρίσις—not only that the judgment of unbelievers already begins in His spoken word (ch. xii. 48), but also that believers are similarly required to submit their sins to the present judgment of His merciful word. Before it was—What I *see*, I do; now it is—As I *hear*, I judge and speak. That is—I hear of the Father, consequently always aright; consequently My judgment is always right, always just, yea it is the only unerringly sure judgment of divine truth, which is revealed in My person to mankind. Let it be remembered that in Isa. xi. 3, 4, this judging in righteousness is exhibited as the first great official work of the future Messiah. It is there negatively declared that He shall not see and hear after the manner of men,[1]

[1] Since the most upright judge, not being omniscient, can only judge according to what he hears and sees in the most unprejudiced manner

and that is one and the same with this positive assertion that he hears rightly from the Father. And here rises to us, when we view it more generally, another twofold distinction :—If I judge you, your sin, your unbelief, the pride of your hearts (as then was to be the case), I judge you justly; if I arrogate to Myself the authority for this, that I am the Son, the Saviour, and Judge of mankind, I do not unjustly appropriate anything to Myself. For the Father Himself in Me commands me in my inmost being, to declare to all the world *that I am He*. This is in sublime analogy with the humble appeal of the Apostles to what the Lord and His Spirit had shown and testified to them, Acts iv. 19, 20. Comp. Jno. viii. 55.

This might have been enough. But the Lord yet more deeply and graciously condescends to us, when He goes on to add—*because I seek not mine own will, but the will of Him who hath sent me!* (πατρός is probably not the right reading). This sinlessness, this pure freedom from self, this living, moving, and having His being in the love of God (vers. 41, 42) as the fulfilling of the law, may and should be seen from without by the world; these are His ἔργα in the highest sense of the word, wherein, through the unity of His entire sacred action and life, all His individual wonderful works attest their divinity. As He did no sin, so was there no deceit found in His mouth—this is the great conclusion which He sets before us here, as in ch. viii. 46; though the Rationalists down to our own day have never understood it. He asserts here, as in ch. viii. 28, 29, His perfect *sinlessness*, and appeals *to that* as evidence, that in this inseparable unity of His whole Person, as He stands before us judging all alike, all His miracles are attested to be divine works, and the sum of His declarations concerning Himself and us, δίκαιον and ἀληθὲς. For ἁμαρτία as sin and as error is essentially one. Sin is the acting from self, error and lie the speaking from self, in opposition to God; and as the Son with perfect ὁμοθέλησις *seeketh* nothing but the Father's will, that is, only lives for its fulfilment

possible. And the *hearing* is placed distinctively before the κρίνειν κατ' ὄψιν (Jno. vii. 24) in προσωποληψία (which does not befit *blind* justice). The Lord, however, needs not first to question and examine men, for He hath heard all before of the Father.

(a condescending expression in antithesis with ourselves)—how could He speak any other than the pure truth of God ?[1]

Ver. 31. Teschendorff here interjects the interruption of a contradicting—"thou bearest witness of thyself!" (of what value is that?) and there is nothing inappropriate in the supposition. It is possible, though not probable, that the testimony which the Evangelist gives as one was occasionally interrupted, and thus broken up into parts; it is not probable, for the Evangelist elsewhere is accustomed to insert the interrupting rejoinders. It is too universally recognised that within the circle of fallible and selfish humanity a man's own testimony in his own affairs is of no avail, to render any resort to the Talmud or other learned source necessary. But Tholuck quotes the Rabbinical אֵין אָדָם נֶאֱמָן עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ—Lücke, with others, Pomponius de testibus —nullus idoneus testis in re sua intelligitur, in connection with which the notes to a certain song involuntarily occur to my mind.[2] Such an allegation against His testimony the Lord might have answered in two ways—by vindicating His true and holy self in distinction from self as applied to us (as ch. viii. 14), or, as here, by speaking more accommodatingly, and in the spirit of the allegation—*If I, in the sense in which ye understand it*, testified of myself, then would My testimony be indeed unworthy of credit. But such a solum Ἐγώ is, as I have said, in My case *impossible*. This is the immediate result of taking vers. 19 and 30 together, as those who heard must have felt.

Ver. 32. But *another!* It is a melancholy exhibition of the superficiality of much of the exposition both of ancient and modern times, that this most sublime Ἄλλος, in which the Lord distinguishes Himself from the Father without prejudice to their essential Oneness, just as in chap. xiv. 16 He distinguishes the Holy Ghost, has been so generally misapprehended. Assuredly the discourse does not in this disjointed way introduce something quite new, the explanation of which we should have to seek in the sequel, but it keeps still its relation to what had been said before, with a design to confirm it; and from what had

[1] Wimmer also in the Stud. und Krit. 1845. i. 118 thus rightly understands the passage.

[2] Wandsbecker Bote, third part, at the beginning.

preceded it must necessarily follow that this ἄλλος must be the ἐκεῖνος of ver 19, now set in opposition to the hypothetical false Ἐγώ. Another in the distinction of persons, and yet not another as He who ever worketh and testifieth in the Son Himself; just as the υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου is ever one with the eternal Son of God. How could the Son, indeed, after all that He had testified and declared concerning Himself, receive witness from another, from an actual *man*, ver. 34? As it regards the formula ἄλλος ἐστίν we may compare those strictly similar in chap. viii. 50, 54, and so also ver. 18 of the same chapter. The present in ὁ μαρτυρῶν and μαρτυρεῖ of itself forbids us to interpret it of the Baptist, who is introduced in ver. 35 with ἦν.[1] In the καὶ οἶδα appears again once more the self-consciousness of Him who alone had heard and seen the Father, the stamp of which in word and work of itself exhibits this testimony of the Father περὶ αὐτοῦ as also a testimony δι' αὐτοῦ. He who is repelled by the supposition that καὶ οἶδα, ὅτι ἀληθής ἐστιν ἡ μαρτυρία αὐτοῦ are the words of the Son in relation to the Father, should compare chap. iii. 33, vii. 28, viii. 26—55 before he decides to reject it. God is the true God emphatically, the Son, in whom He is, liveth, and beareth witness, knoweth Him to be such immediately—and in a manner quite different from man's knowledge that God cannot lie.

Ver. 33. The Jews as νωθροὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς might indeed, as they would understand the ἐγώ of an individual man like themselves, so also pervert this ἄλλος into another man in the ordinary sense, and consequently, as he was most likely to occur to their minds, understand it of John the Baptist. The Lord had foreseen this, and he would by it awaken their *conscience*, for the testimony of John was also a true testimony of the Father; afterwards making that lead the way to a higher and more immediate testimony. So that Teschendorff's interpolation is once more not amiss—"ah, thou meanest John the Baptist, who, they say, testified concerning thee!" The Lord hereupon answers not simply—I mean not *him;* but—not as a man, and

[1] It is well known, however, that Chrys. Theophyl. Euthym. Nonnus (who has ἄλλος ἀνήρ), Erasmus, &c., understand it of the Baptist: Grotius called it facillimum (!)—while men like Hess echo it, and de Wette and Baumgarten-Crusius maintain it vigorously.

not alone! For we must now assert, what almost all expositors fail to discern, that *all* which follows is no more than a development of the previous declaration—ἡ μαρτυρία, ἣν ὁ πατὴρ μαρτυρεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ; that is, that the Lord now points out the three testimonies, the *Baptist's*, that of the *works*, and that of *Scripture*, as one consistent and concerted testimony of God. Here there is a most significantly developed gradation. When the Father would *send forth* His Son, He gave His testimony by the Forerunner whom He sent, whose finger, pointed to Jesus, concentrated in itself, and finally closed the entire Old Testament reference to Christ, by the preaching of repentance in the law, and in the announcement of the kingdom in the prophets. But this testimony appealed for its own value to the mighty demonstration of the Fulfiller who came after him who gave it. Now testifies *in the middle place* the Father *Himself;* (ver. 37) that is, He testifies most directly by the works of the Son, who for us utters His voice and reveals His shape, as it never else was seen or heard; thus the word of John is essentially confirmed by Christ, and the word of the last Prophet, as well as of all who preceded him, becomes a βεβαιότερος λόγος for our ἔχομεν, through the coming of Him whose coming was foretold. (2 Pet. i. 19). And then, finally, the entire Old Testament *Scriptures* (to which the new and apostolical were added to this end) become illustrated in this light, and glorified into the *third* and *last* testimony, to which alone, even after the manifestation and works of the Son, unbelief can be *referred* through all the ages of time. Not as if it could be in itself a *greater witness* besides and above the Son Himself; but for *our* conviction—and thus according to the essential idea of the word—the originally given and abiding *testimony* of the ancient Scriptures is actually the *greatest:* for it is only in the right understanding of them, in the comparison of Him who stands before us quickening and judging us and the world with Him ὃν ἔγραψε Μωϋσῆς καὶ οἱ προφῆται (ch. i. 46), that the works of the Son become understood and appreciated, so that our ἐυρήκαμεν may follow.[1] Such is the progres-

[1] So that this is the reason why Schleiermacher, rejecting the Old Testament, can never find any where the true Christ.

sion of the three witnesses, according to which vers. 33 and 38 appear to be no other than a reproving reference and appeal—*Ye* sent unto John, and yet believed him not;—*Ye* see and hear Me and in Me the Father, but ye believe not; but then in ver. 39 arises the exhortation and *direction*—Now search into the *Scriptures* better than you have hitherto done, and with this one declaration alone can I dismiss you! Thus much preparatorily upon the wide-spread controversy between the Indicative and the Imperative in this passage.

In this second part the reproving ὑμεῖς, taken from the λέγω ὑμῖν, is placed in sharply defined antithesis with the ἐγώ, for the judicial detection of their unbelief. Ye manifested, and indeed possessed, when John came, the beginning of faith; and acknowledgment of the solemn truth of his plain words—though he wrought no miracle[1]—was extorted from you. We know with what convincing power our Lord elsewhere laid this fact upon their consciences—see our exposition of Matt. xii. Vol. ii. Even ye Pharisees desired to hear him, as did Herod when he was in prison; ye *sent* unto him with a certain measure of confidence in him, to *ask* that man if he was himself the Messiah. But when his answer came which pointed to Me, it was not according to your mind, because ye *would* not come to Me, and then was the unbelief of your hearts made manifest. He bare witness to the *truth* (Grotius: modeste dictum, non *mihi*), that is, he confessed and denied not (chap. i. 20) he humbly declared what was the truth, that he was not the Messiah, and pointed to Me, coming after him. Thus the Lord, on the other side, confirms and approves the word of His minister and forerunner, responding with ἐγώ εἰμι to his οὗτος ἐστι. The Lord is not here reminding the members of that mission to John of any single testimony, personally pointing out Jesus, which they had suppressed because of the people (as Lange thinks); it is not of any other record not preserved that He here speaks, but of *that*

[1] "God did not give John miracles to work, in order that no man might say—John wrought miracles as well as He! How can we decide? The Jews would have had more difficulty in distinguishing between Christ and John—it would ever have been a cause of confusion to them." Berlenb. Bibel.

testimony which we read in St John, and which they had indeed suppressed before Himself and the people alike, by not believing it.

Ver. 34. The correct reading is undoubtedly *ἀνθρώπου*, and this singular of itself points to the true sense in which we can understand our Saviour to repel the ordained testimony of him who witnessed of Christ *that all men through him might believe*, chap. i. 7. Now, although on the one hand, it is not John who can previously approve Jesus as a higher authority, but John himself, who is first approved by all things that he spake of this man being found to be true (chap. x. 41)—yet, on the other hand, he was sent of God as the greatest prophet, and consequently his witness was as certainly the voice and word of God from heaven, as the voices at the Jordan and Mount Tabor. Our Lord's meaning must be interpreted as an accommodation to their unbelieving want of understanding. As they held Himself to be a mere man, so they denied the man of God in John, and in the pure Rationalist style, might suppose that their mutual appeals were the result of a concerted and secret plan. It is against this that the word so keenly protests—*I*, the Son of God, *receive not* the testimony (with the article—*the* testimony, necessary to me as in ver. 31 I admitted to you) from John *as from a man*;[1] for, and now we quote Zeller, "where is the *ambassador* of Cæsar or King, who instead of seeking his authentication directly from His own sovereign himself, would appeal to the testimony of the *secretary to his embassy?*" If it *were* merely human testimony—though ye think so—I would either not mention it at all, or absolutely reject it; but I do mention it, and I do refer to it, consequently ye perceive that I appeal to it as the testimony of *God*, who also hath sent this man. *Τὴν μαρτυρίαν* does not go back generally to ver. 31, as we have already said (Bruckner—which I needed)—but hangs directly upon ver. 32, and includes, as we pointed out, the words of the Baptist also under the testimony of *the Father*. The Lord begins anew to teach here that

[1] *Λαμβάνειν* is, indeed, here not merely—to allow the validity, to accept (as ch. iii. 11—32), but to appropriate, seek out, allege, urge as evidence; standing parallel with *ζητεῖν* in ver. 44. But the expression "*grasp at*" is too strong, for here as in ver. 41 we can only assign with propriety the softer meaning to our Lord.

which *Israel* should long ago have known, and which the appeal afterwards to Scripture as the final testimony emphatically decides—that divine testimonies are given through men. And as He now saith this *that they might be saved*, so also hath God the Father from age to age for our salvation's sake condescendingly given His word to man by the instrumentality of man. First at the conclusion, ver. 36, do we perceive prominence given to τὴν μαρτυρίαν; thus expressing the contrast between the testimony immediately given by the Father and that given mediately through John the Baptist.

Ver. 35. The ἦν[1] indicates that John's course was now fulfilled, that he was in prison, if not actually put to death. But the article which must not be pretermitted in ὁ λύχνος has a large signification as an attestation for John, but more particularly in this twofold sense. It places him in opposition to the true φῶς as a human instrument, a light being kindled in him for his own age; but it also points him out as *the* expected Forerunner, who was to come, the Elias before the Messiah. And with this coincides the expression used concerning him, and which is almost literally that of Ecclus. xlviii. 1 concerning Elias: —ἀνέστη προφήτης ὡς πυρ, καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ὡς λαμπὰς ἐκάιετο. Now, whether the Lord consciously and designedly referred to the words of Sirach's son (and we have most undeniable proofs of such *allusions* to apocryphal passages in His discourses), or whether this was a current proverb concerning Elias in those days, does not affect the question at all: the thing remains the same, the reference is perfectly plain and obvious. We must, however, inquire into the meaning of καιόμενος καὶ φαίνων which are certainly not tautological. The καίεσθαι is obviously, as in Ecclus., intended of that fiery *zeal*, which was the essential spirit of Elias (Lu. i. 17, ix. 55); and that with a twofold contrast—first, with the peaceful and mild beaming of light and truth in Christ, and then with the childish folly—afterwards alluded to—which desired only to take pleasure in the light, without being consumed by the zeal. But the Lord indicates

[1] Bengel, who assigns a later date to the embassy, strives to show that the ἦν only places the Baptist in the past, because the Jews were weary of him, and he himself already obscured by the greater light of Jesus.

a yet deeper meaning by the collocation of the two words:—that *man* generally, even a prophet (as the apostles Lu. xii. 35), can only give light by burning, like a lighted candle—until he is burnt out, and his mission upon earth ceases. Thus did the Baptist burn—brightly, but rapidly—he was upon the scene only πρὸς ὥραν. God had placed him, as St Augustine says, upon the candlestick "that men might, by his candle, seek the day"—but even this accommodation to their infirmity was in vain, and was the occasion of a fearful perversion. A man like this preacher of repentance was not sent to be rejoiced in, but for the awakening of λύπη κατὰ θεὸν; they, however, played with him as children play with the light that comes into the room; they know not yet the use of the light, and only take pleasure in its lustre, without using it to light them to duty and earnest employment. Although this implies an acknowledgment enforced from them that in him there was φῶς, the truth, yet it was no more to them (as Luther's translation aptly expresses it) than a mere *schein* or brightness, which led them to stream into the desert without any spirit of obedience to the truth, without any actual repentance or faith, and stand or sit before him like their fathers before Ezekiel, see Ezek. xxxiii. 30—33. The first ὑμεῖς had made prominent the actual representatives and rulers of Israel; but this second one includes more especially the mass of the common people; and this word is at the same time a proof (in opposition to Lange's above-mentioned remark) that the Lord was speaking publicly here, and not before any tribunal. He could not thus have spoken before the greater or lesser Sanhedrim; but if He was comprehending together both rulers and people, He might impute to each party, as in vers. 33 and 35, what the other had done. Just as in Matt. xvii. 12 He imputes by ὅσα ἠθέλησαν even Herod's act to the entire people, see Vol. ii. The ἠθελήσατε is the language of sharp reproof and irony, and discloses preparatorily the secret principle of evil in their will, as it fully comes out in the οὐ θέλετε of ver. 40. Whatsoever *they* either will or will not, is alike contrary to the testimonies of God! The light shineth upon them in vain, and no fire from heaven can set them on fire! Lange and Bengel (and Cyril and Chrysostom of old) refer the πρὸς ὥραν to the people's will (ne voluntas quidem vestra fuit diuturna),

but we hesitate to accept this: for we do not read that the people had abandoned John the Baptist before his retirement, nor is it probable; and the capriciousness of individual runners to and fro, of whom there were many, doubtless, who only paid heed to him πρὸς ὥραν, still less suits a discourse so general as this. We think the thought more striking, the declaration more convincing, if we take it:—as long as this light burned and shone, ye were there to look at it—but now that he is gone, where is the fruit of repentance towards God, and of faith towards Me? If we ask, finally, what was the ἀγαλλιαθῆναι in John which the Lord allows the people to have felt, the answer is obvious—they rejoiced to hear that the kingdom of heaven was at hand and the Messiah come; every thing else they passed over, and painted the Messiah to their own imaginations as they would desire to have Him.

Ver. 36. We have already shown in what sense μείζω is to be understood, and have now only to remark that it gives us to see the principle of the order of these three testimonies; and hence that the testimony of the Scriptures must be relatively the *greatest.* For we can think of no other than a mere relative sense *for us*, when we narrowly examine the subject. Just as the works of the Son are in their foundation all alike great as the works of God, the first faint commencement of judging and quickening in the human heart being a power of God equally with the last things of the last great day, while yet for our θαυμάζειν they are developed as ever-increasing μείζονα, greater and greater things are spoken of—so while all true testimonies of God are equally great in themselves, they penetrate our unbelief with a gradation of energy—at first more and more direct and immediate, its strongest evidence is finally reached by falling back upon the written medium again. Christ as the Sun needed no longer the light of John, and then finally the prophetic-apostolic word (once more to cite 1 Pet. i. 19) shone with the brightest lustre of all, upon the dark places of unbelief. Τοῦ Ἰωάννου instead of τῆς μαρτυρίας τοῦ Ἰωάννου (Vulg. Johanne—Erasm. testimonio Johannis) is a breviloquence which, though the philologist Winer counts it of no significance, has in it here something emphatic; for not merely is the Lord's ἐγώ, but the Father Himself, thereby put in clear antithesis with the ἄνθρωπος,

—although *this man*, so to speak, was himself absolutely nothing but a witness and a testimony.

We have made it already sufficiently plain to our readers that the *works* to which the Lord here appeals, cannot possibly[1] be merely signs and wonders in the narrow sense. The offence which the older orthodoxy has given to Rationalism through laying too great stress upon the evidence of miracles, must be cancelled by a deeper insight. Let the first part of this discourse be rightly understood, which treating of the ἔργοις regards them only as the exciting, teaching symbols of His inward operation: even the μέγιστα and ἔσχατα at the last day being only the final external manifestation of an internal resurrection and of an internal condemnation. Let it be observed that in ver. 24 He most distinctively points to the evidence of the experience of the inner man, and in ver. 30 only appeals to the holiness of His own life. Let the words spoken at the close of the Lord's public life, John xii. 37, be well understood in their analogy with Ps. xcv. 9; and it will be seen that the wonders displayed before the eyes avail not unless the ears of the dead hear the voice of the great awakening call. We do not indeed by this disparage the miracles: they stand among His works, as in the Lord's meaning here, so also in such passages as Matth. xi. 5, xxi. 23. Acts ii. 22 gives them their full importance; but when the Lord speaks in St John of His works, as here and chap. x. 36—38, xiv. 10—12, He only regards the miracles in their connection with His entire holy life and His whole faithful testimony (so Lampe—totus operum ejus nexus), independently of which connection the greatest postenta both in Scripture and the nature of the case are regarded as valueless. "In Christ, whose entire operation, in teaching and acting, consisted in the constant exhibitions of an immanent, ever present Divinity, all activity is coincident with miracle: hence St John says simply ἔργα." (Beck, Einleitung. S. 189.) With this view alone will ἵνα τελειώσω αὐτὰ harmonize, spoken with the same fulness of meaning as in chap. iv. 34 and xvii. 4.[2] All His ἔργα are one

[1] Although Olshausen and Storr, Flatt and Kuinoel believe this!

[2] For the explanation of this in the Schullehrerbibel of Brandt is very flat—that I should do all that is appointed to me, even on the Sabbath, whether ye will or not!

great ἔργον, which proceeds onwards towards its consummation before our eyes in individul ἔργοις. The Father hath given them to Him that He may do them, but at the same time it is the Father who doeth them in Him (chap. xiv. 10) and *thus hath* the Father, since His coming and work ever borne witness to Him; there is no other more immediate self, no other exhibition of the Father than in the Son and His works—that is, His whole life and act, including His *word*, and in the peculiar light of that His own word, brightly shining and clearly speaking to all. This is our anticipatory exposition of the following verse.

Vers. 37, 38. There are not wanting, indeed, expositors (they may be seen in Lampe) who interpolate here a *fourth* testimony, to which the μεμαρτύρηκε referred—namely, the voice from heaven which bare witness to the Son at His baptism in the Jordan. We can only say that, on the one hand, this testimony, as pertaining only to the Son Himself, could not be appropriately numbered among the testimonies for others who should, through it, believe; and, further, as it only became known through the words of the Baptist,[1] it is already included in the first of our three testimonies. We cannot by any means understand how the Lord could lay the stronger emphasis upon a transaction so mysterious, as that which was only seen and heard by John and Himself, after He had been appealing to the wonderful works which had been manifested to the world. And though in that testimony the voice of the Father was heard, yet was not *his shape* seen; consequently we cannot think that the Lord, in speaking here to these Jews, would incorporate in His words His own secret reflections upon that mysterious assurance which He had himself received from the Father—as in chap. i. 51 we discerned such a secret reference in His words to the first disciples. It remains, that He is still speaking of the testimony of the works, that of the whole personal work of Jesus; but now, precisely as at ver. 35, the blindness and deafness of the unbelieving Jews as it respects this testimony is most significantly and impressively described.[2]

[1] Since now no one believes that it took place in frequenti populi confluxu.

[2] Zeller in the Monatsblatt arranges three witnesses, in another manner and apparently very ingenious, and with a typical application

Lange, following many of the Fathers,[1] discovers here an antithesis between *μεμαρτύρηκε* and *μαρτυρεῖ*, as if between the Old Testament and the New, and consequently supposes that the reference to the entire Old Testament Scriptures ("the Father doth not now begin His testimony concerning Me!") begins already here in ver. 37; but in opposition to this we have only to remark that the *μεμαρτύρηκε* is strictly parallel with the *ἔδωκε*. Nor are we to regard it directly as meaning "the immediate divine testimony in the inmost soul of believers," although the Lord presently afterwards goes on to lay bare the truth, that *without this* all other testimony would ever be ineffectual. He is most assuredly speaking here beforehand of an *objective* testimony of the Father, and His meaning is—as I have already done many works, and spoken many words, in these the most immediate testimony of the Father *hath been long with you*, but *ye* have not yet heard or seen any thing of it! And *why?* This is the right point in which to find the transition to the preparatory testimony of the *Old Testament* —*because* ye have not received and appropriated *that* in faith, ye remain deaf and blind to Me! This thought is fully confirmed by ver. 47. But why does the Lord speak here thus of the *voice* and the *shape* of God? This expression is, first of all, based upon the revelations of God in olden time, in which He either *spake* to the prophets, or *appeared* to them—such must have been the immediate impression which it would make upon Jewish ears. *Εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἑωράκατε* we are not to regard as merely "beheld a sight of Him," but in the full meaning of Numb. xii. 8, מַרְאֶה and תְּמוּנַת יְהוָה (LXX. *ἐν εἴδει, τὴν δόξαν κυρίου εἶδε*), as essentially and properly as the *voice* from Sinai, in connection

of the revelation at the baptism to the Father's drawing to the Son—(1) the testimony of His *works*, which the Father hath given to Him; (2) the testimony of the immediate voice of the Father, by which He calleth those who hear to His son—Hear Him! and (3) the testimony of *Scripture*. But the testimony of the Baptist is here very improperly omitted: this was human and divine, just as the prophetic Scripture is; and we may reasonably ask where the *shape* of the Father is in this interpretation, since it cannot of course be referred to the form of the dove.

[1] Cyril. Theophyl. Nonnus also makes prominent the prophetical Scripture:—*φθεγγομένοις στομάτεσσι θεογλώσσων διὰ φωτῶν μαρτυρίην ζώνυσαν ἀμοιβαίῃ πόρε δέλτῳ.*

with which there was no form visible to the *people;* so that the two expressions taken together embrace the Law and the Prophets, as they were already united in the person of Moses. If we ask further, in what sense He could allege against the Jews that they had not heard and seen God like the Fathers, Moses and the Prophets, we are driven to a deeper interpretation by the *paradox* of these designedly mysterious words,—words which, like many others which our Lord uttered, were intended to arouse the conscience by baffling the understanding. First of all He would say to them:—ye are not such as the believing men who received the former revelations, they would not and could not have been vouchsafed to you;[1] and then further:—for although ye have these voices and appearances of God *in the Scripture* as having been afforded also *for you*, yet *ye* have never *understood* them, never heard them or seen them aright! For all external revelation of God avails nothing unless it is met by the susceptible hearing and seeing of man. If, finally, we meditate profoundly upon this marvellous word, we find another *undertone of meaning* in them. It is quite right to say that the Lord does not here deny, but rather affirm, the reality of the φωνή and of the εἶδος of God (else would the entire Old Testament be contradicted); yet we must remember further, that He is speaking properly of the voice and form of the πατὴρ αὐτός, and He finally does actually deny by the striking πώποτε that such ever did, or ever could exist for men, *independently of Himself.* Let ch. vi. 46 also be taken into the account—a parallel so exact that we must necessarily interpret our passage according to its analogy, as well as that of the Prologue (ch. i. 18). He who appeared, and He who spake in the Old Covenant was never the Father Himself, but always the self-same eternal Son who at last appeared in the flesh.—This is an axiom firmly established for all orthodox exposition of Scripture. Thus the saying of our Lord is so ordered that He does not declare with an indefinite generality "Ye know not God in any manner, have not seen Him or heard Him" (Klee) but—ye have neither understood generally all the former voices

[1] By which did He incidentally *design* their fables about the בַּת קוֹל? See afterwards on ch. xii. 28.

and revelations which have been transmitted to you; nor do ye now know that in all of them the same Son was heard and seen who now standeth in your midst. *Else* would ye, and must ye know and understand me, whose word and whose person is now the final φωνή of the Father, and His only possible εἶδος! The Father Himself speaketh with you, shows Himself to you in Me, as He never did before; but ye have ears, and hear not, eyes have ye, and see not! (Deut. xxix. 4).

Why, finally, is this, and wherein does it lie? The last clause gives the solution. The *word* of the Father (now comprising both, for even His form would only *speak* to us) ye have not dwelling *in you*, or rather *abiding;* it hath never laid hold upon you, and found firm lodgment in your hearts. (Χωρεῖν ἐν ὑμῖν, ch. viii. 37). This λόγος αὐτοῦ, τοῦ πατρὸς is assuredly *not* an independently existing, *other*, *first* revelation in the conscience (against this meaning of λόγος in Olshausen, Lücke rightly protests); but it is that one *Word* of the Father, ever tending from above and from without to the inner being of man, ever seeking a place and lodgment in his heart, the profoundest and most essential reality of which can be actually no other than the eternal Λόγος of St John's prologue. But *that* is not now speculatively introduced by our Lord: He now rather refers by this λόγος to that which He afterwards more directly designates as τὰς γραφὰς; here marking the transition to the third and last *testimony*, the externally at least *abiding* form. Ye *have* the word of God,—that is, not the Father's immediate word, but as mediated by Me from the beginning in every voice and manifestation—*in your books;* but ye have it only external, and are like the deaf and blind (Isa. xxix. 11, 12, 18), it has never laid hold upon your inmost souls. *For* ye show this, it is made manifest by this (an ὅτι for διὸ as ἀποδεικτικὸν as Lu. vii. 47) that ye believe not on Him, whom the Father hath now sent, speaking in Him more loudly, and appearing more plainly, than ever before.[1] Yea, ye do not even believe τουτῷ—in the dative—as a Prophet, who testifieth of God as His Father, and thus of

[1] Münchmeyer teaches me that grammatically ὅτι never could stand for διό. I know very well that formally it could not, but in its meaning it might; that is as διὸ ἀποδεικτικόν—which on that account I expressly inserted above.

Himself. Learn here, that in order to man's believing the testimony of Jesus, a preparation is previously required :—among the covenant people of God through the Scriptures, among the heathen (though they are left out of the question in this discourse to the Jews) through something analogous at least. But when this is wanting, and neither are the works of the Son *seen* nor His words *heard*, what remains but to *refer back* unbelief to the *Scriptures*, which are in their totality the *word* which fully corresponds to the revelation of God in the flesh?

Ver. 39. We read in Bengel—Brentius *magni* judicii interpretes esse ait, qui indicativum statuant.; let me be permitted to add—*majoris* vero aio, qui tamen imperativum. For to take unexamined ancient tradition or ecclesiastical translation is no magnum judicium ; but to find our way back to the right in spite of a specious learned criticism, is something more than that criticism, it is a higher potentiality into which criticism must raise itself. The Peschito translates it in the imperative בצר; so did Chrys., Augus., Theophyl., Euthym., accept the word, and generally most of the ancients, with Calvin, Beza, and Wetstein ; so also does Olshausen, with Paulus, and Baumgarten-Crusius. Lange also to my satisfaction seemed to lean that way—"hence He *exhorts* them, to go and study the ancient Scriptures more profoundly;" though, alas, in his third volume, p. 598, he returns to a contradictory decision for the indicative. I myself, in the first edition of Vol. ii., followed in this track, until I came to study the passage more closely in St John himself. It does not affect the matter at all that the formula since ἀπεστάλκατε runs between simple indicatives, nor that ὅτι δοκεῖτε and οὐ θέλετε follow these words—when the subject and its connection of thought demand something different. And we have already prepared the way for the conviction that the whole context, taken in its completeness, demands the change. If the testimony of the Scriptures is actually the last and greatest, and if *on that account* the Lord now first refers to them; if, as we have seen, the unbelief of the Jews towards Jesus was fundamentally based upon their misunderstanding of those Scriptures, what could be more proper than the change and progression of the discourse into an imperative? We cannot but expect from Him who now speaks ἵνα σωθῶσι, that He would not dismiss them with nothing

but reproaches, rather that He would send them away with exhortation and hope. It is to us as if He should say—Ye sent in vain to John, who sent you back to Me; I myself stand before you, but you know Me not; *I now therefore send you back and refer you* to your own Scriptures again! Did He not often do the same, requiring them to go and to read and learn how it was written? Would they not be constrained (as Hofmann, Schriftbeweis i. 568 affirms) now first to investigate the Scriptures as they never had before, in order to find Him of whom they testify—actually to possess in them that which they thought they possessed?[1]

Now let us go on to examine the word ἐρευνᾶν itself! Some one, whose name we have not noted, utters this warning:—Caveant sibi juvenes ab *emphasi*, quam multi, parum græce docti, in hoc verbo invenisse sibi visi sunt; and Deyling reckons this invenisse among the emphasibus *fictis*. Now we would not go with others to the opposite extreme (following Chrys. comp. Prov. ii. 4), and call it a "thoroughly mining" word, yet it is clear enough to all *græce doctis*, that the expression refers to an investigation of the grounds and internal part of things, that it is opposed to the superficial, and that it must here consequently refer to the πνεῦμα and not to the γράμμα of the γραφαί. We ask—could there be imputed to the unbelieving and blind Jews in any admissible sense of the term an ἐρευνᾶν τὰς γραφὰς?[2] Tholuck after Cyril imposes a rebuking sense upon the word as if directed against their ἀκρίβεια in the mere letter, and Teschendorff follows in the same track—"Ye *grovel* in the Scriptures;" but this is contrary to the Greek usage,[3] and the latter is obliged, though involuntarily, to add his much too stringent imperative,

[1] See it excellently shown that through Christ alone the Old Testament becomes truly *Scripture*, in Petersen's v. d. Kirche i. 182.

[2] The Berlenburger Bibel says—"they were not so much investigators as rummagers and tearers of the Scripture. The true דרש was wanting to their מְדָרְשִׁים; their חֹקְרִים were very far from the true חקר.

[3] All the places in the New Testament have the word in a good sense—see especially 1 Pet. i. 11; Rom. viii. 27; 1 Cor. ii. 10, and the ἐρεύνησον καὶ ἴδε of Jno. vii. 52. So also the Sept. for חפשׂ and חקר. In a bad sense it cannot be found in Greek literature.

when he continues—"*Seek* only with honest minds, for it is this which testifies of me!" And so similarly Gossner shifts round:—"but if *we* would rightly apply this text in our day, we must turn it into a positive command; that which was said to the Jews as a *rebuke*, must become to us a *precept* of the Saviour!" We find in these words a most decisive and important principle, which we shall not shrink from making still more emphatic. If in thy practical exegesis for the church of God thou canst not avoid adopting, or admitting the value of, any traditional and also obvious interpretation of Scripture, be very confident that such and no other is the mind of the Spirit in the word. Does the Lord speak only in these words of St John to the Jews of that day, or is He not speaking to us, and to all ages? Is it not in the highest possible degree probable, to speak guardedly, that He Himself in the beginning, and afterwards the Holy Ghost in the Evangelists, had in His eye His future congregation? Now is it not a truth which approves its certainty always and to this day, that the Scripture remains the last testimony to which unbelief may be *referred*, even as it was that which manifestly contributed to the perfecting of the faith of the first disciples? Let it be observed that the *Risen one* in Lu. xxiv., excited their faith towards His resurrection by means of Moses and the Prophets, before He revealed himself to the eyes of His disciples; and then, after He had revealed Himself to their eyes, opened their spiritual eyes fully to understand those Scripture? Let it be remembered that very many Jews who heard and saw the living Lord in the flesh to no purpose, were afterwards convinced by the Apostles' appeal to the ancient Scriptures! Thus let men learn to place these in their right place, even in that in which Christ here places them; nor should we hesitate to go further and say that although He at first, and for His then present hearers, could only have intended the Old Testament, He, with prophetic prevision, included for His future church the New Testament writings afterwards to be written, in which alone His voice should ever be heard, and His form ever be seen. It is probable that He united in His meaning that דִּרְשׁוּ מֵעַל סֵפֶר יְהוָה of Isa. xxxiv. 16 (quite missed by the Sept.) with Ps. xl. 8; but most assuredly He utters here a word for all futurity; the loud *imperative* mean-

ing will never cease to hold good in its exhortation—seek and investigate, not merely in your hearts, in your understanding, but in the abiding written word of God! Without this word there is no intelligent faith, no blessing in the worship of God, no power in the sacraments, no Holy Spirit in the church! Without *Scripture* there is no church and no people of God![1] The way to me, the first coming as well as the constant and progressive communion with Me, is only through these Scriptures, this originally given *Word!* This is the fundamental principle of the great reformation which now seeks to point the souls of men to Christ Himself.

But here we must necessarily remember the warning which these words enforce by the example of the blinded Jews, against a false, self-willed, unbelieving and proud dealing with the mere letter; and the frightful delusion that without the true ἐρευνᾶν into its spiritual contents, in their mere dead letter—*to have life!*[2] Look, what the Jews have now left them in their synagogues—the chests with the Thorah instead of the living Christ for whom Moses would have prepared their minds, and all their Talmudical mystical folly! Not to mention the fearful analogy of the tabernacle in the Catholic Mass!

Hamann says very properly: "The Jewish *opinion* that they had in their Scriptures eternal life was probably as *prejudicial* as it was favourable to their duty of examining them; and this (the examination) is assuredly to be *recommended* to all ignorant or thoughtless Theists" (iv. 260). But we must add to this that most assuredly the Jewish supposition which led to a high estimate of the Scriptures is greatly to be preferred to that contempt of the written word which has utterly lost the one and only way

[1] That is, taking all history into the account. For though in the beginning (according to the well-known saying of Irenæus) barbarians without paper and ink had the doctrine of the Spirit written upon their hearts—yet this did not obviate the necessity of sending even to them the Holy Scriptures. And as little does the dogma of a Scripture-interpreting church follow from it (Möhler's Symbolik § 38.)

[2] Certainly so when it is said with the Jewish proverb: "He who acquires the *words* of the *law*, obtains the life of the future world!" In strict opposition to this our Lord places *Himself* as the living Redeemer.

marked out for inquiry. Israel, possessing still the Old Testament, will enter into the kingdom, when the despisers of Scripture in the final unbelief of Christendom will be judged and condemned. It is sufficiently clear that this δοκεῖν of the Jews, that they already *had* in the possession of the Scriptures and in their manner of studying them, eternal life, is rejected and condemned by the Lord as a presumptuous delusion against all knowledge and conscience; but He Himself extracts the deep truth upon which that error was grafted, and clearly exhibits it, when He connects the denouncing clause by ὅτι with His own ἐρευνᾶτε, and then gives His own correction by the conceding καί. For it thus reads:—*Although* ye most improperly *think* that ye have already in the Scriptures life, yet I assure you that they *testify* most certainly of Me! *Καί—and that* is the undiscerned truth in their imagining—the Scriptures will lead to the Messiah, and *I am He!*[1] Let us carefully observe the unconditional warrant and confirmation which the τὰς γραφάς gives to the existing Jewish Canon. And further let us note the emphatic ἐκεῖναι εἰσιν αἱ μαρτυροῦσαι which recognizes the contribution of every individual γραφή to the great Whole—it is not merely μαρτυροῦσι. "From the first book of Moses down to the last chapter of Malachi, the whole, yea almost every page, is full of testimonies concerning that mysterious person, who is there the word of Jehovah, the speaking and appearing Jehovah, who as the word of Jehovah speaks, and as the face of Jehovah appears, and who in the fulness of time exhibits Himself as God manifest in the flesh, the same of whom the apostle writes—*the life* was manifested!" Thus expresses Zeller the inmost heart of our Lord's word; for although the "testifying of Him" embraces also all the more mediate allusions and references to

[1] Thus the ὅτι, which is so distinctively set against the imperative, does *not* belong to the first clause, so much as to the second or rather to all together. Here is the simple solution—in the right understanding of the whole passage—of that *two-sided* position of the Evangelist with regard to the Old Testament, to which Hilgenfeld (Ev. Joh. S. 213) refers when he says that their notion of the old Scriptures was in one sense false, inasmuch as they contained not life; in another true, inasmuch as they contained testimonies to the Λόγος. Compare also Luthardt's remarks against Schweizer. (Ev. John i. S. 6.)

the future Fulfiller, yet the sublime expression περὶ ἐμοῦ! when taken in connection with ver. 37, cannot mean less than, *I*, the Son—no God or Father being besides Me and without Me—am the God of whom the Scriptures testify. The testimony of Scripture is also a self-testimony of Christ, the witness in all witnesses.

Ver. 40. But from the beginning ye would not come to the living and true God, hence ye have not hitherto found either the Father or Me in the Scriptures, and your reading and learning have not been a true investigation of their kernel, but a mere traffic with the shell; hence ye want no such Mediator and Redeemer as He to whom the whole Scriptures direct you, therefore it is that ye perceive not the gathering together of all the single rays of the past into the brightness of My glory, the consentient reference of all former lights to the full Light and Life which are now come, the concert and consummation of all past words of God in the words of My mouth. I should have been to you the gladly accepted realisation of a long and fervent waiting, and—*I am against you!* And although I now utter a mighty and still awakening testimony, and cry in your hearing and in your hearts—ye *will* not come to Me, because and even as ye would not come from the beginning to the God and Lord to whom the Scriptures in their spiritual ground always bore testimony. Ye would have *life*, ye imagine to yourselves that ye have it, but ye turn away with abhorrence from the thought of coming *to Me* in order to receive it in truth, notwithstanding all My appeals to the weary and heavy laden, notwithstanding my loud cries to the dead; and your hearts have only responded to the Yea and Amen of all the combined testimonies of God by a fearful and a horrible *No!* These are indeed words of sharp condemnation as issuing from the lips which otherwise poured forth so much mercy: let us not, however, merely mourn over the entirely unbelieving to whom they entirely apply, but receive also their application to ourselves, as much or as little as they concern our unbelief-infected faith in the Scriptures and in Christ! How often do some of us read ourselves into the Scripture and read ourselves out of it again; how easily are we unconsciously led, to seek in them for something other than Christ, thinking it Christ all the while, supposing that we are daily and hourly coming to Him. We *think* indeed that

we have come to Him and that we possess *Him*—but where is, and how exhibits itself, the *life* which in that case we should have?—Many of my readers must pardon me, for the sake of many others, that I sometimes find it impossible to expound without preaching.

Vers. 41, 42. Third part of the whole. After the continuous promising and threatening *assertion*, vers. 19—29, came the *reproving* appeal to the Father's testimony concerning His Son, in whom they believed not; now finally follows a *warning* based upon the principle and results of *unbelief*, a real warning to others, and even to these unbelievers themselves as far as they might be awakened, though couched in the form of most rigorous reproof. There stands it before us in all its shame—unbelief in the mighty Son of God and merciful Son of man, unbelief in the *truth* of God as uttered in all His words, in the *love* of God as exhibited in every gesture and every voice! *Ye will not* come to Me! Thus mourns His love rebuking with truth which penetrated the secret principle of their unbelief; love hoping yet to win some of them to Himself, until the time comes when there will only remain the *lamentation—but ye would not!*

But that secret principle is not yet sufficiently detected. Once more and again a Wherefore! Wherefore *would* they not then come *to Him?* Because His selfless holiness contradicts their inmost nature, and forces upon their consciences a judgment to which they refuse to subject themselves. It was the humility of Jesus, in which the Father alone is seen to work and His testimony alone allowed to be heard, which repels their secret minds estranged utterly from the love of God. His humility begins the third time like vers. 19 and 30, but it now brings out what was said in ver. 34 as a summary of all the previous appeal to testimony—*I receive not honour from men!* Δόξα instead of μαρτυρία, however, advances a step further, in order to set over against it the κενοδοξία of This man. That which they find wanting in the Messiah, despite all the glory of the only-begotten shining from His person, was the "glorious manifestation" which would command the acknowledgment of men—that external exhibition of majesty which alone *they* could regard and appreciate as *honour* and glory. But they wilfully refuse to perceive that this contempt of *such* honour was

not only precisely in harmony with His divine dignity, but also essential to His human holiness; so that this humility itself, through which He assigns to the Father all witness and all honour, becomes the summary evidence and testimony of His own true honour and dignity. Where is there a sinful man, who otherwise than through the grace of Christ, can utter these words after Him, without being belied by his conscience or his conduct?

This declaration is so obviously connected with the preceding, that we may regard it as an additional assurance of what had been already said:—the testimony of the whole Scripture which gives Him His honour and cries "This is He! *Go ye to Him!*" even as John's voice and finger-sign had done, is not a human testimony. Whosoever had in any age testified of Him and pointed to Him, the least as well as the greatest of the Prophets, must have previously received His own testimony and His Father's through Him, that so it might be truly a divine testimony. Quite different is that acknowledgment, complacency and fame which come from *men* as natural and sinful men; that honour of the world which sinners only give to sinners, the proud to those who are still prouder than themselves. It is of this that He speaks, who sees through it all, and that with great gentleness instead of rejecting it with abhorrence:—*οὐ λαμβάνω*, such is not for me, I may not, I cannot receive that! *This λαμβάνειν* is generally understood in a stronger sense (just like that of ver. 44), as if it signified an eager desire and seeking after it which our Lord repudiated; but it were below the dignity of the Lord simply to deny that, and the word has here as in ver. 34 with reference *to Him* a softer sense, and the meaning is—I cannot receive it, even if it were given Me, which, however, as long as I deny not Myself, is impossible. Yea, they would at one time have clamoured Him their king, but as soon as He began to rule over them in truth and in righteousness, the cross and the crown of thorns were prepared for Him instead, because their desire and His are perfectly opposite. This Satan knew not, when he offered to Him all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them: but He then at the very outset rejected them all. But, once more, *this δόξα παρὰ ἀνθρώπων* is something very different from that *τιμὴν* which in ver. 23 He demands from all men, and

which He finally must receive; *this latter* He desires for the honour of the Father, and for Himself in the Father's name (ver. 43), as well as for our salvation, ver. 34.

He who avows such a disposition in Himself, on that very account hath long known and penetrated the hearts of these sinners, among whom He now stood. That *they* sought and received empty honour from men, from one another, He had already asserted in the former clause, the emphasis of which was —I not *like you!* Thence He goes deeper at once into their principles, and shows them their utter lack of that which, and not the honour of men, should be man's highest good and most desired honour. *The love of God*—which now takes the place of *life*, ver. 40; not *immediately* love towards God, but (according to the deep meaning of this word in the Scripture, in St Paul as well as in St John), the love of God flowing towards us, to which our love responds in return. It was not said in ver. 20—the Son loveth the Father; but as in the Son the love of the Father dwelleth and liveth, so it dwelleth and liveth *not* in these men estranged from God, and by persistent unbelief established in their enmity against God. Because they, according to ver. 37, had never seen and known God aright, they know and they possess nothing of His love; that is the reason why they seek not in return of love His honour alone, ver. 44.[1]

Vers. 43, 44. And now comes the *conviction*, showing them how this fundamental evil in their hearts exhibits itself in the rejection of Him, who is Himself the revealed Love of God! Jesus coming in the name of the Father is disowned and rejected; another, like themselves, is received, though to their own condemnation. Proceeding from this, and with emphatic comprehensiveness, the principle and reason of their conduct is further pointed to—How *can* ye otherwise? How can *ye*—receive *Me?* This conclusion flows so simply from

[1] We may, indeed, in a certain sense say that—if any one *had* (which, however, can never be true *absolutely* of *any* natural man) the love of God *in himself*, there would be no necessity of any external testimony—because generally no necessity of any σώζεσθαι through the σωτὴρ τοῦ κόσμου. Nevertheless Bengel is not right in saying, that is the causa, cur debeant remitti *ad homines*—for by that he misapprehends the testimony of Scripture as if a *human* testimony, which indeed it is not, even in a relative sense.

all which had gone before that no explanation is needed, only its enforcement upon the conscience. In the ἐλήλυθα the Lord once more proclaims Himself with the most customary and easily intelligible expression as the ἐρχόμενος (ch. iii. 2) promised throughout all the Scriptures; after whom, if they receive Him not, no other can come. (Matt. xi. 3). If He does nevertheless speak of *another*, He must of course mean a false Messiah and Saviour, a deceiver and destroyer. But the Lord does not seem to speak hypothetically—There might indeed come one instead of Me, whom ye would receive, as according to your mind; but the λήψεσθε passes over into actual prediction. But this prediction was not fully and essentially accomplished in the false prophets who were only the prelude, for they did indeed prophecy in the name of the Lord the deceit of their own heart, (Jer. xiv. 14), nor in the subsequent sixty-four false Messiahs (whom Schudt enumerates), for even these came in the name of Christ (Matt. xxiv. 5) not openly in *their own name*, and borrowed from truth the mask of their wickedness. The other in the singular, of whom the Lord here prophecies with reference to the entire wicked world adumbrated in wicked Israel, is finally *antichrist* with His open and avowed denial of God and of Christ, with his most daring I, before which all the proud will humbly bow down, because they will find themselves again in him, and honour him as their true God. As the Father reveals himself in Christ, so will Satan manifest himself in *him* (who is the father of these Jews, ch. viii. 38), and give him all his work and witness, his own honour as the prince of this world; and the wicked will yield themselves to him, because through unbelief they have already fallen into his nature, and fitly belong to him. Thus *this* ἄλλος is the sharp antithesis of that one in ver. 32. Thus will the world finally judge and condemn itself, before it is utterly judged and condemned by God. (2 Thess. ii. 9, 10.)

And what is that preparatory principle in their hearts which ever more and more uninterruptedly will work onwards to that dire result? The Lord mentions it here once more, and it is the same with which the Evangelist closes the history of the first great stage of unbelief, ch. xii. 43. *Pride*, the root of all sin, Satanic pride which dares to oppose God, is the great

obstacle of *faith* in Christ; and makes that faith, as long as *it* is present and rules, *impossible*. Faith or unbelief is the alternative which decides the salvation of men, but these are rooted in a moral state of the heart (as the saying now is); and this our Lord testifies much in the same manner as at ch. iii. 19—21. Unbelief makes its objection and appeal down to our day, but that must not hinder us from stopping its mouth by throwing its guilt on its own head, from maintaining the testimony of pure truth which our Lord Himself hath here given us, and from answering the alleged—I *can* not believe! by—Alas no, but only because thou *wilt* not! Thus πῶς δύνασθε ὑμεῖς here follows close upon οὐ θέλετε. Men approve of all the propositions of those menders of the world who come in their own names,—but they elude and retire before the word of Him who is the only restorer of the human heart, and which also invites their test. They yield to the obligation which their lack of understanding entails, and follow the guidance of critics without end; but their hearts and consciences repel the κρίσις of the Son of God. Instead of honouring Him with the honour which is due to the merciful Father in Him from all the objects of His mercy, they seek to be *themselves* and to be called something; and pitiable as is the sin and the delusion, they *seek* and *receive* most willingly from others, whom in their cold, loveless, and self-seeking hearts they respect not at all, the expressions of supposed deserved honour? There is a deep irony in παρὰ ἀλλήλων, which should be profoundly studied in relation to the deception and the beggarliness of all honour among men:—a poor sinner receives praise from others, a liar rejoices to have his lie confirmed by another! A learned man (but not from God!) hears himself with great complacency cited by others as a famous and honourable doctor; although both parties hold the truth of the Socratic ignorance in unrighteousness, as their consciences well know! For even in this craving for human honour there lies a secret confession of poverty and of shame:—if thou knewest in truth thy own value, of what importance would be the voices and proclamations of men? But ye lust after[1] the vain appear-

[1] Λαμβάνειν has a stronger meaning than in ver. 34—captare.

ance and the lie: how *can* ye give its honour to the truth of God and *become* only *believers*?[1] As to the honour which cometh from *the only God*, the true God before whom every creature must bow,—ye have no mind, no will for that! For your I is your only God; and therefore, though you know it not, that *other*, the anti-God in his own name. Let us observe here the antithesis which is intimated between the μόνος θεὸς, to whom alone all honour belongs, and who returneth honour to His true worshippers, and Satan who only seeks himself to be honoured; and further, the express testimony given to the *oneness of the Father and the Son*, to obviate all misunderstanding, for it is not affected by the circumstance that the Son here uses ἄλλος and ἐκεῖνος concerning the Father; and finally, the distant exhibition of the true good as being the *honour of God*, which, despised of men, is afterwards, ch. xii. 26, most gloriously promised by the Lord as the portion of all His own.

Ver. 45. There remains to the unbelievers, who scorn this honour, the everlasting infamy of *condemnation*, the assured *consequence* of unbelief, proceeding from itself, since it wills nothing else; but the judgment is the utterance of *justice* over the despisers of *mercy*. Christ as the Son of man is not come to judge the world, but to save the world; He judgeth in mercy for the sake of conferring forgiveness, wherever His judgment may avail; He prayeth down to the last for all who, overcome by the persevering grace of His longsuffering, come to God through Him, that He may save their souls. His office and work is now and to the end that of *mediation and intercession*; when this is exhausted He will *judge*. Yet even then—for the future of this verse extends so far—it is not the Mediator of grace who will be an accuser. Satan bears this name elsewhere, as we know, but that *right* of Satan to his own for the fellowship of damnation which will finally be admitted even by God, rests upon the justice of God, whose expression is the *law* in opposition to the rejected grace. It is this which the Lord refers to here; He refers to it, however, not in abstracto, but by *Moses* its representative, because that was most appropriate on the present occasion,

[1] For the Inf. aor. πιστεῦσαι indicates this factum of a beginning faith, exhibiting itself by receiving testimony.

and because He would make prominent the fact that that same Moses was a witness of the Saviour and of salvation. By this means He would allow them no escape from the conviction that even their *accuser* had in vain pointed them to the source of *absolution*; and that nothing remained but accusation since they would not have it otherwise!

"The justification of Christ Himself has now passed into a discourse of condemnation directed against His judges. He whom they had brought before their tribunal, stands before them almost as an accuser." Lange has well expressed this reference of the closing words of Christ's protest; but there is something more in their meaning. He means, taking what had preceded into the account—Think Me not an excited preacher of punishment, *imagine not that I am like yourselves*, that in your sense I seek my honour from you, and, *therefore*, complain of you because you have denied it to me![1] I say unto you, on the contrary,—oh that ye would understand it—not even as the Son, *which I am*, and have all requisite might and authority, do I complain of you *to the Father*, nor *will* I ever, as part of my office accuse you. Nor is there need of this—for the gentleness of those words now turns to necessary severity—for your accuser is ready, he is the same Moses who speaketh to you before Me that which God had spoken to him for all sinners; Moses, whose faithful disciples ye proclaim yourselves to be, and whom ye oppose against Myself! chap. ix. 28, 29. The same Moses, in whom ye have placed your idle *hope*. The ἠλπικέναι is here obviously a rather external idea of false confidence without true πιστεύειν, as it is said immediately afterwards; just the same as the ἐπαναπαύεσθαι τῷ νόμῳ of Rom. ii. 17. Moses accuses them in a twofold manner;—in the name of the law which they do not keep (chap. vii. 19); and even if that accusation, which, indeed, goes out against all sinners, might be supposed to be nullified by atonement, it still remains in the case of these Jews, and with deeper severity, in that, secondly, they would not suffer themselves to be led by the same Moses unto Christ.

[1] As Dr Bauer and his fraternity slander the "Johannæan Christus."

It is not right to say at once that Moses is here set for the *Scriptures* generally,[1] for although in a wider development of meaning, all that the Lord here says would hold good of the entire Scriptures already referred to, yet it is not without reason that *Moses*, at once the lawgiver and prophet, is made prominent; for the Lord's words require a personal accuser and testimony against them, and thus in this last climax of His discourse, the contrast is most keenly and impressively exhibited between their perverted delusion and the truth which had been with them from the beginning, but which they had obstinately rejected. Compare the song of Moses in Deut. xxxi., wherein he predicts the unbelief of the people, and which was to be placed along with the entire book of the law in the side of the ark of the covenant, *for a witness against them:* see vers. 21—26 of that chapter. And we find it, moreover, as the Talmudical formula in quoting his writings, מוֹכִיחֲנוּ מֹשֶׁה שֶׁכָּתוּב בּוֹ—Moses *blames*, condemns us, for it is thus written in him. (Debarim rabba sect. 1 fol. 248, col. 2.) Oh that they had indeed received his condemnation, and not perversely handled his words, refusing to receive their conviction into their consciences, but superstitiously founding upon their letter the hope of eternal life![2] The same may we say of the ethics deduced by human reason, which are but a confused and corrupted abstract of the law of God, even of the "morals" of a certain class in the present day which makes them their Moses in opposition to Christ;—they will excuse you, inasmuch as ye do not in thought and act so live as to stand even their test, for *then* would even these have led you to Christ.

Vers. 46, 47. Although this is a continuation of the concluding words, an explanation of the great paradox just uttered, yet does this *last word* also include one more reference to the profoundest reason of their unbelief (ver. 42), and to that most important testimony for faith, ver. 39. The weightiest circum-

[1] So von Gerlach, in the introduction to this discourse of Jesus, S. 399.

[2] As the proverb before mentioned in Pirke Aboth runs—קוֹנֶה לוֹ דִּבְרֵי תוֹרָה קוֹנֶה לוֹ חַיֵּי עוֹלָם הַבָּא—and in Synopsis Zohar (cited in German by Döpke S. 27)—He who diligently *studies* the law in this life, will not come into judgment in the next.

stance in all the Scripture testimonies to Christ, the essential pædagogical principle in all the preparatory discipline for His coming, was this, that *the law* as such awakens the sense of need and the desire for grace; for without this influence of the law the *promise* which went before, accompanied, and followed the giving of the commandments, could not be embraced, as the Israelites sadly testified. Consequently the last reason of unbelief is—*the want of true and sincere subjection to the law!*

Ye believe not Moses—what a paradox for these Jews! And yet unanswerably true, true in a sense which disclosed their innermost guilt, as soon as they admitted the piercing words into their consciences. Their not believing in Christ is *the proof*, for true faith in Moses must necessarily be followed by faith also in Christ.[1] They *believed* him not in his account of the Creation and the Fall, for had they received those great facts as truth, they would as sinful men have sought the living God, as Enoch and Noah had done. They believed him not in his narratives of the Patriarchs and their faith, else would they have walked in the steps of the faith of Abraham. They believed him not in the sacred, heart-piercing severity of the law, which he handed down, or they would never have gone about to establish their pharisaical self-righteousness. They believed him not, finally, in his economical dispensation, wherein the institution of priests and offerings was designed to bring their sins constantly to remembrance, and all the types and shadows of which pointed ever to a future fulfilment in the great reality; for if they had, they would have been made already by *Moses*, what John the Baptist long afterwards endeavoured to make them, a people prepared for the Lord, and ready, like Simeon, to embrace His salvation with joy. And the same fulness and universality of meaning may be found, by a deep investigation, in the assertion which is brought forward again from ver. 39—Moses wrote of Me: Moses the First (Rom. x. 19), out of whose writings all the others were afterwards developed, upon which they were all built, and without which they could never be understood. Let our Old Testament Theologians remember this, and apply their ἐρευνᾶν (not that

[1] Erasmus, Laur, Valla, Glassius have earnestly followed Priscian in maintaining against the Vulg., that here and elsewhere (ch. viii. 19, Matt. xi. 23, &c.) ἄν is not forsitan.

pseudocritical inquiry which deals only with the shell) first of all to the Pentateuch itself.[1] Moses wrote of Christ not only in the single predictions of the Seed of the woman, the blessing of Abraham, the Shiloh, the Prophet to come,—nor only when (as some one dreams) he gives the tokens of a prophet. But, as Bengel expresses it in his grand, laconic style—nusquam non, throughout and in everything which he wrote, in the same profound sense as that in which the *entire* extant Scripture testifies of Christ, leads and impels men's minds to Him. This is assuredly the Lord's ultimate meaning;[2] though for His first hearers His obvious meaning was,—The Lawgiver himself, that is, his *law*, if ye dealt earnestly with it, might and should have prophesied to you concerning Me, and have prepared your penitent hearts, hoping for God's love, to welcome Me.

Thus the "solemn and alarming note of interrogation" (to use Zeller's expression) with which our Lord concludes this discourse, is strictly analogous with that which was put to Nicodemus, ch. iii. 12:—Moses preaches the necessity, awakens the sense of need of *regeneration*; and how can he who has rejected that, believe the testimony of the Saviour? But He appends something remarkable and peculiar to this by setting γράμματα and ῥήματα in opposition one to another—for even to the last there is a manifold variety of references and applications accumulating and pouring forth in His words. (And γράμματα for γραφαί yet further strengthens the contrast.) For although the living word uttered face to face is in itself more than any writing which may become a dead letter, yet it is in the nature of

[1] Moses did actually write it (if not with all its glosses and supplements); and Baumgarten-Crusius in vain attempts to invalidate this testimony of our Lord against all pseudo-criticism by the already refuted argument that Moses is put here for scripture generally. Neander allows its full weight to the hypothesis of a "negative and formal accommodation," according to which our Lord "adopted the *ruling opinion* as to the authorship of these books," and yet says nothing to confirm it—but this is not in accordance with our theology generally, or our christology in particular!

[2] Luthardt rightly: Not this or that individual word alone, but all the writings of Moses. And as Moses may be deemed the representative of the Old Testament, the Lord's word may be extended so far as to assert that Himself was the substantial contents of all Old Testament scripture.

distrustful man rather to believe the original, firmly settled writings which have been handed down through ages; *therefore* it is generally that the divine accommodation has given us holy Scripture, therefore also it is, that though Christ himself could write down nothing, His word has been reproduced for us in a γράμμα.[1] The question is not here about the respect which *the Jews* bore to Moses, and *their* dependence upon the written word (as de Wette says)—or as to *their* having been likely to put more faith in the writings than in words (as von Gerlach) —but Christ recognizes here the universal requirement of authentic documents which God has already satisfied, and will yet further satisfy. He reproves them, as it were in passing, that this pædagogical condescension of the divine testimony had been rendered vain by their perverseness; while at the same time He gives expression to His profound consciousness, that even after these *most mighty words filled with the Spirit* had been falling from His lips, they would be *for men such as they were*— no more than ῥήματα. Even yet more marvellous is the humility with which, after *such* a testimony to Himself, He places His own words in a certain sense *below* the writings of Moses. Only, however, in a certain sense; for on the other hand it bespeaks His sublime dignity, that He only speaks, and would not and will not write[2]—indeed more generally the relation of the New Testament to the Old is here already intimated. Everything legal and preparatory is better established, as it respects us, in writing or in the letter; but the Gospel could only at *first* enter the human spirit as a living word, the New Testament γράμματα are for ever in an impressive sense no other than ῥήματα, their *letter* as such can never hold the same place as the letter of Moses and the prophetical books.

The discourse leaves its final sentence unexpressed, but it involuntarily rises to our *thought*:—and *if* ye, radically unbe-

[1] And he who believeth not these γράμμασι, would no more believe, would *even less* believe, if the Lord himself were to appear again, and speak His own words, and perform His own works, as then!

[2] Which is here *incidentally* declared: but essentially the words convey an intimation both that He himself would not write immediately (which Hase calls "an accidental matter!") and yet that He would order His words to be transmitted in writing.

lieving from the outset, with your wills averse, believe not these My *words*, how would you believe, if I were to heap miracle on miracle, every new wonder surpassing the last in confirmation of my words, instead of still *speaking* to you? The *Word* of the Son, as was said in ver. 34, is most distinctively that which avails for the quickening of the dead, the Father hath no agency beyond that for Israel or the world. O let us *believe* His *words*, as they are now written down for our good!

Many of our readers will not be displeased if we analyse the whole exposition, and arrange it systematically; those who dislike such methodizing, or think it unnecessary, may pass it over.

Jesus *bears witness to Himself* with a lofty dignity, in which is at the same time expressed His humility before the Father, and His love to mankind—He Himself testifies to His divinity of *operation* as the *Son* in the unity of the Father, as shown in *quickening* and *judgment* being put into His hands. The great position of ver. 17, involving in itself all that was afterwards developed, is laid down with the foresight that explanation would be required by His hearers. Then follows with ver. 19 the testimony which obviates and replies to all misunderstanding and opposition, falling into *three* divisions:—a vindication of Himself which corrects their error, passing into a continuous assertion of His claims (vers. 19—29);—a reproving reference to the extant *testimonies of the Father*, which they had not believed (vers. 30—40);—a *warning* resting upon the ground and consequence of this *unbelief*.

The *first part* gives us:

1. The continuous corrective *assertion*, in itself—the Son doeth *(now)* only the works which have been shown and given to Him of the Father (ver. 19)—*for* the Father showeth Him *all things*, and yet greater things (ver. 20)—even the two *greatest*, the first and last, all-comprehending works, quickening and judgment (vers. 21, 22)—in order that the Father's honour may rest upon the Son. (Ver. 23.)
2. A more direct development of this in *confirmation*, which already passes over into the evidence for it, inasmuch as it promises the experimental proof, now internal, and in

the future external. Ver. 24 stands at the head as the fundamental position, and this is then pursued into detail—

A. For those who now *believe*—*Already* the dead live through the Son of God (vers. 25, 26), through Him to whom as the Son of man judgment is given (ver. 27), that is, for them the judgment of mercy—but also

B. For those who *believe not*, in contrast with them, *in the future!* The last, complete distinction and separation between consummate *life* and the *condemnation* which remains. (Vers. 28—30.)

The *second part* embraces :—

1. The general *appeal* to the testimony of the Father, attached to the previous assertion now repeated. (Vers. 30—32.)
2. The particular *exhibition* of that testimony in its progressive order—

A. The Father testified, first of all, by *John*, who is not to be regarded as man, but as sent from God for their salvation, but who was met by unbelief only. (Vers. 33—35.)

B. The Father *Himself* testifies with a *greater* witness, that is, most immediately and essentially, by the *works* of the Son, which themselves confirm the word of John; but these works are not met by the hearing or seeing of those who had never from the beginning received the *word*—of all preceding testimonies. (Vers. 36—38.)

In this is the transition to the third witness.

C. The Father testifies further, by that continuing testimony of *Scripture*, the *greatest* witness for man (through which alone the works of the Son can be fully apprehended and understood). It only remains to *refer them over* to *this* witness, while it is confirmed, and the principle of unbelief in it detected, which is the aversion of the will. (Vers. 39, 40.)

Thus the way is paved to the *third part*, in which :—

1. The *ground* of unbelief is exhibited in its expression—the rejection of Jesus (and the predicted acceptance of another). (Vers. 41—44.)
2. Its *consequence*, the judgment and condemnation springing from itself, must be held up to their view. (Ver. 45.)

3. Once more the Lord returns to the first and, inasmuch as it lays the foundation for all which follows, the most *important witness* of Scripture—Moses pre-eminently, both as lawgiver and prophet (ver. 46); and to the *deepest principle* of unbelief—want of sincere submission to the law (in a trusting acceptance of the promise which ever accompanied it). (Ver. 47.)

TESTIMONY TO THE PEOPLE AFTER THE MIRACULOUS FEEDING. JESUS HATH THE BREAD OF LIFE; THE EATING AND DRINKING HIS FLESH AND HIS BLOOD.

(Ch. vi. 26—58.)

We have already expounded the historical introduction to this, and the words which were spoken in connection with the narrative, when treating the synoptical account on Matt. xiv.—see vol. ii. We are not willing to commit ourselves to a minute investigation of the transition, vers. 22—24, to the discourse in which our Lord gave His instruction to the people who sought Him after the feeding—for the account of the Evangelist is plain enough upon the main point. We hold to the reading ἰδὼν, and understand it with an emphasis—when the people were convinced by the evidence of their eyes; and regard ὅτε οὖν εἶδεν as resuming it after the parenthesis of ver. 23. The entire narration with its prolixity (according to Baumgarten-Crusius much in the tone of the people who speak in it) bears upon it the unmistakable stamp of the most rigid historical truth, which should help to justify the following discourse, so mercilessly debated over by our modern frivolous criticism. It is not that the Evangelist is in any sense unskilful in recording externals, but he designedly adopts this ordinary method of relating his story, in order to give the firm historical framework (completed in ver. 59) to the "hard saying" thus spoken to such a people. His expressions are classical Greek, if we take the terms as in a representation given from the people's point of view:—they saw that there *had been* no other ship there, and certainly knew that Jesus had gone

across in the same with the disciples. It was not till the next morning that the other boats came for their transit.

Wherefore did these people now *seek out* the Lord, and who were they distinctively? Certainly not the satiated five thousand in mass, for a fleet would have been requisite for their transport;[1] but according to the plain limitation in ὁ ἑστηκὼς, only a residue of the whole who would not submit to the ἀπαλύειν, Matt. xiv. 23, but still clung to the repelling bread-king. Grotius: qui substiterat in loco facti miraculi. Lange: the people which held out on the other side of the sea. Yet not so strongly defined as he would imply—"only the fringe of the great family at the feeding,[2] the most elevated and importunate of the Chiliasts." Rather do we gather from ver. 30 that in their fruitless search "the first excitement in which, after their abundant supply of food, they would take Him and make Him a King, had cooled down, and they were now only curious to know how and when He had crossed the sea." (Brandt Schullehrerb.) They found Him on the other side, that is to say, already in the synagogue; for from the first moment the colloquy goes on uninterruptedly, and it is highly artificial to interpolate at vers. 41—43 a transition to the synagogue. In the πότε of the question a πῶς must be understood, for the land journey round the margin of the lake would have been far too long for so short a time, especially in the night: and this comes forward still more emphatically in the ὧδε γέγονας (since when *art thou here?*) Thus does their sensual curiosity and lust of marvels seek into that miracle which had been secretly given only to the disciples, but the Lord in His wisdom and dignity leaves their question unanswered (it was not for this people that He had gone over the sea); instead thereof He Himself gives them the answer to a

[1] What has been lately said, *e.g.*, by Sepp (iii. 16) of the multitude of ships which trafficked on the sea of Galilee, may be true enough; yet these thousands were not likely to find such a fleet ready for them on the instant.

[2] As it regards which Lange needs for his interpretation of the "miraculous frame of mind," a more spiritual frame than we find, and no less than an evening-meal as at Cana. But this is contradicted by the governor of the feast there, and here by this same select company itself.

counter-question which would have been much more appropriate and useful had He put it—wherefore seek ye Me? He points their attention to the sign of the bread which they had eaten, and explains it—I Myself am the bread of *life!* In this fundamental idea the three great testimonies, chaps. iii.—vi. perfectly coincide with the present; but the progression appears in this, that now He who in His own person was the bread of life come down from heaven, and present among them, points nevertheless to a future (conditioned by his death) when first He would truly *give* Himself—and, at the same time, in this that now the susceptibility which must meet His offers, the hungering and thirsting sense of need in the heart, comes most prominently and strongly forward as a great condition. In chap. v. the discourse was *chiefly* addressed to the rulers and leaders of the people, now His words are pointed directly and expressly to the *people* themselves. Hence the character of this discourse coincides rather with chap. iv. than with chap. iii. But there is, moreover, a great difference in the progression of this discourse:—in the case of the more guiltlessly ignorant Samaritan woman the Lord *awakens* the sense of need in her heart, and His testimony dwells rather upon the fact that He can give *water* which will satisfy the inmost longing of the human desire; here, however, He directly and with reason *rebukes* from the very beginning the want of true desire, and dogmatically represents Himself as the bread come down from heaven, in words which penetrate even to the deepest mysteries of the communication of His incarnate life. In all these relative differences we have pure witnesses to the historic truth of these discourses; the Evangelist, discerning the process of the Lord's teaching, and the process of the mind of the Spirit in it, has given them prominence as an essential abstract of the testimony of Jesus to Himself.[1]

Ver. 26. By His Ἀμήν, Ἀμήν the reproving searcher of hearts gives assurance at the very outset that He knows them far better than they are willing to know themselves. The Evan-

[1] We have given our views already, in the preface to the first volume, upon the treatise which Bauh has bestowed upon this chapter, a treatise written in the marvellous style of orthodox, apologetic criticism. It would lead to wearisome prolixity if we were to attempt to unweave his hyper-artificial confusion upon this simple history and discourse.

gelist had rightly represented the seeing of the miracles—according to the superficial phraseology and meaning of men—as the cause of their following and attaching themselves to Jesus, but the Lord's word now penetrates more deeply into the matter: He gives its right emphasis to the *signs*, as in chap. ix. 48 He had given it to the *seeing*. Ye have seen, yea even eaten, but ye have not understood the significance of the miracle, so as to derive from it the knowledge of Me, and thus truly *seek*, in order to *believe on Me*, ver. 29. Even that ἁρπάζειν to make Him a king was truly no evidence of faith, and such coming to Him as the Lord requires; rather was it at the root a presumptuous and selfish aim—to make the divine subservient to the ends of their own earthly desire, resting upon a state of central *unbelief* in His *true* majesty. Yet the Lord does not say ὅτι εἴδετε σημεῖον, but speaks in the plural; not merely meaning in addition the healing of the diseased mentioned in ver. 2, but everything generally that had been done, or had transpired, in connection with His work, as in ver. 36. For these men the bread was not a sign, but the sign was only—*bread!* The former signs were already forgotten; this last, by reason of its material usefulness which won their hearts, was not yet gone out of mind. The Lord rebukes them that their *eating* and *being filled* in the most common sense, was the only thing of which they were capable; and says at the same time (against Lange) that they had yesterday *eaten* His miraculous bread in no better and higher disposition of mind. I know well, that *that* was according to your mind, and that ye seek me now if peradventure I may continue it! They were like our modern men of industry, *utilitarians*, as Lange himself so far well calls them, and as Grotius had already said—in ipso miraculo utilitatem tantum hujus vitæ spectabant. And is it before *such* a people that the Lord penetrates so deeply into the mysteries of truth, and pours out those deep lessons over the interpretation of which even orthodox divines so often stumble and fall, even then most deeply falling when their misunderstanding or hyper-orthodoxy grows most zealous *in favour of* the mysteries themselves? Assuredly, but it is not so much as the result of a previous plan of His own that the Lord thus speaks to such hearers, as that He is constrained by their ever-deepening contradiction to go on with His

deepening mysteries, until He utters those hard sayings which bring about a sifting even in the narrower circle of His own disciples. He begins in a sufficiently conciliatory manner to speak of faith in Himself who will give the true bread; they then object to Him the manna of Moses, and *He may not retract or retreat*, must give up His truth to the contradiction of sinners (even as Himself to their hands), and not shrink to vindicate Himself as the true bread from heaven. *To this* also belongs simply that word concerning His *flesh*, ver. 31, which He still hesitatingly surrendered to them; and when they strove among themselves over that saying, He pronounces His judgments upon their proud minds, but yet in all humility and tenderness—for He gives them the most gracious disclosures, apparently only in vindication of Himself, or *as if* extorted from His humble and gracious truthfulness, concerning that sacred mystery which was afterwards to be sealed and confirmed to His friends and disciples in the sacrament of the last supper. How could the Lord do otherwise than continue thus to yield up Himself and His truth, for His love could never let the most perverse questioner go away unanswered, and, on the other hand, His wisdom foreknew to what purpose and use the despised words of His mouth in the synagogue of Capernaum would be put by the Father in the future history of Christianity.

Olshausen speaks, in his wonted manner, altogether too humbly and flatly concerning the Lord of glory:—"That *He might hope to be able*, by disclosing the full truth, to stimulate within them the germ of higher attainments; or should they remain impracticable, or should they become contentious, it would doubtless be *His wish* to repel them, and oblige them to go away!!" There is, however, some truth in this, when more becomingly expressed. But much more will arise hereafter to be considered, when we ask the question whether the "eating the flesh of the Son of man and the drinking His blood," is to be classed among the most intense, and highly-wrought figures of speech, or as the—*plain expression of a great truth which must not even thus early be kept back from the world.*

Ver. 27. The reproach which was spoken in the Indicative, as laying bare their secret hearts, is *followed* by the hortatory Imperative (which gives us another example, confirmatory of

chap. v. 39.) In that most general expression *βρῶσις* is the transition first made to a spiritual meaning; but there immediately rises, as the case of this people required, the contrast between the two senses in all its strictness. The food of the body perisheth or passeth away—in the use of it in man himself, since the greatest part of it must again, as dead excrement, be rejected (Col. ii. 22; Matt. xv. 17): consequently there is nothing in it *living* or abiding; and if not used, it perisheth by corruption, &c. But how can that which perisheth itself, preserve the equally perishable and mortal bodily life of man from the power of death, and give a *ζωὴ αἰώνιος!* This passage must be understood just as 1 Cor. vi. 13. The *ἐργάζεσθαι* which is here chosen to correspond with *ζητεῖν* is first of all intended emphatically for the *first* clause, from which it then passes over to the second. Its meaning is originally *to gain by labour*, to get or acquire by diligence, see Lu. xix. 16; 2 Jno. 8, and in 1 Cor. ix. 6 it stands absolutely, to work for bread. Thence the derivative meaning—*to make a business* of, to engage in any thing as a calling, mainly, that is, for the sustentation of life, as in Rev. xviii. 17, *τὴν θάλασσαν*, 1 Cor. ix. 13, *τὰ ἱερά* (as פָּעַל with ב in Isa. xliv. 12). But neither of these meanings suits the idea here: the former certainly has no application to the earthly bread of this people, who would prefer to receive it *without* labour from the hand of Christ, and as it respects the heavenly bread, that is promised in *δώσει*. So that de Wette's translation, erwirket, is altogether false! The word here passes over into the general idea not merely of *procuring*, getting for themselves (Prov. xxi. 6 פַּעֲל Theodotion), but of *seeking to get*, troubling themselves about, making that an anxious concern. Yet must it not be reduced to a mere *φροντίζειν* (as Euthymius explains it), for it retains the idea of a wearisome effort on the part of man, a *ποιεῖν* and labour in order that it might be given, which applies also to the eternal food.[1] Schleiermacher very appropriately obviates the misunderstanding of *ἐργάζεσθαι τὴν βρῶσιν τὴν*

[1] Steinmeyer's homiletical exposition, on the other hand, is very artificial, according to which the *use* which we on our part make of the bread which is *given*, may be understood as a work! This must be in working up, *digesting* the food, but how does the language here used agree with it?

μένουσαν to which Luther's translation might lead, by saying "that they on the preceding day had not themselves laboured for the perishable food; it was now their great care and concern to get into their power and appropriate Him from whom they had received it." Thus the Lord's meaning is:—*Be quite as earnestly eager* to get for yourselves the true bread, make that your main business;[1] yea, seek Me, hold Me fast, but not as a bread-king, rather as the Feeder of your souls! Thus does He lay hold upon the minds of this people by this significant *middle-term* (de Wette—a word carefully chosen in order to the development of the discourse); though they afterwards might resent the reproof which had been administered in His use of it and say (as Pfenninger makes them say)—"What are we to mind in this world, if not our *bread?*"

His first address has, however, three divisions—the reproach; the exhortation which springs from it; the *promise*, which shows them the right method of the desired ἐργάζεσθαι, in the believing, earnestly-anxious coming to Him who hath that better thing which is needful for them, to Him who was marked out by what He yesterday gave them as the Giver of the true gift. It is clear that ἣν does not refer to the ζωὴν (as has been supposed) but to the βρῶσιν. The future δώσει points indeed in the Lord's secret thought to that future of ver. 51 in which He will first fully give Himself by His death to be the life of the world; but now He generally invites those who hear Him, to eat of His bread, as Wisdom does in the Proverbs of Solomon, ch. ix. 5.[2] *For* while He names Himself the Son of man, He yet at the same time calls *God* His *Father;* this is the meaning of ὁ θεός as following after, the emphasis being thus—if I speak of the Father as My Father, hear it aright that He is God! The *God* from whom ye receive all good things, from whom ye should be eager to receive all good things, is My Father, who hath sent Me, the Son of man now standing in your presence, to give life

[1] For that the strong μὴ—ἀλλά does not literally forbid the working for daily bread, is clear of itself. Yet Epiphan. hær 80 had to do with people who so perverted the Lord's word.

[2] As the Jewish phrase had the bread of *doctrine;* and the Rabbinical exegesis of such passages as Isa. iii. 1 points that way. Christ indeed *intended* much more from the very beginning!

to the world.[1] Σφραγίζειν, *seal* (rather erroneously in the German Bible "versiegeln," to seal up), that is, to confirm, approve, must have been at that time a customary and well-understood expression, as we here and at ch. iii. 33 observe. The Father hath marked out Jesus (as it were stamped), or authenticated and warranted Him by the *testimony of works* (ch. v. 35); this, however, is here as there not to be understood merely of the *miracles*, but of the *stamp of Divinity* which was impressed upon His whole life and working: comp. ch. x. 36 ἡγίασε.[2]

Although they do not fully understand the words of Jesus, yet those words were plain enough to make them observe at least whither they pointed. Those who answer Him are not necessarily, as has been said, the better portion of the multitude: the Evangelist assuredly always lays hold of those expressions of the individual speakers which most aptly represent the sentiments of the entire man. But what do they mean by the ἔργοις τοῦ θεοῦ, which they so markedly substitute? There are expositors, though not much to be thought of, who meet from very different sides in one common and very strange interpretation. Not merely does Stolz translate—"what can we do, to work that which God alone should work?" but even Hess and Pfenninger have understood it very much the same, and Schleiermacher is persuaded that he must thus understand the words: "they admit that it is a work of God to give the imperishable bread, and ask Him how He could attribute to them the doing of that which God only could do; and what He could expect them to do, in order to accomplish a task which belonged only to God," which exposition, accepted by Meyer, Herder also received, though with a mocking turn—"How are we to do this? This we leave to God!" Schmieder also acceded to this view, though he somewhat modified it when he said "how are we to *procure* the means of nourishment for our souls which

[1] This view is more natural than that which makes πατήρ and θεός in *connection* with one another, stand for the designation of *willing* and *being able!*

[2] The Lord bears on His breast the high-priest's seal—קֹדֶשׁ לַיהוָה. Thus does the fundamental truth of that ancient, but generally rejected exposition, which traced here the χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως, find its justification.

God can only *prepare*?"[1] Yet we cannot agree with this interpretation; and though most learned commentators pass it over entirely, we think it of great moment to the meaning of the answer which the Lord connects with their question, to pay attention to it and show its untenableness. Everything, when we narrowly look into it, is against this view. They must then have misunderstood the ἐργάζεσθαι as signifying to procure or create, which could not well be possible in connection with the bread in the desert; they rather by τί ποιῶμεν indicate a better understanding than that the Lord had warned them against what they could not have done. On the other hand, they must have discerned the spiritual meaning of the βρῶσις, and its divine origination, far better than we are at liberty to suppose; indeed the whole saying so interpreted would have been altogether too keen and ingenious for this people. Finally, if such had been their meaning, they must naturally have adopted the Lord's own word, and as He had spoken in the singular they must have continued with τὸ ἔργον. Assuredly, the ἔργα from the lips of Jews must be interpreted simply according to the general phraseology of the time, as referring to those "works" with which they were continually busy in the exercise of their devotion, in the endeavour after their own righteousness. Thus it is manifestly the genitivus beneplaciti, as it is termed, which follows, Ps. li. 19; Jer. xlviii. 10; 1 Cor. xv. 58.[2] It is very characteristic that they pass over the promise altogether, and fasten on the requirement; they understand thus much, that the Lord requires from them a diligent labour after righteousness, and express themselves consequently in the way which was familiar to them—what dost thou require from us with thy ἐργάζεσθαι? What are we to do then? But we doubt whether (as Lücke thinks), they mean actually and properly the works of the *law;* Lange meets the case better who says, "they now would see in Him a *lawgiver*"—instead, that is, of a Saviour bringing grace, they expect from Him *new* commandments. This alone is conformable with all that follows, particularly their setting up Moses in opposition; and

[1] Zeugniss von Christo in Predigten, S. 257.
[2] Nonnus appends quite rightly θεοτερπεῖ θεσμῷ.

only thus can we understand the answer of our Lord which has been so often perplexed and perverted.[1]

Ver. 29. We may confidently regard it as a misunderstanding and a misuse of this saying, to make it prove that God worketh faith in us. The Lord has been requiring from man an *ἐργάζεσθαι*, and such an interpretation is remote therefore from His meaning; nor would it be an answer to their question even *if* that had so intended *τὰ ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ*. Even the arch-predestinarian Lampe cannot avoid perceiving that *ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ* is intended in the sense of their question. It is very significant that our Lord opposes a *singular*[2] to their plural; and faith to their works as the *one, true foundation-work*, from which all works well-pleasing to God must proceed, (in its deepest sense quite in harmony with Rom. iii. 27, 28);—He replies to their *τί ποιῶμεν* by *πιστεύετε*, just as His apostle afterwards does. Schleiermacher: "I do not know that there can be found even in the writings of the Apostle a passage which more plainly and expressly teaches us that the whole imperishable life of man's soul proceeds from *faith in Christ*, and that nothing but this faith lies at its foundation; a faith, *from which proceeds every other good thing acceptable to God*." Yes, verily, this is the evangelical answer to all legal questioning. But faith is itself called a work, and that not catachrestically in deference to the question concerning works: it is itself no other than "the true, God-appointed work, the substance of the first commandment, it is a law in obedience."[3] Comp. Jas. i. 25, *ποιητὴς ἔργου* (not *ἔργων*) and *ἐν τῇ ποιήσει αὐτοῦ*.

To those who imagine that the Lord, by implication, would pass over to the genitivus causæ also at the same time, we can only say that whatever truth there is in that (Eph. i. 19; Col. ii. 12; Phil. i. 6, &c.) belongs not to this passage; for *this*

[1] It will not do to detect, as Luthardt does, in the *ἔργα τοῦ θεοῦ* as spoken by *Jews*, the deep meaning of *ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν* ch. iii. 21.

[2] The significance of which distinction Luthardt should not have denied (Stud. u. Krit. 1852, 2)!

[3] Nitzsch, die Gesammterscheinung des Antinomismus, Stud. u. Krit. 1846, 1, 69. Lange:—"Faith is a work of man from God, in and through God, and for God; and therefore it is as well God's work as it is *the highest, freest work of man*." (Leben Jesu iii. 603).

meaning the expression would be too strong, and the saying would be here in the whole Scripture a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον—that our faith is the work of God in us! In Eph. ii. 8 salvation is the *gift*, but faith the instrument of its reception on the part of man; according to 1 John iii. 23 it is the *commandment* of God to us that we believe, and no other can be the design of ἵνα πιστεύσητε in this passage. At most might it be said, as Hess cautiously puts it, "that which God worketh in you can only be accomplished through *your* believing," or—God is *for that* always providing and working, and ye should enter into His purpose by a reciprocal ἐργάζεσθαι. This latter view might be in some sense justified by the ἵνα if stress is laid upon it (to that end God worketh, that), but it does not respond to the question; the former scarcely can be reconciled with τοῦτό ἐστι. Turning from all this let us rather mark in this saying the theme of the whole discourse, as it connects *believing* and *eating*, not, indeed, identifying them, but plainly declaring that he only who believes will be willing and able to eat of that meat which is unto everlasting life. If we ask after *our* ποιεῖν ἵνα—it is absolutely no other than believing, coming, receiving. If *we* ask (which the Jews, however, on this occasion did *not*) after the work of God in us, *then* we say that in another sense this is *His* ἔργον, to feed our souls with Christ, and on Christ, His Son.

However perverse and to be condemned were the meaning and spirit of these contradicters in the rejoinder which now follows, yet it was so ordered under divine guidance that their folly should be the foundation upon which the Lord would raise a testimony thus extorted from Him by the false representatives and adherents of the Old Testament. We may say, indeed, that these Jews themselves gave to Jesus the most appropriate subject which the occasion required; inasmuch as He now, as *opposed to Moses*, can so much the more plainly and convincingly testify of that bread of life for the world which, from this time forward, was present among them—and in the form of simple reply and vindication of Himself.

Dost thou assert thyself to be sent of God after and above Moses—how canst thou prove that, what sign shewest thou? Here do these people shew themselves to be no better than those Pharisees who elsewhere desired the sign from heaven, after hav-

ing seen so many signs; and we regard this as quite natural and consistent with the narrative. It is quite unnecessary and incorrect to refer this to *others*, and not those who yesterday would make Him a king if so He might be made further *subservient to their purposes*.[1] The entire account has nothing to do with any others, from ver. 26 downwards. The Lord has now excited them, given them offence, and pointed them to that better thing which they desired not; they remain wavering for a while, vibrating between better and worse impulses, until, finally, unbelief keeps the field. If, in ver. 28, there was something responsive to our Lord's words, that has now passed away, and in vers. 30, 31, they go to the opposite extreme. We cannot, with many (Ebrard last of all) discover here a continuation, according to which a *request* underlay the question—*give* us then that better, everlasting bread, give us *this sign first*, then will we believe—for this would be perversely to invert His requirement that they should first believe. No, that does not come till ver. 34. Still less may their saying be explained, with Lange—"they *confide in Him* that He might take them under His care, even as Moses had their fathers, but they are not willing to expect anything less from him than they received from Moses; *He must continue in the same path and provide for them fully and entirely*. Such confidence and such expectation would amount to the very πιστεύειν αὐτῷ which they declined; but it is the boldness of unbelief which speaks here most strongly in the ἐργάζῃ of unbelief, which, having seen much, will see more, and which here gives back His own word to the Lord with a clumsy perversion—what are the works of God which thou workest, to constrain us to accept from thee thy doctrine and laws, to guide us in our works? We *see* not the sealing of which thou speakest, in anything that hath taken place yet![2]

[1] So Neander: "Thus others came forward; for it is part of John's manner not closely to distinguish individuals in his narrations, but to group them in masses." But this cannot, thus absolutely and without qualification, be maintained.

[2] Berlenb. Bib. rightly thus—"so dull and so audacious is man!" Brückner opposes this emphasis, and says that the σύ which would justify it is wanting; but there is no force in this, as the antithesis is plain enough in the connection, and the σύ of the former clause passes on to the second.

The new sign must be from heaven, but naturally enough something good for them on earth—nothing else does this people desire; and as the matter in question is bread and feeding, the manna given by Moses in the wilderness comes aptly to their minds, and should He have given them manna too? Signs heaped upon signs, one approving the other, give no evidence to the unbelief which is of the heart; as had long ago been seen in their fathers—the more God thus gratifies their love for wonders, the more insatiably will they desire to see more.

We have here a normal passage for the distinction between πιστεύειν εἰς and the mere πιστεύειν τινί. It was the former which the Lord desired, but they will not even concede to Him the latter. If we are to attach ourselves to thee as another Moses, or to place thee even above him, and devote ourselves entirely to thee according to thy word—then perform some sign as great as, or greater than those of Moses. This, from the point of view of their *hardness of heart*, is not an altogether stupid requirement, but the true philosophy which, in its opposition to the revelation of God, is never wanting to unbelief.[1] We may imagine how highly the Jews thought of the *Manna*, the θεῖον καὶ παράδοξον βρῶμα according to Josephus, the θαυματουργούμενον καὶ τεράτιον ἔργον according to Philo, when we find that Aben Esra calls it the greatest of the miracles of Moses, and read in the thoughtful book of Wisdom so romantic a diatribe upon it, ch. xvi. 20, 21. (And Nonnus has—μάννα πολυκλήϊστον). Our fathers did eat manna in the desert, so many hundreds of thousands so many long years daily—*against that fact* the food given by Jesus seems to them very insignificant, and especially when it was taken into account that that bread of Moses came *from heaven!* For this glorification of their Moses they have even a text of Scripture, they think themselves quite justified and impregnable. It is found (only that here ἐκ and φαγεῖν are added to strengthen it) literally in Ps. lxxviii. 24, with which may be compared Ex. xvi. 4, 15, and Ps. cv. 40. But these presumptuous quoters of Scripture forget, alas, or have never read

[1] Kleuker (Briefe über Herder S. 74) reminds us very aptly of Mendelssohn's requirement, that the law of Moses should be abolished in as emphatic and glorious a manner as that in which it was given.

and known, that this very Ps. lxxviii. is full of keen condemnation of their fathers' unbelief, and that the manna is there only coupled with the quails, in which their lust ate death! And they now were acting no better with regard to the miraculous bread of Jesus than their fathers had done, who were not contented with the manna, but wanted flesh also, yea, longed after their common bread and water again (Numb. xxi. 5). Their fathers had indeed believed Moses before the manna was given when he led them out of Egypt, but after the manna was given they believed him not. These wise ones know not what they say; and have only come to utter these words because the bread of life offered to them had thrown back their thoughts upon *eating* again—ἔφαγον and φαγεῖν is the limit of their ideas.

Vers. 32, 33. Instead of such correction of their error, and reproof of their perverseness, as would have been abundantly at His disposal, if the Lord had been disposed fruitlessly to dispute with them, He is contented with a calm and gentle denial that the manna was the bread from heaven, and a renewed offer of the bread which He Himself brought. His Ἀμὴν, Ἀμὴν is opposed in the fulness of dignity to their unintelligent quotation of the γεγραμμένον. His declaration contains a threefold antithesis—it was not *Moses* who gave it you then, it was not that essential *bread* which I refer to, because *not from heaven*. The last contrast is that which comes into strong prominence; the second is only suggestively hinted in that, but the third must first claim our notice. For the Jews had not mentioned their *Moses*, but the emphatic σύ shows that they intended him; and hence, as the Lord well knew, their cited ἔδωκεν was referred to Moses, though in the Psalm, and in every passage of the Pentateuch, the sending down of manna and every gift is always attributed only to *God*; see, *e.g.*, Ex. xvi. 15. But this first opposing thought is immediately dismissed; and the emphasis falls now upon τὸν ἄρτον, not simply of itself according to Erasmus *illum* panem, but as connected with ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, we must understand it as *denying* that that bread was from heaven in the higher and true sense, as the following verse shows. Moreover, *we* shall not take much time in proving to our readers, that our Lord is very far from contradicting the testimony of the Old Testament, and from confirming the notion now alas so prevalent, that the

manna was altogether earthly in its origin.[1] If the manna had actually been no more than a natural product of the earth marvellously increased every day ("the sap of an Arabian plant," says even Tholuck!) there would have been no meaning in its being laid up in the ark of the covenant. But the entire history, and especially the cited passage in the Psalm, maintains the contrary. As the substitute for the fruit of the earth it is called there דְּגַן־שָׁמַיִם, and in Ps. cv. 40 לֶחֶם שָׁמַיִם which Aben-Ezra rightly interprets of the firmamental heaven—כִּי בָאֲוִיר יוּלַד. But the parallel לֶחֶם אַבִּירִים points certainly, as the ancients interpreted, to the *angels*, not, that is, as if it was food common to men and angels, but as this corn *grew* in heaven and not upon earth, so was it *prepared* by the service of the strong ministering spirits of God, and thus angel-bread not bread of the baker. Comp. Wisd. xvi. 20 ἕτοιμον ἄρτον ἀκοπιάτως.[2] It was truly a יְצִירָה חֲדָשָׁה בַּשָּׁמַיִם, as R. Bechai says, but this heaven of the firmament and the angels is not the heaven of the Father, from which the Son brings down the true bread, which endureth unto everlasting life. But the manna stank through the disobedience of the children of Israel, and preserved them not from dying in their sins, just as the miraculous food of Jesus had only *satisfied* the unbelievers as common food.

But why does the Lord in His answer say "you," instead of "your fathers?" First of all, because His declaration embraces that antithesis itself; but there is something more profound indicated thereby, which it imports us to understand, though the Jews when they heard it first were not likely to understand it aright. The Lord must necessarily in the deep workings of His mind speak with a wide reach and fulness of meaning; *His* thought on this occasion does not limit itself to the manna, but His design is to tell these contradicting *disciples of Moses*, whether they could seize His meaning or not:—*Your* Moses, in

[1] Bahrdt could thus maliciously read it: Ye good people, that which you have said does indeed demand attestation. What if I asserted that that manna which the Jehovah of Moses (not my Father!) gave, was not from heaven at all?

[2] See further in our comment. on Ps. lxxviii.

giving manna to the fathers, and generally in giving *you* the law, and all that it was in his power to give, neither gave you bread, nor any *living power*, nor any new remedy from heaven *against death, the wages of sin*. *Therefore* He makes prominent the name of Moses first, and places the δέδωκεν ὑμῖν and the δίδωσιν ὑμῖν in such simple and comprehensive contrast. We can scarcely doubt that *some* who retained this saying in their minds and pondered it well, would afterwards find this meaning in it.

The true bread from heaven is a bread of *God*, the Father, in a pre-eminent sense, a bread *which cometh down from heaven*, and that in a much higher sense than that in which it is said of that typical and unreal bread, that when the dew fell, the manna came down upon it. (Numb. xi. 9 יָרַד, LXX. κατέβαινε.) This parallel in contrast shows of itself that the descriptive adjective ὁ καταβαίνων belongs to ἄρτος; and that we must not (with von Gerlach and Olshausen, who opposes Lücke on this point) make it the subject of the proposition: *He* is the bread of God, *who* cometh down from heaven, that is to say, Myself. That does indeed lie in the background of the subject, but does not yet shape itself into words; for it is in ver. 35 that the new, great utterance begins—ἐγώ εἰμι; see also in ver. 38 the καταβέβηκα, and in ver. 41 the καταβάς which *then* the Jews rightly deduce from our present καταβαίνων; and further in the Lord's words, vers. 50, 51, the significant distinction by which the καταβαίνων is attached to the ἄρτος as descriptive, and to Himself the καταβάς—all finally in ver. 58 coinciding and terminating in the καταβάς alone.

We cannot, indeed, strictly affirm it nowhere else to be said that the Lord "is ever coming down" from heaven, but that He hath once for all come down. He says καταβέβηκα, but never what has no meaning—ἐγὼ καταβαίνω.[1] But the middle-term καταβαίνων hangs on to the typical element in the manna, according to which the καταβαίνειν ever continuing was certainly prefigurative. The fulfilment of the type, however, in the μάννα ἀληθινὸν goes beyond the type in every relation and point of view:—Christ *giveth life*, does not merely sustain the temporal

[1] Comp. Hofmann, Schriftbeweis i. 118.

life for a season, but brings anew eternal life; and furthermore He giveth it to the whole *world*, not to the one race in the wilderness![1] That word was most assuredly spoken concerning Himself as the σωτὴρ τοῦ κόσμου; so that He might well proceed, when the Jews lingered upon His *giving* (δώσει, ver. 27), to say to them—do ye not understand in what sense I speak this? I myself *am* that bread! I myself, standing before you, am the greatest sign from heaven, the wonder of all wonders;—he who believeth Me, and believeth on Me, will *inwardly experience* that it is so! Thus there is once more the appealing and urging reference to that one and alone sufficing evidence of experience. But where the craving of the heart's necessity is not found, unbelief can behold the works of God and yet ask for more, demands evermore new signs, understanding not those which have been already abundantly given, neither the old nor the new.

Thus was it with these Jews, who well knew that which they did *not* want, but not *that which* they did require, in this their demand. The word which they now interject, ver. 34, is quite rightly placed in juxtaposition with the similar one of the Samaritan woman, chap. iv. 15, though there was probably much less of the impulse of faith in their's than in her's. There is just so much apprehension and recognition of what the Lord had just spoken enforced from them, that they remain in embarrassment, desirous of saying something and not knowing what else to say. We cannot, however, detect in their words any evil-minded *mockery*—"thou dost promise great things, but if we take thee at thy word, thou wouldst be fain to let alone giving us *that* bread"[2]—for the κύριε of itself (more than ῥαββί, ver. 25) opposes that notion; and in that case the Searcher of hearts would not have entered into further colloquy with them, at least such as we afterwards find. But still less is it a "childlike

[1] Here and ch. xiv. 31 the *world* is to designate believers! (*e.g.*, according to Flacius.) But life is ready *for* all. More than that is not said, only that all the world, *if* believing and eating, might receive life.

[2] Lampe cites some of the fathers for this view, which Baumgarten-Crusius shows to be a mistake. Calvin, however, did so interpret it, and others after him.

expression;" although the Evangelist thus symbolically sets it before us, that *we* may, with full purpose and earnestness of heart, pray in such terms for that which they lightly and with perplexed minds demanded.

Vers. 35, 36. The Lord, who maintained throughout the whole of this conversation the utmost forbearance of condescension, now speaks to them a word which at once gives them a full explanation in answer to their request, just as if it had been earnestly intended, and yet withholds not the assurance that He well knows their unbelief. Just as in chap. v. 30 He made the transition from the indirect form of speech to the ἐγώ, so He does also here, for from this point we find no less than thirty-five times this ἐγώ, or μοῦ, μοί, μέ. They hold fast their misunderstood *giving*, but He can only give to those who believe on Him, He therefore proceeds—Yea, verily, I would gladly give it to you, but in order to that ye must first recognize that I personally *am* that bread which cometh, or rather is come, *from heaven*, this bread *of God* for the life of the world, this *bread of life*. Here we perceive a threefold gradation in the expression, the significant deepening of which we may profitably ponder. In ζωῆς is embraced the two ideas that He is, and hath life, in Himself; and that He giveth it in and from Himself, (ζῶν, ver. 51, and ζωὴν διδούς, vers. 33, 54). *Bread* is the universal food, nourishment, sustentation of life generally. We have already shown, upon chap. iv. 14, in what sense the promise of no more hungering and thirsting holds good. The πώποτε responds in gracious corroboration to their πάντοτε; but that He, when speaking of bread, includes another figure and refers to thirst, is not an empty tautology, but founded upon more than one important principle.[1] For, first of all, hungering and thirsting embraces, as a phrase (as Rev. vii. 16, after Isa. xlix. 10), all the individual needs and all the unsatisfied desires of man, in their complex and manifold variety. And then it is not without significance that the manna in Ex. xvii. is said only to satisfy the hunger of the people, and not the thirst which immediately was

[1] Whether, as Braune thinks, there is a designed reference here to the similar conversation with the woman of Samaria, we must leave undecided: the word must have its own appropriate meaning here in connection with the hungering.

excited after eating the bread from heaven; for thus we understand that this true bread from heaven far surpasses every preparatory and typical supply of man's need. Finally, we acknowledge, for our own part, that the Lord seems to us to have already in His secret thought that meaning of "eating and drinking," which in immediate connection with His own body and blood He is constrained afterwards to dilate upon more fully. But that in the whole it is only a spiritual satisfaction and supply of need that is intended, is manifest from the imposition of *faith* as the sole condition. According to ver. 30 they promised their faith when they should *see;* to that He now proceeds to attach His words, but meets them by an allusion to the true *seeing*, which differed from theirs. The first καὶ is an *etsi*, but the ἑωράκατε does not simply mean—ye have seen signs (for He disclaims this in relation to them in ver. 26); for the μέ is certainly the right reading. Ye have often and long enough seen *Myself* (which is more than My individual miracles), the light of My life and work, the light of My whole manifestation hath shone upon you, and yet have ye not rightly seen, ye do not truly believe! This He had said to them in effect, vers. 26 and 29—though Alford improperly regards this allusion as far-fetched. Any more *distant* reference to what other hearers had heard (as ch. v. 37, 38) is quite inappropriate; and so is any "flaw in the narrative" which (as Lücke says) would entail on the Evangelist the opprobrium of connecting together as one discourse sayings uttered at different times.

Vers. 37, 38. The most immediate connection of these words with the preceding is to be sought in this, that the Lord, just as in ch. v., proceeds to disclose the secret ground of their not believing, their disobedient resistance to the drawing of the Father; exhibiting this, however, in the most gracious manner, and appending to the reproof a new and most benignant *promise* for every one who yet might believe and come to Him. We may also penetrate deeper and say with entire propriety, at the same time, that the Lord is consoling His own Spirit in the Father's presence with the reflection that with all the unbelief which prevailed there could not and would not fail to be some given unto Him: He encourages His own soul to wait for every individual who might come to Him. Yea we may further say—so widely

and luminously do these general expressions throw their beams around—that He is speaking in a *disclaiming tone* at the same time—I only receive what comes to me as the gift of the Father; *your* trustless dependence upon Me, springing from the desire of bread, *your* interested and carnal seeking avails not with Me!

The *neuter* πᾶν, preceding as it does, is of great significance. In its extent of meaning it refers back to the κόσμος of ver. 33; but more specifically embraces in the neutral form (just as in ch. xvii. 2, comp. also 1 Jno. v. 4), the whole body of those who come to the Son as one integral whole in itself, so contemplated and foreseen; and, at the same time, maintains a deep universal principle which underlies the character of each individual of the chosen, and makes all one—so far concurring with ch. iii. 6. The Saviour of the world, who, according to His humanity, must pour out, like Isaiah His type, His appeals and invitations to a stiffnecked people, with unwearied labours which might almost seem to be experimented "in vain"—has yet as the *Son*, who is never independent of the Father, in connection therewith the clearest and most serene contemplation, or insight rather, into that problem, the hardest of all to our theory and practice, of the mysterious ἐκλογή. He beholds even here already with unveiled countenance the eternal counsel even to its utmost goal in the salvation of the ends of the earth (Is. xlix. 3—6), but now in conformity with His κένωσις He beholds it, as it were, in the spirit of faith and obedience. In general He has a fixed knowledge that *all* must and *will* come to Him which the Father giveth to Him; but as it respects the individuals He receives *each* as he comes as a new, and, as it were, unforeseen gift, the slight earnest and first-fruits of His labour and toil. And that this δίδωσι is used, and not δέδωκε (differently from ch. xvii. which regards all from the point of view of the consummation of all) of itself secures us, if we rightly understand it, against any predestinarian perversion of the meaning. This *giving*, when viewed apart from the divine knowledge of all His works from the foundation of the world, embraces a work which even before the Father is ever progressively going on to its consummation through individual instances one after another. If we take into account all other testimonies to the love of God and His willingness to save all the world, it will be perceived that He who giveth

His Son to all, wills also to give all to the Son; so that we are to understand here—all which He *can* give. This is confirmed past all doubt by the declaration which follows in ver. 44; for the giving and the drawing of the Father are one, as is shown once more in ver. 65. (Comp. ch. xvii. 6, 9, 11). "He giveth them over to the charge of the Redeemer" is saying too little, for this expresses only the result of this preventing grace; to this also belongs all the pædagogic preparation to that end, and indeed the latter is more especially signified. The voluntary *coming*, at the same time, to the Son in faith, (hence the fut. ἥξει) is now at the first the fruit of the Old Covenant gathered in; but the Son receiveth every one so won, and so given to Him with joy.[1] Τὸν ἐρχόμενον now places the individual who *at any time* comes more strongly and concretely over against the πᾶν, and in the promise of not casting out, there lies a most gracious, and affecting *Litotes*—how should I otherwise than take him to My arms, and bear him rejoicingly on My shoulders? Tholuck and Lücke refer this to the elsewhere mentioned exclusion from His kingdom, but this seems to us scarcely to suit the present, deeper circle of ideas; nor does the expression include any reference to that absolute preservation of the soul so received, of which ver. 39—as also ch. x. 28—first speaks. The Lord's meaning exhibits here simply the assurance, that if in the midst of so much unbelief, there comes here and there one, the right one, given to Him of the Father, He will assuredly not reject or cast him away—"even if he comes ever so creepingly" (as the Berlenb. Bibel says). Thus do we rightly hold fast that meaning of the word which the Holy Spirit has impressed upon the souls of so many from age to age for their full assurance in coming to Christ. As the Lord prospectively *comforts* all who should come, and throws open the door wide to their coming, so also, as we before said, He encourages Himself to this persevering readiness to receive them all. Schleiermacher says gracefully and well: "He utters this word Himself, that, however long men may neglect it, however long it may be that they see and hear, and yet believe Him not, when they *do* finally come, He cannot, and will not, and must not cast them away."

[1] Nonnus adds: ἀλλὰ νόῳ χαίροντι δεδέξομαι.

For how should He not *receive*, what comes to Him as given of the Father? This is the corroboration of the thought which the following words yet more expressly afford. As to the general statement of ver. 38 in itself, compare chs. iv. 34, v. 30. As to its relation to the context here, ver. 39 must be considered in connection with it. Pfenninger says—"how should I cast any one out, when for the very purpose of receiving him I came down from heaven"—that is of receiving, preserving, and guiding to glory all who are thus given to Me. *Not mine own will*—for my personal human will is merged into the divine will of the Father, *the love of God is in Me*, this impartial and universal love; *it is not in Me*[1] to receive or reject arbitrarily, or to make any difference between those who come. I discern in the coming of every man, and even in the slightest advances towards it, the being given Me of the Father.

Vers. 39, 40. The will of the Father, the counsel of His redeeming grace through His Son, embracing all that are to be saved, and therefore actually are saved, is now openly declared and firmly attested; in ver. 39 as it regards its final goal, and in ver. 40 as it regards, once more, the present *beginning* towards that glorious consummation. We would prefer, with Griesbach, Knapp, and Lachmann, the reading γάρ instead of the repetition of δέ in ver. 40, and πατρός μου must stand for πέμψαντός με, the πατρός being omitted in ver. 39. All and every one that is given, is to the Son as to the Father, a precious and beloved possession to be kept most diligently; therefore will He, according to the will of the Father, bestow the most faithful care and solicitude that He *lose* nothing and not one, ch. xvii. 12, xviii. 9. If we should be disposed to understand ἀπολέσω here—I will not destroy (but take care of, heal and save)—that would be indeed a strengthening of the previous Litotes μὴ ἐκβάλω ἔζω, but its tone would be too harsh to be suitable here, and we cannot consent to that interpretation. (The word as used in Lu. ix. 56 is something very different, being addressed particularly to the disciples.) But to translate it—I will not permit them to perish or be lost (ch. x. 28), embraces too much, and weakens

[1] Richter's Hausbibel—Christ hath no arbitrary, electing human will.

the tender pathos of the thought hitherto expressed, which has been simply this—that the lost sheep now found, and led back by the drawing of the Father to the good shepherd, are *His own*, and that He could not, nor would, *lose* them again for His own sake and His Father's. Thus the μὴ ἀπολέσω corresponds strictly with the δέδωκε, and is the proper expression for the sense of φυλάσσειν, comp. ch. xii. 25.

But the will of the Father is itself conditioned by *faith*, and the ground, beginning, and distinctive test of faith lies in the true *hearing*, as it is said elsewhere, or as it is said here with the same meaning, in the true seeing, recognizing, understanding, and accepting the Son. It is clear enough that θεωρῶν (Syr. דחזא לברא) signifies much more now than the fruitless having seen of ver. 36. It is itself the beginning of believing, but is not on that account one and the same with it; just as further the receiving and enjoying of eternal life is only the consequence and fruit of believing. Let us carefully distinguish those three critical points, the germ and the fruit of the πιστεύειν in the centre; in order that we may have a key to the right understanding of the entire discourse, and not *superficially* attach everything which the Lord says to simple "believing," without any further qualification. Certainly, to cast our glance forwards for a moment, *believing* in vers. 40 and 54 stands quite parallel with *eating and drinking*, the same promise being attached to both of ἔχειν ζωὴν αἰώνιον, but the eating is not on that account the same thing with believing, or conversely, but *the believing makes the soul capable of and ready for the eating.* Roos said most pertinently and clearly: "He who cometh to Him in faith will no more suffer hunger or thrist. Wherefore? Because the faith which comes is a faith which *enjoys*, or because something to eat and to drink is given to him who comes. This eating and drinking is just something which faith has to do, if it will obtain satisfaction or the enjoyment of 'eternal life." We say once more what was said on chap. iii. in connection with the new-birth—think not too lightly of faith, it must lead to and become the eating of Christ! But think not too hardly of this eating, it takes place through simple faith! or otherwise—believing is our ἐργάζεσθαι and ποιεῖν, to which the food which God gives is apportioned. Augustin's celebrated expression (on ver.

29 above) *Crede et manducasti!* does indeed properly enough oppose the "parare dentes et ventrem," but if rigorously taken, would set aside the sacrament in itself, if not as found in John vi., as a *πάρεργον*. We would say instead—crede *et manducabis*, this alone is strictly true![1]

Let us go back, however, to the text, as far as we have yet explored it. The raising up at the last day,[2] twice emphatically affirmed, points out to us the final goal of salvation and preserving power, after the attainment of which there is no more danger of perishing, or losing again that eternal life which is now, the body also being raised, consummate. The promise is in its true meaning similar to that which is uttered in chap. xi. 35—he shall *live* though he (apparently again) die! Even death shall not prevail against him! "In the interview with the woman of Samaria, Jesus did not proceed beyond the representation of Himself as spiritual, living water, which refreshes and sustains *the soul;* here he already intimates that He is about to go further, and to describe Himself as the Restorer and Transformer of the *entire man,* even of the body." (Olshausen.) We add, even as He already went so far in chap. vi.; and would entreat every intelligent reader to take *this* as the first key to the understanding of the whole of the subsequent discourse concerning the Lord's *flesh and blood.* He who does not recognize the *glorified corporeity* of the resurrection as the goal of all God's dealings with the children of men delivered from the bondage of death,—he who does not see that in order to the victory of grace over sin, the restitutio in integrum of fallen man, something would be eternally wanting if bodily death was not also vanquished, so that the *ἀνάστασις* alone consummates the *ζωή*—and further that this restoration can only come to us through the *body* of the second Adam, the man from heaven, first glorified—he who does not apprehend all this, will never understand either the Lord's supper itself, or the testimony which the Lord here gives of its deep foundation and principle.

[1] And Calvin comes near to this when he protests against other expositors—Illis manducatis est fides, mihi ex fide potius consequi videtur.

[2] The keen-sighted Baumgarten-Crusius as Hezel as oft, makes this to be the new Messianic time generally—Reuss no less than the last day of every believer!

Inasmuch as ἀναστήσω forms the antithesis of ἀπολέσω, it includes, what indeed lies essentially in the word itself, the idea of a full presentation. If any one, however, would therefore say—"the ἀναστήσω does not mean that I will raise them up from the dead, but will present them as saved, without any diminution or loss"[1]—that would be to err from the plain meaning of the word, and the constant phraseology of Scripture. We may not however despise, in such a case, the Zugleich (at the same time) of Meyer's note, offensive as it is to many of our School Divines; we may contemplate the pregnant fulness of meaning without instituting foolish contrasts; and in the present instance agree with Lücke's exposition—"Will present them fully in the glory of the resurrection."

Let us learn, further, to observe how necessarily and naturally the words of God, when put into human language, assume various meanings in various relations. In ch. v. 29 ἡ ἀνάστασις is predicated also of the evil, but we saw there that this is only asserted in their case by a kind of irony, since it is rather the consummation of their *death* into eternal. Here, on the other hand, the pure idea of a true *resurrection* unto fully restored life exhibits itself in the ἀνάστασις, just as in ch. xi. 25; and it would be exceedingly wrong on that account, either to deny to the wicked that other resurrection in its kind in this word, or to deduce from it that *all* will finally be saved, since all will be finally raised up, and that the Lord intends here to assert this.[2]

The Lord might now, humanly speaking, have closed His testimony with these words, if a yet more far-reaching and sti-

[1] Kleuker in the treatise—Johannes, Petrus and Paulus als Christologen, Riga 1785. S. 107.

[2] Thus two very different men, one of them, however, scarcely in exegetical earnest. Schleiermacher: "What else can we infer from these words but that He hath given all men to the Son; since if only some are raised up, the Father would not have given Him all, or if the Father had not given Him all, all would not then be raised up!" Joh. v. Müller brings the same from ver. 37—"Ye will finally all come to Me, for the Father hath given Me all, and therefore hath given Me you. Ver. 38: I would draw now even you to Me, but that is not in the Father's plan as yet, your hour is not yet come!" This is to forget the whole of the remaining Scripture in considering our passage, and to interpret even that capriciously. For how is it said in ver. 37 that the Father hath given all to Him?

mulating continuation of it had not been *enforced* from Him; though we might humanly say with the same propriety that He had clearly foreseen this influence of His words and the turn which they would give to the people's thoughts. The *οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι* now first occurring has unnecessarily caused much hesitation to expositors: simple readers will immediately understand that the same persons are referred to who have been speaking before. Lampe was prepared with his "facile mihi persuadeo" for the opinion that another detachment had left the *ὄχλος* before referred to; and Lange accepts this with the qualification that a specific "judaising or pharisaic party" among the people is now indicated as having come forward. But what necessity is there for this? This seems to us in every case an artificial resource, and to be contradicted here by the fact that St John reckons the Galilæans also in mass with the *Jewish people* opposing Jesus; see also later, ch. x. 19—24. As their fathers *murmured* in old time, so do *these* Jews murmur now.[1] Their objection is not taken so much against His calling Himself the bread of life in and of itself, but against the *καταβαίνων ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ* asserted in connection with it, which in ver. 38 had been magnified into *καταβέβηκα*. Not now affected by any Jewish or Galilæan notions about the Messiah generally, which indeed are involved in ch. vii. 27 but not in this passage, they have to do only with His asserted *καταβέβηκα*; they understand this, and quite rightly, of a mysterious origination of His humanity, different from ordinary generation—in this being far more true and profound in their apprehension than many of our recent divines.[2] Against this they object a ready and dogmatic *οἴδαμεν*—without reflecting, however, that it was with them as with those others, ch. vii.

[1] Baur and Hilgenfeld go very much too far when they say that Ἰουδαῖοι in this Evangelist is just synonymous with—enemies of Christ!

[2] "As long as the *ground* of faith in Him and the ground of hope is sought in anything external, in the manner in which His earthly life begun, or in any external circumstances in which he differed from other men, so long are we not in the right way to believe." This assertion of Schleiermacher is half *true*, but only *half*, for *as* something external the miraculous birth of Christ is not the ground of faith; it is not, moreover, any thing external at all, and its truth follows from faith in Him. Not merely—"the true and living faith will say to itself, it is just so as it is written in our holy books, *but it might have been other-*

42, in their erroneous conclusion based upon the birth of Christ in Bethlehem—the notorious fact, as they thought it, that He was only a man born in the ordinary manner, whose dead father and still surviving mother they know. *Περὶ αὐτοῦ* was regarded by Nonnus as in the masculine, and so also by Lampe: de Wette, Bengel, and the Berlenb. Bib. translate—they murmured *concerning Him*. This appears to us correct, and seems to suit well the reduplicated *οὗτος* afterwards, though the *περὶ τούτου* of ver. 61 makes us hesitate.

Vers. 43, 44. The Lord does not answer *this* *πῶς* by any such explanatory response as would be appropriate only to an existing faith; He no more enters into the mystery of His descent from heaven now, than He had before solved the mystery of His coming over the water from the other side. Could we suppose Him to have surrendered up to such minds His great truth, and said—Ye err, beloved people, I was conceived in the womb of Mary my mother, through the power of the Holy Ghost!?—No, His wisdom knoweth better how to speak to unbelievers so as at once to indicate His own dignity, and administer instruction to them. First of all, He endeavours to mitigate their murmuring by the *μὴ γογγύζετε* which exhorts them to a reflecting tranquillity; for no man is ever drawn of the Father to Him in such a murmuring frame of mind. He then repeats with a more definite development —first, the last great thought which had been uttered, vers. 37 —40, and then from ver. 48 onwards, His earlier assertion concerning Himself as the true bread from heaven in vers. 32—35.

For the giving of the Father He now, penetrating deeper, substitutes a *drawing*; an expression which is as profound in its grasp as it is simple to be understood, but which has no strict parallel in earlier phraseology. Meyer explains the word much too superficially, when with a laudable intention to make it plain he says, "like a father drawing or leading his child to the physician or the teacher." That would be "adducere," as Tertullian renders it (adv. Praxeam), or the *ὁδηγεῖν* of Chrysost.: (which

wise (?)—but better with Nitzsch—"from the deepest ground of the testimony that He came forth from the Father, and generally from faith in the Saviour as the only-begotten and as the archetype, there emanates an especial authority and credit for the original Christian narratives which directly affirm His miraculous conception."

he on another occasion exchanges for the flat and yet more vague *βοήθεια*); but *ἑλκύειν* expresses something more inwardly operative, as ver. 45 presently shows. We may compare in the Old Testament Cant. i. 4, מָשְׁכֵנִי, Hos. xi. 3—5, אֲמַשְׁכֵם, Jer. xxxi. 3, where the LXX. have *εἵλκυσά σε*, although in this ordinarily cited passage such an exposition of the Hebrew text is uncertain.[1] At a further distance comes the later Rabbinical phraseology, which distinguishes those who come voluntarily, from an internal impulse, as tractos, גֵּרִים גְּרוּרִים; see Buxt. Lex. sub. גור pag. 484, where we find the false interpretation scil. a se ipsis; rather should it be, drawn by God Himself, Abodah Sarah 24, 1. (Comp. also Winer Realwörterb. sub. voce Proselyten.) Yet these may serve in some degree for the explanation of the obvious expression. The Father draweth to the Son:—this is *now* said especially for Israel concerning the Old Testament *παιδαγωγία εἰς Χριστὸν*; even as afterwards the exalted Son Himself draweth all men in all the world, even the Greeks and Heathens, to Himself, ch. xii. 32.[2] Yet may we not, in relation to this drawing of the *Father* (the analogy of which, indeed, may be traced outside Israel), say with Ebrard, "by means of the *law* through the Holy Spirit,"—but it is the essential Fatherly attraction of love which is meant, the attraction and invitation of mercy *under* all discipline and preparation, for which sense Hos. xi. and Jer. xxxi. are pertinently to be quoted.[3] Indeed, *this* idea of the מְשׁךְ in relation to the prose-

[1] We doubt, however, whether absolutely false, as Baumgarten-Crusius thinks. Gesenius without further ado ranks this מְשַׁכְתִּיךְ חָסֶד under the formula משך חסד, so that the suffix would be resolved into tibi. Thus R. D. Kimchi expounds—מְשַׁכְתִּי לָךְ חַסְדִּי; the Chald., however, has with equal propriety of grammatical form דַּבְּרִית יַתְכוֹן, בְּטַבְתָּן, which is just parallel with Hos. xi.—and we must leave the matter undecided.

[2] There is a certain drawing of the Father to the Son, even in the case of the heathen world, and natural humanity, yet ever to be regarded as only the work of *grace*. To use this expression with regard to the longings and susceptibilities yet inherent in our fallen nature (as Beck does, Stud. u. Krit. 1847, 2, 355), is unjustifiable to our mind.

[3] In His state of abasement, the Son doth not yet say—I draw,

lytes is attested and confirmed by the place in Maimonides adduced by Lampe, in which the teachers are said to deal mildly at first and only to *draw*—וְדִבְרֵי רָצוֹן וְרַכִּים.

This much is certain, without any learned investigation, and it is to our experience as manifest as it is mysterious, according to the Lord's testimony—"that if a man longs after God, it comes not from himself, but is the Father's drawing in Jesus Christ His Son." (Jacob Bœhme.) The *awakening* of this longing to draw nigh is not in its deepest principle so much the effect of the terrors of the law, as of the distant influence of eternal love working in them: these are the cords and bands by which God seizeth upon men and bringeth them to Himself. Luther's words, quoted by so many expositors, "the drawing is not like that of the executioner, who draws the thief up the ladder to the gallows; but it is a gracious allurement, such as that of the man whom everybody loves, and to whom everybody willingly goes," may be supplemented by the equally quaint language of the Berlenburger Bibel: "He draweth not, as a man draweth to the block!"

Ver. 45. As the Jews had previously brought forward a γεγραμμένον for their manna, so now does the Lord, though late, yet not without reference thereto, bring forward a similar one for that drawing of the Father to which He had alluded, from the Prophets. The general ἐν τοῖς προφήταις might indeed be taken for the customary form of citation, as in Acts xiii. 40, vii. 42; Mar. i. 2; or, on the other hand, it may refer to that most pertinent classical passage Isa. liv. 13 in connection with others related to it (such as Jer. xxxi. 33, 34, to which even Schleiermacher would specially refer it); but we think also, that the Lord significantly thus spoke because He would collate, as it were, and place in juxtaposition the promissory part of the Old Testament in the *prophets* with *Moses* of whom mention had been already made. (Fikenscher, with regard to this, has the original remark that "in the second portion of the Old Testa-

because He hath not yet the full authority for that, being ever in subordination to the Father in this. Hence should we poor mortals arrogate to ourselves nothing before the God-man, but deal kindly with all who are coming. See Meyer Bl. für höhere Wahrheit, V. 382.

ment, which treats of the Divine Promise, God hath revealed His merciful will towards those who seek salvation, and who have already given heed to the voice of the *Law*."

This drawing, as it is altogether divine on the part of Him who draweth, so it is, "altogether spiritual on the part of Him who is drawn." (v. Meyer). It is an inward teaching of God—an *inward* teaching, consequently not merely that preparation and external guidance which comes through the outward call to the fellowship of His people, and the possession of His word; a *teaching*, consequently it does not consist simply in dim feelings of dependence and superficial conviction, but in *knowledge*. It is deserving of thoughtful remark that our Lord, for His own secret consolation as He stands confronting unbelieving Israel, selects the words appropriate to the present occasion from that prophetic chapter which, following the description of the Messiah's passion and rejection, comforts Him with a glorious prospect of the great congregation of many children which should be born to His church in the last times:—Let the fifty-third and fifty-fourth chapters of Isaiah be read in their contrasting connection! But that which there appears as the goal of consummation, is interpreted now with strict propriety, as on the part of God, concerning the deep-laid beginnings from which that consummation is to grow.[1] The free application of those words on the present occasion dispenses with the בָּנַיִךְ which, in Isa. liv. 13 suited the connection, but retains the πάντες in a *yet more universal* sense. Διδακτοὶ θεοῦ, as the Sept. also interprets these (comp. θεοδίδακτοί, 1 Thess. iv. 9) corresponds with the Heb. לִמּוּדֵי יְהוָה which signifies these *well-taught* scholars, furnished with perfect knowledge, yet at the same time points to the *way* which leads to that result, the way of obedient hearing and willingness to be taught, see Isa. i. 4, 5. Now, since God hath from the beginning aimed at winning such לִמּוּדִים, and since the more proper fulfilment of that prophecy, the preparing of a new church in Christ, *beginneth* more specifically in the time of Christ, the Lord may well give the words such an application as He here does—affording us a most instructive example of

[1] "The subject here is the Divine voice in man, preceding faith, to lead them to faith in Christ as a Saviour." Neander.

His method of using Scripture, which brings into prominence its most internal and spiritual meaning, that which is of universal force, and passing by its more particular reference. The docti a Deo of Erasmus is more correct than the docibiles Dei of the Vulg., yet this latter unusual expression brings out the presupposition which lies in διδακτοὶ of that voluntary learning and hearing which the Lord proceeds to develop and enforce. This ἀκούειν καὶ μανθάνειν (the learning being ever essential and practical, or an *experience*) is the complete explanation of διδάσκεσθαι. Be only a docibilis Dei, and thou will assuredly come to be a doctus a Deo![1]

We may further take the πάντες which the Lord makes so prominent, in the sense of v. Meyer's note—"and the promise is truly universal, so that no man can excuse himself." Münchmeyer's animadversion (upon the first edition) is, however, so far right, as neither in the prophetic passage, nor in the connection of our Saviour's discourse, is the absolute universality of this call and teaching the immediate subject; but neither can the *all* (as he insists) be interpreted with the predestinarian tinge as *merely*—"all, who actually *will become* His disciples." For *those who hear* and *those who learn* are manifestly in this case a narrower circle—*not* all whom the Father teacheth, accept His teaching. And thus as the Son, according to chap. xii. 32, draweth all men, so certainly doth the Father also, indeed, every man in his time, with manifold degrees and in various manners. Thus, consequently, the universal promise remains as an intimated fact, on account of which the Lord adduces the quotation with an extended application. It is not promised that all will learn and accept the teaching; and hence it remains certain, since immediately afterwards the matter is made to rest with *our acceptance* of it, that "*this* passage should abolish all predestinarian meaning in the previous ἑλκύεσθαι." The commencement —the Father draweth; the middle-point of calling and separation —man yields to be drawn, heareth and learneth; the end of this

[1] Pfenninger's conceit is very pleasant (in the jüdischen Briefen, &c.) of the little boy who comes in among the murmurers against the Lord and hearing how beautifully He taught, hoped when he grew older to understand it all, and himself to receive the bread of eternal life

economy of the Father—he who is drawn *cometh unto Christ.* This coming presupposes indeed a drawing of the Father, but also the hearing and learning. And it is the Lord's design to say that it is just this latter which is in the decision of man; and therefore He exhorts them to come, and therefore He dissuades them from an unbelieving holding back. Were it generally otherwise, how *could* then the Lord always and everywhere cry—Come ye, hear, learn of Me! and that in the midst of such men as these Jews? And if the Father doth actually on His part draw and teach *all* these Jews, of whom so few actually became לִמּוּדֵי יְהוָה—how should He not generally draw *all men?*[1]

Vers. 46, 47. And now a further explanation follows, in order to obviate any misunderstanding as to a separation between the Father and the Son; and in order that all who might attain to see the manifested Son may nevertheless be referred immediately to the Father as well; this leading back in ver. 47 to the first and fundamental assertion of vers. 35 and 40. Understand Me not, says the Lord as if *any man* could ever have heard and seen the Father, unless it were through the mediation of Me, the Son; and that having thus the Father he cometh to Me as to another! Here again are the same trinitarian fundamental-ideas, which are only found fault with by the dogged misapprehension of speculation which goes beyond the word of Scripture, but which as profoundly as clearly pervade the entire Gospel of St John. Here have we also proof, as testified by the universal τίς, that we rightly expounded ch. v. 37 as declaring that no man hath ever immediately seen the Father, in the sense in which the Son alone hath seen Him. (Not even Moses, as Cyril remarks.) The *seeing* is used interchangeably for the hearing, because it is the more internal idea; and it is here substituted because in the same sense no man hath ever heard the Father, or learned any thing from Him, independently of the Son who is the mediator of all Revelation. (Matt. xi. 27).

Vers. 48—51. As we have already said, the Lord *repeats,* in

[1] My critic Münchmeyer in his animadversions has not entered into the depth of the connection of thought as pointed at here (and which in the first edition was only briefly hinted at for ready minds). And this is an example, that the diffuseness of which many complain, is yet very necessary for many of my readers.

order to cast down all their murmuring by His mild benignity, His first great assertion—I am the bread of life; as the foundation upon which He will then proceed (in the middle, ver. 51, *καὶ ὁ ἄρτος κ. τ. λ.*) to append another great word, as to the time and manner in which He will feed the world with Himself, give Himself to the world. Not My word, not My doctrine, not any thing of Mine, but I Myself *am* that bread, in my heaven-originated humanity (begotten of the Holy Ghost) which hath in it the Life of God—nothing but this. *Your* fathers—not as the apostles afterwards say—*our* fathers, in common; the Lord could not possibly have said this latter, though in His human nature descended from those same fathers. There is at the same time a reproving allusion in the word—your unbelieving fathers, whose genuine children, alas, ye approve yourselves to be. (Matt. xxiii. 31, 32). They did eat the manna *in the wilderness*, as it is written in Ex. xvi. 32, and ye yourselves have said, though without reflecting that that never brought them *out of* the wilderness. *And are dead*—this has a simple and gentle tone, but in the Lord's lips it means much more than when said by the Jews themselves, ch. viii. 52, 53. Throughout the entire discourse He never speaks *merely* of bodily death, which indeed none of His own were exempted from, and not even Himself. He reminds them that those fathers, not entering the promised land, died *in the wilderness* and *in their sins!* (Ch. viii. 24; 1 Cor. x. 3—5.) The manna saved them not from that—see on the same Ps. lxxviii., to which the Jews had appealed, especially vers. 31—33. Again, since bodily death is at the same time included in this *ἀπέθανον*, it follows in vers. 50, 51, that the removal of that too is promised through the *ἀνάστασις*. *Οὗτός ἐστιν*, ver. 50, is *now* fully one with the *ἐγώ εἰμι*, which precedes and follows it; and thus responds to that *οὗτος* of the murmurers, ver. 42. *Ὁ ἄρτος ὁ ζῶν* is afterwards explained, ver. 57, in its profoundest meaning; here however it has the direct meaning—I Myself am the living bread, that is, *a living, personal* bread, a living (in the life of God) and life-imparting *Man*, who may therefore truly be called such. *This* is the proper and essential transition to the great statement which now follows.

Ver. 51. Thrice had it been said—I *am* Myself the bread! and now is it added, with a change,—the bread that I will *give*?

Obviously, for how could He be the bread, if He could not give Himself, or something of Himself, to eat? Therefore He now distinguishes, from Himself who is the bread, *the bread which He will give*. And what should we expect to find here? First, He saith—I give; then—I am Myself bread; now if He *again* proceeds to speak of giving, what but Himself can He give? Again, however, because indeed His spiritual Person, His most essential I and self, may not be eaten immediately and directly, the solution of the great mystery how a living Man may become bread for other men requires *a means and prepared vessel* which shall be the more definite channel of this most wonderful impartation.[1] Just as He stood in the presence of these Jews at Capernaum, He could not give Himself to them to eat—and yet he has hitherto preserved a careful *distinction* of ideas, between the hearing of His word, the believing on Him, and the eating and drinking of His food. An exposition which should be perfectly unprejudiced and simple-minded, and which received these clear words (containing purely human ideas, whose reference to His Person is the only *θαυμαστὸν* in them) as hearers and readers from the time they were spoken till now must have been almost universally compelled to receive them—such an exposition would now wait for something distinctive to follow, and not that blank tautology, insufferable at this critical point in the discourse, which would be involved in the interpretation—And the bread, that is, which I will give, is no other than My Person and Manifestation, once more Myself!

But what other than this insufferable tautology is involved in the far-famed and much-loved exposition of the spiritualists who recoil here from the *flesh* of Jesus, an exposition which first started from the ever-critical gnosis of the Alexandrians?[2] "The bread is the entire living manifestation of the Logos in the flesh,

[1] Kahnis: "A life to be communicated requires a medium of communication. 'Bread is for others only when, to use the Scripture expression, it is broken for them. Thus He who *is* bread, must *give* bread."

[2] For what Ignatius, with a free and wide spiritual application, said of the words "flesh and blood of Christ," which are, indeed, *also* symbolical (Dorner, Entwicklungsgeschichte i. 159) can scarcely be called exegesis; it was not intended for such, and indeed latently recognised the real sense.

consecrated to the salvation of the world"—may seem to be something different and more to the point, but is not in reality so, for the Lord's Ἐγώ had already signified no other than His divine-human Personality and Presence, consequently all that is contained in His manifestation in the flesh.[1] This is very obviously seen in Ebrard's remark—"the totality of the Person of Christ, the whole Christ, is to be to us what bread is to the body!" For we may put another question—How may this be? How does the *giving* enter into this? and if we are referred to the "believing" which in us and because we believe His plain word, desires still the promised eating, this is only to lead us round and round the pastureless and unsatisfying heath of speculation, and to despatch us with a vague Crede et manducasti in a very different sense from that which St Augustine could have intended. Regarding the Lord's words in their integrity from beginning to end, and contemplating the mass of such emptying and enfeebling exposition, in which the plain words which He speaks are turned into mere figures revolving round a nebulous nothing, we are compelled to exclaim—This is a hard *exegesis*, who can hear it?[2]

For ἡ σάρξ μου is not—My Person, My power and influence, My spirit, yea not even My body, but absolutely no other than what it says—My *flesh*. Further the ἐστίν in connection with it is *explanatory*, forms the *transition* from the *figurative* expression ἄρτος to the expression *proper*; just as we find it said in the

[1] Klee's aim is good, but he hits it unskilfully, when he says—"From this purely spiritual and ideal eating and reception of Him, He now passes to another eating and reception, to the true and actual reception of His body in us." For this is not *another* eating distinguished from the former, nor had the Lord been speaking of a purely spiritual and ideal eating at all, neither the Saviour nor the Scripture generally knows any thing of this.

[2] Petersen (v. d. Kirche i. 171) that the Lord is the bread of life "because He as absolute religion in Person is for humanity its true substance" (comp. S. 219), and this is not badly said, but this spiritual internalizing must not take away the reality of the "bread" which is the "flesh"—this Petersen would not do. (Comp. S. 222.) Here let Thiersch speak—"The necessity of recognizing a mystery in the Lord's Supper has become apparent to many of our recent theologians from a clear apprehension of the Lord's words in St John: all attempts to establish an unreal and spiritualist explanation must be wrecked upon this discourse." (Vorlesungen über Kath. u. Prot. 2 Aufl. ii. 252.)

parable—the enemy *is* the Devil, the harvest *is* the end of the world. The Lord never explained—any more than any reasonable man among ourselves—a figurative saying by a new figure. Let the whole discourse, moreover, be examined in its progression—first, the general βρῶσις derived from the occasion; then the ἄρτος which already promises a real, concrete signification; now that interpretation in σάρξ; and finally the most concrete and material σάρξ καὶ αἷμα. So that there is not here, as Schulz animadverts, a sudden and unexpected leap in the sense; but only the express mention of that which had been perfectly prepared for, and intended throughout.

We leave Scheibel's altogether over-curious investigations as to the presence or absence of the article in σάρξ[1] to rest upon their own foundation; they are not necessarily involved in the establishment of the assured truth, that the flesh of *Jesus* is through the sanctity of His birth and of His being, with all its ὁμοίωμα in relation to our own, essentially distinguished from it. We certainly have afterwards ἡ σάρξ simply (as in ver. 63), but when the Lord says now—ἡ σάρξ μου, it must be understood in the sense of that corporeity united with sinless holiness, thoroughly penetrated and filled with Divine life, which is to be conceived of in the ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο of the Prologue. Thus it is actually a "special human nature which the Lord here ascribes to Himself, and promises for man's sustenance."[2] He does *not* say—I will give My *spirit* to be your bread of life, but it is as afterwards explained in ver. 63—*My* flesh *is* spirit and life. He does not, however, say as yet σῶμά μου, as afterwards at the supper, for that His flesh, as it was before death, was to become a body extended into innumerable members in the church, was only to be mediated and accomplished through His death and resurrection; He here means simply and clearly that human corporeity, in which He stood before His hearers, pointing at the same time to a future giving of His body, or its preparation for being made the bread of the world.

[1] The venerable old Glassius admitted: dubia et infirma sæpe esse, quæ ex *articulorum* emphasi desumuntur argumenta pro *articulis fidei* comprobandis. And: ex curiosâ et minus necessariâ articuli consideratione falsæ hypotheses et errores facile oriri et invehi possunt.

[2] Scheibel in his larger work on the Lord's Supper, p. 201.

It is acknowledged by most expositors that ἣν ἐγὼ δώσω[1] speaks of *death* and nothing else. Even Hezel could not regard it otherwise, though he trifles upon it: "His death was the slaying of an animal body; animals are slaughtered for food, hence the occasion for the *figure*. It is not to our taste. But it is truly oriental!" He then comes back from the historical and actual slaughter of the paschal lamb to the oriental figure in our paschal supper, and then with truly occidental abstraction interprets—"he who eateth My *body*, that is, tasteth and relisheth, doth not misunderstand, My whole life-history, with all and each of its events, even the most paradoxical, *regarding them from the right point of view*, he to whom the whole series of my fates upon earth is matter of delight and nourishment." No, such exegesis as this has no relish for us even as such; far less has the food which it thus offers the nourishment which our hearts, hungry for life, longing for spiritual life and refreshment, cry out for. But we ask once more—Is that which our spiritualists offer us in their prejudiced exegesis essentially different in its ground, from the poor theory of the savourless Hezel? Can then "the manifestation of Christ as the Son of man in flesh and blood" be matter of nourishment to our souls without any thing further; and better and more essentially so *after His death* than before, in spite of our absolute conviction that the contrary must be the case?

Schleiermacher, indeed, tells us that "the divine and heavenly in the Redeemer could not otherwise be communicated to us than through His having taken flesh and blood and become Man; in His human life and influence and doctrine we must discern the Divine and *receive it into ourselves*." But that goes no farther than the incarnation, and does not include the mystery of its consummation in the death of the cross; if the Lord had spoken of *that*, and if that had been enough, He would have said—My

[1] Although this clause is wanting in the Vulg. and other Vers. and Codd., and is rejected by Lachmann and Tischendorf, yet is it undoubtedly genuine. Lücke admits that it must be supplied from the first δώσω which is undisputed, but the short formula appears to us altogether inharmonious and strange. Neander, too, regards it as very harsh and unlike John's phraseology, and says very properly that its omission would be occasioned by the ὃν ἐγὼ δώσω immediately preceding. Even de Wette perceives that the excluded words are indispensable to the sense.

flesh, which I have assumed, instead of—My flesh, which I will give. And Schulz is complacent enough to add—"to eat His flesh and drink His blood, means to make ourselves participants of His blessed manifestations as the Son of man with flesh and blood, *and* of the benefit of His sacrifice of His own life." But in our text there is no room for this *and*, the latter alone is the thing in point; the question now involved is the communication itself, and in using σάρξ in relation to it, the Lord can evidently not mean simply the acceptance of the benefit of His death. For *He does not speak of a* πιστεύειν in the δοῦναι, but of the φαγεῖν of that σάρξ which is given, and which only in and after His death approves itself to be in the fullest sense living and life-giving; and further, He so speaks as to show that He is explaining the previous figure by language which is now unfigurative. "Thus the flesh now *becomes* bread. The flesh has to do with the obtaining for us, the bread with our enjoyment and appropriation." (Berlen. Bib.) Lücke is partly right when he says that "the giving up of His flesh is the condition and appointed manner of the true and full enjoyment of Christ." For the promised *giving* embraces in one word two ideas—He will so give it to death, that it may afterwards be given for the life of the world. But yet it is only half-true, for there is a fundamental point which cannot be reasoned away, which men's blinded eyes and pusillanimous faith shrink from in dread, plainly as it is written down, viz.—that this sacrificed *flesh* is itself the only and true *object* of enjoyment. Life is given to us through His appropriated death, and the vehicle of that gift is ἀληθῶς His σάρξ καὶ αἷμα, become for us πνεῦμα καὶ ζωή.

There, as He stood before the eyes of the people, of the disciples, of the Apostles, He had the words of eternal life, as the best among them felt even though they understood it not; He performed the works of Divine Omnipotence; but with all His works and words, with all the believing of those who believed in Him He came not yet into their souls, so that even the Apostles could only avow, standing as yet without, and as it were over against Him,—*thou hast* words of eternal life! These words could not yet become to them the bread of life, any more than we now can receive, *merely* through the word, as only *word*, that same life which is the implanted germ of the resurrection at

the last day. But after He had given up His flesh to death, He received it again glorified and Spirit-penetrated, and in this He giveth us life. The excellent Lange, who, alas, has fallen into the toils of the spiritualism of our perilous time, speaks in a very strange way for a Christian man—"The world as a whole eats, absorbs, Christ; draws Him into its life of death; but *thereby* His life-giving flesh, identical with spirit, His energizing quickening being, is communicated to the world, and gives it back its life." Not so! Not a single word is here said of the world's receiving Christ into itself, and to a Christian apprehension of what the world is and what Christ is, this is a horrendum dictu. Hence it is only—*ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου ζωῆς*, not—*εἰς ζωήν*. Vers. 53—58 speak of *him who* truly eateth Christ, and is nourished by Him.[1]

It is as if the contention of the Jews, ver. 52, stood in the gospel as a prelude and type of the warfare of commentators over this discourse. Their endless variety of interpretations betrays the same confusion. Yet it is with pain we must confess that the Jews better apprehended the subject of the problem than our volatilising expositors. That which the whole company of these worse Nicodemuses contend about with their *πῶς δύναται* is the incontestable and plain *δοῦναι τὴν σάρκα*.[2] They add their *φαγεῖν*, and with a right apprehension, for the Lord immediately confirms and takes it up—*ἐὰν μὴ φάγητε*.[3] He makes no

[1] Lange's answer to my observations (Leben Jesu iii. 613) does not induce me, unprejudiced as I am and full of respect for him, to retract them. He appeals to the fact that, according to ver. 33, life is given to the world (?), but this must be very cautiously understood, for the *ὑπέρ* of ver. 51 brings in the appropriate interpretation of ver. 33; and in no case, we must maintain it, does the world as a whole absorb and consume Christ. This is an expression which, as being altogether improper and misleading, I must denounce.

[2] The objectors characteristically omit the *αὐτοῦ* (which is only introduced as a false reading), since they think not of the specific difference of *His* flesh.

[3] "The Jews thought that Jesus spoke of an actual partaking of His body, and Jesus does not give them to understand by a single syllable that they thought wrong: He maintains and repeats it. He makes mention also of His blood, so that we can all the less doubt that He intended to be understood in the literal sense." (Klee.) Consequently in no such sense as that which Ebrard understands (i. 79), who thinks "the Lord by a kind of *oxymoron* entered into the very words of the opponents, and assured them that He certainly

reply to the πῶς, and therefore we should not seek one; certainly should we not contend with imaginations of our own replying to the πῶς over the mystery of our eating unto eternal life. But the more we contend, the more plainly and stringently does He assure us that He means no other than what He has literally said, and what He goes on still more literally to say. Are we then to eat the flesh of man? was the question of a Capernaitical misunderstanding, which overlooked the future tense of the saying, and all that might be involved in that. Has then Christ even still His flesh for us to eat? This is the question and contention of our *Christians* now, notwithstanding that He has instituted for them the last *Supper*. Here stands His answer for a testimony—he who believeth, and cometh and eateth, in and out of the Sacrament, will become inwardly conscious of its truth. Dost thou as a Christian assume its truth, but without being able with entire and absolute simplicity to bow before the word; dost thou, with a pure intention to make it more intelligible and apprehensible, seek to remove as much as possible what is offensive to thy reason in the σάρξ (as *many* must have done then, else would there have been a much more general and unanimous murmuring)—then be sure that the Lord is patient with thee, and will continue to utter His plain word until thou dost understand it, or until even with a lack of perfect apprehension, thou dost experience its inmost truth in spite of thy under-

would give them His flesh to *eat*, that is, in a spiritual sense," or, in other words, *not* actually His *flesh!* Nor as de Wette conceives, who regards the carnal language of the Jews as being taken up and intensified by Him "through a *love of paradox* peculiar to Him in St John!" All such shifts and turns deal falsely with the text and *pervert the meaning of Jesus*, to use the mildest words. Even Schulthess, who on his own authority has struck out the second clause of ver. 51 as foreign to John's style and inconceivable, (and, in order to undermine the whole effectually, with equal arbitrariness declared the words ἣν—δώσει down to ὁ θέος to be *patched in*)—this same Schulthess admits that "if Jesus actually said all that is *here written*, it was no chicanery on the part of the Jews, but they took the words *in the only sense which they could bear*, even if there were another meaning in them." What need have we of further witnesses? For that a Schulthess should strike out what did not suit him is just as marvellous as that the Jews should only in *chicanery deduce from* ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ἄρτος their δοῦναι τὴν σάρκα φαγεῖν! ("Is it food, so must He give Himself to feed. And what else is there in Him to *eat* but His *flesh?*")

standing. *For* the contention about it is better than the murmuring; though there are cases in which murmuring and contradiction might be better, because more sincere, than disputation out of a murmuring heart.

Ver. 53. Their unintelligent striving, with which indeed much murmuring may have been mixed up, enforces from the Lord His final affirmation; in which He pursues His testimony to the utmost bounds of what He could reveal to them, though retaining throughout the form of testimony still. His sacred dignity does not permit Him here to enter so far into the συζήτησις, as He afterwards in His condescension did (as this Gospel attests);—let us take notice of this distinction, and follow His example. Let us on our part take great care how we give good reasons to those who dispute, yet never overstepping those limits, where mysteries demand only faith, and all μάχεσθαι as well as all γογγύζειν can do no more than hinder the soul from hearing and learning the Father or the Son. Let us not, when we reach that limit, qualify and dilute the interpretation of the Lord's word, in order to make it plausible to human understanding, but imitate the Lord in this history, and give out our exposition as simply a testimony appealing to the ἀυτὸς ἔφα of *our* Master, which should put an end to every dispute.

He who refuses to eat and to drink, will not live, or will not be able to *maintain* life. Just so, does the Lord now say, ye can have or *obtain*, without that nourishment of which I speak, *no life in yourselves!* Thus speaks He to living men, standing before Him, whom He thus declares to be, according to *their* nature, spiritually dead; and the ζωὴ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς is their life in its higher element and power, the internal and real life of the Spirit of God. "By being certified of our utmost danger of death must we be brought unto faith. But this way pleases these inquisitive Jews as little as it pleased their forefathers." (Rieger.) Moreover, it is obvious that our Lord does not in this so rigidly worded utterance deny the beginnings of divine life in man, before the nourishment of His flesh and blood became possible to them; but He mentions now the ζωὴν ἔχειν in that entire fulness of meaning which involves the consummation at the final resurrection; in order to this, He solemnly testifies, the fellowship of His divine and living corporeity (glori-

fied in death) is necessary. For certain assurance that He means nothing else than the *life* dwelling in His flesh, and through it communicated to us, not the flesh as flesh, nor yet the *πνεῦμα αἰώνιον* of His divinity in itself (Heb. ix. 14), but *that* in union with His human corporeity, He now further connects with it the *blood*, in which is the life. (Lev. xvii. 11.) But what a new offence is this to Jewish ears, since from the time of Noah, and more expressly after the promulgation of the Levitical law (see again Lev. xvii.) the partaking of the blood was an abomination forbidden under the penalty of entire excision! Thus this is not simply a "strengthening" of the "figure," but a very strong and newly iterated declaration that in and with Himself *an altogether new thing* should come, that He would provide for the world a *Paschal sacrificial meal*, in which the entire old covenant should be surpassed and abolished. At the same time the definite separation and juxtaposition of *flesh* and *blood*[1] speaks in the most significant manner of that *death* of which ver. 51 testified, since only a perfect death entirely separates the flesh and blood.[2] The Peschito uses everywhere here פגר for *σάρξ*; but this is essentially inexact, since it is not a *cadaver* which is spoken of here; it describes simply the flesh as having passed through death, and been emptied of the blood. The concomitantia of the body and blood is not true of the Lord's Supper, any more than of Jesus himself as gone up into the heavens, as we may learn from Heb. xii. 24.[3]

Thus we find our way to the answer to the last question—How *receive* we and partake of the flesh of Christ given to us through death? And what is this *eating* and *drinking* of which the Lord here at length speaks? *How* it takes place cannot be told independently of experience; and we poor mortals, who with all our philosophy and physiological researches have never

[1] The latter is therefore to be *drunk*, not, as the prohibiting law speaks, to be *eaten* with the flesh.

[2] It is as if it were also said—which I will *pour out* for the life of the world.

[3] That is, if an express word of Scripture is demanded, and allowed to be valid. Otherwise the severance of the blood from the risen and glorified body is of itself a simple and necessary consequence. "Flesh *and* blood" in the connection which the pervasive circulation effects, is an idea appropriate only to the present mortal condition of corporeity

penetrated the lower mystery of our earthly nourishment, may perfectly rest in that, if we only know by inward consciousness that we have received life. But *what* is it? Just an eating and drinking, who can better state it, or more clearly define it? We repeat that this eating and drinking is *not* one and the same with *believing*. Zwingli's reason may ever so flatly maintain that Christ speaks of a kind of profitable enjoyment of His flesh and blood *in which nothing corporeal finds place*,[1] but He says nothing in his opposition to the Ἀμὴν, Ἀμὴν of our Lord, more than that he has not understood it, and indeed has not heard it aright. Of still less account is that dangerous idealising of the plain word, evaporating its meaning, and resolving Christ into the world, which we alas find in the pages of Lange. "When man apprehends *the world* in its *ideality*, in the true relations of its being, and thus in its highest relation, that is, in its relation to Christ, *it will already in a sense become to him the body and blood of Christ*, and there he will enjoy the nourishment for his true life. But more *essentially* he partakes of the body and blood of Christ, when the whole Personality of Jesus, all the acts of His life (even the most parodoxical, videatur Hezel antea!) *especially* His death become to him the pure, spiritually quickening food of his essential nature. *But then finally* he enjoys the body and blood of Christ in a distinctive sense, when the *word* concerning the life and death of Christ becomes to him one with the thus consecrated element of real life-nourishment itself. As long as man partakes not the body and blood of Christ, that is, does not live, move, breathe in the real-ideal relations of the world to Christ and through Christ to God, must his hunger after life (not his *death?*) continue, notwithstanding all earthly nourishment, and his thirst for life remain unassuaged, notwithstanding all earthly cups. It is manifest that Jesus has here depicted in a *symbolical* form the *eternal ideal communion* which begins with the beginning of the Christian's life of faith," &c., &c. No, it is only manifest that the protest which was lifted up

[1] In the celebrated letter to Alber. Vult Christus, nisi carnem ejus edamus, *id est nisi credamus* mortem eum pro nobis obiisse et sanguinem effudisse, vitâ nos carituros. Tunc editur corpus ejus, cum pro nobis creditur cæsum. Fides ergo est, non manducatio, de quâ Christus hic loquitur.

in Krummacher's Palmblättern against Lange's falling away from the *Scriptural* Christ, if not founded on altogether sound principles and misunderstanding much that was true, was yet on the whole correct and necessary, and that Kling's apology (in the Rheinischen Monatschrift) is altogether too complacent. For here we have the κόσμος becoming Christ, not an ἐνσάρκωσις of the λόγος; as if the Lord had said—unless all your eating and drinking is an eating and drinking of Me; or—as ye have in you the hungering after life, that is, already life itself, so must ye also know and experience that I Myself am everywhere and in all things its appropriate nourishment!! It is quite characteristic that we find here the *body* always substituted for the *flesh*,—a view altogether unwarranted; and equally *perverting* and profaning is that view by which the most holy communion table of the Lord is changed into a table served at all places and for the whole world, at which in every enjoyment the "eternal ideal communion" is celebrated, with the world opened up to us by Christ and glorified in and by Him.[1] He who shall thoughtfully ponder all this, will perceive in such words the last extreme of that exposition which recoils from the actual flesh and blood of Christ, and will fly back with a far greater abhorrence to the simple letter of the word of Christ.

But we are now pressed by the question which has excited the contention of ages—does the Lord here speak of the hereafter instituted Supper or not? It is with the utmost modesty that we would oppose high, even the highest authorities, of holy men and ecclesiastical confessions; but we feel ourselves constrained and warranted *once more to stand in opposition* with all the earnest emphasis of a conviction which has never stood altogether alone in the true church of all ages. The fathers of the church began very early to spiritualize the meaning here; Luther and Calvin were at one in this, that this discourse did not treat of the sacrament; the Formula concordiæ makes it a testing article

[1] Literally we find in Lange afterwards: "the entrance into the *Christological world*, in which *all* sensual experience becomes an enjoyment of the body and blood of Christ." Once more—"all gratification of life becomes a happy consciousness of incarnate being!!" This would have a more appropriate place in Leop. Schefer's Laienbrevier. Even though the Cathari had said it before, whom Rothe (Ethik ii. 463) justifies.

that John vi. only meant a *spiritualis* manducatio ;[1] Storr "willingly concedes that John vi. says nothing of the sacramental ordinance; and in general most were agreed in this till these later days when opinion has begun to turn. Lücke quietly says that "the historical relations of the discourse, as well as the entire connection and expression of the thoughts, forbid *every* reference to the Supper, whether mediate or immediate"—and certainly this is saying too much. Baumgarten-Crusius, the same: "there can be no doubt left upon the point, that this discourse contains no allusion to the Eucharist." Lange, after his manner says: "This discourse cannot speak specifically of the Lord's supper, just because it is treating of the entire christological relation of the world, *out of which* Christ at His death deduced and made prominent the institution of the Sacrament (which in symbolical precision represents that great full truth, and typifies the ideal participation of His life.) Or the Sacrament is only spoken of in a similar way to that in which *the institution of Baptism may be referred to in the history of the flood!!*" This is a melancholy corroboration of what Dav. Schulz so presumptuously says—"John thinks of the supper in its right place"—which, in the case of St John, can scarcely be thought of a priori!

On the other side Lampe is obliged to confess: *Negari nequit, Patrum maximum numerum* nostrum locum de sacramentali manducatione intellexisse. As Roman Catholics have been here and there found to deny it in opposition to their church, so also have there even been Lutherans earnest in acknowledging and maintaining the reference of this chapter to the sacrament.[2] Bengel, with whom we almost entirely agree, declares himself in very measured terms; Jesus *verba sua scienter ita formavit,* ut

[1] Duplex igitur est manducatio carnis Christi. Una spiritualis, de quâ *præcipue* Christus in Evangelista Johanne capite sexto agit, quæ non alio modo, quam spiritu et fide in *prædicatione et meditatione Evangelii* fit. Ed. Rechenb. pag. 743. Though one might find refuge here in some qualifying and better interpretation forced upon the *præcipue.*

[2] Calvin. Instit. iv. 17, 4. Nam quod se panem vitæ nuncupavit, non eam a sacramento sumpsit appellationem, *ut quidam perverse interpretantur.* These *quidam* are probably Lutherans, even at that time.

statim et semper illa quidem de spirituali fruitione sui agerent proprie, sed posthac eadem consequenter etiam in augustissimum S. Cœnæ mysterium, quum id institutum foret, convenirent. Etenim *ipsam rem hoc sermone propositam in S. Cœnam contulit.* The arch-Lutheran Scheibel does not hold in this matter with father Luther (which in his work he discreetly passes over) and must stand as a heretic before the Formula concordiæ. He is not ashamed, in company with Knapp, to appeal to such men as Bretschneider (Probabilia S. 86—90), and Schott (Epit. theol. dogm. Ed. 2. p. 142), as unprejudiced witnesses for the application to the Eucharist. In the Lutheran Zeitschrift (1847, 4) Oster, among others, has maintained the truth against Luther and almost all Lutherans, though with many strange things mixed up with his defence. Even the recent work of Kahnis is unprejudiced enough, at least in general, to admit what will not bear denial.[1] And Calvin, we may add, could not avoid commencing the chapter to which we have already alluded with the admission of some kind of reference—Ecclesiæ suæ sacramentum dedit, Spirituale epulum scilicet, *ubi* se Christus vivificum esse panem testatur.[2]

How is it then? And what must we say to a simple Christian who involuntarily thinks, when he reads this chapter, of the Lord's supper, in order to bring to bear upon him the opposition of theological wisdom; which typus doctrinæ is it that we must select to extract and remove the embodying element from this "spiritual participation," out of all the various methods of stating the subject, from those of Clemens Alex. and Origen, down to the "excellent Schulz" or the ingenious and poetic Lange? I think, would we say to him, that there have always been theologians whose wisdom has been one and the same with the simple intelligence of the church. "God's words alone throw the true light upon God's works"—this utterance of Hasenkamp' is just as true when inverted—God's works also

[1] See the history of exposition on this subject in a short sketch of Kahnis, p. 115—118.

[2] The Reformed may make as good use of this ubi, as the Lutherans of the præcipue of the Formula concordiæ. In another place Calvin says, upon John vi.—Nihil hic dicitur, quod non in sacrâ cœnâ figuretur ac vere præstetur fidelibus.

throw the true light upon His words.[1] This twofold canon has a most perfect application to the relation between John vi., and the Institution of the Supper, under two aspects —the Sacrament is to be understood according to this Word, and this Word is to be explained by the Sacrament. When the Lord, being about to give His flesh for the life of the world, appointed His body and blood to be eaten and drunk in the future—must He not have thought of what had been said at Capernaum, and have reminded His disciples of it likewise? Was not this institution a fulfilment of that previous discourse? Were both *without any connection?* We think it impossible to affirm this. And can we suppose that Christ, when he was speaking at Capernaum, did not at all think of the future sacrament? We regard that as equally impossible and unimaginable. Bengel: tanti hoc sacramentum est momenti, ut facile existimari possit, Jesum, ut proditionem Judæ v. 71, et mortem suam, ita etiam S. Cœnam, *de quâ inter hæc verba certissime secum cogitavit*, uno ante anno prædixisse, ut discipuli possent prædictionis postea recordari. Tota hæc de carne et sanguine J. C. oratio passionem spectat, *et cum eâ* S. Cœnam. *Hinc* separata carnis et sanguinis mentio constanter. Yea, verily, to this also belongs what is said in the sixth verse of the same chapter—He Himself well knew what He would do.

Almost all the lines of opposition to this truth meet in one great misunderstanding, that the Lord is supposed here *only* and *exclusively* to be speaking of the afterwards instituted *sacramental* participation in bread and wine; now this we declare as firmly as any to be entirely untrue, and such an exaggeration of our meaning involves a grave offence in our opponents.[2] We may say at first with entire correctness—the Lord's supper points back to this discourse as its foundation; and then must also perceive that this discourse points prospectively to the

[1] As we said before in our Andeutungen für Gläub. Schriftverst. S. 83.

[2] As, for example, Baumgarten-Crusius speaks of the view contended against, as if it made Jesus say—He who shall not partake of the supper to be instituted, &c., &c. But this is far from our meaning!

Lord's supper. The Jews had, like their fathers, miraculous food in the wilderness, but they ate it only as common bread, on account of their unbelief; the Lord anticipatingly grants to our faith the assurance that to us even a morsel of common bread and a few drops of the fruit of the vine shall become His flesh and His blood.

Nothing is more simple than the old observation, that the Evangelist John, who has historically recorded neither the appointment of baptism nor the institution of the Lord's supper, has exhibited to us instead, how the Lord in ch. iii. prophetically spoke of the essential nature of Christian baptism, and here in ch. vi. of the sacrament of the Lord's supper.[1] Von Gerlach admits this: "as baptism is the sacrament of regeneration of water and of the Spirit, so the holy supper is the Sacrament of this quickening and renewal through the flesh and blood of Christ, and therefore stands in the same relation to this discourse which baptism does to the conversation with Nicodemus." But this is saying very much and quite enough, for Jesus "speaks, however, in both places (although of spiritual baptism and of the spiritual supper), yet *with reference to their visible instrumentalities*," (v. Meyer on ch. iii. 5). And Delitzsch has lately avowed (Beicht-und Communionbuch S. 32) two positions to be impregnable, that this discourse is not to be taken as figurative, and that it is related to the Sacrament of the Lord's supper just as Jno. iii. 5 is to the institution of Baptism.

Thus, indeed, the Lord is *not merely* here speaking of an external *eating and drinking* exhibited and sealed through a symbol elevated into a Sacrament. "The circumstance that the Lord speaks freely of the enjoyment of His body and of His blood *before* He had instituted the last supper, shows that bread and wine is not invariably or indispensably necessary in order to eat and to drink Him, or to be born again into a new creature through the

[1] Lücke postulates that John must afterwards have narrated the institution of the supper, for his readers to understand this chapter on this supposition, but he forgets entirely that *his readers* already enjoyed the Lord's supper when they obtained his Gospel! De Wette thinks that St John's not mentioning the institution of the Sacrament makes it *improbable* that He refers to it in ch. vi.—but the very contrary is true.

impartation of His pervading incarnate nature."[1] Thus the institution of the Sacrament itself is not meant, in which we must, to avoid falling into heathenish superstition, absolutely distinguish between the external and the internal, with all their unity. "The external participation signifies the internal, but, in signifying it, effects it also." (v. Meyer.) Thence follows what he has said elsewhere—"Is then this external participation absolutely necessary to this effect of being united to Christ, so that we become partakers of His glorified humanity? The entire sixth chapter of St John opposes such a notion, as well as the true life which we discern to be enjoyed by people who from erroneous principles reject altogether the external Sacrament, only being the more eager on that account for the internal eating and drinking of Jesus Christ." Else they would have been right who gave the Sacrament to little children that they might not remain utterly without life; but the Lord would not have been right here and in Rev. iii. 20, where He in distinctive contrast with the external speaks of an internal supper, enjoyed in the heart of the believer opened to His entrance, and using also language derived from the institution of the former.[2] We will now set over against the threefold method of enjoyment which Lange gave us, another threefold method, but thus:—Man has already a preparatory fellowship in the bread of God, not indeed through Christ in the *world*, but by participation in the *body of the church*, in which the energies and influences of Christ are now working; then consummating this he becomes personally a partaker of Christ when he receives Him in faith, and through faith by the Holy Ghost (without earthly medium) receives His flesh and blood; finally, the Sacrament is the sealing of this participation in critical and *concentrated* assurance and reality, helping many to its first enjoyment and strengthening all

[1] In the admirable questions and answers on the Sacrament, v. Meyer's Blätter f. h. Wahrheit iii. 185. With which we may compare v. 136, x. 129, xi. 224, in order to be fundamentally instructed in all that pertains to the subject, or at least to be stimulated to obtain such instruction.

[2] Thus when Kahnis (v. Abendm. S. 125), says that a reception of the body and blood of our Lord independently of the Sacrament has no other Scripture than this to rest upon, he forgets Rev. iii. 20.

therein. For here we may confidently agree with Petrus Martyr, *rightly understood*:—neque enim sentiendum est, discrimen esse inter spiritualem manducationem, quæ habetur in Johanne cap. vi. et illam, quam Dominus instituit in postremâ cœnâ, nisi quod *ei doctrinæ ac promissioni*, quam prius tradiderat, *adjecit symbola*.[1]

The Lord, in sum—with the intention of afterwards establishing the great truth in an external Sacrament for our weak faith—speaks here beforehand of the essential, inward *spiritual* Supper, of the essential res sacramenti; so that we have here already "the final leading back of the sacramental participation" to an actually present, essential eating and drinking, to which Melanchthon rather than Luther attached himself. (Nitzsch Urkundenbuch der Union, S. 51). This epithet "spiritual," (*i.e.* unsacramental) however, which may well be admitted for the sake of the above contrast, we must not understand of a *spiritualis* fruitio or manducatio in the strictest sense as opposed to corporeity, since *other than in* the Sacrament there yet remains the actual σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα which we receive; consequently there is an eating and drinking which the mouth of the inner man effects. What other than this might be "the *idea* of the Supper"—which many admit here? *Consequently the words of institution are to be understood according to Jno. vi.*; and as Luther rejects this because his exaggerated doctrine of the eating and drinking even of unbelievers is overturned on this view by the whole of the passage, vers. 54—57, we have only on that very account to protest all the more strongly, with the Lord's plain word in our favour, against Luther's doctrine.[2] Not as the Magdeburghers in their dispute reversed it, and would explain the obscure words in St John by the plain words of institution![3] In such a dilemma is found the whole sacramental dispute. But

[1] Plank, Geschichte des protest. Lehrbegriffs v. 2, 18.

[2] Yea assuredly "every man who received the body and blood of Christ, *would*, according to Christ's words, receive eternal life"—consequently the unworthy cannot receive His body and blood. Kahnis in vain endeavours to invalidate this consequence by His obscure words about *the idea of the Supper*, and thus about what the Supper was supposed to effect. (S. 124).

[3] Plank, Geschichte des Lehrbegriffs, S. 94.

we on the other side hold fast to this, that the discourse of Christ here is to be applied to the Sacrament, and against the interpretation which would forbid that, we protest as against one which invalidates and destroys its essential spirit and meaning. "Is it possible," cries Nitzsch (Urkundenb. S. 57) with incontrovertible force, "for a man so *superficially* to explain flesh and blood in John vi. as Luther does, and then to understand body and blood so profoundly as He does, when he interprets the Sacrament!"

Let us ask, finally, and returning from our own time and its contentions to the Jews who were then listening, whether these latter would not be likely to think of something akin to what afterwards was made prominent in the Lord's Supper. Pfenninger's declaration that "neither Jew nor Gentile could have understood *that!*" is altogether incorrect as far at least as the Jews are concerned. They could as Jews better understand the real eating and drinking of a *sacrificed* flesh and blood than the ideal partaking of our speculatists; that is, if they had not been blinded by their offence against His human person. The δώσω ὑπὲρ spoke in well-known terms of a sin-offering and atonement, as which the Lord would offer Himself; but their contradicting and prejudiced will causes them to pass over that, and instead of sympathising with the eating of that flesh as bread which the connecting middle-term of the *sacrificial meal* should have rendered easy, they precipitately take offence at the simple δοῦναι τὴν σάρκα φαγεῖν. Kling (Stud. u. Krit. 1836, i. 147) has very pertinently referred to the passover-season, ver. 4, though without specifically enough deducing the consequence,[1] that at such a time the reference to the Paschal Lamb must have been very obvious as well to those who were *hearing* as to Him who spake. Moreover, we find again in chap. vii. 37 just such a point of connection for the discourse in the *thoughts appropriate to the feast.* And we heartily agree with Kling (idem S. 148) when he replies to the sophistical question—"but how could Jesus propose such a subject in this place and to such hearers?" by the counter-question—"How could St John presume to

[1] As Lindner does (Lehre v. Abendm. S. 42), and Knapp previously (Glaubenslehre ii. 476).

place his own thoughts, however conformable to truth, in His Lord's lips?" We say with him from our very heart—If the Evangelist has so arranged the discourses of Jesus in inappropriate situations without historical truth, "then his gospel becomes a mere romance (Poetry and Truth out of the life of Jesus, inextricably interwoven), and it loses that character of *μαρτυρία* which its author so expressly vindicates for it."

Ver. 54. According to Calvin, these words render it indubitably certain that—perperam de cœna exponi totum hunc locum. With this we cannot by any means agree; but, on the other hand, it is indubitably certain to us that an eating of the flesh, and a drinking of the blood of Christ on the part of unbelievers and reprobates, has been corruptly fastened on the manducatio oralis, and introduced improperly into the notion of the Sacrament. Not merely this utterance of our Lord, but the entire New Testament, shows us that an actual participation of the body and blood of our Lord, as not springing from and not leading to faith, is an unimaginable nothing, the assertion of which, however, on the part of the Lutheran, was the cause of all this unhappy strife.

The Lord now in these last five verses leads back His discourse, which has gone so far and so deeply into the plain reality of the subject, to this general commencement concerning the bread of heaven:—I am *bread*, food, nourishment in the fullest and truest sense; man may and must partake of Me, eat and drink Myself (vers. 54—56)—then I give to the eater *life*, that life which I have *from the Father*, ver. 57—consequently this is the true bread *from heaven* which abolishes death, ver. 58. Q. E. D.

Τρώγειν, instead of *φαγεῖν*, is certainly, even if it introduces no distinction of meaning, yet a strengthening of the expression; as Lange admits (though condemning himself) when he says—"thus truly and properly to eat." On the other hand we are unable to perceive how (as Tholuck thinks), the words *τρώγειν* and *πίνειν*, *unless they are tropes*, should prove too much and lead to the Catholic doctrine. For laying aside the actual mastication with the bodily mouth, there is the fervent and eager *reception into ourselves* of the invisible, spiritual-corporeal flesh and blood of Christ which assuredly is an actual eating

and drinking on the part of the essential man which liveth not by bread alone. Moreover, there cannot be brought forward a single parallel in which our Lord, especially when opposing prejudice and misunderstanding, has so peremptorily and pertinaciously pushed a mere figure to its uttermost extreme. If in the Old Testament the typical character of Solomon's Song (to take the strongest example), delineates and paints out the individualities of the figure, that we must consider as something quite foreign from our present theme, and not to be drawn into analogy with it. For there the word starts from the present realities of earthly things, to which the prophetic and longing spirit attaches the reflection of spiritual things; but in the New Testament the internal truth of reality comes first, and only borrows the garment of figure so far as is necessary for the assistance of the apprehension. We protest again and again against all reference to "figurative style of speaking" in considering these words of our Lord. We think it quite unworthy both of Him and of His sayings to "allege that all this heaped up and repeated imagery will teach no more, after all, than a spiritual union with Him."[1] And when Luther speaks of an "embellished discourse," we lose our respect in a conviction of his prejudice. And whereas Hess regards the Lord "as now first giving to His figure its perfect *round* and finish," we cannot but think that He is pointing it with repulsive *angles, if* it was no more than a mere figure. It sounds pompously enough when Lange says: "The truth, in opposing such a tone of mind on the part of the captious and perverted critics of His words, who will not understand them, adopts the strongest and *proudest* expression, in order to bring the process of hopeless reciprocal excitement to a pure conclusion; the mystery *conceals itself* before those who scorn it, while it confronts them *in the richest array of symbolic language*, and thus sunders itself entirely from them." But we must protest—oh no! far be it from us to allow this. Such a proud self-assertion is not to be thought of; there is, indeed, a mystery here, but not a mystery which shrouds itself in concealment, rather is it as plainly disclosed as human language, which cannot but speak of

[1] So J. v. Müller, who even says—*moral* union, establishing this from ver. 63!

internal processes in figures derived from the external, will permit. Here is no symbolism, no gorgeous array of imagery, but an inexpressibly humble *offering up* of the sacred truth enforced from Him who speaks. Does not the Lord even now in the holy supper give up with equal lowliness His flesh and blood to the rude hands of unbelief, just as He then gave up, as a type of this, the word which fore-announced it?

Ver. 55. The true reading is certainly ἀληθῶς, Vulg. *vere*, although the merely diplomatic criticism of Lachmann decides for ἀληθής.[1] Lücke has shown that the connection would require ἀληθῶς, and that ἀληθής, if genuine, must be taken in the same sense, that is with the meaning which, in chap. xv. 1, iv. 23, i. 9, xvii. 3, is expressed by ἀληθινός. Its interpretation is not sensu proprio or literally, but *more* than that, inasmuch as everything external is rather the shadow and figure of the *essential* and only *true* relations and things. In this sense the flesh and blood of Christ are truly eaten and drunk, Christ is the true Bread, corn of wheat, vine—the true Foundation as the true Light, the true Door, the essential Way—the true and real Forerunner, Shepherd, Bishop, Physician, Master, Witness, &c., &c. Therefore, away from the presence of this ἀληθῶς with all your idealities and enfeebling abstractions in the place of βρῶσις and πόσις, φαγεῖν and πίνειν, and even of σάρξ; they pretend to explain the truth of the words of Jesus, but they only confuse and abate and mar their meaning. "The Lord was not accustomed elsewhere to speak in this corporeal style, when He spoke of spiritual things He had spiritual words for their conveyance; and when He spoke figuratively He took care that the figure should never contain more than the reality intended; figure with Him is truth, just as His name is Truth. If He would be understood of a spiritual receiving simply, why did He not use the ordinary expressions which are plain and strong enough elsewhere, and why did He let the matter rest with—bread of life? Wherefore did He go on to speak of flesh, and even of blood? In the word "bread" there was figure enough for the illustration of His meaning; the words "flesh and blood" could give no illustration as a figure. And as He well knew how

[1] Compare against this, Scheibel das Abendmahl, S. 212—215.

much the Jews and His own disciples were likely to stumble at His words, would not His wisdom and His love as a Teacher demand that He should obviate all misunderstanding by the further declaration—*as* ye eat flesh and eat bread, thereby receiving them as food into yourselves, *so* should ye receive Me into your hearts! But He rebuffs all the doubts of the Jews by uttering the words yet more strongly and distinctively, and leaves them no option but to understand that they must eat His flesh and drink His blood. Yea He says expressly—My flesh is *truly* food, My blood is *truly* drink—and that in a sense which is expressly in contrast *with figurative and unreal*."[1] Yes, verily, just as Lange sets out by saying—though he seems not to be aware what a condemnation he prospectively passes upon his own subsequent abstractions—"He uttered the truth so *concretely*, so distinctively, that He was with His flesh and blood the essential bread of life for the world," &c.! Christ sublimely speaks, beyond all contradiction, of a true and actual partaking, which must be as *corporeally* understood as His glorified flesh and blood must be, and of course in no other sense. But on that account not of a partaking with the mouth, as Kahnis asserts, so that the fulfilment of these words can *only* be found in the Sacrament, and the participation of His flesh must be limited to that of the holy supper. (S. 123—126.) For exegesis leaves the question untouched, whether with the bodily mouth or only with the spiritual mouth of the inner man the glorified corporeity of Christ may be, can be enjoyed: that is only a speculative-dogmatic, theosophical question, for the answer of which we must (as Nitzsch says) "enter deeper into the corporeity of Christ generally, into the idea of a spiritual, glorified body," than the doctrine of the Church, on either side, has hitherto done.

Ver. 56, 57. The former words signified—Thus My flesh and blood being meat and drink, I am no other than a personal, living *Bread;* according to the general figurative expression which your reference to the Manna at first occasioned me to use in reply. The Lord now turns to the transitional assurance—such partaking of Myself communicates *life* to those who partake through my inbeing in them, that life which I through the Father

[1] Kapff Communionbuch, S. 74, 75.

have in Myself. Comp. ch. xv. 4, xvii. 3, v. 26. The διά with Accus. (Vulg. propter) stands here as generally, and it is so acknowledged by Winer, as the causa efficiens, the instrumental means; and for this change of the case in regard to the often interchangeable ideas of "on account of" and "through or by," Winer cites sufficient examples from the classics.[1] We find almost the same thing in the New Testament. Jno. iv. 41, 42, xv. 3; Heb. v. 14, (but not Mar. ii. 4). *Τρώγων με* instead of *τὴν σάρκα μου* comprehends both in one, in order to prepare for the return to *ἄρτος*.[2] But it is far from tenable that (according to Brückner's note to de Wette), our Lord *drops* the *πιεῖν τὸ αἷμα* as only having been occasioned by the accidental circumstance of ver. 52. Oh no, it was with deep earnestness and rigid meaning, without any inducement thereto from without, that He spoke of flesh *and blood* as the interpretation of "bread," and it is only because He is returning back to this original expression that He now speaks only of *eating*, the drinking being obviously included.

Ver. 58 closes calmly and propitiatingly with a simple repetition and summary of the whole discourse. The Lord has five times said—my flesh; four times, in addition to that, my blood; nine times before this has He spoken of bread, and now twice more; and for the *seventh time* in the whole discourse, as coming *from heaven*. *Οὗτός ἐστιν* means, with conclusive emphasis—this and of such a kind is the *bread* of which I have spoken; and the *οὐ καθώς* resolves itself thus—not *a bread from heaven* in the manner in which *ye* spake of it, when I was constrained to add *καὶ ἀπέθανον*. The appended *τὸ μάννα* is the result of some gloss which aims too accurately to sum up the whole;

[1] "A mediation of life which takes place *through* the Father in such a manner as to make Christ live by the Father's will, because He hath the Father in Himself as the ground of life," Beck, christl. Lehrwissenschaft 1, 460. But I confess that I do not understand what this means. Comp. S. 518. Schultheß persists in interpreting—I live *for His sake*, *αὐτὸν δοξάζων*—as if this was compatible with that idea of living which enters into this whole discourse.

[2] The Rabbinical אכל משיח, to which Lücke after Lightfoot refers, is not pertinent here, as Baumgarten-Crusius remarks, for it is interchangeable with—eating, enjoying, partaking of the blessings of the Messianic *age*.

it weakens the emphasis of what was designedly spoken without it:—In regard to this bread there is no such thing as *having eaten and are dead*, but for every one who eateth it there is an unlimited ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, commencing with the first eating, and going on for *ever*. Thus returning to vers. 47—50, and ver. 32.

APPEAL TO THE OFFENDED DISCIPLES FOR TEST AND DECISION. THE ASCENSION OF THE SON OF MAN: SPIRIT AND LIFE.

(Ch. vi. 61—65.)

This separation between the false and the true disciples through the *public* testimony which Jesus bore to the *mysteries of His Person*, and its *impartation for life*, is not simply in the scheme of the Evangelist a result of this great discourse of our Lord, but his plan, as exact and deeplaid as it is natural, makes it a *general conclusion of its first section*. Between the people and the twelve we find since ch. iv. 1 (otherwise than as in ch. ii. 2) a class of μαθηταί in the widest sense—dependents, followers. Among these there would naturally be *many* who would be more than ever offended and repelled by our Lord's words, *traversing* as they did every notion they had ever held. But the Lord, who knew and had foreseen their murmurings, utters *to them* especially, and not, as we might imagine the scene, to all the people, a *last word* designed for their *utmost possible instruction*, and to bring them to a *full decision*. First comes the introductory question joining issue with their thoughts, which *detects to them their offence*—"I know it well;" but this put into the form of a question which points to something deeper and further. Then comes immediately in ver. 62 a position (deeply to be pondered!) which forms the *transition* from this to the *removal*, if possible, of the offence, and to their further instruction. But the most significant, and properly *fundamental statement* for their instruction is contained in ver. 63; and that not laid down as a general ground-principle merely, but with *express application to the litigated* and *offending words* which had just been spoken. (This again is to be carefully noted at the

outset!) Finally, the *repelling detection* of their unbelief closes all—of that unbelief which was the real ground of their offence; and the word uttered for *full and entire decision*, ver. 64, 65. The principle of stumbling is unbelief, but the ground of unbelief is resistance to the Father's drawing.

The τίς δύναται ἀκούειν is the crisis, or worst result, especially in scholastic discussion, of the πῶς δύναται which at first only contends about possible interpretation. In this connection σκληρός is not simply—unintelligible; nor is the ἀκούειν added to it, simply—to understand, to grasp. But the discourse becomes to them, just because they *only too well understood* its literally spoken conclusion, and can hope for no Maschal for its interpretation, a contradictory, insufferable, hard, and as it were indigestible morsel—a Messiah, who gives Himself to death—in order then to give His flesh and blood to be eaten and drunk![1] On that account αὐτοῦ is not to be referred to λόγος (as in ch. viii. 2, 3), for then would ἀκούειν be rather intelligere, but—who can longer listen to *Him*, and remain with Him as a μαθήτης? The true parallel is ch. x. 20, and so Nonnus regards it here.[2] Οὗτος ὁ λόγος embraces the whole discourse in the synagogue, which the Evangelist has just described as a διδάσκειν; but the offence seizes upon its final and keenest climax. That which so mightily offends these disciples, is not so much or not alone (as Schleiermacher thinks), that the Lord had so presumptuously placed Himself in a region above the gifts and wonders of Moses and the Old Testament; nor is it merely (as Lange) that He had spoken of Himself as καταβὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ; nor *merely* (according to Lücke and Ebrard, as Hase,

[1] Lücke has properly illustrated this meaning of σκληρός by Old Testament passages, such as Gen. xlii. 7, xxi. 11, Prov. xv. 1 by the contrast in Eurip. with μαλθακός, and especially the "dura vox" of Cicero. Lampe had already given more copious citations, Prov. xviii. 23; Deut. i. 17; 1 Kin. xii. 13; Isa. viii. 12; and especially in the New Testament, Jude 15, according to which the expression non tam absurditatem quam *impietatem* designat. The interpretation which Chrys. and Euthym. support by δυσπαράδεκτος, by no means exhausts the meaning; nor can we attach any value to Sepp's notion that the Jews spoke after the later usage of Rabbinical disputation. (See Buxt. Lex. s. v. קשה, the whole article.)

[2] Καὶ τίς ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ φθεγγομένοιο δυνήσεται.

too, affirms) that He had spoken of His impending death in defiance of all their notions of the Messiah, for we saw in ver. 52 that it was the δοῦναι φαγεῖν which echoed finally in their ears with offence, though the δοῦναι εἰς θάνατον had previously been heard. The offence did not rest upon "this pre-eminently, that He had declared Himself to have come down from heaven" (as Hess concisely says), but specifically upon His words concerning the flesh and the blood. But here again *not* with v. Gerlach, "because they did not apprehend the *spiritual* sense of His words, but stumbled just at that," for it is a presumption as gratuitous as groundless to think that they should have so marvellously *spiritualized* the interpretation, as our modern expositors; and then it would be quite unintelligible why the Lord should first say to them—the flesh profiteth nothing! Thus it is almost, though not entirely, as Augustine says upon Ps. xcviii.: Acceperunt enim stulte et carnaliter illud cogitaverunt, putantes, quod præcisurus esset Dominus particulas quasdam de corpore suo et daturus illis. They well understood the literal meaning of His words;[1] and that appeared to them so unintelligent and unpalatable that they—to speak gently—"thought that they could fasten upon Him a charge of fanaticism." This must be firmly established in order to the understanding of the τοῦτο in our Lord's question, and of the whole discourse which then follows.

Vers. 61, 62. Doth *this* offend you, that ye must ἀληθῶς, in order to have life, eat My flesh and drink My blood? He well knew that it would be so with them, and nevertheless spoke precisely as He did. Just as He, on many other occasions, repelled individuals who hastily approached Him by words of rigid test, so also here it was His purpose, now, and yet more when they afterwards gave Him occasion, to place them under "strict review" and sift the whole company of these His professed disciples. We say with Lange "that it is by this tendency[2] that the whole character of these and such like discourses of our Lord is to be explained"—leading, however, to a yet fuller explanation. And

[1] Thus not as Pfenniger superficially says—"a hard saying, for He attached to it eternal life, and no man can tell to what!"

[2] That is, in connection with the constraint which gave it strength.

the words which now follow we must consequently accept in a different sense from that of most of our recent expositors. It is clear that an unexpressed proposition must be supplied before ἐὰν οὖν in the second question, but the general and indefinite τί ῥέξετε of Nonnus, or τί ἐρεῖτε of Euthymius, do not help the matter; since the same question again recurs, as to how that is intended. There are only two suppositions possible: either the Lord would say—will ye not then *much more*, and then first really be offended? or—will not your offence be then removed, will ye not then better understand My words? ..

The former finds more general acceptation; Olshausen, like Tholuck, holds to it without giving any solid reason, Lücke supports it by what he thinks good grounds, and Schleiermacher completes it—"then will ye be altogether in error concerning Me!" Baumgarten-Crusius gives the most emphatic expression to this interpretation—"If ye now, here in my presence, adhere to your old delusion, how entirely without counsel and strength will ye be when I am gone away?" But we must declare this view to be most unconditionally false; because it sets out with the assumption, first, that the Lord refers in His ἀναβαίνειν merely to His departure in death, and then that the offence did not concern the eating and drinking His flesh and blood. If it concerned—allowing it for a moment—the death of the Messiah, then would the Lord's word here be *almost* a meaningless tautology (as Meyer, de Wette, Ebrard, have it)—Doth it offend you that I must die? What will ye say when that actually comes to pass?[1] But although we do not deny that "in a certain sense death was the external side of His glorification, the return to His Father the glorifying reality of His death," yet we cannot but see that the Lord now, in order to the removal of their stumbling-block, refers only to *this* other *glorifying* aspect or consequence of His going away: In ver. 51, He spoke in connection with the giving His flesh, properly of *dying as such*, and He could not without further explanation speak of that same death as an ascension to heaven where He was before. The offence which commentators take against the bodily and

[1] It seems, moreover, artificial to press the antithesis—Ye are already offended by the λόγος concerning death, but ye shall actually see and find it true, θεωρεῖν.

visible ascension to heaven which is here pointed to,[1] has for its root, alas, a profound unbelief in the necessary actuality of this occurrence, which, together with His miraculous birth itself, would be firmly established in the minds of all who have a right understanding of the entire earthly history of the Logos made flesh, even independently of the sacred narratives which record them. It is impossible that John should have, or present, in his Gospel a "view or point of contemplation," which should contradict the conviction of the church in what took place just in the manner which St Mark or St Luke relate; in the case of the ascension it is as in the case of baptism and the Lord's supper—he assumes and takes for granted the historical fact, and instead of narrating it, he records utterances of our Lord which predict and bear testimony of it. (Besides this place, in ch. iii. 13, and xx. 17; thus this is *not* "the *only* mention of the ascension on our Lord's own part.") The plainest and most obvious meaning of our Lord's words can be no other than that which afterwards came to pass in accurate correspondence with them. And if any one thinks it out of harmony with truth that the disciples are represented as *seeing* in the future the return and final entrance of the Lord into heaven—an objection which is not met by Lampe's observation that there were probably some there who would see even that—we reply that θεωρεῖν is to be understood of a certain assurance, such as the testimony of the apostles and the Holy Ghost sent from heaven actually gave to them all, and which was equivalent to the evidence of their having themselves seen, Acts ii. 23. Kling (Stud. u. Krit.) defends this most triumphantly, by the striking parallel—"that ἐὰν θεωρῆτε is no more to be literally understood of a beholding the ἀναβαίνειν, than the ὄψεσθε of Matth. xxvi. 64 is to be taken literally."

But now, finally, for the main point in which we find the perfect decision of the question! Our inmost conviction assures us that our Lord must here have designed to say something which would remove difficulty and *propitiate*, and to dismiss these departed disciples with some ray of hope for the future; it

[1] Which, men are even bold enough to say, contradicts the character of St John's view.

must have been His aim, as we said before, as far as possible to attempt their instruction.[1] Now it is quite contradictory to this ground-tone of our Saviour's present discourse to regard Him as announcing that they should receive still greater offence in time to come; that would have been indeed a σκληρότερος λόγος. We cannot see (with Kling) that the οὖν, which often merely takes up and continues what precedes, decisively opposes the supplemented sense which we refer to; and all the less, as it was assuredly the general interpretation of the older church, which accepted the οὖν, though with a less rigorous meaning. Suffice it, that the Lord signifies and promises here a future *removal of the offence*, a subsequent better knowledge, when His present earthly manifestation should be finally withdrawn, just as in ch. viii. 28.[2] There, however, the allusion is only general; here there is special application to the ascension which takes Him up as the Son of man, that is, even His flesh and His blood, in the likeness of common flesh and blood, in itself being without spirit and life:—for this was the subject treated of here. He thus mentions what might be understood of itself from the preceding ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβέβηκα, and for the sake of comforting both Himself and them, that they would after that be able better to understand the πῶς δύναται of ver. 52. *For*—and this must be carefully noted!—he speaks not as dismissing those who were insincere only, whose return was not to be expected, but rather to that better class of which many afterwards believed; and for *these* He could not have intended to say—τοῦτο ὑμᾶς οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον σκανδαλίσει;[3] If not put so forcibly as Chemnitz does: Qui enim potest suam carnem contra carnis naturam cœlestem facere, idem etiam eam cibum hominum vivificum efficere potest; yet at least we may say—Then will ye find my words concerning the eating My

[1] With which even Lücke agrees: "That Jesus said nothing to remove their offence, but what would have a tendency to increase it, is scarcely imaginable." He then finds it removed in ver. 63, after being increased; but we cannot understand ver. 63 itself without the transition in ver. 62 concerning the *glorification of His corporeity*.

[2] For which Kahnis decides (with Calvin, Grotius, Lampe now), and with appeal to Stier.

[3] Lampe adduces this reason, when he says: In priori sensu (*quanto* magis) verba hæc nonnisi spuriis, in posteriori (an adhuc) etiam veris discipulis Christi opponi poterant, unde *hunc* potissimum amplectimur.

flesh not so hard as ye do now. Ver. 62 continues in the same tone of reproving question as ver. 61, but it gives also a doctrinal statement as a key to the right understanding.

And what kind of a lesson is it? We do not add much to our apprehension of it by supplying—will not then the offence be weakened? For this supplement is obviously to be understood according to either of two opposite views. Grotius represents the one: nam corpore meo *procul* in cœlum *amoto*, nulla spes erit ejus manducandi *κατὰ κυριολεξίαν*. But our whole exposition has tended to overturn this view, which we shall again have to do with upon ver. 63. We therefore apply it to the other view, and expand it thus: *Then will it be disclosed to you that, and in what way, my human corporeity, become heavenly and glorified, may be given to be eaten and to be drunk.*

Does any one think that this is not yet plain enough, and feel a necessity that Jesus should expressly say—How, if I shall institute the supper, in which My flesh and My blood will be offered under the emblems of bread and wine—we can only say that this is most marvellous folly. For Jesus has not, as we have said before, spoken only, or even pre-eminently, of a sacramental participation of Him; He afterwards gives to His own the Sacrament as a holy thing, the express description of which in the hearing of these unbelievers would have been as inappropriate a profanation, as it would have been useless and confounding. Even the little company of His faithful ones understood and truly received the Sacrament only after His ascension; and to obviate even in them every false notion of its nature, the Lord must fully establish and plainly declare the great truth which we shall now approach.

Ver. 63. Baumgarten-Crusius, an expositor whose view of the entire discourse we are compelled most decidedly to protest against, remarks nevertheless very properly—"That even the first clause (*τὸ πνεῦμα—οὐδέν*) is not designed to lay down a general proposition, but has definite reference to the present time and the subject in hand." But when we understand this aright, how much follows from it! The universal incontrovertible axiom, which is laid down as fundamental, is conveyed in the great and widely-applicable utterance—It is *the Spirit*, who, or properly which *giveth life* or quickeneth. He who has understood the Lord's words to Nicodemus and the woman of Samaria, will also

understand this saying, which now is, as it were, drawn out and brought forward from the central heart of those discourses. *Life* in that higher meaning in which the Lord promises and brings it to us, has its original seat in *Spirit;* and in the highest sense it is only the Spirit, who proceedeth from God whose nature is Spirit, and who cometh to us through the Son, that can *make alive* our dead spirits. Thus far the ground-thought is perfectly the same with that which the apostle Paul afterwards so often utters; but in this case there is placed in antithesis to the πνεῦμα something very different from the γράμμα of 2 Cor. iii. 6; and in this we perceive a modification of the general axiom to suit its special application to the thing intended here. Here the antithesis is ἡ σάρξ,—and what is that? It cannot mean the general idea of the natural corruption of humanity, all that is born of the flesh, and is itself flesh, or man's carnal condition of sin and death (although this from Gen. vi. 3 down to Rom. viii. 2, 3, and through the entire Scriptures, forms the most common antithesis to πνεῦμα); for οὐκ ὠφελεῖ οὐδέν intends to say πρὸς τὸ ζωοποιεῖν,[1] and the reference must be to something which can quicken the σαρκικούς. We are not aware, however, that any one has ever sought to establish the application of this antithesis, without further qualification, to our present passage. But there have been many who have declared themselves in favour of another very inapplicable notion of the contrast, which we shall not be long occupied in refuting. They understand in σάρξ the carnal, externally literal *meaning of the words;*[2] but none of them has ever attempted to prove that either πνεῦμα or σάρξ simply could bear such a meaning as this antithesis assigns to each. But inasmuch as a carnal or spiritual meaning of a discourse may at the same time be taken as a carnal or spiritual *apprehension* of it, *sense for it*, this view passes over into another, which is fitly expressed by the τὸ σαρκικῶς—πνευματικῶς νοεῖν of Euthymius; and they who hold it talk in various ways of the earthly-prejudiced, unspiritual minds of the disciples, of their carnal notions, as, for

[1] As Tertullian (though with a wrong apprehension of the whole)—ad vivificandum scilicet.

[2] Tertullian: the sensus carnalis, against the spiritualis; just so August., Chrys., Theophyl., &c. Wesley too—the spiritual meaning of these words—the bare, carnal, literal meaning.

example, Klee speaks of their "fleshly and prejudiced acceptation of His words." But this altogether overlooks the plain fact that simply and necessarily ex vi oppositi the Lord is not speaking of what might be useless to the understanding and acceptance of His words, of what would never be able to discover their truth,[1] but of what *could not quicken or give life.* Not to say, that then οὐκ ὠφελεῖ οὔδεν would be saying *too little* for the misunderstanding, perversion, and offence which, according to this view, the σάρξ produces. It is of course true that it was the carnal mind and apprehension of the disciples which only thought of the flesh when the Lord's words fell on their ears; this was a consequence involved in His words or was presupposed in them, but this could not possibly be the immediate and essential meaning of His expression, for it says nothing about the flesh which should understand, but of *that which was understood.* Jesus brings graciously into full prominence the fundamental truth which lay under their misunderstanding and offence, in order to confirm it in the light of the preceding great declaration concerning the πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, and thus to say—If I had intended the word which I spoke in this sense, ye would have been right in repelling me with your τί ὠφελήσει ἡ σάρξ—*but in this sense I intended it not!*

Every view which refuses to entertain this immediate reference of ἡ σάρξ to that σκληρὸς λόγος περὶ τῆς σαρκός, is out of harmony with the subject and the discourse;[2] and it is remarkable to observe, in connection with this, how much violence is done to the words in order to invalidate their meaning. Nothing is more simply sure in *this* contrast between πνεῦμα and σάρξ as *in relation to the promised* ζωοποιεῖν *through a* σάρξ *to be eaten,* than what the oft-misapprehended Calvin in his unbiassed and acute words expresses—caro, si a spiritu separetur; just as Augustin had also said—accedat spiritus ad carnem, et prodest plurimum; and Bengel very clearly—"caro *mera* nihil prodest, qualem scilicet Judæi *putabant* esse carnem illam, de quâ loque-

[1] As the Berlenb. Bibel this time so grossly misses the meaning—"The flesh is of no avail *for true exposition,* a spirit must be there. Every carnal manner of treating the subject."

[2] We may be excused from entering polemically into the great mass of contradictory opinions.

batur Jesus, cf. 2 Cor. v. 16. Loquitur *sub conditione*, eâque impossibili, *si sola caro esset*, uti etiam loquitur v. 38 de sua voluntate."[1] The flesh *in itself* as flesh, which should have no spirit, as ye understood it.[2] That *can*, indeed, most assuredly give no life of God to those who are dead in sins, since itself in a lower sense is only living through an indwelling πνεῦμα.[3] But we have already unconditionally denied that our Lord could here speak thus of His own flesh, so that we might dare to add, *e.g.*, with Grotius—ne mea quidem; or to assert boldly with Schulthess that Jesus in so speaking included His own flesh, *yea had it especially in view*; or to say superficially with Fikenscher—"in My flesh itself your salvation does not lie, but in the *spiritual enjoyment* of My flesh!" For if *the flesh* is to be spiritually eaten, yet that which is to be eaten is a spiritual *flesh*.

Thus it was pure folly in Zwingli to use this ἡ σάρξ ὠφελεῖ οὐδέν for his continual, tenacious motto against the mystical reality in the Sacrament, and to defend himself against the objection by saying—Caro Christi omnino plurimum, immo immensum prodest, sed ut diximus, cæsa *non ambesa*. Cæsa nos servavit a cæde, sed ambesa penitus nihil prodest. Against which Lampe (who, however, otherwise only deals with the discourse in a dogmatically prejudiced and enfeebling way) has well observed—Sed ita iterum pro unâ ellipsi duplex statuenda erit. Non solum enim tum *carnem* in genere nominans *suam* intelligit, verum etiam non simpliciter carnem suam, sed *manducationem carnis suæ* inutilem declarat. It is very much to be deplored that in our own day theologians follow in the steps of Zwingli; as, for example, Schenkel (against Alban Stolz, Gesetzeskirche und Glaubenskirche, S. 26), who professes to find in Cyril his position concerning the *Capernaite* error that the substance of Christ was to be *bodily* eaten, not clearly understanding his πνευματικῶς and σαρκοφαγία. We say with the

[1] And with equal correctness before—Non est sermo hoc loco de carne corruptâ, de quâ nemo dubitat, quin nihil prosit.

[2] This corresponds literally with the τὴν σάρκα ver. 52, without the αὐτοῦ which here makes the great difference.

[3] And this, with a *slight touch* at the lower analogy, Beza would improperly make the only sense of this deep word. Vos sensus ipse docet, *ne hanc quidem vitam animalem* manare a carne,—utpote quæ aliunde, nempe ab *hominis spiritu, corpus vivificante* proficiscatur.

Hirschberger Bibel (which indeed afterwards holds only to the "carnal method and spirit")—"It cannot be thought, without ascribing to the Lord a contradiction of His own previous words, that in saying *the* flesh, not by any means *My* flesh, He could have meant to utter anything which might be applied in any measure to His own flesh, after He had again and again said that *His own* most sacred flesh should be the true life-giving food for man." We refer to Scheibel's often quoted work, who, in page 174, with well-grounded and holy zeal, asks—and is it that the body of Jesus οὐκ ὠφελεῖ οὐδέν? Luther found it hard to defend himself against Zwingli, because He had concealed from himself the true meaning of the entire chapter. At first he incautiously assented—It may be very true that even the flesh of Christ profited nothing, but yet it is in the supper, where as being without the Spirit, it truly profiteth nothing. He then retracted this admission, and maintained confidently afterwards that in this passage the flesh of Christ was not referred to, falling back upon the exposition which we have rejected, of a "carnal interpretation." Finally, he called it one of the flattest blasphemies, that Zwingli and Œcolampadius should dare to maintain the flesh of Christ to be of no profit, eaten carnally, *just as if it were mere empty flesh, in which no divinity was.*[2] And in this last he was altogether right, for, as Bugenhagen once expressed himself in a letter to Hess—"if Christ had in these words spoken of His own flesh, He would have denied Himself, for He had said shortly before that His flesh should be the life of the world."

From this right apprehension of the second clause a peculiar light is shed back upon the first, so that the declaration "id quod spiritus est, vivificans est" should be, properly speaking, inverted for the application here—*That which* quickeneth, thus My flesh concerning which I have asserted this, is πνεῦμα, not mera caro. *My* flesh hath and giveth Spirit! This almost coincides with Storr's expression—"My higher, heavenly, and divine nature,

[1] Plank, indeed, thinks this rather an ingenious evasion.

[2] In the Tischreden (Förstemann i. 74) we find it in the strongest manner—God's flesh.—On another occasion, and without perceiving how far it would carry him, his exposition makes Christ say—"*My* flesh and blood hath the power and force which God hath, it makes divine, and will fill you with God."

not the human flesh in itself; *but that penetrates this through*—even unto its *words*." Only that this last interpretation of the following part of the verse, to which we are now led, we must entirely reject.

That Spiritualism, which would escape from the Lord's flesh, has found plentiful help in this statement, and now rushes with impetuous confidence to the next, altogether forgetting that in this concluding clause there must lie an immediate application of what is there said *to the words which had given the offence.* It contrives so to generalise and etherialise the Lord's most decisive declaration, as to find in it a most manifest confirmation of the "spiritual sense" and "spiritual participation" which it had set out with. But the Lord does not say, as Grotius reads, πνευματικά ἐστι; or—πνευματικῶς λεγόμενα, as Schulthess expresses it—the words which I have spoken are of a spiritual meaning, of anagogical, mystical interpretation; but He says something very different.

What then are the ῥήματα which He here means? It is very important for understanding this that the λελάληκα is established by pretty general consent as the right reading, and not λαλῶ. Thus it is *not* the words of the Lord, or His doctrine, His testimony generally, as in ch. iii. 34, v. 47, xiv. 10, xv. 7, xvii. 8. A meaning may indeed be extracted from the λελάληκα such as this—the words which I have so long, so often, and so much spoken to you already;[1] but taking into account the entire development of the connection, according to which the Lord is aiming to give as much explanation as possible to take away their offence, and at the same time to show the reason why He had not *spoken* otherwise then He did, this λελάληκα, especially with the ὑμῖν, can only be regarded as referring to the object of their offence (the τοῦτο with which he began). The Lord never said before His glorification—receive ye the Spirit through My words; ch. vi. 39 utters an earnest protest against this. Thus He *could* not have here intended—"ye receive *this* Spirit, in order to partaking of My flesh in the right manner, out of My

[1] Thus Lange, according to whom our Lord makes His future operation clear *through his operation in the past;* so that it meant—*thus have I long begun already* to feed you with My flesh and blood. Against all this we have only to insinuate our earnest note of interrogation.

words, which themselves are spirit and life!" (von Gerlach). In the highest degree treacherous as it regards the opposite fundamental scriptural view, is the remark of Lücke—"death took away the σάρξ of the Redeemer; but there remained to them His πνεῦμα, that which was *essential!*" No, verily, *it remained with them not*, but came to them even as he had promised, first after His glorification. And does this in any way quarrel with St John's point of contemplation? With rather more caution does Baumgarten-Crusius express himself, when he makes it mean—"*for the present* the most spiritual thing to which they could be referred, was His Presence in His *words*, for indeed *in them they might already have* the Spirit for whom they hoped, and the life which He had promised to them."

We are assuredly very far from detracting from the profound truth and meaning of Peter's confession in ver. 68, or from denying the living power of the Spirit-words of Jesus; *now* that He has gone up to His glory we ourselves maintain in the strongest manner that the words which come from Him to us with the Holy Ghost, and which are accompanied and filled by His influence, however we may hear them or read them on paper, bring to us (in the unity of His flesh and blood) spirit and life.[1] But that the *words* of Jesus as such could have been, before the obtaining and outpouring of the Holy Spirit, actually ζωοποιοῦντα, we must decline to admit; moreover, we most inflexibly deny that nothing more than this was the meaning of His words concerning σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα, and that He here gives His explanation of these words.[2] Then would every thing come back to His *doctrine* and *teaching* again, through which or in which the Spirit could exert His energy, and σάρξ καὶ αἷμα would be no more than—*figures*. "I confess"—says the mild Kling, with dignity opposing Lücke—"that I was altogether astounded at

[1] Basil. M. adv. Eunom. libr. V. wrote with converse truth—θεοῦ λόγος ὁ υἱος, ῥῆμα δὲ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα.

[2] Although, *e.g.*, Petersen (i. 192) so expounds them. Steffens has put it most strongly, with an otherwise good intention (Wie ich Wieder ein Lutheraner wurde, u. s. w.)—"His words *are* Himself, are Spirit and Life!" But we cannot allow even these more tolerable applications to stand as exegesis, such, for instance, as Pfenninger's well-intentioned—Yea, His words are God's words, Spirit and quickening power (already) are in them; yea, *much more* than that, *Himself*, His whole being!

seeing such an expositor consenting to this view of the profound discourse of the Redeemer. How inappropriately and perversely must Jesus then have expressed Himself in vers. 51, 53—56! Is then *He Himself*, who offers Himself as living bread, identical with the contents of His own utterance concerning His person? Is His flesh and blood, which men must receive into themselves in order to obtain eternal life, no other than His doctrine?! If Jesus had so spoken, then would He truly not have been the personal Wisdom, and His words would *not have been* spirit and life!" How does it rejoice one of us to be able to speak with even only not absolute agreement, in the words of an academical theologian! But that joy is a little disturbed, when Kling's subsequent interpretation forbids my concurrence —"The words which He had spoken, were pure spirit and life, divine in their kind and in their original, and living words throughout."

For my own part I am exegetically bound to maintain that the Lord specially signifies by τὰ ῥήματα the great words σάρξ καὶ αἷμα. Lücke insists that if that distinctive former language was now intended, ταῦτα τὰ ῥήματα should have been used, as in ch. viii. 20, x. 21; but in those parallels the subject referred to was something immediately preceding, but now some interval and interruption had transpired, so that ταῦτα would scarcely be in keeping, but ἃ λελάληκα ὑμῖν, that is, what I spoke to you in my last sayings just before, would be precisely so.[1] Scheibel: "it is hermeneutica sui ipsius, and of the preceding saying—the words which I have spoken are to be understood of Him who is spirit and life."[2] In order to this it is not absolutely necessary,

[1] Bengel makes a critical distinction that He says not λαλῶ—jam enim aversi erant. Moreover that *here* the *quoting* λαλεῖν stands instead of λέγειν, does not contradict what is said later upon ch. viii. 25. Even in ch. viii. 28 it stands ταῦτα λαλῶ. Here in ch. vi. the form of the expression is so intended—thus and not otherwise have I *spoken*. Thus when Kahnis (v. Abendm. S. 122) rejects my exposition that it refers to the contents of the last-spoken words, on the ground of the "universal character of the declaration," we can only confidently ask—Where is this universal character? We read the opposite.

[2] The highly respectable English commentator Alford says of my interpretation—It seems to me beyond question the right meaning.

with Bengel, to press ῥήματα into דְּבָרִים, *res* verbis comprehensæ: yet the ἐστὶ *twice* repeated with emphasis, and specially corresponding in each case, is a continuous *exposition*, just as that first ὁ ἄρτος ἡ σάρξ μου ἐστὶν, ver. 51. So now again—ἡ σάρξ μου πνεῦμα ἐστι, καὶ τὸ αἷμα μου ζωὴ ἐστιν. If I give My flesh in order to quicken, it is as a vessel of the πνεῦμα; My blood a vehiculum of the ζωή.[1] This is said on the one hand, for an abiding protest against every carnal and grovelling misunderstanding which would cling to the σάρξ; but, on the other, it will by no means abate in the very least the true, though heavenly, corporeity of Him who is gone up with flesh and blood. Indeed he who can say (like Schulthess, v. Abendm. S. 57)—"the *true* body of Christ is related to the body which was crucified and buried, as the *true* bread which He declared Himself to be, is to *perishable* food," must refuse to hear and read what He himself has said—My *flesh* is this true bread! He can have no clear idea of what the flesh of Christ is, because either he is wanting in faith in the *incarnation* of the Logos, or does not perceive clearly its consequences. The great result is the receiving from Christ's corporeity His *flesh and blood*, not merely *imperishableness*, but much more than that.

Where, then, may the flesh and blood of Christ have remained? What did they become? To that end did He rise again bodily—to give back his corporeity as "perishable" to the dust, to be resolved into nothing? As Dav. Schulz applies even to the flesh of Christ (known to have risen, and to have been taken up into heaven!), what 1 Pet. i. 24 predicts of πᾶσα σάρξ!?[2] What

[1] That is also very different from the converse—"the true body of Christ is thus all which truly served as the veil and the instrument of His Spirit." Rather would we maintain that all which now brings to us the spirit and life of Christ participates in the outpourings and influences of His everywhere present flesh and blood. Even Bretschneider has discerned the exegetical truth from his point of view, when he says in his Probabilia—Corpus hoc, *in se spectatum*, non habet vim vivificantem, sed πνεῦμα, λόγος πνευματικὸς *cum eo conjunctus* hanc vim *communicat* cum eo. Σάρξ ergo *sola* si comederetur, nemini daret vitam; sed σάρξ cum cœlesti spiritu conjuncta id efficit.

[2] We have spoken in our exposition of the Epist. to the Hebrews i. 308 of the question what became of the *poured out blood* of Christ, though in a manner very offensive to our modern theology. We cannot abate this offence now, and least of all as it confronts us in the

meant it then that the *Son of man* should come again? The self-same Person, which formerly was the Son of man, now as a bodiless spirit—and yet to appear, and be seen when He comes? What are we to do with passages such as Phil. iii. 21; Col. ii. 9? If we

strange criticism of Münchmeyer, who blames my opposition to the Lutheran doctrine, while he himself understands Jno. vi. very unecclesiastically as meaning solely a *sacramental* participation; who would do well to study my other writings before he attacks one of them with an entire misunderstanding; whose protest against my doctrine concerning the blood, ventures to affirm, in plain opposition to the Lutheran doctrine of the Supper, and the words of institution themselves, that—the blood *which was shed* (which yet we drink) is as utterly lost as the wood of the cross! We say nothing of the entire ignorance of all christological anthropology which lies at the bottom of such protests as these. We will now in this second edition condense for our readers who may not possess the work on the Hebrews, what we have advanced there, on ch. ix. 13, 14. "Now arises a bold, yet obvious question—whither went that blood of the God-man when it was shed, that blood containing in itself bodily and really the spiritual energy of all quickening out of the life of Christ? —The Lord's spilt blood, one may suppose, could not actually and bodily come into the holiest of all. Where did it then remain, and what became of it? we ask with all solemnity. Might this sacred blood be lost, absorbed, and come to nothing in the soil of Gethsemane and Golgotha? Far be it from us to think so! that contradicts the assured truth of a Resurrection and glorification of all the corporeity of the God-man, which once taken upon Him was never to be laid aside. If the Father keepeth all the *bones* of His Holy One, so that not one of them should be broken in the true Paschal Lamb (Ps. xxxiv. 20; John xix. 36); if also the *flesh* of the Holy One of God lay in the grave secure from corruption and waiting for new life and spiritualisation (Ps. xvi. 9, 10);—should the *blood* be lost and perish? Far be it, we say once more. (We may add now—With *us* the blood is mere element of physical, mortal life, but the blood in His case was also penetrated and pervaded by the πνεῦμα αἰώνιον). The treatment of this subject by earlier theologians may have been conducted in a very irreverent manner, repulsive even to the faithful, but there is a profound Truth and Light at its foundation. It is plain, at the outset, that the blood of Christ, as pertaining to His humanity, shared in His glorification, since it is present and communicable, in the Sacrament. But if you ask further—are the outpourings of the blood of Christ, from the first drops in His bloody sweat to the final stream from His side, which indeed the Omnipotence of God could keep in permanent being, just as a similar power works in the resurrection of every human body —restored to His body again, or do they exist independently of it? The word of the Risen Saviour is the first answer, when He said to His disciples—Handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not *flesh and bones*, as ye see Me have. (Luke xxiv. 39.) The Lord did not say, nor could

entertain such etherial, spiritualising notions of the ascension of Christ, as would make the plain account of His actual, bodily, visible presence at the end, a mere docetic representation or myth,[1] then should we do better to consider with the German

He say—*flesh and blood;* for, as another Scripture reveals to us, flesh and blood in that union and combination which belongs to this lower, earthly, mortal life of the body, cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor thus enter into incorruption. (1 Cor. xv. 50). Did then the Ascension unite the blood collected in the meanwhile below and preserved, with the hitherto bloodless resurrection body? For the same reason we answer, no. And what need we ask, when the distinctive and decisive answer is plainly given in the Holy Sacrament? His glorified *flesh*, which now is called His body of itself, and His shed *blood*, both, in conjunction one with the other, and independently one of the other, still sundered as they had been separated at the Cross, the offered up body and the *poured* out blood are given us by the Lord to be eaten and drunk. Does not this give us to understand why, after John vi. and the Institution of the Supper, the New Testament speaks so distinctively of the blood of Christ? Moreover, let us read in the Epistle to the Hebrews, what is written in chapter xii. 22—24! In connection with the enumerated *realities*—Ye are come to Mount Zion, to the city of God, to the multitude of thousands of *angels*, to the congregation of the first-born, to the Judge and *God* of all, to the *spirits* of perfected saints, to Jesus the Mediator of the New Covenant—and then we read at the close, in connection with and after the person of the glorified Saviour Himself—after the holy seven-number yet another and last reality—*and to the blood of* sprinkling, which speaketh better than that of Abel! Then must this most holy blood exist as separate in heaven."—Let it be observed how the so-called "Johannean Christ" and the so-called "Author of the Epistle to the Hebrews" coincide, and let us learn to apprehend the whole New Testament as one γραφή with a systematic connection. To acknowledge the authority of the already itself apocalyptic epistle to the Hebrews, and to submit to be led by it onwards to its τελειότης (chap. vi. 1), is both the result and the test of a true understanding of Scripture, just as the Apocalypse itself is. Compare what Beck has said almost in accord with ourselves, concerning the blood of Christ (Lehrwissenschaft, S. 626—629, in the note.) He, however, protests against Bengel and the "separated existence of the blood in heaven." For my own part I did not derive this doctrine from Bengel, nor from Oetinger (who holds it fully, see in Auberlen S. 272—276), but from the Scriptures alone, not one word of which can be broken, however paradoxical they may appear —nor from Materialism as Lange insinuates (iii. 614.) This latter thinks that I need no more disturb myself about the shed blood of Christ than about the sweat or the tears!—but where then is the Scriptural "glory of the Logos as the life of all things;" Holy Writ surely speaks differently of the *blood* and of the tears!

[1] Or those which will allow Lücke to say, "the thought of the glori-

Catholics (in my first edition—the late; in this—some time since!) whether we had not better give up altogether the festival of the Ascension. (As an article in one of their Synodal organs then directed.) The Scripture, however, tells us that the *bodily humanity* of the ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ, is made and is become εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν. (1 Cor. xv. 45.) What the Lord told Nicodemus, and what He afterwards spake at Capernaum, form together mutually complementing truths. He brings down *for us* through His going up, spirit and life (chap. iii. 13)—but He *hath* already the Spirit in Himself though veiled in the flesh, and confined in its out-beaming power. According to Acts ii. 33 He did not then first receive on high the Holy Ghost from the Father, but freedom and power to pour out upon *us* the fulfilment of His *promise*. For in Jno. vii. 39 the glorification of His σάρξ in order to the streaming forth of the water of life *from His body* (as we shall expound on ver. 38 there), must be taken in connection with the ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο of His birth.

A Capernaite κρεωφαγία and αἱματοποσία cannot assuredly be the question here. Calvin penetrates with considerable clearness into the mystery, when we find him once saying—Carnem Christi sine ullis ambagibus fatemur esse vivificam, quia—eadem illa caro vitam in nos spirat—nam ex abscondito Deitatis fonte in Christi carnem mirabiliter infusa est vita, *ut inde ad nos flueret.* Quite right, but this *inde fluere* is not quite enough, it does not amount to the *eating*, of which the Lord spoke. We must most absolutely decide that in the *glorified Christ first* we are to discern the κοινωνία καὶ ἕνωσις σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος, of which Irenæus speaks in relation to the Sacrament.[1] We may, with D. Schulz, admit a σῶμα πνευματικὸν, but protest against a σὰρξ πνευματικὴ, for, as Olshausen pertinently says, "it does not appear what there could be pneumatic in the σῶμα, but just the σάρξ itself." Thus there is the most perfect communicatio idio-

fied flesh of Christ, seems to me to be quite strange to John even after the resurrection!" as if he did not record the finger in the print of the nails, and, at the same time, the coming through the closed doors. Was not that indeed a beginning of the glorification? Not yet, assuredly, the perfect glorification.

[1] And indeed in a yet stronger sense in the *glorified* Christ, than that in which Ignatius ascribed it to the Person of the God-man generally.

matum now (although not previously in the condition of κένωσις); thus also the rejected ubiquitas corporis (namely, that which, as ever possible to the Lord's will, comes into fact in His church) as it is almost literally declared in such passages as Eph. iv. 10; Col. ii. 9. Not indeed that absolute, and simply impossible thing of exaggerated Lutheranism! To these depths point, and of these mysteries testifies the Word which we have now expounded—mysteries which shall be, when the Son of man, *remaining a Son of man*, shall go back again to heaven where before His *becoming man* He was. The ἐστί of this saying is partly prophetic, as it refers to the meaning and contents of the words which were spoken for futurity; and it has also a well-grounded truth in the concealed mystery of His divine life for the moment in which He uttered it.

Vers. 64, 65. These words are not so straitly connected with the preceding as Kling thinks, who would on that account change the punctuation; but the second part of the discourse follows here. The detected offence was first set aside as far as it might be, by instruction, explanation, and reference to the future; but now, as it is fit, the offence itself, or rather its disclosed principle, unbelief in the teacher come from heaven, is reproved and corrected. *Here* first would we refer, after this entire process of thought, the carnal apprehension which it has been sought to discover in σάρξ; the Lord has previously been placing the object of their misunderstanding in the clearest possible light, but now He predicts, in addition, that as the disciples through their own deep guilt have not understood Him yet (have not remarked the πνεῦμα of that σάρξ which should ζωοποιεῖν), so they will not for the same reason understand and accept the explanation which He has just given. *But* I may say what I will, my strongest μαρτυρεῖν and plainest διδάσκειν finds no entrance where it finds no faith! Ἐξ ὑμῶν τινές, although there were πολλοί,[1]—is the mild utterance of our Lord which confirms what we have just said, that He directed His words not only to those who were entirely departing from Him. The εἴρηκα ὑμῖν should teach

[1] Roos has it otherwise: Not all who murmured were thus unbelieving. *Many* disciples murmured, but only *some of them* believed not. That might pass, if (as Roos himself mentions) the first πολλοί did not come back in ver. 66.

us that the quite parallel λελάληκα ὑμῖν is just in the same way to be understood—the Lord refers, both in the one and in the other, to His own previous words. But here the ὑμῖν has a yet narrower application—even to you My disciples and not merely to the mass of the people have I spoken and addressed these words! Even your hitherto ἐλθεῖν πρός με and περιπατεῖν μετ' ἐμοῦ was not the right and actual coming, without the obedience of faith responding to the drawing of the Father, without the hearing of trust in order to learn.

The parenthetical observation of the Evangelist points at the close of this section to its beginning, with which he closes the whole; hence ἐξ ἀρχῆς refers not simply to ipsum hujus sermonis tempus, as the ἀρχή with relation to the future indicated in ver. 62, but it must be understood as in ch. ii. 24, 25—from the beginning of His dealing with each He knew his character. At the same time the Evangelist goes forward preparatorily and transitionally to the following record, for he adds to the τίνες of the disciples generally, an allusion to the τίς from among the twelve in particular. And the εἰσίν οἱ μὴ πιστεύοντες of the former describes what was now passing in the present; while the ἐστίν ὁ παραδώσων of the latter points to the *future* as now present to the Lord.[1]

The immediate result approved the truth of these last words. The many turned away ἐκ τούτου, that is, from this critical moment they also externally turned away, as they had never been inwardly turned towards Him; and returned not back (so long at least as the Lord was thus surrounded by following disciples, no more is to be found in it than that); were of the same mind till the ascension of the Son of man. That there were among them such as fell away from the beginning of faith is very possible; though it is almost denied by the μὴ πιστεύοντες of our Lord, and the οὐκέτι μετ' αὐτοῦ περιεπάτουν of the Evangelist.

[1] And not as Tholuck says, "that Judas *might* from his tone of mind become His betrayer."

APPEAL TO THE TWELVE. WILL YE ALSO? ONE OF YOU IS —

(Ch. vi. 67—70).

The false disciple, found; alas, even in the narrowest circle of the *twelve*,[1] and patiently tolerated by Jesus; goes not away indeed, but even through his hypocritical remaining becomes a διάβολος—yet shall he not remain unwarned and unexhorted; the Lord reveals him to himself without revealing him, just as far as it was wholesome and fitting. The first, *testing* question was itself uttered pre-eminently on account of this Judas, though it evoked a blessed confession of their faith from the others; hence no commendation here responds to it (as in Matt. xvi. 17), but only a second question, which scarcely retains its warning tone to the *lost one*, but only detects him, and as a warning to his fellow-apostles, as *one among them!*

Ver. 67. According to strict rule the μή in this question should indicate—ye will *not then* go away?[2] The rule, however, is not quite so rigorous, as even Winer admits; and we might accept the question thus, conformably with our Lord's meaning—will ye, too, or *any one* among you! This certainly must have been the undertone to Judas, even if we conceive the tone and sense of the question to have been quite negative—expecting neither yes nor no. In putting this inexpressibly affecting question to His chosen twelve the Lord was not, indeed, in His inmost soul indifferent; but He did with design and self-repression propose it calmly as an actual *question*, awaiting their reply. This must then, as now, have been *felt*, though not perceptible in the few words themselves. It cannot be the Lord's *will* that any one should ever turn away from Him, and these twelve He had in a special manner *chosen!* The decision, nevertheless, He ever and

[1] In which designation, it must be remarked, St John speaks as *taking it for granted.*

[2] Hence many understand, and we find it in de Wette, unaltered by Brückner—"I hope not!" So that it is expounded as a question of "sorrow seeking consolation."

in every case leaves to the *will* of man. That was the principle and reason of the withdrawal of the other disciples; thus plainly announced in order that we may beware of attributing to the drawing of the Father any thing like compulsion, or of supposing in the lack of the Father's gift any thing like a decretum reprobationis. It is altogether inconsistent with our Saviour's dignity, especially in connection with this chapter, to understand in the question an appeal of sorrow, demanding consolation—ye, my own twelve, will not forsake me too? Rather does the Lord speak thus to His apostles—if it be your will, too, then leave me, ye are free to do so, I restrain you not—just as God spake in former times to Israel by Joshua, Josh. xxiv. 15. But it is not less true that such an appeal to their own free-will is the mightiest possible appeal to their hearts.

Peter instantly replies in the name of the others, as he thinks, of all. He first seizes on the *going away*, and strengthens the idea, so strange to him, in his ἀπελευσόμεθα. "Very sure it is that we cannot counsel or help ourselves; *to whom*, then, can we go, as our Master and guide? The Baptist is no longer with us,—are we then to go back to the Rabbies again?" The very thought of this was sore affliction to him. No, *we* remain *thy* disciples! He apprehends that which the Lord had said in ver. 63, with the same general half-interpretation in which so many remain at the present time, and which has its truth in hearts like Peter's, though the Lord intended it in another sense. Yet Peter's words mean something different, and indeed more just, than if he had said—thy words are spirit and are life. He uses them with the genitive of their contents—they *speak of* eternal life, they *promise* it to us, thus much is clear to us with all their obscurity. And because *our* desire is set *upon that*, and not upon bread or anything else, we remain with thee.[1] His confession rises higher in the following words, since He knows thus much, and has just heard it repeated, that *faith in His own person* is the essential matter in the Lord's words. But he subjoins to his

[1] And he who thus purposes and thus remains, will go further than to the *words* of the Lord: he will enter into actual participation of Himself. It is matter of grief to us sometimes when we hear it boasted, with more than exegetical error, that the words of Jesus are pure spirit and truth.

πεπιστεύκαμεν the ἐγνώκαμεν also, since his faith is matter of clear consciousness; since he knows in whom he believes, and wherefore. The order may be found reversed elsewhere (as ch. x. 38; 1 Jno. iv. 16), but Peter designs here to testify, that through a preparatory belief and reception of His words, even those which were full of mystery, they had attained to the height of their present knowledge of Christ. (Comp. ch. iv. 42.) For this was the main point in the contrast between them and those others, and this was the first element of separation. If the Text. Rec. were correct, the confession of Christ here uttered by Peter would go beyond those others in ch. i. 49, iv. 42, xi. 27, and be quite parallel with Matt. xvi. 16, and Thomas' words alone in ch. xx. 28 of St John's Gospel would go beyond them; we should then trace in the connection a very manifest emphasis upon the τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ζῶντος, with significant allusion to the Lord's previous words in ver. 57.[1] Not merely is this latter addition, however, spurious, but most probably ὁ Χριστὸς, ὁ υἱὸς also; at least critics are almost unanimous in preferring ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ. We cannot, indeed, regard this latter as perfectly suitable in this place, where the sum and result of our Lord's words is given; and we may remark that neither Bengel nor Knapp decides for ἅγιος;[2] but we must abstain from the difficult attempt either to justify this ἅγιος by internal argument (which is not unnecessary, notwithstanding the result of all mere criticism, as long as probable various readings are on the other side), or to defend the propriety of rejecting it as in itself impossible. Our object is especially to unfold the words of Jesus.

Ver. 70. This heart-piercing question of the Redeemer, which proceeded from the deepest mystery of the will of His love in its condescending strife with the evil will of sinners, appertains, with all its tone of human gentleness and soft complaint, to the most *severe and rigorous* utterances of His lips. Its warning severity and force are only surpassed by its own intenser repetition at the last supper—*one of you* will *betray* me! When Peter utters his impetuous and well-meaning *we*, the Lord points to a

[1] Not, however, as Grotius supposed—Thou art the Son of God, and not, as the people said, the son of Joseph!

[2] Not Bengel, though he rejects the ζῶντος; but he thinks that the υἱός aptly corresponds with πατρός μου of ver. 65.

fearful exception from it; and that in the way of *question*, just as if the eleven might and should have known that all was not right and secure in their own circle. In fact they might have suspected it, at least, just as the Lord clearly saw it, if they had themselves been altogether pure, and sincere, and deeply-grounded in the truth. For that many a hypocritical evil-doer conceals himself from our detection, is the effect of human weakness in ourselves; but this infirmity is even in our case closely bound up with our sin, even though it be no sin itself; and even while it imposes upon us the obligation of charitably thinking the best of every one, until his iniquity become known to us. The Holy one of God could not be deceived by any sinner whatever; His heart-searching inquisition into the secret soul of man needed no miraculous intervention of divine omniscience, but only the pure gaze of His single eye. That, therefore, the apostles could have among them an undetected Judas, points of itself to the common sinful humanity inherent in them all; and the Lord's troubled words are a common warning to the whole circle, since in a certain sense He imputes the sin of one to the whole brotherhood, and reckons for it with them all. No other than this is the meaning of that awful, and still more piercing repetition of the words in the final, most confidential circle of love—one *of you!* It is as if the Lord should now say—be ye all careful and humble, believers though ye are! It is not enough to have believed, and to have known; not enough to have remained with me when others departed! The Betrayer and Destroyer insinuates himself into the narrowest circle, and most immediate fellowship with my person!

But the most piercing and mysterious words of all are his *direct utterance*, spoken after that which we have just mentioned had led the way to it in their silent comment. Even mine *election* is not enough! It is very obvious that this ἐκλέγεσθαι has a different meaning from the same word in ch. xiii. 18, where Judas is specially indicated as *not* chosen; but we should greatly mistake if on that account we should *here* understand only the external calling and election of the Apostleship. The Son knows, like the Father, nothing of a mere external election unaccompanied by the earnest reality of love, which designs to save and accomplish all the purposes of a spiritual calling. This distinctive will

of *His own* which manifested itself in the choice of Judas, the Lord mournfully *sets against* the self-procured fall of the One, the personal guilt of which that choice aggravated; what else does the connection indicate which binds the two sentences in one question? Is there not even among you twelve, all of whom I have alike chosen, One, whom that I know I must now tell you who know not, whose sin is only made worse by its opposition to my grace? *Consequently*—and this is the special purport of the question—is there not a most critical and fearful danger connected with the keeping of the heart of man? Had I not cause to put the question to you all—*will* ye also go away?

Alas, that Judas had gone too! This question mercifully points to him the way of departure, in which he would at least have been honest in his sin, like that prodigal in the parable, and with the same hope of an eventual return. But the hypocrisy of presumption, pride, and covetousness, which induced him to remain because he was one of the twelve, was a snare to him in which he became fast involved. It is shown, nevertheless, in him, as the most palpable example of human ruin and fall yet known in history, that there is in the divine love, without prejudice to its prescience, an *election* of the *lost*. That the Lord can use, and does use the self-same word here and again in ch. xiii. 18 in such different meanings, exhibits to us the two aspects of a mystery, the dogmatic or speculative investigation of which does not belong to strict exegesis.[1] In protest against an invalidating interpretation of this ἐξελεξάμην we have only to put in juxtaposition with it ch. xvii. 12, in which this same lost Judas is at the same time enumerated among those who were *given by the Father*.

Finally, what is the signification of διάβολος here? Does the Lord actually term Judas *a devil* (as we read in Luther's Bible with the Vulg., as the Peschito has it סטנא, as even Stolz was obliged to translate it, and Seiler, with the qualification—he has devilish dispositions)—or are they right, who resolve the words into the general sense of *a secret traducer and adversary*?[2] Euthymius gives this latter as a second interpretation in connection with

[1] The mystery lies yet further back, even in Satan, who in his very creation was *chosen*.

[2] In a sense, therefore, synonymous with ὁ παραδώσων.

the first, ἐπίβουλος; and the later expositors, as we might have expected, give it the preference. Neander, with a most enfeebling exposition, has it, "He had chosen them, drawn them to Himself, He says, and yet one of them had become possessed with the heart of an enemy!" It is, indeed, certain that as שָׂטָן in the Heb. admits of this more general signification, διάβολος is the prevalent Sept. translation of it, and that this Greek word is further used as the rendering of צַר and צוֹרֵר in Esth. vii. 4, viii. 1. (Comp. 1 Macc. i. 36, διάβολος πονηρός parallel with ἔνεδρος). But the usage of the Greek Testament is another question. The Lexicographers must attach to the expression the additional idea of a proper opponent (adversarius), for the *calumniator* of other passages is not altogether suitable here. We are ourselves of opinion that even those passages, as a whole, are to be understood *not without reference* to the devil. In any case Eph. iv. 27 and 1 Tim. iii. 6 must be excepted; there Satan proper is signified. In 1 Tim. iii. 11; 2 Tim. iii. 3; Tit. ii. 3, the general Greek signification comes, indeed, into the foreground; though not without allusion, assuredly, to the arch-slanderer, who has ever been so designated in the current language of Christians.[1] St John, finally, in his writings (and stress is laid upon this in other cases) uses the word διάβολος only for Satan. But Olshausen thinks this a decisive reason for translating it otherwise here, since the word is always used for "*the* devil," and never for "*a* devil."[2] I think otherwise. The passage must be regarded, in any case, as a ἅπαξ λεγόμενον, contrary to St John's usage, and that of the New Testament generally; whether the distinctive opponent be described with Wahl *adversarius*; or with Schöttgen, *homo diaboli similis*. If the Lord, not using the Greek, in all probability said *Satan*, He did not mean what we should designate as "*a* devil" (δαίμων, δαιμόνιον, hence St John did not thus render His word); but as parallel

[1] And even in the passage of Maccabees before alluded to the same thing is already found: see v. Meyer's corrected translation.

[2] But the same Olshausen, in his last volume on 2 Thess. ii. 3, returns to this passage, and says that Judas was among the disciples, what *the devil* is among the children of God. Thus Jno. xvii. 12 was too powerful for him, and caused him to forget his own exposition.

with such Old Testament passages as 2 Sam. xix. 22. He seemed to have called Peter Satan on one occasion; but we have given (Vol. ii.) another interpretation of that passage. And what a difference, at all events, between Peter's lapse into an instrument or minister of Satan against Christ, one solitary, undesigned instance, caused by the weakness of *flesh and blood*, and this attribution of a personal, persistent διάβολός ἐστι. St John, who only once has ὁ σατανᾶς (ch. xiii. 27), reserved this most personal expression for that consummation of the indwelling and influence of Satan in Judas; the word, according to Greek usage, would here have involved too unqualified, and absolute an identification.[1] As we understand our Lord's thoughts, He does not mean *merely* what otherwise would be τέκνον or υἱὸς διαβόλου (for that would be too slight and general for application to Judas, who was the *guide* and head of those who took Jesus), nor does He simply place him in parallel with any individual δαίμων or δαιμόνιον, but—one among you is *the Satan or devil in relation to Me*, that is, *his* elect instrument, *one who has fallen*, through a devilish spirit, into the ministry, and as it were, the *representation of the Devil*. How could this be better expressed in Greek (by St John or by Jesus Himself) than by this διάβολος, which, while hinting strongly at the article, yet naturally leaves it out?[2] This is the only interpretation which satisfies our feeling in a passage where emotion is pressed to its extremest point; to think of a mere adversarius without reference to Satan appears to us insufferably bald. Lücke insists that "his relation to Jesus is much more significantly indicated, than the character and cause of the evil in him;" we cannot but think, however, that *both* are in the connection equally demanded in the exposition, and that both therefore are designed in their deepest unity by διάβολος. No other than Satanic counter-influence, that is, to which the heart had given place, could have first neutralized and then entirely overcome the grace of Christ ministered to one who had been chosen to be an Apostle; and then, again, one who, as such, had yielded himself up to Satan could not be other-

[1] For σατανᾶς is a personal name, but διάβολος at the same time a designation of the office or spirit of that person.

[2] For γίνεται or ἐστί μοι εἰς διάβολον or σατανᾶν would be, on the other hand, not *personal* enough.

wise than the most immediate instrument and representative of Satan *in relation to Christ;* and we think that the truth which lies in Lücke's requirement as to the relation of Judas to Christ in διάβολος, comes out with its strongest force in our view of the passage.[1] Only thus do we see the harmony between this first word of our Lord, which already penetrates the depths of the fulfilment of the fearful prophecy in Ps. cix., with the later expressions of the Apostles *derived from this* in Jno. xiii. 27; Lu. xxii. 3, with the Lord's own saying, Lu. xxii. 31 (Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you all!), with the typical relation of Judas to Antichrist which is intimated in the parallel of Jno. xvii. 12, and 2 Thess. ii. 3. If we were to admit that the specific development of the sin, and its actual exhibition, in the *delivering Him up* to his enemies, came only before the Lord's actual contemplation with the approach of the time;[2] yet even then we must maintain, and all the more emphatically on that account, that the Holy One of God must have thus early most profoundly and searchingly pierced the hidden secret of Judas, the impending and already uprising *Satanity* of this *man*.[3] Not merely (as Neander says) that "the disposition which made him afterwards a traitor, betrayed itself to Him in its germ;" but that He contemplated beforehand in the germ and beginning the full consummation of the evil. Thus was this Judas daily and hourly before His eyes, a silent temptation—and in a very different sense from that in which Peter was so for a moment—to fall from the patience and enduring love of His appointed suffering for sin, by casting him out of His presence and judging him at once,

[1] Thus it might be translated, though not advisable, in the people's Bible—*is devil;* to be completed by—in my sight, and in relation to me.

[2] As Lücke suggests, the Lord Himself does not here term Judas παραδώσων, but it is the reflection of the Evangelist ex eventu.

[3] We discover here that there is such a thing possible to humanity, even as there is a *divinity* possible (though not in the sense of the Graser Erziehungsprinzips)! Judas himself, indeed, was not yet "altogether satanized" (as Boss in his Satanologie rightly remarks), for he was moved by a final *remorse;* but it is saying too much, though even Luther declares it, that man may never become devil. The repentance of Judas was his last of humanity, presently afterwards the devil in him was consummated by his daring self-murder.

whereas He was come to save and seek out with forgiving mercy that which was lost. This also our Lord acknowledges and bewails in that fearful ἐξ ὑμῶν εἷς διάβολος ἐστιν—the profundity of which we cannot deem exhausted by any exposition of a mere *insidiator* or *adversarius*.

TO HIS UNBELIEVING BRETHREN: MY TIME AND MY WAY ARE NOT YOURS.

(Chap. vii. 6—8.)

An observation of Oetinger upon this place is as simple as it is profound, and must not be lost sight of in any attempt to discern the system of St John's Gospel:—"I assuredly believe that John wrote the first ten chapters of his gospel with reference to his three fundamental points:—1. of word, 2. of life, and 3. of light."[1] Nothing is more evident than that chaps. i.—iii., following the Prologue, continue the idea of *testimony*, which turns now from the Baptist altogether to Christ, see chap. iii. 11—32. The stages of this trichotomy, however, pass naturally one into the other. Ὁ λέγων σοι, chap. iv. 10, λαλῶν σοι, ver. 26, as the answer to the woman's ἀναγγελεῖ ἡμῖν πάντα place distinctively before our eyes the λόγος (chap. i. 18, ἐκεῖνος ἐξηγήσατο), and chap. v then completes the idea of *His witness to Himself*: yet these chapters iv. and v. pass over, as we have seen, into the second idea—in Him is *life*. This again is superabundantly brought out in the sixth chapter, where not only the words of the Eternal Speaker discourse of eternal life, but the σὰρξ of the Incarnate One is announced as πνεῦμα καὶ ζωή. But Oetinger overlooks what we have just hinted, when he says: "Chaps. vi. and vii. refer to the *life*, as is evident in every verse; chaps. viii.,

[1] See Oetinger's Selbstbiographie, herausg. von Hamberger. Stuttg. 1845, S. 52, and compare Auberlen, die Theosophie Oetingers, S. 409, as also Oetinger's Theologie nach der Idee des Lebens, herausg. von Hamberger, S. 106. The characteristically bold assertion of Baumgarten-Crusius "that the Prologue is not echoed in the gospel itself" (i. 368) must be entirely reversed. The Prologue is no other than a pre-intimation of the contents of the whole Gospel.

ix., and x., passing then manifestly to the *light*." For chap. vii. forms already, as before, the transition from life to *light;* and that by bringing into prominence the sufficiently prepared for requirement of *faith* in Him who manifests Himself to the world,—manifests Himself, however, now, His full ὕψωσις and φανέρωσις being yet in the future, in a manner which the darkness of the world cannot apprehend, ὡς ἐν κρυπτῷ ver. 10. Let chap. vii. 33, 34 be compared with chap. xii. 35, 36. And once more let note be taken of the reference made in chap. vii. 39, as throughout all the stages of the entire Gospel, to the future consummate glorification of Jesus.

In the whole of chaps. vii., viii., ix., x., Jesus (as the Light of the world, chap. viii. 12), bears a testimony more and more definite to Himself that He was sent from God His Father into the world for its salvation, and that He Himself was one in dignity with the Father who sent Him: bearing this testimony by word and deed during the feasts of Tabernacles and of the Dedication at Jerusalem, that is, in the very midst of His enemies, who could not lay hands on Him before His hour was come. As His discourse proceeds at the feast of Tabernacles, faith or unbelief in Him as the Christ becomes more and more sharply defined. Upon a following day, and occasioned by the circumstance of the adulteress which put the Pharisees especially to shame, a second discourse is appended to that of ch. vii., in which He defends His testimony to Himself in all the depth and fulness of its meaning, and most severely condemns His enemies' sin and unbelief. The result of this light shining in the darkness is—the attempt to stone Him! (Ch. viii. 59). Finally, chs. ix. and x. give together the last great testimony of Jesus to Himself as the *light*, in which only they who are blind see, those who see becoming blind: a testimony of *word* which hangs upon that incontrovertible though rejected testimony of *deed*, in the healing of the man born blind.

This main section of the Gospel thus viewed—a section to which Luthardt, upon his arrangement also, gives the title of "conflict with unbelief"—is *introduced* by the record of the desire on the part of His *unbelieving* and vain brethren that He should *prematurely* and in *their* way *show Himself to the world*, with His reply to them in word and act. We would have the

profound harmony and fitness of this circumstance in this place deeply pondered by those who understand the principle of true criticism, that the more plainly in any *historical writing* a *plan of the matter* is evident, the more certainly is that writing legitimated as *true history*. And where should we expect this principle to operate in its fullest degree, but in the history of our Lord, which is throughout in its every incident full of significance, pervaded by a typical reference, and in its continuous course most perfectly "real-ideal?"

It will be seen by a reference to our tabular harmony in the third volume, in what way we arrange the Galilæan incidents and discourses which St John passes over, and that we do not, with many, identify this feast-journey of our Evangelist with that of Lu. ix. 51. We find in the intimation here given of a persistent and increasing enmity directed against Him, a hint for the interpretation of all that follows. He Himself clearly knew from the beginning His time, and goal, and course; but—"none else can comprehend Him, no man can apprehend His hour, neither His brethren, nor the people." We have elsewhere asserted our view, and cannot now of course reopen the question, that these *brethren* are—contrary to all catholic tradition, and much Protestant criticism—no other than brethren who belong to Mary, being always found in her company; that is, her sons born afterwards to her who continued in a not unblessed marriage with Joseph.[1]

[1] The immature treatise in the first collection of my Andeutungen —written in my twenty-third year—has been condensed in my Expos. of the Ep. of Jude (Berlin W. Hertz. 1850), and the argument still more strongly enforced that they were the sons of Mary. We regard this result as established, after so many dissertations, especially through those of Blom, Wieseler, and Schaff. The latter alone has done my treatise the honour to refer to it, although he (S. 8 of his essay on James), has not noticed the postscript in which I corrected the error in connection with the μετά of Hegesippus. Whether James was one of these brethren, does not affect the matter; though I have not yet been convinced of the contrary. Thiersch still agrees with the Greek church that they were brethren of Joseph's former marriage (as Nonnus, Jno. vii. 3 without scruple interpolates υἱες Ἰωσήφ); but in opposition to this I have only to repeat my former words, that it is less disparagement to the divine dignity of the whole procedure to assume the subsequent fruitfulness—required, too, on other grounds—of the marriage planned and confirmed of God between Joseph and Mary,

We must not, however, leave this subject without most earnestly protesting against Lange's recent view that the brethren who here appear as unbelievers were even *apostles*. In John ii. 12 these same brethren are with their mother, and distinguished from the *disciples*, as they distinguish themselves here from the μαθηταῖς. Lange endeavours to invalidate the simple and plain words of the Evangelist—*neither* did his *brethren* believe in him (which are themselves the strongest argument against the signification "cousins," since *one* such συγγενὴς or ἀνεψιὸς was an apostle), by asserting that they are only to be "unbelieving in a higher sense;"[1] but this we find it impossible to admit with any regard to the context. For the unbelief of the brethren so perfectly stamps their words, and, more than that, the Lord's answer so sharply repels them, placing Himself in direct *opposition* to them, and classing them so clearly with the world, that we cannot understand how any one—duly weighing the latter fact especially—can think of apostles in this case! Assuredly if faith may be asserted of a mere conviction or sentiment of the intellect (though St John never so represents it), then were these brethren not absolutely unbelievers, for they presuppose in Jesus the power of ταῦτα ποιεῖν and of φανεροῦν ἑαυτόν, and only wish to impel Him to a public declaration of Himself. But inasmuch as they—whether disciples or not—would make all depend upon an external exhibition to the world, and a brilliant success among men, without any trust of the heart, without any apprehension of the true, the divine in Him, and without any respect for the sufficient demonstration He had already given, they place themselves on a level with Gamaliel, at least, as unbelievers. When, not without an admixture of taunt, they challenge Him to make public proof of His claims, their unbelief may fairly be denominated unfriendly and even hostile. The words which we find in the typical prophecy, Ps.

than to regard the holy virgin as espoused to a widower with sons and daughters.

[1] Dr Kuhn also, who maintains the argument against their being literal brethren, attributes to the πιστεύειν of our passage only a "special sense." (Jahrb. für Theol. u. christl. Philos. 1834, 3). Lange has allowed himself more recently to speak of a transitionally expressed unbelief, and of an obscuration of mind and feeling, but most obviously in opposition to the plain tenor of the text. (Leben Jesu iii. 567, 591, 610).

lxix. 8, correspond with wonderful exactness to the relation between Jesus and these brethren—I am become a *stranger* unto my brethren, and an alien unto *my mother's children.*

Jesus had not gone up to Jerusalem, either at the Passover or at the Pentecost; Galilee was the scene of His labour, Capernaum His Jerusalem: so now He makes no preparation to go up to the feast of Tabernacles. They cannot understand this, any more than the whole course of His general conduct. And they speak to Him in their ancient familiar and confident tone —that to which they had been accustomed in their family dwelling—Now, brother, if thou art actually the Messiah (we wait to know more about this, that we may understand the honour which will thence ensue to us), be at length in good earnest, and show thyself! The impatience of their vanity impels them to utter the challenge in a manner somewhat *taunting*, the tone of which cannot fail to be caught by every unprejudiced mind. (Not, however, *mockingly*, as Klee much too strongly asserts.) Their boldness already breaks out in the unqualified imperative—*μετάβηθι ἐντεῦθεν*: in such a style none assuredly would have ventured to speak to Him, but those who had grown up with Him and had been accustomed to use it. (It is altogether unimaginable that this could have taken place in the circle of His apostles; the words of Peter, Matt. xvi. 22, admit of no comparison, and we should be ashamed to waste words upon it.) Let *thy disciples* (among whom *we* do not yet reckon ourselves!) behold the works which thou doest—they mean especially the followers whom our Lord had won in Judæa, and even in Jerusalem, whom He should take care of in order that His interest might advance, and independently of whom they esteemed His Galilæan followers of slight account. Their words, however, assume at the same time that even these Galilæan dependents would not be contented with His Galilæan exhibition, unless He could legitimate His pretensions with becoming dignity in the great capital. Their ideas of the Messiah had made the Nazarene brothers of this presumptive Messiah so full of the lofty Jewish feeling, that they despise their own Galilee in this *ἐντεῦθεν*, with something of the same spirit in which the Rulers afterwards spoke, ver. 52.

In ver. 4 *τί* before *ποιεῖ* has a certain emphasis; it does not

here refer to any slight matter, but such things as their brother contemplated and purposed to do; this, however, lies in the subject itself, and it is not necessary that we should resort to any special signification of the Greek τί in connection with ἔχειν, εἶναι, ποιεῖν. The καί is certainly not a Hebraism (as Grotius has it) for אֲשֶׁר, but as a *nevertheless* expresses their sense of the self-contradiction in which the conduct of Jesus seemed to them to be involved—purposing and willing to do some great thing, and yet keeping *His person* in the background, instead of going boldly forward to the critical scene of accomplishment. A *political* meaning their brethren do not seem to have, but they express honestly the first and most obvious principle upon which this vain world acts—He who will be anything must go forward openly and boldly to dare it! With *such a* measure do they mete Him! The καὶ αὐτὸς, although its meaning is otherwise obvious enough, we do not regard with Lücke as merely *idemque*, indicating the self-contradiction in the strongest manner; but we agree with Kling and Baumgarten-Crusius that there is also an opposition intended between the questionable τί ποιεῖν and the *personal appearance* necessary in order to it. It thus fully corresponds with the φανέρωσον σεαυτὸν, in which the pith of the whole finally lies. The εἰ has obviously, as we have before observed, an undertone in it of derision, or if that be too strong, of hesitating doubt. For we cannot apprehend ταῦτα ποιεῖς to mean—is that thy design, wilt thou be the light of the world; but they designate by this expression (as Lücke rightly says), "his then present operation in Galilee," the same which they have already disparagingly referred to as ἐκ κρυπτῷ ποιεῖν, and now again still more strongly doubt of and question by this εἰ. Thus it is not—*since* thou doest such things (ἔργα ver. 3), or *canst* do such things,[1] but—*if* what we hear concerning thy miracles be actually true.[2] In this contrast ἐν παῤῥησιᾳ answers plainly enough to ἐν κρυπτῷ; and it is quite unnecessary to adduce the Rabbinical usage, which retaining the Greek word

[1] Grotius: ποιεῖν hic potestatem perpetuam faciendi significat. Si potes, inquiunt, et ubi et quoties vis talia facere.

[2] As we apprehend in Nonnus: εἰ τάδε ῥέξεις ποικίλα θαύματα. The Evangelist John thus pre-supposes in this ταῦτα, that Jesus had wrought many wonderful works in *Galilee*, which he has not recorded.

employed it in the sense of *celebrity*. The words here in connection with αὐτός, go beyond the ordinary idea, and express the sense of the speakers to be, as Hezel puts it, "play a public part," show thyself unrestrainedly, place thyself boldly forward (not simply as yet διαφημίζεσθαι.) This is the mistaken prejudice which pre-occupies their minds; they apprehend the Messiah's work after a worldly fashion, and would precipitate it in the spirit of Isa. v. 19; for the same world which, according to ch. iii. 20, hateth the light in the best sense, seeks it in another and worse sense with ignorant hardihood, and lays the utmost stress upon *publicity*. Kling remarks, with as much point as truth, that the brethren use the expression τῷ κοσμῷ with a certain "appropriation of the language of the disciples;" though this appropriation is at the same time ironical and blind. Hence the Lord must at once proceed to open their eyes that they may know what the *world* properly is, and what is His relation to it.

His answer is just as gentle as we might have expected it would be to His own peculiar brethren; but it is also just as severe as such persistent unbelief among those so near Him demanded. The gentleness consists in this, that He not only meekly accepts the direction to depart, but condescends to justify Himself by giving them information of His reasons; the severity further appears, in that He does this only by placing His own manner of acting and theirs in direct and irreconcilable contrast. They will not be His μαθηταί, He therefore classes them with the world of which they had ignorantly spoken. My *time* is other than yours; that is, at the same time, my manner of acting, my whole relations. We see in the πάντοτε of the contrast that the Lord proceeds from the first sense of the appropriate, appointed time of departure for the feast, to a more general and absolute sense of the word καιρός. His brethren, like all men of the world, as long as they remain such, have, alas, no higher reference, no higher guidance, no great restrictions in their ποιεῖν and ζητεῖν, and therefore all that may be understood by καιρός in relation to their acts, is utterly indifferent to them; they may *always* do what their heart listeth in its folly, the folly wherewith they imagine to themselves that they may make their own time. But when, on the other hand, the Lord speaks of His own time, He refers to that high divine appointment and

guidance which beforehand disposed of every single circumstance, for the sake of the great, final object of His life. Just as in chap. ii. 4, He passed, in a similar expression, from the immediate and obvious matter before Him, to the great futurity, so is it here. Indeed, in the present instance the reference is more certain and more distinct, inasmuch as His brethren have desired His departure to the feast as the means of bringing nearer the object of His life. We may say in a certain sense with Bengel, that in ver. 6 He is speaking more directly of the feast, and in ver. 8 proceeds to refer it to His sufferings and death: this requires qualification, however, inasmuch as the first already passed over into the second. What is it that the brethren wish? That He should show Himself to the world! Now in *their* sense He came not *for this*, the world *as such* neither did nor should know and acknowledge Him down to the end, see ch. xiv. 17, 21, 22. In order, however, that He may not utterly repel them, but as far as possible give them instruction, He mysteriously attaches His words to theirs, substitutes, however, His own sense, the only correct one, of the public exhibition which they demanded,—and according to that meaning His death in His manifestation. His enemies may not lay hands upon Him until His Father wills (see presently chap. vii. 30)—but He also for Himself may not and will not receive the greetings of His followers consequent upon His public, tumultuous, entrance into Jerusalem; He will not receive their Hosannahs as Messiah, and deliver Himself into the power of His enemies, until His Father should say to Him—The Hour is come! Consequently His time for public procession to the feast, and His hour of passion, which here coincide, was not yet come; though the brethren in another sense imagined that the time had come for His entrance on His glory and honour. In the second clause we should at first have expected only—but your time, that is, the time which you falsely suppose to be mine. Instead of this, the Lord proceeds at once to a perfect separation between Himself and them, as a matter that would be immediately understood of itself. They excluded themselves from the circle of discipleship, partly in irony and partly as pledging their homage when His claims were authenticated; but He repels them from Him with the deep sorrow of earnest truth—we have nothing now in common! The

expression ἕτοιμος, parallel with πάρεστιν, is translated rightly by Meyer—vorhanden, present, now.[1] Nothing hinders or limits you, for you have not to measure your steps after the counsel of God, and in the presence of an angry and persecuting world.

If it was in their desire to become celebrated with their brother, His immediate intimation must have overturned all their foolish speculations—From me, as my disciples, ye have nothing to expect but the hatred of the world; that is the law and the rule of my kingdom. Ye spake of the "world;" and meant by that the whole multitude of the people with their rulers: but I say unto you that ye yet know not what the world is, though ye belong to it, and are also its fast friends. It is a word of keen condemnation, when the Lord says to any one—the world *cannot* hate you, it leaves you in peace as you leave it! And it was with the deepest grief of heart that he felt Himself constrained thus to speak to His own brethren after the flesh. When, on the other hand, He described Himself as hated of the world, and gave as a reason of it His testimony against its evil works, He told them indirectly, though plainly enough, *what* it was that He sought, *what* He designed to do, and that (as Fikenscher says) "faith in Him had nothing to do with the world's notoriety and consideration." Thus He speaks as the *Light* which was hated of the world (ch. iii. 20), as He whose aim was not so much to come to the light Himself, as to shed His own light upon the world for *its* revelation, to give His testimony as graciously, and yet as prudently as might be, until the hour should come when He should for the first time and finally succumb to its hatred.

The concluding verse, as a well-founded consequence, gives them back for their μετάβηθι His ὑμεῖς ἀνάβητε. The *first* ταύτην may not be genuine, but that is of little significance: the various reading οὐπω for οὐκ is more important. The former stands in Lachmann's text, but it can be scarcely regarded as the true reading; it would not have been easily substituted by οὐκ, whereas it was very natural to qualify the difficult and harsh οὐκ, by changing it for οὔπω. Porphyry could not have alleged against the Lord the imputation, if not of falsehood yet

[1] Bengel, on the contrary,—fitted for you, and Stolz—appointed; but these are already involved in the καιρός.

of *inconstantia*, if he had read *οὔπω*. Nor is this latter so suitable to the words, which, with designed indefiniteness, *repel* the brethren and send them on their way alone, as to the following *οὔπω πεπλήρωται*, which gives a *reason* for His *οὐκ ἀναβαίνω*. This *οὔπω πεπλήρωται* does not, as it were, intimate (according to Lange) that He will presently follow; for in the prudent design of the Lord His brethren were not to know this, that they might not herald His coming and excite expectation. But the *πεπλήρωται* rather points, according to the Lord's usual language, more strongly than before to the *sense* in which He speaks of His prescribed time and hour, and its coming. It is altogether another thing, and quite consistent with it, that the Lord in His own mind intended His *οὐκ* for *οὔπω*; which it has been unskilfully sought to intimate by substituting this reading, or by the addition of *νῦν*, thus obviating every appearance of untruthfulness in His words. But this appearance does not exist in them, if we only allow the Lord to speak as a man with the prudence with which we may and must ourselves often speak in such circumstances.[1] For the brethren it was perfectly true, that He was not going to set forth with them, and, therefore, in the way which they desired; what He designed to do afterwards was a matter for His own thoughts alone. His word would have been untruthful then only if He had used, instead of the observable *ἀναβαίνω*, the future *ἀναβήσω*. Such reservatio mentalis as this is unavoidable, if we would speak to the world wisely, according to Solomon's rule, Prov. xxix. 11. It is an idle and unbecoming subtilty, to which the ancients, and Bengel, and now again Lange resort, which would make a great distinction between the declaration—I go not with you upon the Festal journey, and—I shall not during the feast go to Jerusalem. For it is not true, that his going up might have been regarded as subsequent to the feast, just as the Greeks might go; His secret going up was after all, as the Evangelist himself says in ver. 10, an *ἀναβαίνειν εἰς τὴν ἑορτὴν ταύτην*; and the more obviously so, as He afterwards, in ver. 37, on the

[1] "There is only one passage which has ever been adduced as bearing the appearance of attributing untruth to our Saviour—Jno. vii. 8. But an untruth cannot be detected here in any sense (even if *οὐκ* is the right reading.) Rothe, Ethik. iii. 575.

great day of the feast, utters His testimony with express allusion to the customs of the feast.[1]

Enough, that He would not on this occasion go more φανερῶς in the procession, that is, not in the company of His unbelieving and vain brethren; but He went up ὡς ἐν κρυπτῷ, by which St John affirms the conduct blamed by the brethren as the wise procedure of His counsel; and the ὡς (a rather *strengthening* than qualifying addition) intimates—that He had the appearance *as if He were actually* One who in distrust of His work must withdraw His own person from observation! The Gospel will in due time abundantly explain the paradox of this temporary incognito of the Lord of glory and the King of truth. Whether, moreover, the Twelve, whom we find in ch. ix. 2 surrounding Him as ever, went up with Him in secrecy, is a question which we may ask without any certain answer; it *might* indeed have been that at this time He sent them also forward before Him, and that this fact is contained also in the οὐ φανερῶς.

AT THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES; FIRST GREAT CONVERSATION WITH THE JEWS. MY DOCTRINE IS FROM GOD; CIRCUMCISION AND HEALING ON THE SABBATH; YE KNOW WHENCE I AM!

(Ch. vii. 16—29.)

Thus must we comprise together *three* discourses of our Lord at the feast of Tabernacles, which, proceeding through interruptions, form one connected conversation, the *first great colloquy* with the Jews in the temple, both rulers and people. He therein testifies, induced on each point by some especial circumstance, the divine origin of His *words* and of His *works;* appeals, in order to excite faith in the former, to that witness of inward experience which will be afforded to every one who willeth to do

[1] Another view (as we find it lately reproduced in Sepp) thus explains it—that he did not at first actually purpose to go, but that He afterwards subdued His own inclination in order to do His Father's will. Which, nevertheless, is not intimated.

the will of God, as well as to the external evidence which was to be found in His humility; defends the propriety in particular of His last Sabbath-miracle by analogy drawn from the law; demands a right judgment; reproves the unbelievers while He detects to them their wicked plots and their judicial ignorance of God. All being clear confirmation of what He had before said to His brethren concerning His own witness and the world's hatred.

They *seek* Him, generally, at the feast in Jerusalem (as ch. xi. 56)—though with very various spirit, for all minds are excited, whether for Him or against Him. Among the common people there yet lingers at least some doubt, but the rulers are decided and have decreed against Him. Hence there is no more than a secret murmuring, for no one ventures to speak openly and freely in His favour. The Ἰουδαῖοι, ver. 21, might have been the inhabitants of Judæa, ver. 1, or the Jewish people generally as in ver. 2; we should then have to make the distinction afterwards between the people in general specially intended in ver. 12, and the rulers in particular, ver. 13. Yet certainly the Galilæan followers of our Lord, who have come to the feast, are included in the ὄχλοι; and after the phraseology of the entire chapter we should more correctly regard the Ἰουδαίους as the leaders and rulers of the people, the ἄρχοντες, ver. 26, as first in ver. 1, and again in ver. 13. Their ζητεῖν is consequently an obviously unfriendly search, as in ver. 1; though we must not press it so far as Hezel does—"they commanded Him to be sought out, and sent spies to take Him, in order that they might place Him in durance." For the public inquiry ποῦ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνος, seems to indicate something different from this. By this expression the Evangelist, having set out with the malicious question of the enemies, *passes over* to the more general inquiry and curiosity concerning the accustomed chief stranger at the feast. Thus the following verse is not to be regarded with Lampe as *effectus* hujus inquisitionis, but as a continued description of the state of things in the metropolis, that no man, enemy or friend, remained indifferent, every one thought of Him. Every one knew without mentioning His name who this ἐκεῖνος was, and all miss Him, and feel His absence. Euthymius took the word to be a scornful one (as in Matt. xxvii. 63), spoken διὰ τὸ

μῖσος; we cannot go so far as that, but think that, whether in scorn or in pretence, the enemies themselves spoke in lofty terms concerning Him—where is the celebrated man, the great Prophet, abiding?[1]

This simple question issuing from His enemies, awakens into expression the doubts which existed concerning Him, among the common people—comp. ch. ix. 16, x. 19—21. His friends only venture to utter, indefinitely and timidly enough, their slightly defensive ἀγαθός, which we do not interpret, with Baumgarten-Crusius,—a benevolent, friendly, well-wisher of the people; but with Von Gerlach, following the Hirschberger Bibel—an honourable and true man.[2] This was saying but little in itself, yet as a protest against the charges brought against Him, it was much. Listening hypocrites, speaking well of Jesus, in order to sound His disposition, are not to be thought of among the ὄχλοις, and after the parallels which we have referred to. The accusers betray by their τὸν ὄχλον that they speak as taking the position of the rulers, and speaking on their side. *These* speak openly enough, and the following clause does not intend to signify that *all* speech about Him, whether for or against, was only a γογγυσμὸς, for we only can be said to speak παῤῥησίᾳ as it regards the assaulted feeling of the heart. *For* Him no man ventured to speak openly for fear of men; and Schleiermacher preaches well upon this text against the "most culpable weakness and guilt of the people around Him in our Lord's days." The people who were attached to Him feared the Jews (comp. chap. ix. 22); even as His enemies again feared the people when they would carry into execution their ζητεῖν ἀποκτεῖναι, Matt. xxi. 46.

Into the midst of this mutually restrained ζητεῖν καὶ γογγύζειν our Lord suddenly and expectedly entered, as fearless as prudent. Τῆς ἑορτῆς μεσούσης (Vulg. with precision die festo mediante) does not necessarily mean the fourth day of the festal week, but, generally, during the interval between the high festivities of the first and last day. The sudden and unexpected

[1] As Lampe quotes Gualther: Non tam contemtim, quam invidiose. Ubi tandem latet ille magnificus suarum virtutum ostentator —? Cur non nunc prodit in publicum?

[2] There is no question but that it may mean this. Yet in Neh. vii. 2, which has been referred to, the LXX. read ἀληθής for אִישׁ אֱמֶת.

appearance, manifesting the utmost confidence in them, gave Him for a while the protection of the surrounding people; for He wisely chooses the time of His working, neither precipitately involving Himself in danger, nor holding back with undignified caution. Fikenscher imagines that His appearance had something of a miraculous character, considering the shortness of the time since His later departure from Galilee; but this we leave altogether undecided. Suffice, that He appears in the Temple, and takes His place in one of the side-rooms appointed for the purpose, and began as usual to *teach*. That is, on this occasion and at first, without any direct personal witness, but, as it were, with the general design to expound the Scripture. The Jews *marvelled*, which must ever be the first influence when He speaks. The θαυμάζειν does not imply, as Lange and many others have imposed their meaning upon it, that they contested His right openly to teach, and charged Him with presumption before the people;[1] that would have been expressed in a very different way. Certainly we must not suppose, further, with Lampe, that this was the first time of His entering the temple! No, even these Jews are constrained to bear involuntary testimony to His wisdom, though they afterwards, like those at Nazareth, give it an invidious turn, by their malicious question as to *whence* he obtained it; while their conclusion in reality destroys their premises, and the true answer is contained in the question itself. "The supposition that man can only learn from man" is not merely, as some one has said, a "Galilæan folly," but a Jewish one also, as we here find, and it is, indeed, the common prejudice of the learned. "How is it then that ye good people have never known, that there are many things which a man must not have learned, in order to know them otherwise than if they had been learned!" (Kleuker.) *Learning*, that is, according to the signification which it bears here, and which it ordinarily bears, that of the human school and accustomed discipline of learning, such as was common in the Lord's days.[2] That Jesus had undergone no such scholastic discipline, and that this was

[1] Neander: Not being trained He was not justified in undertaking public instruction. Brückner: A new method of stirring up enmity against Jesus, His qualification to instruct being impeached.

[2] Nonnus quite correctly: ἴδιον τέχνῃ.

generally known and admitted, is a very important testimony, or "biographical datum." How, and in what way, the Son had indeed *learned*, is not a question which we can enter upon now.

Luther's translation—Wie kann dieser *die Schrift?* How knoweth this man *the Scripture?* has been needlessly corrected. Lücke thinks, and Lange confidently follows him, that γράμματα, without ἱερά, could only signify letters or literature, learning, as in Acts xxvi. 24. Others regard this as settled by the absence of the article, which, however, determines nothing. Bengel in his German New Testament has it—how is this *a learned man*, having never yet *learned?* And Fikenscher, too, feels constrained to translate—the sciences, like the Vulg. *literas*. If, however, the μεμαθηκώς might seem to include a reference to this more general sense, it yet remains quite certain that among the Jews learning in general and Scriptural learning were one and the same (Acts xxvi. says nothing against this, see ver. 22) —the Lord had certainly not given in the temple any specimina eruditionis, but a most surprising and simply-profound understanding of Scripture; and, finally, the Evangelist himself, ch. v. 47, uses γράμματα for the writings of Moses. Consequently Luther may be quite right, in company with the Peschito, which has translated it by ספרא (the Book.) And Sirach knew no other σοφιά, wisdom or science, than that of a γραμματεύς, and desires for its cultivation leisure from every other avocation, the freedom from business in order to exercise himself continually, exercise such as πᾶς τέκτων applies to his own craft, Ecclus. xxxviii. 24—27. That is, indeed, the human rule and requirement for every one of us; yet there are exceptions to it even among ourselves, and it is a mischievous prejudice, which has been too much fostered by the monopolising learned, that learning is essentially necessary for such a believing comprehension of the word of God as suffices to obtain the kingdom of heaven. *Against that* the Lord's word now testifies, inasmuch as He not only refers back His own doctrine to the revelation of the Father (which, indeed, was for Him in another sense the school of human *learning*), but also at the same time indicates to every sincere follower the internal, practical way to the only true apprehension of the same doctrine.

Ver. 16. What our Lord elsewhere terms His words, His

word, or testimony, He *this once* designates by the expression διδαχὴ: taking occasion to do this, in order that He may thus meekly place Himself on a level with all other διδάσκοντες and διδασκάλοι, when διδαχή is spoken of according to its contents, and system, and method. When in the well-known passages of the synoptics, which, indeed, are not strictly analogous or parallel with this in St John, we find astonishment excited by His διδαχή (Matt. vii. 28, xxii. 33; Mar. i. 22, 27, xi. 18; Lu. iv. 32); when (Jno. xviii. 19), Annas inquires concerning the διδαχή of Jesus; and the disciples, Matt. xvi. 12, are warned to beware of the διδαχή of the Pharisees—the word is to be taken in the same sense according to which the Lord's teaching is placed among the manifold doctrinal systems and διδασκαλίαι, Matt. xv. 9, of the day. Thus he enters into the midst of the *teachers* and says—ἡ ἐμὴ διδαχή. But in the same breath He places His doctrine in direct antithesis to all that might be called ἐντάλματα or θεωρήματα ἀνθρώπων—οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμή. We may say that this paradox not only exhibits to us the origin, but has reference to the *substance* of His teaching, its most essential and specific subject and theme. For now that πίστις has become again a γνῶσις, and Christianity a system of *doctrine*, it cannot be too emphatically or too persistently inculcated that the Lord Jesus teaches *no new thing* in the world: He neither gives to the heathen philosophers new theorems as such, nor to the Jewish Scripture-wisdom altogether new precepts, promises, and revelations. The *new* in His doctrine, that which indeed makes all new, consists in this, that He testifies Himself to be in *His own person* the *Fulfilment* of the entire Old Testament, and *His kingdom* to be the *realisation* of all right knowledge and true desire in the whole world.[1] From the first appeal to the old law of love made new in Him, to the predictions of the last things, in which He only seals and confirms and closes the ancient prophesies; and through the entire circle of that revelation of human and divine things with which He responds to the seeking, questioning speculation of the heathens, big with the word and notion, but never bringing forth the thing and the reality—everywhere and throughout all there is the one great—*I am He!* Thus far

[1] Dietlein in his writings against the school of Baur maintains and develops this most excellently.

His doctrine is one with Himself, and the acceptation of that is one with the πιστεύειν in His ἐγὼ εἰμι. (Ch. viii. 24.) As in ch. viii. 26—28 He says before the Jews, and as in ch. xiv. 24 He says before the disciples, so He says now here—that which I speak, and teach, and testify, I speak under the commission, and by the authority of the Father *who hath sent Me.* He is indeed as the speaker no other than that great *Prophet* promised in Deut. xviii., but only again as the only-begotten of the Father, to whom alone the words of God are given in an essential, pre-eminent, and exclusive sense—hence all other prophets and speakers in the name of God. were only imperfect types and forerunners of this true Prophet. If the Jews had never considered and applied in this case that which held good with regard to the old prophets—who is his father or his master? (1 Sam. x. 12, comp. Amos vii. 14, 15), but desired only a μανθάνειν after a human manner, then is the Lord's answer most abundantly decisive :—so little is *My* doctrine derived from human instruction, and learned humanly by Myself, that it is not in any sense according to your notions the product of My own study, investigation, or thought—but no other than the revelation to My mind of Him, who sendeth Me to speak to you, and Himself speaketh in Me and by Me.

Ver. 17. He who is of God, heareth and understandeth the words of God; he who is of the truth, discerns and accepts all that which the personal Truth Himself brings to man and speaks as the fulfilment and realisation of all those truths which were extant among men before His final testimony came. For this no such learning is necessary as can only be acquired within the limits of the school, or by the hard discipline of study; the Father revealeth it to the babes who are willing to learn of His Son, to learn for the direction of life and action, and for their righteousness as sinners before God. That which was long ago expressed by Sirach's son (Ecclus. xxi. 12)—He that keepeth the law of the Lord, getteth the understanding thereof (ὁ φυλασσων νόμον κατακρατεῖ τοῦ ἐννοήματος αὐτοῦ, καὶ συντέλεια τοῦ φόβου κυρίου σοφία, according to the ancient word in Job xxviii. 28)—finds in this utterance of Jesus its full and most distinctive expression. Here does the Lord protest against the πρῶτον ψεῦδος of all learning, gnosis, philosophy, speculation of pre-

sumptuous and blind men; and assures us that there is no such thing, nor can be, as pure thought, no such investigation as is independent of the heart's disposition and the will's direction, at least in regard to His doctrine, and the things which pertain to the will and revelation of God. He sets out with that position which Schiller once so scornfully repelled as "ins Gewissen schieben"—"the laying it all on the conscience," and admits no other evidence than that a posteriori, springing from an inward moral experience, where alone is the veritatis cum *pietate* vinculum. It is the *will* of man which is concerned, there lies the lack and the hindrance; faith, and progressive knowledge in believing, is also an act, springing from the sincere *willing* to do the divine will; unbelief and the ignorance which follows it, is a crime to be reckoned against those who love and who work a lie. Oh that this catechumen-word could pervade even our orthodox theological science, so that our *μεμαθηκότες* might first come to that *true γραμμάτα εἰδέναι* which coincides with the "hermeneutics of the New Testament writers" as taught by Jesus, and then arrive at the true *διδάσκειν ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ* for others! The Lord does not say at the end of His testimony—ye have not understood Me, or apprehended my meaning; but—ye *would* not! Where, however, the *ἐάν τις θέλῃ* is at one with the *θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ*, a sure, and inexhaustibly increasing *γνώσεται* is promised.

But what is this *will of God*, which the Lord assumes to be already known to every one to whom He proposes His own *διδαχή*? There must indeed be a manifest criterion for this recommended criticism of divine revelation. The doctrine of Christ does not present itself to the world and the human heart unprepared for and unmediated. And His own saying incontrovertibly attests that He does not demand a blind submission to it as an absolute *παράδοξον* and *θαῦμα*—true knowledge never could come in this way. Thus when the old dogmatic finds in it at once only the promised testimonium Spiritus sancti internum,[1] and then by a strange circulus demonstrationis which must always be a *σκάνδαλον* to all who are upright and intelligent, makes

[1] As Ebrard also incautiously writes, "but they should first seek to do *what He says*." And Theremin (Abendstunden, last ed. S. 392) discerns here the mystical "testimony of immediate intuition." Neander, confirming Schott and Lücke, maintains against this—the will of God cannot *here* be understood as the will of God now first *manifested*

the knowledge of the truth of Jesus dependent upon the *doing of His doctrine*—it is evidently erroneous, inasmuch as it just overlooks the *mediating instrument*, to which our Lord's word here especially refers. The "will of God" is *here* certainly not (as in ch. vi. 40) the lex fidei (thus Lampe concisely!)—the doing of His will is by no means the ὑπακοὴ πίστεως, when the ἀκοὴ has gone forth—πιστεύετε. For then the Lord would only say—he who only believes, will believe! A "believing in experiment," which wretched Pietists (in this worse than honourable Rationalists) impute to the people, means nothing; to experiment upon it is a wickedness which tempts God, and destroys the sense of truth in us. Thus we never may pray in experiment whether it will avail, never may follow Him on experiment whether He will approve Himself our guide. The Lord's word knows nothing of all this. But He lays hold of an established fundamental principle to which He makes His appeal, proceeding from which every sincere person will and must come to the believing knowledge that the doctrine of Christ is from God, and then afterwards go very much further. The old and most excellent M. Fr. Roos of Würtemberg hits the point well and simply—"no man is so ignorant in religion, as to know nothing of the truth; and no man is so disquieted by religious doubts, as not to perceive anything which he must feel to be the revealed will of God. Now Christ says, if any man will do his will *as far as he already discerns it*, he shall know, &c. (Christl. Glaubenslehre, S. 7, 8). This will of God is manifestly revealed "in the law and the prophets, and in our own conscience," as Von Gerlach comprehensively remarks. For Israel in the law, to which therefore in the closest connection ver. 19 refers, and in the prophets' preaching of repentance and faith which rests upon the law. But also for all heathens there remains a consciousness of God, which maintains its inviolable place in the practical conscience as a δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ (Rom. i. 32).[1] And this is

in Christ, but only the will of God as far as the Pharisees might even in their position have already known it; thus the willingness to do that will is the subjective point of union in every man generally to which the objective evidence and conviction attaches itself.

[1] Chrysostom: ἐάν τις ἐραστὴς ᾖ τοῦ βίου κατ' ἀρετήν. That is better than Grotius; qualemcunque voluntatem sibi revelatam.

enough; for the doing of His will is from beginning to end the great and immovable essential in coming to God, and in the living knowledge of His name through fellowship with Him. "He who deals with his religion as a science merely, which he may indeed understand but will not practice (just as many are learned in geometry yet never measure a field) will never come to God aright."

Once more, the one great desideratum of humanity is the actual performance, the perfect fulfilling of the law, and this the grace and truth of Christ alone can bring within the range of possibility to man. Yet the Lord does not say—ἐάν τις ποιῇ. "It is not of doing itself that the Lord first speaks, but only of *willing;* if this is pure and simple, there follows (through the strength of Christ) the ability to perform." (Albertini.) But the result in the case of all who hunger and thirst after the righteousness of a known or unknown God is that they first embrace with joy the words of Christ concerning justification through grace by faith, He becomes their consolation and gives their conscience rest; then follows in the accompanying new-birth the reception of His strength, which confers upon the θέλειν the perfect and absolute ποιεῖν. *This* is the testimony that Christ's doctrine is of God which is alone possible to every one at the beginning; and this increases with increasing holiness in ever-progressing internal experience which approves its true divinity. The Lord speaks here, as the words run, more of the *beginning* of faith. Richter's Hausbibel says excellently: "ver. 17 is the least degree of, and the way to the testimony of the Holy Ghost, not this itself in its fulness." We add—He who will *do*, will learn to *believe;* he who deals earnestly with the Law first, will gladly embrace and fully understand the Gospel. But *then* when the διδαχὴ is discerned and acknowledged to be of God, its whole fulness is entered into and explored; then results, as the Lord says to His *disciples*, ch. viii. 31, 32, the *following* of Christ, the participation of His Cross and Resurrection, the doing the whole truth in works, performed through Christ from and in God.

Ver. 18. Or whether I speak of Myself! To this opposing hypothesis the Lord appends that other demonstration, which we denominated above the external evidence afforded by His low-

liness. But what is the relation between this and that *internal experimental evidence* which discerns through the inward feeling of need that what He offers is the true nourishment of the soul? In a certain sense both are united and their force is blended, for here His person and His doctrine are one: the doctrine makes on every sincere soul, which would honestly and willingly be taught to do God's will, the impression of an offered Righteousness; while the Person legitimates himself as trustworthy and true in all his testimonies and promises. Nevertheless the former is to be presupposed in order to the latter; for only he who is himself sufficiently sincere to be willing to do the will of God, will in his own humility be able to apprehend the lowliness of the Son whom the Father hath sent. Thus the evidence is quite rightly made to proceed from the internal spirit of every man who is to be convinced; and only in the susceptible does it proceed from without inwardly. The deceivers impute to the Lord deceit, the presumptuous presumption; but the sincere who will admit the influence of His truth into their souls, discern at once in the divine and pure humility of this enforcer of Truth, so utterly free from every taint of human vanity, the ineffaceable and incontrovertible seal of certainty. Thus we may say that the Lord goes on in ver. 18 to explain the process of the γνώσεται in the honest heart:—he who in *inward* seeking and longing is ready to know and to do the will of God, and he alone, will be *externally convinced* by the humility of the meek and lowly one; because he will be able to *recognize* in that the pure seeking of God's glory. Moreover, the Lord in these words only calls to their minds and adapts to the present occasion, that which He had said at the feast of Purim, ch. v. 41—44; and we may therefore refer to our exposition at that place. The former clause —that he who speaketh (teacheth) of his own, assuredly therein must seek his own glory, is undoubtedly true, as constantly attested by all rightly understood and deeply investigated experience: consequently, the second, which is the converse and antithesis of the former, must also be true. It may be, and it has been said, that this proposition is not capable of universal application, and that the Lord designed *only* to refer it to *Himself*, as ver. 16 and ch. v. seem to demonstrate. It is supposed, apart from Him, to be conceivable that a man in a lesser sense

sent and commissioned of God, that is, a prophet, a teacher, might with fundamental sincerity seek the honour of God, and yet err and be untrue through human infirmity. This is assuredly true, but the Lord is not here speaking in any relative sense; but lays down a simple antithesis, which declares that no error is from God but must be of a man's own. Thus it remains an abiding truth that anamartesia in knowing and willing, in doctrine and life, is one and inseparable: consequently it is only to be found absolutely in that one Holy One whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world; and can be predicated even of apostles and prophets only within the limits and measure of their mission. Even they were not in their whole life free from error, because they were not free from sinfulness; only in their official function as discharged orally or in writing. Every error is in its very nature presumptuous and self-seeking; as the dictum of Jerome defines it in its highest degree—omnis hæreticus est animal gloriæ! But then even in the case of apostles and prophets the sanctity of their personal life is no *distinctive* (however co-operating) criterion and evidence for the truth of their doctrine; but the concert of that with the complex whole of the revealed word of God and the testimony of the accompanying Holy Spirit. Thus, though the Lord is laying down a position which is really of universal application, it is obvious that in the very nature of the case He Himself alone can sustain perfectly the test of this most rigorous criterion. Who besides Him could dare to stand forward and give warranty for His whole life down to its minutest detail—Behold Me and learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly of heart? He only is absolutely free from taint as ζητῶν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ πέμψαντος, and therefore ἀληθὴς, because no occasion, or possibility of deceit exists for Him. Only in and upon Him is there no ἀδικία: not merely, that is, His cause is righteous—but ἀδικία is the comprehensive idea of sin (in will, in aim, in deed) and error in knowledge; with the full meaning of ἁμαρτία in ch. viii. 46.

Ver. 19. The expositors who would make this the beginning of a new discourse, have most assuredly failed to discern the full meaning of all which has gone before. Now follows a reference ex opposito in illustration of what has been just said. Jesus understands and teaches the word of God, expounds the Holy

Scriptures with a faithfulness of truth which must convince and overcome every man by its first influence, because He lives in the most entire and selfless obedience to the Father; but what kind of students of the law and expositors of Scripture must they be who wonder at His words and can moreover contradict them? They know and study the law, they glory in it as pre-eminently given to themselves—yet will they not keep the law! Therefore they can only *speak* about it, surround it with their subtilties, and make it the object of disputation; their impure minds cannot lay hold of its inmost truth, because they are ever seeking refuge from its keen meaning in subterfuge and bye-paths of error. The law was to Israel the first and most immediate portion of the will of God, ver. 17. These further words again go back to ch. v. 45—47, and are to be understood according to the fundamental meaning which we there endeavoured to disclose. It is well known that once in seven years the whole Law was read before the people at the feast of Tabernacles, Deut. xxxi. 10—13. This alone is enough to establish a specific reference in our Lord's words to the festal solemnity; whether, as Bengel thinks, this public reading occurred at the present feast, we must leave to the chronologists to determine, if they can.[1] The Lord says—*Moses* gave you the Law, not God by Moses, simply because that was the habit of speaking among the Israelites, and because the Holy Scripture itself significantly so speaks, for example in Deut. xxxiii. 4. When He goes on to charge the whole people represented before Him at the feast, in this universal way—None of you keepeth the law, we must understand the *law* and the *keeping* of the law in a general sense, and not limit it to the specific example which follows. Just as Stephen afterwards in the Spirit of Jesus charges the self-same people (Acts vii. 53), with not fulfilling the law which they had received, inasmuch as they did not penitently acknowledge its requirements, but hypocritically in the name of the law rejected that Gospel for which it was the design of the law to discipline and prepare them. And just as there Stephen couples with this their shedding the blood of the righteous (his own forerunners), the Lord Himself now speaks:

[1] Sepp (iii. 50) has even calculated, in his way, that during the course of our Lord's public teaching, the entire canon of the law was read through in the synagogues.

—*Why go ye about to kill me?* He who thinks of a trespass on their part against that single precept—thou shalt not kill! is far from rightly understanding His meaning. By the rejection, hatred, and final crucifixion of Jesus, Israel did indeed break both tables of the law, deny to God His honour, hate their brother in hatred to God, instead of loving him in the love of God (ch. v. 42); and utterly refused *to be loved themselves.* Their enmity against the Holy and Just one, ripening into murder, is no other than the final and consummate outbreak of their opposition to the truth which He testified to them, and of their hatred to the will of God, or that law as the living exhibition of which He stood in their presence. Let the emphasis of the little word τί, so keenly penetrating their consciences and revealing the ground of their contradiction, be moreover observed:—τί or διατί με ζητεῖτε ἀποκτεῖναι; *Wherefore* am I, in my truth, lowliness, and sanctity, so hateful to you violators of the law? Wherefore but because ye will persist in refusing to *do the will of God?*

So boldly and yet so simply does the Lord speak, with such majesty of meekness does He condemn, that the heavy inculpation may be regarded as at the same time the lamentation and request of His love—let it be no longer so with you, act ye not thus; He brings out into light what was crouching in the darkness, and lays bare to them the secret impulses of their iniquity. A renewed contradiction on the part of the people gives occasion to His *second* discourse, wherein, after having been speaking of His *doctrine,* He justifies the works, that is, the miracles which confirmed it, out of their own law, and in the very matter concerning which they had made the law a pretext against Him. The Sabbath-healing at the former feast furnishes an obvious and appropriate example, for its offence was yet remembered and still exerted its influence. He had blended them all together as unbelieving and disobedient, not keeping the law, and yet not urged by their consciousness of sin to faith in Him; and it was not without perfect right that He ascribed to *this* people in common a murderous spirit and intention, already revealing to them what would come of their enmity, and what presently afterwards was its actual result. There was in them an internal principle of enmity which their leaders might work upon; else the whole body of the people could never have been transported

so far as to utter their "Crucify Him!" against the Righteous One, their Benefactor, the worker of miracles, the great witness to the Truth! But now for the present the greater part of this people, especially the Galilean visitors at the feast (see, for the distinction, ver. 25 afterwards) were neither privy to the ambushes of the rulers, nor were they altogether conscious of the full extent of their own enmity to Jesus; hence they protest wildly against what seems to them an insane accusation, and show by that same boisterousness of what they themselves might be capable. Speaking with dogmatic precision, this δαιμόνιον ἔχειν is something different from μαίνεσθαι (for which *distinction* and the transition from one meaning to the other, we may refer to Matt. x. 20); yet then, as now, such impetuous expressions of scorn in the mouth of the people (ch. viii. 48 introduces another element in addition) might easily become synonymous, and lose their preciseness of signification.[1] Thus Jesus has here the same measure dealt to Him as the Baptist at last had, according to Matt. xi. 18. It is not in harmony with the simple record of the Evangelist to suppose that they were the same ensnaring opponents who thus directed the thoughts of the people; since he describes their words as the immediate and impetuous *answer* which they made to the Lord's words. And equally irrelevant is the paraphrase: "that he was tormented by a demon of *disturbed mind*; a *fixed idea* which had mastered him and made him believe that his life was in danger," or that "a *spirit of morbid dejection* had put this fear into Him."[2] This notion may be regarded either as the result of a modernising tendency, or as in harmony with that older view of Scripture which is found in 1 Sam. xvi. 14, xviii. 10; but it will not harmonise with the δαιμόνιον ἔχειν of the time of Christ.

Ver. 21. The Lord does not return their contumely, but answers their violence by an all the more serene elucidation of

[1] The *Greek* δαιμονᾷν, insanire, gives no evidence on this question, scarcely containing an analogy which would be suitable in relation to Jews.

[2] Thus Lange, who adds further—"The frivolous people in the crowd easily jumped to the conclusion that Jesus was a morbid disturber of their peace, coming to interrupt the joy of their festivity." But we must be on our guard against these poetical incursions upon the letter of the narrative text.

that which He had deliberately and solemnly said; turning, now as ever, their interruption to the account of His continuous apologetic testimony. It was a notorious fact that the unforgotten miracle at the pool of Bethesda had occasioned an unabating *θαυμάζειν*, a wondering excitement which was generally associated with a condemnation of His sabbath-breaking: it is to this that He now appeals, and speaks to the contradicting people of no less than their *χολᾶν*, ver. 23.[1] Klee and Baumgarten-Crusius understand this *θαυμάζειν* quite rightly as a *σκανδαλίζεσθαι*; but it must not be overlooked, how prudently the Lord begins with the lightest and most gentle expression. (But we cannot hold with Teschendorff—ye *wondered* all of you at the first, *till* some came and imposed upon it the crime of Sabbath-breaking! for it stands in the Present—*θαυμάζετε*.) The Lord says *ἓν ἔργον*—what then is the antithesis of this? Some take it to be the many much more glaring violations of the Sabbath on the part of the people, in comparison of which they suppose that our Lord apologetically terms His own violation a very slight and isolated case.[2] But, on the one hand, such an even momentary and hypothetical admission (quite different from chap. xviii. 23 or Matt. xii. 27 with *if*) is quite beneath our Lord's dignity; and, on the other, we see that it is not His design to charge the people with manifold breaches of the Sabbath,—He rather concedes in ver. 23 their punctilious exactness in its observance. In the subsequent words of chap. x. 32 we have the true antithesis, and His meaning is—all My other many good works lose their value in your estimation and are forgotten, as soon as one of them becomes an offence! Thus the *ἓν ἐποίησα* involves a certain irony, but of the gentlest kind—"Be it so, I have only committed this one breach, and now let Me speak of that."

Vers. 22, 23. He so speaks of it as to make it the occasion of introducing a new and surprising analogy out of the law, to

[1] It is contrary to the strict connection of the whole in St John's account, to assume (with Olshausen) that another similar intervening occurrence is here referred to.

[2] Fikenscher says—"Ye should be reasonable, and if I have committed an *error* (!) ye should not condemn Me on account of one only: for where is the man who has never transgressed the law, and how often have ye done it yourselves? How little does your sinful record wonder at Sabbath desecration."

illustrate the collision between obligatory acts of benevolence in the healing and preservation of human life, and the external, rigorous observance of the letter of the Sabbath;—justifying, as He frequently does, His own exaltation of the one over the other. The διὰ τοῦτο is by most of the ancients (Euthym. like the Vulg., and similarly Nonnus οὗ χάριν) referred to what follows; but even in that case it should not be placed just as it is in the middle of the sentence (as in Luther's translation), for it then has no meaning;[1] but the meaning must be supplied (Winer § 7, 3)—Therefore *know ye*, therefore I say unto you. (It was reserved for Glassius to say that διὰ τοῦτο often, like לָכֵן, means attamen!) But this seems to us forced, and we prefer the construction—like Meyer's "ye all wonder *darob*, on that account,"—which connects the words with θαυμάζετε, in common with most of the moderns.[2] Lücke adduces proof from profane writers that θαυμάζειν, though seldom, yet sometimes, occurs with διὰ (not, indeed, in the Sept., but in Mar. vi. 6; Rev. xvii. 7, we find it); and Baumgarten-Crusius remarks that the ἕν is made more strongly prominent through the διὰ τοῦτο.[3] It is at least a similar construction which we have in St John's χαίρειν διά, ch. iii. 29. But more difficult and more important is the decision of the true meaning of the entire discourse concerning circumcision on the Sabbath; a matter which is far more confused than cleared up in most of our commentaries.

Much first of all depends, indeed almost everything, upon the view which is taken of the interjected οὐχ ὅτι. We cannot

[1] Alford, indeed, sees "an appropriateness of meaning in ver. 22 with the διὰ τοῦτο, which it has not without it. Moses *on this account* gave you circumcision, not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers, *i.e.*, it is no part of the law *of Moses*, properly so called,—but was adopted by Moses, and thereby becomes part of his law." But ἐκ τοῦ Μωϋσέως would not then be repeated by name—for this manifestly indicates a *parenthesis*. [The repetition of ἐκ τ. Μωυ. ἐστ. does not necessarily imply a parenthesis: John constantly uses these formal repetitions: this in answer to Stier.—Alford.]

[2] Beza, Griesbach, Knapp, Lachmann, Lücke, Klee, Baumgarten-Crusius, &c., and Theophylact among the ancients.

[3] Which answers Alford's objection which demands δι' αὐτό for the construction with θαυμάζετε.

imagine that our Lord could mean thereby "an *undervaluation* of circumcision, as a mere legal form, *not* introduced by Moses, but through *tradition of the fathers*."[1] The sacred sign of the covenant of promise given before the law was holy as such even to our Lord for His age; and He cannot speak of that as a mere "tradition" of the fathers, which *God* had Himself appointed to Abraham.[2] Thus in Acts vii. 8 this covenant stands significantly before and above the succeeding law. As to the question wherefore Jesus did not mention Abraham, but the fathers, Lampe has already said: Nihil aptius invenimus, quam quod Jesus noluerit hominem cum homine, Mosen cum Abrahamo in conflictu ponere, quasi Abrahami præ Mose major esset auctoritas, sed ipsas *œconomias* Mosaicam et *Patriarchalem* inter se conferre. Non hic de personarum sed de temporis agebatur prærogativa. Does the parenthesis, then, rather express the precise opposite—Moses gave unto you circumcision, as establishing more firmly an ancient and holy law? Not so, Kling insists against Lücke,—the observation is intended neither to elevate nor degrade circumcision, but only to correct the inexact form of expression which followed the popular usage. But such punctiliousness we can scarcely reconcile with the Lord's dignity, not even when "speaking with people who had been impressed by his knowledge of γράμματα."[3] If the more exact expression had no meaning of its own, the Lord would not have attached so much value to it as to append it. But a new difficulty arises, when we consider the question of circumcision being placed above the Sabbath as an older ordinance;[4] for Luther's inconsiderate marginal gloss is altogether vague—"keeping the Sabbath is a law of Moses, circumcision is a law of the fathers, and they come into collision with one another." If Moses had taken circumcision into his law as an ordinance derived

[1] Thus Baumgarten-Crusius, and Hezel before him.

[2] Hence Hezel more cautiously at least—"from father Abraham, as an hereditary custom (appointed for him, indeed, by God in his time.)"

[3] Not that they doubted, but they wondered at it as a thing proved.

[4] Bengel: amplificatur dignitas circumcisionis respectu sabbati, quo illa sit antiquior adeoque potior. And Lange speaks with similar want of exactitude of a precedency of circumcision over the Sabbath festival.

from the fathers, he had also incorporated the Sabbath from a still older original, even from *Paradise*. How then does circumcision take precedence of the Sabbath? It was indeed older than Moses, but the Sabbath was older still; thus is the later placed above the earlier? The solution of the whole appears to be this—that the Lord is not here speaking *immediately* of the paradisaical, patriarchal Sabbath, but of the *Mosaic*, that is, of the Sabbath as a total cessation from all work rigorously established in the law, and fenced with its strict sanctions. So says Grotius correctly: circumcisio est antiquior *rigido* otio Sabbati *per Mosen* imperato. And now first we understand the Lord's words to say—that even this *Mosaic* לֹא־תַעֲשֶׂה כָל־מְלָאכָה on which His opponents laid stress, could not possibly have been intended by Moses in so rigidly exclusive a meaning, for Moses could not contradict himself. Therefore it runs—*Moses* gave unto you circumcision, that is, he adopted without scruple the command given by God to the fathers "*on the eighth day*" (Gen. xvii. 12; Lev. xii. 3); the same Moses who imposed upon the Sabbath (also in existence from the beginning) its new strictness. *Consequently* ye see that circumcision as ordained of God before the law is quite in harmony with the renewed, albeit externally more rigorous Sabbath law;—*consequently*, that your present rigour is ungrounded, and places you in contradiction with yourselves and your own habitual fulfilment of the law in the article of circumcision. Did God forget the Sabbath, when He spake to Abraham of the immovable *eighth* day? Or did Moses scruple at all on that point? In this view the Lord's words proceed simply enough: καὶ ἐν σαββάτῳ περιτέμνετε, that is, *thus* in your practice the Sabbath and circumcision go on harmoniously together.[1] Ye neither think nor say anything about a violation of the law in this matter; but in your habitual practice ye take care that the whole law of Moses, which in itself is one, including the precept of circumcision on

[1] The corrected translation should mend this. Luther's *noch* oder *dennoch* beschneidet ihr—*nevertheless* ye circumcise—confuses the whole, as if there were a contradiction with what preceded. In the Hebrew New Testament (London, revised by Reichardt) it stands quite correctly וְעַל־כֵּן.

the eighth day, should be kept inviolate: *that the Sabbath precept is not thereby broken is self-evident from the same Moses.*—Thus it is evident how unnecessary and incorrect is the forced translation of ἵνα μὴ λυθῇ which we find in Bengel (and then in Semler, Paulus, Kuinöl)—ita ut non solvatur, salvâ lege; as also in the bibles of Seiler, van Ess, Allioli—without violating or transgressing it.

Thus far, it seems to me, all is clear. But now for the conclusion a minori ad majus, or the contrast between the circumcision of the ἄνθρωπος and the making whole of the ὅλος ἄνθρωπος —how is this intended by our Lord? At the first glance there are but two antitheses which present themselves—between the healing and the wounding, and then between the entire making whole and the only partial wounding or purification. As it regards the former, which Kling adopts and would connect with the latter, our unbiassed judgment, with all respect for the excellent Kling's general remarks on St John, must protest against it: for no man shall persuade us that Jesus in a public festival discourse would regard circumcision, contrary to all theocratical propriety, "only in its external form and operation!" Our inmost sentiment revolts against this; for it is in vain that we seek anywhere in Scripture for a passage (apart from the maternal complaint of Zipporah, Ex. iv. 25, capable, however, of an altogether different interpretation) which brings into view the wounding and painful side of the περιτομή. No, *the circumcising of a man* is here in the meaning of our Lord an act of benevolence, a deed of love, as we discern in the very word λαμβάνειν. We are therefore referred to the other contrast, since the ὅλος cannot possibly be meaningless in the text. Is then the ὅλον ἄνθρωπον (*a* or *the* whole man, the latter being doubtless intended as furnishing an example for the general position) to be taken as the opposite of the ἓν μέλος which was cut off, as Tholuck, Hess, Winer, and others think.[1] We protest once more against this, and this time *with* Kling, for that would be too external, Rabbinical, and petty a manner of speaking with respect to the sacred act "which did not purify one member only, but

[1] Circumcisio, quæ est in uno ex 248 membris hominis, pellit sabbatum, quanto magis totum corpus hominis. Tanchuma p. 244, 1.

consecrated the whole man." Are we then to give up all notion of a contrast, and regard it merely with von Gerlach as a juxtaposition of the two Sabbath works in their equal significance for the healing of the entire man?[1] This will not help us, for why then was the ὅλον only added in the second, and not in the first, instance? I see no alternative left but to accept the interpretation which Bengel and Olshausen represent, though it has been much controverted:—that the Lord now speaks in addition of the well-known, and striking *conversion* of the healed sinner; emphatically including this result (intended in all His dealings) in His *every whit whole* (ch. v. 11, 15). This altogether harmonizes with our exposition of ch. v. 6 and 14.[2] Thus it is—the *whole* essential *man*, body and soul! This must ever be the ultimate aim of all the good deeds of the Saviour; and it is quite worthy of Him, and quite appropriate to the general theme, that He should point to this His high end and aim in connection with that one miracle in which it had been attained. He thereby says, moreover, what would otherwise be wanting to their most perfect judgment of the matter (*οὐ κατ' ὄψιν*, ver. 24):—Is it of no moment to you that a soul has attained salvation before your eyes through My good deed; do ye not appreciate the making whole of the entire man—*that highest end to which the law, circumcision, the Sabbath, and all the institutions of God, for ever tend, as the design to which they for ever point?*

On the contrast which still remains with the preparatory circumcision which certainly referred also to the *healing of the soul*, Bengel speaks so excellently that we will transcribe his full observations: *Non* opponitur totum corpus hominis parti ei, quæ circumciditur; nam a minori ad majus non procedit consequentia, in permissione, *hoc modo:* licet circumcidere partem, ergo licet sanare totum. Sed totus homo est, corpore et animâ, cap. v. 14, cujus sanatio multo majus, multoque adeo magis sabbaticum et legi probatum est beneficium, quam circumcisionis actus externus

[1] Similarly Brandt's Schullehrerbibel:—His healing was at least as important a work as the circumcision of a child.

[2] This is not too subtle a meaning for the appreciation of the Jews (as Alford objects), but would be quite intelligible. Nor can we give up our conviction, that according to ch. v. 14 the full conversion of the healed man is intimated.

per se spectatus, *vel etiam* circumcisio, *etiamsi spectetur ut sacramentum ;* nam circumcisio est *medium*, sanatio animæ *finis*. We take the latter of these suppositions, for we have already rejected the actus externus per se spectatus. We do not say altogether with Olshausen (though not denying its relative truth) that circumcision related, like every thing in the Old Testament, only to the σάρξ. Still less can we concur with Baumgarten-Crusius, contrary to that profound estimation of the Old Testament which we must ever assume in our Lord's words, in understanding it to mean—ye circumcise that the law might not be abolished, in the external interest of a mere form![1] For our Lord neither thinks nor speaks in this disparaging way, of the νόμος and περιτομή. But—the circumcision imparts to the *child* (here, too, a preliminary allusion—not a ὅλος ἄνθρωπος), the reversion of the grace of God which will make him whole; the *typical* sign and promissory seal of future salvation, of that healing of the whole man in body and soul to which the foreskin stands opposed as the sign of our inherited sin and depravity; but what I have done and effected by so doing, is the realisation and fulfilment of the typical sacrament. This may probably have been Augustine's meaning in his contrast of the signaculum salutis and salus itself.[2]

We have but little to say, after establishing this true and elevated meaning, concerning the external seeming violation of the Sabbath by *work* in each case. There may be some truth and force in what is urged as to this point—that while Jesus' healing was effected by a single word alone,[3] the whole work of circumcision, especially including the binding up and precautionary measures for healing, was attended with considerable labour. The Rabbinical rule, which is generally quoted incorrectly, runs thus : מִילָה וּרְפָאוּתָהּ דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. But with Lange and Klee (following Cyril) to refer the making whole to that (if it is permissible to care for the healing of a circumcised per-

[1] Ebrard approximates to this when he makes the contrast—*ritual observance* and *good deeds*.

[2] Baumgarten-Crusius does not quote specifically, and we cannot refer to the passage.

[3] The Lord's lowliness allowed Him not to say expressly—I spoke one word only, rise and be whole!

son)—is altogether a perversion, since the discourse is simply concerning *περιτέμνειν* and *περιτομὴν λαμβάνειν*.

Finally, we must decidedly reject the notion which Lange, referring to Winer's Wörterbuch, admits:—that Jesus here also contemplates the *primitive* purport of circumcision in its bodily medicinal use apart from its typical design, then drawing a parallel between it and His "making whole." No scriptural theologian will yield to Hezel's assertion, that the *first* and *immediate* design of circumcision was medicinal. Even Michaelis, whose Mosaisches Recht is usually quoted here, says at the outset most pertinently:—its *first* design, and that which God most expressly explained, was to be a sign of the covenant; and only afterwards does he diffidently intimate the possibility of a subordinate medicinal end, independent of this symbolical purpose. As Lange indeed goes on to say—the higher signification did not exclude the lower aim to make sanitary provision for the people's good. Let him think of it as he will! The opinion of the Jews, as Philo shows, went to the same point, though at most they only regarded it as a subordinate meaning of the divine purpose—and even then with less reference to physical purity than to the requirements of fruitfulness. These allusions, however, are so far removed from the obvious design of a discourse which is strictly popular, and which is merely adducing analogy from the plain fundamental principles of the law, that we hesitate not to deny them altogether. Our own exposition, which is, we hope, more in harmony with the dignity of our Lord, and more theocratical in its tone, will be found sufficient.

Ver. 24. This simple sentence scarcely needs a word. *Κατ' ὄψιν* is, as Wetstein has shown, good Greek; and it *may* correspond with the Heb. לְפָנִים and פָּנִים נָשָׂא. We incline to prefer the latter (in the place of לְמַרְאֵה עַיִן), since the words refer not merely to the appearance of the thing condemned, but (and this marks the *progress* of the appended thought), to the hated *Person* in whom it is condemned. It cannot, indeed, be proved that *ὄψις* may thus simply stand for *πρόσωπον*. In any case the Lord refers to such passages as Deut. i. 16, 17 (where *πρόσωπον*)—then Isa. xi. 3, (where *κατὰ τὴν δόξαν*)—finally Zech. vii. 9, *κρίμα δίκαιον κρίνετε*. The article in *τὴν δικαίαν*

κρίσιν[1] expresses very plainly such a comprehensive reference to the precept of their neglected νόμος which commanded in vain a righteous judgment.

The *third* discourse of our Lord, following the others in continuous progression, was occasioned by another interruption and colloquy of the people among themselves: emboldened by His public appearance and testimony, they raise more undisguisedly and more sincerely than in their previous γογγυσμὸς the great question *whether He was the Christ or not.* Since, however, no really right motive impels them to this, but He is constrained rather to declare that *they both know Him* and whence He is,—He must continue to utter His testimony against their perverse rejection of His divine mission as the result of that unbelief which judged κατ' ὄψιν.

The people previously had refused to allow that any one was seeking to kill Him, and those who spoke might not have known thereof; but now, when He has brought to their minds the much condemned Sabbath-miracle, certain inhabitants of *Jerusalem* bethink themselves—yea, this is He whom our Rulers have since that time been plotting against! (We perceive that Jesus was far from being known personally to all; many beheld and heard Him for the first time in this feast. His bold and fearless public speaking in the temple, which no man dared to prevent even by the protest of a λέγειν, certainly not by any intervention of force, extorted from this people the bold question—whether He were actually the Messiah! This sounds at first more than the previous timid attribution of ἀγαθός, but it is nevertheless a lower tribute, and bespeaks a less worthy feeling as its source. For they are under a wretched restraint; their own knowledge is made dependent upon the question whether *the rulers* in very deed knew and acknowledged Him. Miserable people bound down to this slavish subjection, how far are they from that independent conviction, which the Saviour had promised to every

[1] Braune makes the refined remark that probably Nicodemus afterwards, ver. 51, referred to this word, which he had heard and laid up in his heart.

sincere soul! How strangely in contrast with His γνώσεται, ver. 17, is the inquiry—μήποτε ἀληθῶς ἔγνωσαν; still worse—no sooner have they put forth their very bold, and almost ironical question, than they are abashed at their own temerity, and would atone for their curiosity by retractation. They will be guided in all things by their rulers; and give their own judgment in submissive conformity. They change their note—"Yet how could this be? The Christ when he appears will come in mystery, and his origin be unknown: but we know all about this man, his origin, father and mother!" Thus we see that their seeming previous ignorance of Jesus, who in ver. 25 is first recalled to their minds in connection with the recent miracle, was not the pure truth: they know this man, whom they so slightingly treat in His presence with οὗτος and τοῦτον, in *their* way very well; and this must come to light yet more and more. The whole proceedings betray nothing but insincerity on their part, and the utter want of all keen and penetrating earnestness of spirit. As inhabitants of Jerusalem, who hang upon the lips of their rulers, they have the watchward ready—οἴδαμεν; as proud dwellers in the capital they look down with supreme contempt upon His Galilæan origin (comp. ver. 52); yea they have, over and above, a little confused semblance of learning to bring to light. It is probable—for the positive πόθεν ἐστίν in their antithesis almost intimates as much—that they know by name father and mother, as they in Capernaum did, ch. vi. 42; but they *think* they know the birth-place, and suspect nothing about Bethlehem, see afterwards vers. 41, 42. Suffice that whatever they know tends only to confirm the unbelief of their hearts. Their half-knowledge on both sides, both as to this Jesus and their expected Messiah, like all half-knowledge, does nothing but confuse and lead them astray. We have, as Lücke rightly observed—no perfect and reliable account of the opinions of the learned *in that age*, and still less of the popular notions, concerning the Messiah; and it is therefore a hopeless task to attempt to illuminate by Rabbinical erudition what must be left in obscurity. We see, indeed, that many afterwards admit the Galilæan to be the Messiah, while the chief men, again, in direct contradiction to 2 Kings xiv. 25, and Nah. i. 1, know nothing of a prophet rising in Galilee, nor think of the Messiah in connection

with Is. ix. 1, 2.[1] Thus much seems to be clear, that they have a certain indefinite, distorted notion of the higher, miraculous origin of the Messiah; and oppose this to the notorious human origin, as they suppose, of Jesus.

In general this chapter exhibits to us a strange mixture of contradictory demands, opinions, expectations, frames of mind, and tendencies; the desire to know without any accompanying intelligence, secret hate and secret fear in strange counterpoise and conflict, agitating the minds of all. But in the midst of all He stands who is the Light of the world, uttering His luminous words, with an answer, ever new yet ever the same, for the contradiction of all! Thus it is now for the third time.

Ver. 28. With profound sorrow in His inmost heart, but yet for the truth's sake with unavoidable *irony*, He concedes to them their miserable *οἴδαμεν*; He, however, as meekly as perseveringly, repeats the unwearied *οἶδα* of His own testimony, that He is from the Father. Their colloquy concerning Himself in His presence has become so tumultuous that He is constrained, contrary to His wont, to gain a hearing by crying aloud into the midst of the multitude; but the Evangelist carefully appends his own *διδάσκων*, in order that we may not misinterpret this *κράζειν* as the unseemly utterance of injured feeling or passionate zeal. Many would regard the first clause as a *question*, that so the irony may be obviated, which Richter regards as beneath the dignity of Christ.[2] But our exposition has detected and justified so much that is ironical, such passages as Matt. xxiii. 31, to wit, that we find no need of any such evasion, even if it did, as it does not, harmonize with the *κἀμέ* at the commencement. Nor can we any more understand the direct sentence as an actual admission that they were rightly acquainted even with His human origin, and in a certain sense knew Him and His *πόθεν* (as Lücke, v. Gerlach, Richter, and others think)—for in ch. viii. 14, 19, He speaks quite otherwise. Such a concession in His question, condescending to their false point of view, appears to us much more unbecoming, than the mournful and lamenting

[1] It is taught even in the Sohar, that Messiah the King will manifest Himself in Galilee. In Gen. fol. 74, col. 3; and in Ex. fol. 3, col. 3.

[2] Bengel assures us—ironia nunquam usum invenias Dominum?

irony which Flaccius and Calvin, with many others, have discerned in the words—Yea, ye know Me, and from whence I am![1]

On the following clause, which contains other thoughts amply illustrated already, there arises only one question,—whether the ἀληθινός be on this occasion equivalent to the ἀληθής of ver. 18, or whether we must adhere to its general meaning in St John's phraseology. Grotius understood it to mean—It is My true, essential Father, who hath sent Me, which was contained in the πόθεν; but no one will defend such an interpretation. Tholuck —He is a real and essential God, not the imaginary God of your thoughts. Similarly Brandt—the true, living, and hidden God. And Olshausen thinks that here the ἀληθινὸς θεὸς, as He essentially is, is opposed to the imperfect, notional knowledge of Him which the Jews had. Lücke and Lange interpret it—My true *Sender*. But all this appears to us too artificial, not *popular* enough for this simple testimony to the people; and we would suggest, as a philological refinement, whether then the article should not have preceded. Comparing ch. viii. 26, xix. 35; Rev. iii. 7—14, xix. 11, we hesitate not to translate, with Erasmus—verax; for which many from the most ancient times till now have declared themselves. (Cyrill., Chrysost., Euthym., Theophyl., and among us Lampe, Baumgarten-Crusius, &c.) Kling very soundly develops the thought that as it is deceitfulness which would be contrasted in the arbitrary and presumptuous ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ, consequently the antithesis would require a mission from one who was true. But this truth arrogated for God is not to be understood in the sense of Nonnus' addition—εἵνεκα πομπῆς; or as Cocceius and others interpret it of the fulfilment of the promises through the mission of Christ, for this is quite foreign to the present subject. That which follows shews us the right method:—because *they* know not the true God, know not His truth, or Him in and according to His truth, *therefore* they also know not Him whom this true God had sent. Thus we have the same testimony which constantly recurs in various forms—He only who knows and acknowledges God in His already revealed truth, either will or can believe in Christ!

[1] Glassius unhesitatingly places this passage in his chapter of irony.

Quite parallel with this is ch. viii. 54, 55 once more. Thus the token of the Messiah which they insisted upon holds true, but also it is approved in their own case, and in a very different sense from theirs.

Ver. 29. This is the strongest, most simple, and concentrated, closing testimony of the whole discourse; coinciding with that of vers. 16, 17. It is of little significance whether or not δὲ is genuine; though without it the expression would be still more direct and positive, and its most direct assurance would be entirely safe from every contradiction. Before this οἶδα of the divine-human self-consciousness of Jesus, all the confused conflict concerning it which agitates the Christian world now as the Jewish then, must melt away. But His knowledge of God involves a *twofold* consciousness—which in this verse, as everywhere, we should be careful not to overlook or lightly pass over—His knowledge according to His eternal Sonship of a pre-existent εἶναι παρὰ θεοῦ (ch. viii. 58), and His knowledge of His being sent into the world as man, of His being come from the Father or from heaven. The former is a necessary pre-supposition for the latter, which is unimaginable without it. Hence here the παρ' αὐτοῦ εἰμι clearly responds first to the κἀμὲ οἴδατε; and then the κἀκεῖνός με ἀπέστειλεν to the πόθεν εἰμί.[1]

FURTHER WARNING TO THE UNBELIEVERS:—YET A LITTLE WHILE AM I WITH YOU!

(Ch. vii. 33, 34.)

The Evangelist paints by strong though delicate touches the historical process of the enmity which was excited against the Lord; he does not forget the human procedure in his contemplation of the hour and power of the divine counsel; and delineates the background of Christ's person and word with the

[1] Here, then, we have the correction and supply of de Wette's deficiency, who could contentedly declare, on ver. 28, that the Lord did not ascribe to Himself in opposition to them, *a supernatural origin*, but only a "*divine mission*." What apostle or prophet, with "divine mission," could ever say—I am of God!

pencil of a master, uniting art and nature, the most suggestive composition of the whole being blended with the plainest truthfulness of detail. In any other treatise than this of ours much might be written upon this subject, which would tend to reassure many in their confidence that the historiography of the Holy Ghost is a great truth, and the criticism of its modern enemies only a lie. Yet, in simply adhering to the *words* of Jesus, we are vindicating most strenuously the Gospel itself; since even here *they* shine forth as beams of light upon the dark background.

Ye know not God! Yet He hath sent Me to you! This simple and elevated declaration exerts a twofold influence:—some would have laid hold upon Him at once, if their daring had been equal to their will; many, on the other hand, begin to entertain something like faith in His plain and boldly repeated assurance. These latter reply to the objection which had been urged in ver. 27, by a bold question; the weakness and imperfection of their faith, however, is exhibited:—not so much by its avowal in the form only of question, as by its dependence (so contrary to the method prescribed in ver. 17) upon *miracles*, and those as valued by their *number*. At this point it is announced to the Pharisees, the ruling party in the council, by their spies, how matters are going in the temple, and what a tone of mind and feeling the bold words of Jesus had excited among the people. It is improbable that just at this festival-time they were holding a sitting in the לִשְׁכַּת הַגָּזִית; we should rather suppose that they met by concert in reference to this express occasion. Suffice that the first official mandate is now sent forth against Him; officers are sent to take Him in the temple. But the Lord goes tranquilly on to speak yet once and again, until His hour has come. The seventh chapter now sets before us specifically *two* more discourses, in which He warns the unbelieving against a neglect of the day of grace, invites believers to come and receive out of His fulness, which will then be opened up and stream forth in all its abundance when his enemies shall imagine that they have put Him away for ever. In both discourses He speaks of the same, ever more nearly approaching catastrophe of His δοξάζεσθαι. The αὐτοῖς of ver. 33 is rightly to be rejected, but even if it remained it would not

imply that what follows was spoken to the officers sent, but that the Lord spoke further to the mixed multitude composed of enemies and friends, yet with special reference to His enemies, and with reference to that measure which was not concealed from His knowledge.

Ver. 33. The Lord has an accurate knowledge of His own time, and therefore speaks thus definitely—ἔτι μικρὸν χρόνον. He attaches His words as He proceeds to the former τὸν πέμψαντά με; but now adds the ὑπαγειν, upon which Grotius pertinently remarks—renunciaturus legationem, quasi dicat, yidete, quomodo tractandus sit vobis legatus. I will render account unto God of the result of my embassage to you His rebels! Meanwhile, in connection with the warning against rejection and neglect which is here so prominent, there is manifest the same supplicating exhortation rather to believe, which is expressly added in chap. xii. 35, 36; while in chap. viii. 51 the full declaration recurs with yet more rigorous warning. Μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι speaks yet of offered mercy within the limits of the unexpired day of grace. They would and they will remove Him out of the way, put Him to death—but they will only thereby send Him back to the Father from whom He came; rather it is He himself who will freely and voluntarily *go* when His hour is come.

Ver. 34. And now He goes on to say—Just then, when ye shall think that ye have put Me away and destroyed Me from your midst, will ye first begin to seek Me, but then in vain. It is not as if He would intimate that when they might think they had seized Him, He would elude them. And can the ζητεῖν which He here predicts, be the same malicious and crafty ζητεῖν with which they now lay in wait for His life? (As Origen thought, and Grotius, with others among the moderns—your enmity will then touch Me no more.) Most assuredly not, for that is so obviously to be understood of itself, that He needed not to say it; the Lord makes reference to His own salvation and security against those men, but *their own* rejected and mocked salvation, as a comparison with ch. viii. 21 manifestly shows. Olshausen rightly remarks, against that very inappropriate view, that the οὐχ εὑρήσετε must correspond with the μεθ' ὑμῶν εἰμι; and that the distinctive ζητήσετέ με of ch. xiii. 33 leaves no doubt of the *good* sense in which the ζητεῖν here is to be under-

stood, as meaning to seek and long after with ardent desire. If, with Lücke, we regarded the whole saying as a mere formula of amplification applied by St John himself, in which the ζητεῖν is without any specific meaning,[1] our exposition would be simple enough; but we very much doubt the propriety of assuming any such difference between the essential utterances of our Lord and the Evangelist's style of reporting them. The right interpretation, as acknowledged by Tholuck in his later edition, and before him represented by Luther and Lampe, is very obvious and plain to the truly practical understanding: hence the annotated bibles (Berlen., Hirchb., Brandt, v. Gerlach, Richter) are all agreed upon it. Ye shall seek *me*, that is, as I truly am, and would now be to you, a Messiah, a Saviour from sin and misery—but after My rejection ye shall find none.[2] Lu. xvii. 22, 23 is strictly parallel. The fundamental idea is also the same with that of Prov. i. 21—28. If unbelief despises and neglects the time of offered mercy, there follows in righteous judgment the period of its hardening, in which strictly speaking it *can no longer seek* in a right sense, but bereft of faith and light grasps aimlessly nothing; and it is this perverse, never finding, hardened and ineffectual seeking of the Jews, continuing to this day, that our Lord here predicts. This is not merely "its prophetic undertone," as Lange thinks, but the most essential meaning of this word, besides which it has no other. Isa. viii. 21, 22, finds in this its consummate fulfilment, compare Amos. viii. 11, 12.

In the following clause an equal emphasis must be laid upon the οὐ δύνασθε, which testifies in general that man cannot by his own power penetrate whither Christ leads His believing people, into heaven where the Father is. This holds good in a milder sense for the disciples themselves tarrying behind for a while, ch. xiii. 33—36—on the other hand, however, our Lord

[1] So de Wette: "after the Hebrew manner the seeking here means only the not finding, the mere fact of not being present; with all your seeking ye *would* not find me." Grotius: "si me quæratis, non comparebo."

[2] Rauh: "because they would continue to seek in that Messiah what he never could be to them." Quite correct, apart from the strange connection which he would establish with the withdrawal after the miraculous feeding. (Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1850. S. 279).

promises to His servants and followers at the end—Where I am, there shall they also be! ch. xii. 26. Thus we have in a new parallel and in a new connection the ὅπου εἰμὶ ἐγώ of this passage, which is thus, and this has its force, the standing expression of our Lord. Thus we must not be led astray by the circumstance that in ch. viii. 21 and ch. xiii. 33 ὅπου ὑπάγω takes its place: for this gives another application only to the words, coinciding with the idea which is *here* also previously expressed by a preliminary ὑπάγω. We may not therefore read εἶμι here in this one place, contrary to the usage of the entire New Testament;[1] but adhere with the Syr., Vulg., and Luther to the εἰμί, in connection with which we would with Euthym. supply τότε.[2] Where I *then am*, where I *shall be* after My departure, which through your rejection will be to you an entire and absolute going away—ye shall not be able to come, with all your half penitent, half persistently perverted seeking and endeavour. And has not this been fulfilled in Israel even to the present day? Yet not only in Israel, but in all who pass by and neglect the Lord's word in ch. xiv. 6; yea even to the faithful who have found and possess Him in their hearts, it remains true, that they also must wait upon the earth until He shall come and fetch them home where Himself is.

Pfenninger represents his excellent Zephonias as writing to Severus concerning the discourses of this chapter thus: "Thou seest what eternal contradictions are here—or, I would say, seem to be here. Now the people will make Him their King, and He eludes them and departs from them. Now He declares Himself to be the Messiah, and to have come down from heaven; then again He represents Himself as suddenly going away. Now they are laying snares for His life, and He removes Himself

[1] As in some MSS. which Schöttgen's Lex. accepts; as Nonnus, translating ὀδεύσω; as Theophyl. expresses it, though probably in an inexact quotation; as the Ethiop., Copt., and Arab. versions read. H. Stephan., Casaub., Ludov. de Dieu, and Beza prefer this reading also; and, finally, Bengel himself decides for it, on account of the parallel ὑπάγω, adducing two passages from the Sept. and some from classical authors to establish the prosaic propriety of εἶμι.

[2] That is, supply it in exposition; in which, nevertheless, as the Lord then spake, the emphasis of the essential present is significant (which Alford erroneously regards me as forgetting).

as one afraid; then He puts forth in the temple, and in the very neighbourhood of the council-chamber of His foes, the boldest pretensions, knows Himself to be in jeopardy yet remains standing there, no man daring to lay hands on Him. Ah, who shall solve all these mysteries to me, O Severus!" This is a good representation of the state of things preceding His δοξάζεσθαι. But when after the ἐδοξάσθη the solution of the mystery is missed by so many who behold it, what shall we say of *their* unbelief? What shall we say to that criticism, which takes offence at and scorns the "Johannæan Christ," even as His enemies did then? Let us mark, however, with reverence, with what sublime elevation this Christ with all His "contradictions" stands before us for the contemplation of all who truly believe on Him!

Among the Jews of that time, as St John records, all else was absorbed in bitter mockery, for they had no apprehension whatever of a "going to the Father." Whither then will His journey be, that we should not reach Him? *They* think perversely of their ζητεῖν as His enemies, and say in their hearts (as Teschendorff paraphrases)—In Palestine there are no ways not open to us! But—will he go into *other lands?* For it is evident that *place* and not people is here intended, as the residence of their people was the great point in all their notions of geography; and the expression διασπορὰ των Ἑλλήνων,[1] is not the same with the διασπαρέντες themselves. Those who (like Hezel) interpret the words simply—to the dispersed Jews, *or even* to the Gentiles; take away their critical point and force.[2] Their mockery takes this turn at once:—will he, since his pretensions succeed not with *us*, carry them to the *Gentiles* (Syr. לְחַנְפֵּא impios)? Thither we should not follow Him, indeed![3] It must remain matter of doubt whether they speak thus as having marked his promises even to the heathen;[4] thus much is cer-

[1] As Salmas. rightly perceived; and the Peschito has בְּנֵי.

[2] It is altogether erroneous to understand the Hellenists in both places, as Meyer and Baumgarten-Crusius do (after Calv., Scalig., Lightf., Hammond), for they are never termed Ἕλληνες. In the New Testament Ἕλληνες are invariably the Gentiles as opposed to Jews.

[3] Ver. 36 then only means—or if we do not thus understand him aright, what does he say or mean in his unintelligible words?

[4] Neander thinks it "a point worthy of note, that their anxiety to make him a heretic was founded upon a dawning *presentiment*, excited

tain, that the Evangelist gives us this saying as an unconscious prediction of these Jews, in which they are forced to utter their own condemnation.[1]

INVITATION TO BELIEVERS: PROMISE OF THE STREAMS OF LIVING WATER.

(Ch. vii. 37, 38.)

Ver. 14 began with the middle of the feast, and the connection is clear down to ver. 31. About ver. 32 we may go on to a following day, but not yet the last, of the feast. The officers (whose return ver. 45 may retrospectively refer to a former day, but possibly may not) have not laid hands on the Lord—some had mocked against Him, others had murmured for Him, and there it rested. The Lord now on the last and most festal day of the feast pronounces His great promise—obscure to those who heard it—and the notification of the particular feast-day gives us an unmistakable intimation that, besides the *Scripture* which was appealed to, there was in His words a reference to the customs of the feast which might lead to a correct understanding of their meaning. Else why was this definite statement of the time inserted? That was sufficient for Jewish readers; and as it regards futurity it pleased the Holy Spirit to leave something for Christian investigation. And that investigation has almost universally determined that our Lord spoke thus strikingly of the streams of living water, because a symbolical ceremonial of pouring out water belonged to the feast of tabernacles, and has just preceded His words. We have, moreover, the entire Tract. Succa in the Babylonish Talmud expressly devoted to this feast, and Dachs and Cramer have profusely illustrated it from rabbinical materials.

The feast of Tabernacles had degenerated in the lapse of time

by many of Christ's intimations, that His teaching was destined to be universal.

[1] Rauh: "We cannot but hear now, as in the similarly ignorant prophetical word of Caiaphas, even in the midst of their malicious mockery, a truth which annihilates the mockers themselves."

into a tumultuous harvest-rejoicing which closed the feasts of the year in carnal merriment after the solemn day of atonement: its symbolical meaning had been fancifully carried out, and overlaid with many customs which destroyed its true intention. This went so far that heathens, such as Plutarch (Symposiac. lib. iv. quæst. 5, with a marvellous array of evidence; compare, however, the contradiction in Tacitus hist. lib. v. cap. 5) could discern in this *θυρσοφορία* and *κρατηροφορία* of the Jews a Bacchic festivity. The *κρατηροφορία* of Plutarch gives at any rate a sure testimony concerning the custom of that time, as reported by the Rabbies and called by them שִׂמְחַת בֵּית הַשּׁוֹאֲבָה (Joy of the drawing water), and concerning which they said:—he who has not seen this rejoicing, has never seen yet what true joy is. For on each of the seven days, early after the morning sacrifice, a priest drew water with a golden pitcher from the fountain of Siloah at the foot of Mount Zion.[1] This was borne in pompous procession and jubilant music[2] through the water-gate into the Temple, and poured out on the western side of the altar of burnt-offering. There was no wine mixed with it (as Lundius and others say); but wine and water unmixed and in separate silver vessels accompanied. Nor was "part of it drunk," as Hess without any genuine authority asserts, but the water was poured into a pipe conduit which carried it below out of the mountain again. Spencer (de Legg. Hebr. rit. iv. 2) and Lakemacher (Obss. phil. 1 pag. 18), derive this usage with very great improbability from the heathen libations; for we find as early as 1 Sam. vii. 6, comp. 2 Sam. xxiii. 16, something of the same kind, and points of union with Old Testament symbolism generally are not wanting in this matter.

Whether this שׁוֹאֲבָה took place on the eighth day, as Lundius and others say, is, to say the least, doubtful: see Lücke in his commentary. We find it, indeed, mentioned in Tract. Succa, though only as the unallowed and solitary opinion of Rabbi Juda Hakkadosch, that it was done every day of the eight. The eighth day was originally only a kind of after-feast,

[1] According to Jerome on Isaiah, *not* of Mount Moriah—see Winer to v. Raumer.

[2] Hence Nonnus speaks of *χοροστὰς ἑορτή*.

as the last feast day of the year. According to Numb. xxix. 12—38, the number of the sacrifices diminished gradually through the seven feast-days from thirteen to seven bullocks, making altogether seventy; and on the eighth an additional bullock was offered. Yet on this day, also, there should be an עֲצֶרֶת, which much-contested word is interpreted by the LXX. ἐξόδιον, by the Vulg. collecta, by Luther Versammlung; Jun. and Tremellius, and Michaelis Suppl. interdictum (scil. laboris); but the Rabbis explain it as the end of the feast, or (as if עֲצֵרָה, cohibitio, detentio) as the holding on of the expiring feast, and detention of those who celebrated it.[1] This last harmonizes with the assertion of Gesenius, and with the interpretation, to us most probable, πανήγυρις. It is, however, certain, that in process of time the eighth day attained a distinctive and pre-eminent significance. It was said that the seventy bullocks were offered for the seventy nations of the earth (a traditional hint of the prophetical symbolism of the feast of Tabernacles, not to be despised): but now on the eighth day the Lord invited His own people *Israel* to special and confidential joy.

On which day was it that Christ spoke the words now before us, or which does St John signifiy by the ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ μεγάλῃ?—The ancients[2] decide for the seventh, which was called on account of the Hallel seven times sung, הוֹשַׁעְנָא רַבָּא: and on which, according to the fable of the Rabbis, God determined how much rain should fall during the year. But of late nearly all critics, following Lampe, decide for the eighth. We prefer the latter view, though very little is affected by it, and certainty is not attainable. But not the latter view because of what is said in ver. 53, that every man went unto his own house, and consequently no longer to the tabernacles: for this verse, or at least the day referred to in it, is itself very uncertain, since ver. 45 may introduce a subsequent event. But because St John cannot be regarded as speaking with legal exactness in the word ἑορτή, in which he rather embraces popularly the whole of the festivities; and the name applied in

[1] Abarbanel: ויעצרו לשבת בירושלים גם אותו היום see Buxtorf. Syn. cap. 21.

[2] Buxtorf, Lightfoot, Cocceius, Vitringa fil., Reland, &c.

Tr. Succa to the eighth day, which was equally kept sacred—יוֹם טוֹב הָאַחֲרוֹן שֶׁל חַג seems to suit the description of the Evangelist better than that הוֹשַׁעְנָא רַבָּא. Still, it is not exactly as Lücke puts it, that we must either accept R. Juda's single authority as to the pouring out of the water on the eighth day, or, supposing that Jesus spake on that day, renounce any allusion in His words to the preceding seven days' שׁוּאָבָה. We hold with Lange on this point, that there is more fitness in supposing the circumstance over before its signification is pointed out. But we demur to the ingenious explanations which, without any Rabbinical traces, he inlays into his exposition; such as that the temple-mountain having no spring of its own was typical of the insufficiency of this temple-service; and that the outlying and oft-despised fountain of Siloam, Isa. viii. 6, was therefore a symbol of the prophetical Spirit; that on the close of the eighth day, and after the drawing of water was concluded, the *sense of deficiency*, calling to mind the promised issuing of waters from the temple itself (Ezek. xlvii.) took possession of people's minds, and that our Lord founded upon such feeling His promise. All this is very beautiful, but it is too far-fetched and uncertain a foundation for the Lord's words, which need no such elaborate introduction.

Thus much, however, is historically certain (if the Talmud is to have any authority for the time of Christ) that in connection with the drawing of water, prayer was offered for rain at the seed-time; that not only was the great Hallel sung, with its close of most important though oft unrecognised Messianic prophecy (Ps. cxiii., cxviii.), but also, in all probability, Isa. xii. 3, a passage which in many ways has been referred to this feast. Further, as the tents brought the journey through the wilderness plainly before the mind, so the remembrance of the water miraculously supplied would not fail to be understood. Finally, and it deserves careful notice, the Rabbins, amid much other fanciful reference, have expressly referred this water to the *outpouring of the Holy Ghost*.[1] On the whole, St John's reference of

[1] Maimonides quotes this as an ancient opinion. Compare also the passage in Sepp iii. 57, "They draw up the Holy Ghost in that water."

this cry of our Lord to the feast as apprehended in its joyful close, is plain enough: it suits very well the prominence previously given to the *law*, and the *light* subsequently mentioned ch. viii. 12, to which there was also something analogous in the usages of the festival. It is in the great condescension of His love that the Lord does not disdain to base His words upon the true meaning of a ceremonial self-chosen, and of divine service which Israel offered to God in carnal and thankless festivity.

That which He had earlier spoken by the still well of Jacob in Samaria, He now publicly announces to all Israel on the great feast-day. It is the same long-forbearing invitation with which His new revelation closes in Rev. xxii. 17. *If any man* thirst—this is His unwearied cry of solicitation—and were there not some who yielded themselves to its influence? The less effect His word had upon those who heard its dying echoes then, the more evident is its reference to futurity, the more plain its prophetic impress for time to come. And if He perceives in the usages of human invention the foundation of a prophetical meaning, it must evidently be through tracing it up to congenial truth in the sacred canon—hence we see the plain necessity for the following *καθὼς εἶπεν ἡ γραφή*.

But where do we find in Scripture that of which the Lord now speaks. It is not a literal quotation; and it was a very narrow though well-meaning notion of old time that it was to be referred to some lost or *Apocryphal* book,[1] though Bleek to our astonishment has revived it. (Whiston speaks of a lost passage.) It is an intolerable sophistry, and declines the question altogether, to take *εἶπε* in this place in significatione jubendi.[2] Not much better is the opinion of Euthym., Chrys., Cyrill., and Theophyl., who allow the citation, but refer back to passages in Scripture which speak of *faith*.[3] We feel that the very point, and distinc-

[1] For it not only merely did not consist with "our Lord's wisdom as a teacher to use any other than the Canonical medium" (Lücke)—but there is a real ground of distinction between the Canon and the Apocrypha.

[2] Heinsius in Arist. Sacr. p. 406. Fresenius Predd. herausg. von v. Meyer, S. 449. Yet Fikenscher revives this—"He who *believes* in me, with such faith as the Holy Scriptures require, and not such as the lying lips of men proclaim it."

[3] Surenhusen will have the saying to refer both to what preceded

tive force of the sentence is in ποταμοὶ ῥεύσουσιν ὕδατος, and that this must be found in Scripture. But where?

According to our conviction, which is based upon the fact that the New Testament citations are never to be held as merely general, such promises and invitations as we find in the prophesies of Isaiah are not quite sufficient to meet the case, although, as we shall see, they may converge into a general citation. Such are Isa. lv. 1 (Ho every one that *thirsteth*, come ye to the waters!); chap. xliii. 20 (I give waters in the wilderness, and *rivers* in the desert, to give *drink* to my people, my chosen!); chap. xliv. 3 (I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground!) Still less applicable is the fountain opened for sin and for uncleanness in Zech. xiii. 1, which is for washing and not for drinking; or the womb of the morning, Ps. cx. 3, which Reichel, the expositor of Isaiah, brings forward,—see upon chap. lv. 1. Although the former places of Isaiah aptly enough speak of drinking and flowing waters, we find wanting some γραφή from which might have been taken the ῥεύσουσι and if possible also ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας αὐτοῦ; indeed we should desire it to stand in some relation to the festal drawing. And we are met by that significantly repeated prophetic promise of a fountain and stream which should in the Messianic future flow from Jerusalem, from the holy mountain, or properly from the temple itself—in Joel iii. 18, Zech. xiv. 8 (where it is expressly יֵצְאוּ מַיִם־חַיִּים), and particularly Ezek. xlvii. 1—12 where the figure indeed changes its application, but in Rev. xxii. 1—17 is taken up again. Now that which is thus promised as a thing new and in the future to the *temple* (to which in the type the water must be brought with toil),[1] and in figurative allusion symbolizing the new spirit and life, might be most appropriately referred to by the Lord during this festival when the typical water was

and what follows. Rus defends the first connection of καθώς with πιστεύων.

[1] For it is hard to believe what has been said concerning the secret water-treasures of the mountain on which the temple was built (see, *e.g.*, v. Raumer's Palästina who even brings the above prophecies into connection with them). Sepp, indeed, has much to relate about them, ii. 208. But afterwards in Vol. iii. 53 he has forgotten that, and contradicts himself by the true assertion that there was no fountain of living water in connection with the old temple.

being fetched up from the valley to the temple. But who and what is in the consummation the new temple, the new Jerusalem become one great Sanctuary? We say rightly indeed—the *church* of the Lord, particularly regarded in the final perfection; to which the prophetic words point forward.[1] But only in the church as a whole, as far as the Lord Himself fills and pervades His church, and pours forth from her the streams of his unexhausted blessing:[2] the same cannot possibly be attributed to *every individual* πιστεύων as such (though the Lord uses this language expressly), as we shall hereafter see more at large. On the other hand it is Christ, in His own most sacred person, yea, according to Jno. ii. 21 His *body*, which is the true *temple* of God (let this be carefully observed at the outset!) consequently He may rightly be regarded as referring to *Himself*, even as He proceeds—if any man thirst let him come *unto Me* and drink. Are we not to be quite prepared to hear Him go on—from *Me* flow forth the promised streams of living water! In effect we can only thus understand the αὐτοῦ, and thus find a citation which collects together in one many several passages of the Old Testament:—these Scriptures all speak of Me![3]

But, in order to this, we must receive a *punctuation* of the passage, which is opposed to nearly all ancient and modern exposition, but which, as often as we recur to it, appears to us more and more certainly to be the only correct one. It is, indeed, not quite unknown to the learned, though by them little esteemed; it seems particularly (and this *to us* only serves as a recommendation) to have enforced itself in the domain of *practical* understanding, and in quarters independent of each other. This is reason enough, if it can be established, to oppose it to a univer-

[1] We do not deny, indeed, that in the last days (Isa. ii. 2, 3) this prophecy will have a more literal fulfilment. The Lord thought also of the Jerusalem which should bless the earth in that far-distant futurity, while He looked upon the then Jerusalem before Him: but He fixes our thoughts upon the more near and obvious meaning for the immediate future.

[2] Even this must not be so pressed, in the style of Schleiermacher, as to substitute the Church for the Lord! (Schleier. Homil. über. John ii. 51.)

[3] The Peschito has, instead of ἡ γραφή, the plural כְּתָבָא.

sal learned tradition. Let the passage be thus disposed :—*Ἐάν τις διψᾷ, ἐρχέσθω πρός με, καὶ πινέτω ὁ πιστεύων εἰς ἐμέ· καθὼς εἶπεν ἡ γραφὴ· ποταμοὶ κ.τ.λ.* And let him drink thereof who believeth on Me! as the Scripture (concerning Me) promises, &c. This is far from being, as Lücke says, no more than a mere proposal of Bolten. Bengel is disposed at first to regard this nova interpunctis as plausibilio, but afterwards considers it as harsher than the received one; we cannot think it, however, at all more harsh than the Nominative absolute with the interjected *καθὼς εἶπεν.*[1] The Berlenb. Bibel refers to "many" who thus read. Reitz, in his notes to Goodwin's Moses et Aaron (5th Edit. pag. 294) proposes this as the resolution of every difficulty. The Strassburg edition of the New Testament of 1524 has this punctuation. J. J. Rambach has developed it in a very convincing manner in a Whitsuntide sermon upon this text,[2] which, though bearing marks of deference to the prevalent taste of the age, is very vigorous. He further quotes for this view Triller, Untersuchung etlicher Oerter des N. T. i. 344; A. H. Francke's Pfingstprogramm von 1724; and J. E. Pfeiffer's Dissertation. Thus this exposition has not been without its favourers and advocates. Even Heumann adopted it at an earlier period, though he subsequently laid it aside again. Roos quietly expounds it in the same way as far as the *sense* is concerned, without any polemical object or any defence of its grounds: he obtains the same meaning by another construction and ellipse, in itself, however, open to the objection of being artificial:—"He who believeth in Me, *will find me to be* what the Scripture has

[1] Alford has recently protested against this, expresses his surprise that any one accustomed to the style of our Evangelist could for a moment suppose this construction possible, and characterises *καὶ πινέτω ὁ πιστεύων* as harsh beyond all example. After having renewed our investigations into the connection of the whole passage, we find the language and the meaning of this reading so imperatively required, that we are still constrained to the acceptance of a phraseology—nor is this without example—which is certainly singular. But it would be better to refute the strong grounds of our opinion, instead of adhering so tenaciously to the one objection of a harsh and strange phrase. We shall give further on our *reasons* for placing *πινέτω* at the beginning of the sentence, which makes, as we think, everything clear!

[2] See his Auserlesene heilsame Worte des Herrn Jesu. ii. Theil Jena 1731. S. 75. "Jesus als die Quelle der lebendigen Wasser."

said *concerning the Messiah.*" Die Lehre Jesu Christi, neue Aufl. S. 12, 118, where, in connection with this we find, S. 119, the thought hazarded that the Saviour would teach the Jews how to understand aright the meaning of the word *Messiah*— He, from whom the Spirit proceeds. But whenever the learned commentators have occasion to mention this exposition, however obtained, of the *αὐτοῦ*, it is rejected immediately with some peremptory note of unsuitableness, without any attempt to prove the assertion.[1] I shall give my reasons *in its favour;* reasons which will have their force in proportion as my readers are disposed to deal faithfully and rigorously with the clear sayings of the Holy Word.

1. The *Scripture* declares invariably no other than that the Lord himself will give the living water, and refresh His people with it: that from Him or (which is essentially the same) from His Temple (house, seat, congregation, body) the *ποταμοὶ* flow.[2] Hence Bengel's keen penetration into the Scripture cannot avoid referring the *αὐτοῦ* to the Messiah *(hic est fons*, ex cujus abundanti fluxu *fideles accipiunt);* but then he goes on to say:— Credens *comparatur* cum ipso Domino credentium, de quo agit promissis. Now this comparari is to our own mind exceedingly *unbiblical;* and it is a remarkable circumstance that greater exception has never been taken against a phraseology which would be without a parallel anywhere else in all the Scripture.[3]

[1] Nösselt (Opusc. iii.) institutes a false comparison with ch. xiv. 12, and would refute the above construction very summarily by saying that it is contrary to the context and to Greek usage—which says nothing. His inane interpretation of *doctrine* may indeed be said to be contrary to the context and to Greek usage. Münchmeyer thinks my exposition (not *mine*, however, distinctively) *harsh* in spite of its plausibility; but that is matter of taste. But when he lays stress upon the assertion that the receiving of the Holy Ghost is never exhibited by the figure drinking, one can hardly believe his own eyes. For is not this the case *here*, upon *any* supposition? Whence does the believer obtain those streams, ver. 38, but through the drinking of ver. 37, which again is substituted in ver. 39 by receiving?

[2] Even Sepp (iii. 53) is involuntarily driven to this most obvious thought, though without entering upon the exegetical problem: "Christ declares Himself to be the Temple of the New Covenant, *from which* the streams of living water flow *into* the heart of *every believer*, for the alleviation of all his thirst."

[3] Jul. Müller (Deutsche Zeitschrift 1850, 11) reposes calmly upon

For there is a very different meaning in the passages (which Nösselt also quotes) Jer. xxxi. 12; Isa. lviii. 11, wherein the souls of the redeemed are likened to a garden rich in water (properly, watered, רְוָיָה); or even Cant. iv. 15, where the bride (*i.e.* again the entire church!) is a well of living waters. Passages such as Prov. xvi. 22, xviii. 4, (which have also been alleged) employ a phraseology which is outside our present range, beyond the *prophetical* circle with which we here have to do. We found occasion to remark upon Jno. iv. 14 that it is not he who drinks that is said to become a spring, but only the water within him; the discourse there was not concerning any streaming forth upon others. Could the passage Isa. xii. 3 (to which the Lord must have referred in His mind) understand in מַעְיְנֵי הַיְשׁוּעָה —believers?? According to the usual reading He must almost necessarily have so interpreted it; yet in Rev. vii. 17 His Spirit explains it otherwise, speaking only, even in the fulness of consummation, of their being led to fountains of water. In Rev. xxi. 6 the Lord only gives to him that is athirst, of the fountain of the water of life which is His, which indeed is Himself; and in Rev. xxii. 1 the final stream proceedeth, as we might have expected, out of the throne of God and of the Lamb, but not from the Blessed themselves. And shall we *here* assume *streams* to flow from every individual *believer?* In the light of this general view of the analogy of Scripture, the words of our Lord and His quotation, cannot to our minds be reconciled with the current interpretation attached to them.

2. But now, on the other hand, the κοιλία which is too often overlooked, throws another critical element into the question. What does this signify in this place? It has been very generally assumed, and expositors have cried out with one common consent, that κοιλία like the Heb. בֶּטֶן or מֵעִים, is sometimes put for the inward parts, and so far the heart or the soul. This ob-

"this immeasurably great and blessed promise" given even to the "least" of believers, and seeks in it as an undertone the general truth, that the operation of the Spirit of Christ uses as its instrument the influence which men exert upon one another. This latter point may be admitted, so far as it goes; but *here* much more is said than merely that!

servation is very ancient,[1] and is continually applied without examination or challenge to this passage. In Wahl's Lexicon it stands—ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας αὐτοῦ *i. q.* ἐξ αὐτοῦ. Wesley interprets —his inmost soul. Van Ess translates—aus dessen Innerstem! from his inmost being. This application of the phrase may be conceded in many Old Test. passages,[2] although in none of them could קֶרֶב or נֶפֶשׁ be substituted simply. Let us look carefully, for example, at the distinction in Prov. xx. 27, where our modern Magnetism might point us to a right understanding of the חַדְרֵי־בֶטֶן. Compare again the same antithesis in Ps. xxxi. 10—נֶפֶשׁ in itself, and the corporeity penetrated by it. Even in such passages as Prov. xxii. 18 (of which there are scarcely any other) there is a similar reference. But how can we understand such a phraseology to be used in the New Testament without any occasion—*so material a figurative expression for the soul or inmost personality?*[3] This is the greatest difficulty of the common exposition, though it is generally passed over very lightly. Hence the various endeavours to find points of connection for it.[4] First it is sought, and rightly, in things from which water issues, and on which the comparison here certainly rests. But the belly of the urn or amphora with which the water was drawn is certainly inapplicable to the case; though

[1] On a very inappropriate passage, Job xv. 35, and disturbing the entire *figure*, Olympiodorus says—κοιλίαν ὅλον τὸ ἐντὸς χωρίον φησί, καὶ αὐτὴν ψυχήν. Gregor. Magn. fables:—quia, sicut *proles* in utero concipitur, sic cogitatio in *mente* generatur, et sicut in ventre *cibi*, ita continentur in mente cogitationes.

[2] Only let the quotations be cautious; and not, for example, Ecclus. xix. 12, where the bodily figure is plain enough, as is the allusion to Elihu's words; or Job xxxii. 18 itself! It is true that in Ps. xl 9, בְּתוֹךְ מֵעָי appears to be almost equivalent to בְּלִבִּי—though we would not decide so quickly upon this point as Beck does (Bibl. Seelenlehre, S. 65), but think there is something distinctive in that passage.

[3] For all are willing enough to substitute "personality," even of those who cling to the old interpretation—comp. *e.g.* Nitzsch prakt. Theol. i. 172.

[4] From a feeling that it is insufficient in itself, and cannot stand alone. Hence we find Nösselt saying—"κοιλία is either, *i.q.* animus, like מֵעִים, or (if this is not enough)—*pars pro toto homine!*"

Surrenhus. and Schottgen, with Bengel, and Richter, following the Hirschb. Bibel adopted this view: for so petty a reference weakens the abounding idea of the ποταμοί. Therefore Hezel preferred the "*reservoir* of a spring." Gieseler comes nearer the mark (Stud. u. Krit. 1829 i. S. 138), when he elucidates it by ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας τοῦ ὄρους; von Gerlach follows him, and Olshausen should not think this too far-fetched, for, as the water which was drawn and poured out flowed through canals out of the mountain again, just so, according to the Scripture, should one day the water of life flow forth from the living temple.[1] Indeed, we do not altogether reject the reference supposed by Döpke[2] to the *rock* in the wilderness which gave forth water (which at the feast of Tabernacles would be obvious enough); inasmuch as in typical intimations like this the various types hint at each other and are blended together. Following this view v. Gerlach and v. Meyer cite 1 Cor. x. 4. But Döpke perceives more clearly than these others that that allusion would tend to strengthen the interpretation which refers the passage to *Christ Himself*. Suffice that the expression does assuredly contain "a reference to *corporeity*," to an actual receptacle in which the waters are contained and *from which* they come, in direct contradiction to Klee's arbitrary and bold assertion, that κοιλία is descriptive of that which is profoundly hidden and internal, in the very depths of the nature of spirit!! That which encloses and contains the water in the type, is, according to the Scripture, the temple and its mountain; which again must be regarded as that which the rock was in the wilderness—and in its fulfilment—?

3. But this corporeity, thus understood, is not to be regarded as the entire human personality of *every believer*, as the αὐτοῦ here distinctly individualises him! This would not indeed be *as* the Scripture hath said, but *against* its constant testimony where the streams of living water are spoken of. Even if we could re-

[1] The fountain of Siloah, of which Olshausen thinks, did not spring from the temple-mountain, as we said above; and it has no applicability *here*, although chap. ix. 11 directs us to its significance as already existing in the Old Testament.

[2] S. 242, whom Hartmann follows—Enge Verbindung des A. T. mit dem Neuen, S. 641.

gard an apostle or any other mighty instrument or witness for God, as resembling Christ in being a source of spirit and life to others (though this is against the propriety of all Scripture, as we have seen)—yet even then we must shrink from asserting the same of every πιστεύων, who hast just come himself to drink of that living stream, and must ever continue to drink.[1] We maintain that the Lord could never have intended to say *that;* although many in all humility have so understood His words, without thinking of all the consequences of their interpretation. Augustine, for example, seems to feel the impropriety of representing the Holy Spirit as thus flowing from the believer, for he has chosen to extricate himself by reducing and enfeebling the meaning of the Evangelist's words :—Quid est fons et aqua viva? Benevolentia, qua vult consulere proximo? Baumgarten-Crusius takes away the essential spirit of the text when he interprets—"his soul will evermore derive from the depths of that fountain *refreshment* and *consolation!*" But is this exegesis? This may be something like the meaning of ch. iv. 14, but has nothing to do with this passage.

4. But now let us look at and understand *St John's authentic interpretation!* This spake He—*not* of the Spirit which His own, or His apostles particularly, should pour forth, or communicate again to others—but which they that believe should *receive from Him.* It is of no importance whether the ἅγιον, rejected by Grotius, Mill, Bengel, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, be genuine or not; and Lücke's scruple about the interpretation of the coming of the Spirit, springs from a view which does not scripturally understand either the ἔμελλον, or the οὔπω γὰρ ἦν, or the ἐδοξάσθη; and is consequently altogether ignorant of what St John and the entire New Testament mean by the Spirit first given by Jesus at the Pentecost. One is almost ashamed to point out to him that even the Old Testament speaks of the Spirit as water, and as water poured forth: Isa. xliv. 3 allows no hesitation on

[1] Lücke:—That at the moment of believing the streams of living water begin at once to flow!

[2] Least of all to the people then before Him, from whom He desires a first coming that they might believe on His word; and so that, according to the Scripture, the stream of life might flow forth for them to drink as believers.

that point. But the difference between the New Testament spirit and the preparatory spirit of the old covenant lies not merely in its greater fulness, nor even in its permanent indwelling; but that which proceeds from the glorified God-man, is on that account something specifically different and quite new, concerning which it might be said with perfect propriety before the glorification of Christ, "that it was not yet with us as a gift."[1] The *glorification* of the Lord is in truth not merely "the exhibition in all its clearness of the entire series of all His doctrines and miracles" (as Hezel says); but it is that perfect penetration by the Spirit, and that glorifying into divinity, of His human nature, His flesh and blood, which was the fruit of His whole work of self-humiliation and redemption, both as His own reward and for our salvation; and which ch. vi. so amply expounded. Or can we suppose that the Evangelist here knew nothing of this truly mystical idea? Here, where according to the simplest view of the whole passage, and giving it all its grammatical and historical due, he most evidently makes it dependent upon this δοξάζεσθαι that as the Lord Himself said according to the Scripture, the promised streams *should* hereafter flow from His *body*, the true temple and the true rock! Let it be observed, moreover, how after the Resurrection the Lord in His final promise already shows by a symbolical action that He now breathed forth the Spirit which they were to receive. This has indeed a different meaning from that which Swedenborg, who so marvellously rationalises the mysteries of Scripture, says—the divine in Christ flows forth from the human. This utterance holds good in all that fulness of meaning to which ch. vi. directed our thoughts. Triller (quoted by Rambach), rightly spoke of an aqua viva e *Christi corpore profluente*. His בְּטֶן is in truth now the ὀχετὸς (as Hesych. interprets it), the independent spring as well as the imparting channel of the πνεῦμα, as all profound perception has admitted from the beginning;[2] the true πλήρωμα of which Jno. i. 16, after ver. 14 speaks, coinciding with Col. ii. 9, without any necessity for our distinguishing between the notions of St John and St Paul.

[1] Which is intended by the *gloss* δεδομένον, accepted by Lachmann and expressed in the old versions; as the δοθέν, ἐπ' αὐτούς, αὐτοῖς found their way into many MSS. as explanations.

[2] Irenæus spoke of Christ as πηγὴ τοῦ πνεύματος.

5. Finally, the arrangement of the words which we have preferred gives us the true gradation, which is sustained by practical experience, from thirsting to drinking,—as Rambach has well developed it in his sermon. The order of our salvation proceeds from *thirsting* as a condition in us; the *coming* is then the test of sincerity and earnestness in that *thirst.* In this coming, in this state of having come, *to Him, faith* first becomes sure and confirmed; and he only who is come to the fountain with full trust and confidence, can and will *drink* thereof.[1] This is then "the fourth or the lowest step, as it were, to the well of divine grace, from which we draw and drink." Yes verily; the Lord places the πινέτω in emphatic opposition to the mere drawing and pouring out again, witnessed in the festal rite; from which the poor people went empty away. And therefore there belongs to this πινέτω a subject which is yet to be distinguished, to whom it is made a *promise.* That is, the *second* Imperative passes over, as it often does, into a promising Future. And if we thus understand it, we have finally—and what more can we say?—a reason given us in the true meaning, for the supposed harshness of the construction:—the πινέτω must come first, as being the *emphasis* of the promise, before the condition which follows it.

We would *paraphrase* the whole for further enforcement of our view. "Are there not then among you joyous guests at this feast, any thirsting souls who are not satisfied[2] with all this ceremonial and typical procedure, this commemoration of ancient facts and wonders (the true meaning of which prophecied, however, of a great futurity), who long for righteousness, for Spirit and life? Whosoever feels this true thirst, let him now come—as long as I am with you this is My invitation—*unto Me!* With Me alone is the true water of life, soon *will I give it. Then* shall every one, who has become a believer in Me, *drink* to his full satisfaction, in a sense very different from your present beholding merely the water poured out. For if the Scripture speaks of

[1] Believing and drinking are not *one and the same* here, any more than in ch. vi. It is not, as it has been translated—bibat eo ipso quod in me credat. We understand it very differently.

[2] Schleiermacher understands the Lord to say here:—he who thirsteth cannot satisfy himself by the memorials of old usages and ancient wonderful works of God.

streams of living water issuing forth from Jerusalem and the Temple—quite different from your well-meaning though petty drawing water from the valley, by which, however, ye are reminded of the prophetic word—that is spoken of Me and My body, My entire Person, and specially My humanity. In all those passages the Messiah was referred to, who is Myself, and it is as if it were said—The streams will flow out of *His* בֶּטֶן, to water the earth, and to give drink to the people.—And now we cannot but hope that all who are one with us upon the fundamental postulates of Scripture, will feel how natural and how necessary is St John's own comment upon this most mysterious saying (most expressly contrary, as it is, to the more recent exegesis, which admits no distinction between the life imparted to faith before, and that imparted after, the day of Pentecost):—But this He spake (his εἶπε like the εἶπε of Scripture) as a promise and a prediction for the future; at that time some πιστεύοντες were called and collected together, but these and all believers who were afterwards added to them, *received* or drank afterwards the *streams of the Holy Ghost*, which through His *glorification* were *poured out* in abundance upon all who believed.[1]

The *results* of this first festival-discourse of Jesus, both as it respects the common people and the rulers, are exhibited by the Evangelist in a succinct manner, and in their precise order. The contention among the people concerning Him becomes stronger, and the enmity of the rulers, still restrained from exhibition in act, becomes yet more manifest. Many of the people think that He is the Prophet, some think that He is the Messiah Himself; and ignorant that these mean one and the same, their misunderstanding confusedly contends. Others again oppose these latter on grounds which they deem irrefragable, since he is a Galilæan, and not from Bethlehem and of the seed

[1] I find, to my great satisfaction, that Steinmeyer has declared his approbation of the exposition here maintained (Beitr. zu Schriftv. ii. 123, 129.

of David.[1] The schemes of His enemies are still under restraint, but their enmity manifests itself all the more fiercely. And that in two ways: first directing itself against the unprejudiced testimony of the returning *officers*, and then provoked by the well-founded objection of *one of their own council* in their midst.

With a "marvellous admixture of fear and of courage" (as Teschendorff well says) these servants testify to the power of the words of this man, through the influence of which their hands had been restrained. But this is at once repelled with hateful scorn, although afterwards the shadow of an argument is adduced: they allege, to wit, the universal unbelief of the rulers, and contrast with them the ignorant populace, designated by an emphatic word of contumely which gives vent to the envenomed bitterness of their hearts. At that point Nicodemus quite unexpectedly answers both: for he shows that there is one ruler at least who dares to speak *for* Jesus, and that the people who attached themselves to Jesus did not thereby break the law, but rather the high council which condemned a man without hearing him or investigating his *deeds!* This is gentle enough as an avowal of "believing in him," but amply significant as referring to all His *works* (ch. iii. 2), and His equally memorable words; it is indeed a *well-grounded* objection in the mildest and most courteous form. But so evil-minded are these wicked men, that they repel their colleagues' words, even as they had those of the officers. First of all comes their hasty opprobrium, which stamps all intercession on His behalf as the abhorred connection itself. Here the wise and lofty rulers, having probably just found out this cry "of Galilee!" are at one with the ignorant and despised *mob*, ver. 41. When they add their reasoning upon the subject, and give what they think their valid reason (*search* in the Scripture, *look* in his life), their argument is altogether destitute of foundation, and blindly contradicts the most

[1] On many accounts Jesus did not lay open claim to descent from the entirely obscured lineage of David—among which Hess reckons His reference to His brothers. Can we suppose Him to have made His public appeal to that circumstance, and related everywhere His birth at Bethlehem?—He himself aimed to awaken faith in quite another way, although these external circumstances would be of great service to sincere inquirers.

certain history—to say nothing of the Messianic prophecies in Isaiah.

HIS JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE ADULTERESS.

(Ch. viii. 7, 10, 11.)

Repeated and yet more distinctive discourses of our Lord now follow, in which He defends *His own testimony* to His divine mission and its great ends, His human *sinlessness* and His divine dignity; reproving more severely *than ever before* the *sin* and unbelief of His enemies. But these discourses which commence with ver. 12 of the eighth chapter, appeared to be prepared for by an occurrence of the early part of the day following the festival;[1] an occurrence which put the Pharisees especially to shame, and with which the discourses seem here and there to have points of connection.

And is this a mere illusion in the present text of our Gospel? Is the section of the woman taken in adultery St John's or not? A true tradition intercalated afterwards, or a mere apocryphal legend? We cannot evade giving our answer to this question, and will therefore, with reference to the design of this book, give it as concisely and clearly as possible:—concisely for the learned who have at their command the whole apparatus of disquisition on the subject; but clearly we hope for the unlearned who would desire to know our opinion and its grounds.

The facts of the case, which give rise to contention, may be thus stated, without any bias or prejudice of view. Several manuscripts, and some of them very important, such as the Codex Vaticanus, are *without* the entire passage, chap. vii. 53—viii. 11. Some others have it with notes of suspicion or rejection. In others the entire section stands after chap. vii. 36—after chap. viii. 12—at the end of the Gospel—and even after Luke xxi. 38. It is *not* found, further, in the old versions:—not in the Peschito (at least in the ancient codd.), in the Philox. Syr. it is

[1] See how all hangs together through the links of ver. 30 and ch. ix. 1. But it was a Sabbath, ch. ix. 14.

at least only doubtful, just so in the Copt. and Armen. versions, while the Gothic and Arabic (Sahidic) have no knowledge of it at all. And it was originally not noticed in Nonnus. Again, we have no reference to it in the fathers—Clemens Al., Origen, Basil, Chrysostom, Cyril, Appollinaris, Theodore of Mops., and even Theophylact; among whom Origen, Chrysostom, and Theophylact, are distinguished commentators upon this Gospel. Tertullian and Cyprian do not mention the history at least; and the interpreters in the Catena make no allusion to it. All this is historically true, and yet Lücke's expression is premature and too strong, that this section first became an integral portion of St John's Gospel in the fourth or fifth century. It would be more correct to say cautiously, instead, that it often is wanting before the time of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine. For it must on the other side be acknowledged as an authority which has a retrospective validity, when we read in Jerome adv. Pelag. lib. 2 cap. 17:—in *multis* et græcis et latinis codd. *invenitur* locus de adulterâ muliere etc., and when we find some Scholia appealing to *ἀρχαῖα ἀντίγραφα* in its favour. Even the Ital. and Vulg., and the Apost. Const. (I. 2. 24) have a knowledge of this narrative;[1] and according to the testimony of Eusebius (III. 39) there was even in the *Εὐαγγέλιον καθ' Ἑβραίους* a passage extant, which can hardly be any other than this. Finally, it deserves to be carefully observed, that there was afterwards an almost universal adoption of the section into the Gospel of St John; and among the numerous codd. (more than two hundred) which contain it, is the important Cantabrigiensis, which once had weight as the representative of the *κοινὴ ἔκδοσις*. Thus the historical result which lies before us, *so far as our already discovered materials reach*, is the remarkable fact which demands explanation—that in very early times the narrative of the adulterous woman was either wanting in the Gospel of St John, or was found in a different place. If no preconceived view affects our decision of the question, and no critical bias disturbs our condemnation of it, no more than this can be assumed, or need be acknowledged.

[1] And this is of no small moment, even if it is reckoned an interpolation, in establishing its early existence and recognition, and the tradition which handed it down, even though not decisive for the passage as originally in St John.

We are not disposed to attach any importance to the fact, that the Cod. Alex. is generally included among the Manuscripts which omit the section, for it is generally defective, and exhibits a chasm[1] of the whole of this Gospel, from ch. vi. 50 to ch. viii. 53; nor to its omission in the defective Cod. Ephræmi which similarly leaves out the whole from ch. vii. 3 to ch. viii. 34: it is more to our purpose to show that its exclusion in many of the fathers cited above, or their silence concerning it, may be accounted for on various grounds. For the sake of brevity, however, we appeal to the decision of Ebrard, who is no unconscientious critic—"the external testimonies *against* its genuineness are altogether *insignificant*." Now though Olshausen or any other should aver the investigation to be settled and closed, the case is not so utterly hopeless if there is any room for such a critical assurance as that.

The immense *variety of various readings* (arranged as they have been in three main recensions of the text), would necessarily be the result of the uncertain and capricious nature of the question, and are less an argument against the section, than a concomitant circumstance. The question *wherefore* the narrative has been omitted or displaced, was answered pertinently enough by Augustine and Ambrose:—That a fear of misunderstanding or abuse or an ascetic scruple concerning its morality, induced men to ignore the very remarkable absolution of so gross a sinner. They who are not contented with this, place themselves under an obligation to answer a preliminary question of still more significance——whence and upon what ground did any ever presume to *interpolate* in the Gospel of St John *such* an unauthorised and unattested narrative? Klee says boldly that "it is, generally speaking, easy enough to account for its absence in many of the Codd., if it had been originally in the text; but the converse is utterly unaccountable, how it should ever have crept in, if it had never been there."[2]

[1] The relation of the *space* of this chasm, as to whether it would be sufficient to have contained this section, is hardly to be decided. But we may with Ebrard deduce from the chasm as appearing in three other Codd., that "consequently the matres here read the section, which the copies *ventured to omit*."

[2] Or "this narrative has so much in its favour, that it might be a hundred times omitted through all kinds of scruples, rather than have

But let this be enough, as our book does not profess to enter into critical disquisition, to show that we do not form our decision without adequate perception of the true conditions of the question. What shall we say more? Even Lücke, one of the most determined opponents of the passage,[1] refers the verdict to the instance of *internal* criticism, and sums up the whole in terms not stronger than these: "*documental* criticism has ample reason, if not for denying the Johannæan authenticity of the section, yet at least for doubting it in a high degree. Internal criticism gives absolute sentence against its genuineness."[2] Now this is enough for us! Lücke finds as the result of subjective internal criticism that "the phraseology and manner of narration are not St John's, the contents are harsh and improbable, the connection with chap. vii. 52 neither exegetically nor historically clear"—but *we* may be permitted to give *another* result as approved by exposition.

For we are in fact not so compliant as to content ourselves with its mere *historical truth*, which might, however, consist with its spuriousness in St John's Gospel. The narrative in itself was assuredly not such as could have been invented, it exhibits no trace of having been apocryphal, betrays no marks whatever of fiction; on the contrary it is throughout, and especially on the stooping down and writing upon the ground, as original as it is in harmony with the spirit and mind of Jesus. If any man fails to discern *that*, we most confidently deny to him the capacity of estimating the value of internal criticism in matters that pertain to Scripture. Hence many of those who oppose its authenticity in St John (even Hitzig himself) attribute it to a well-grounded and genuine tradition. Even Hezel cries out in his enthusiasm, upon ver. 7:—"Yes, in this saying the true and undoubted spirit of Jesus breathes!" Lange too confidently assigned the occurrence to the dubious questions in the last week, induced by its arrangement after Lu. xxi. 38; though he afterwards (iii. 622) determined to treat it in its true position in St John

been once admitted in its true character if spurious." So Rennecke, die Lehre vom Amt der Schlüssel, Malchin, 1845, S. 28.

[1] With whose decision Alford is inclined to coincide.

[2] To which Semler also appealed for his argument against it.

because it seemed to him to harmonise well with the feast of Tabernacles. Olshausen (whose dry pertinacity in many particulars we are well acquainted with) stands almost alone among the orthodox in adhering to an unqualified suspicion of its historical truth. The entire body of the several difficulties which he has alleged, and which are designedly placed in the strongest possible light, will be softened away in our subsequent exposition.

We hold, and hold fast with the utmost confidence, the assurance that this contested section is St John's.[1] All that has been brought forward in disproof, fails to convince us of the contrary. The *phraseology* which has been detected to be foreign to St John's, admits of various explanation. It is partly found in those ἅπαξ λεγόμενα which, it is well-known, often mock criticism, and are to be found in every section of Scripture which deals with a distinctive subject (ἀναμάρτητος, εἰς καθεῖς, ὄρθρου, καθίσας, πᾶς ὁ λαός);—it may in part be the result of that variation in the text which has been the singular fate of this passage (such as the frequent δέ instead of St John's οὖν);—and for the rest it is simply of no importance, as in the case of the πορεύεσθαι and παραγίνεσθαι with εἰς, or when the γραμματεῖς of the Synoptics are introduced—one cannot see why they should not[2]—or that St John should record that Jesus

[1] Euthymius expressed his suspicion, grounded upon the MSS. only with a διὸ φαίνονται παρέγγραπτα καὶ προσθήκη. Erasmus, Calvin, and Beza, lightly doubted. Then we have as opponents, more and more decided—Grotius, Clericus, Wetstein, Semler, Griesbach, Paulus, Wegscheider, Schulz, Tittmann, Schott, Knapp, Lachmann, de Wette, Feilmoser, Credner, Hase, Meyer, Hitzig, Tholuck, Olshausen, Bleek, Lücke, Neander, Wieseler, Lange, Luthardt. Yet Lücke returns to the original expression—"that the Johannæan authenticity *appears* to be irretrievably lost." Among its defenders stand (not to mention the treacherous Schulthess) since Lampe, Mill, Whitby, Heumann, Bengel, Michaelis, Matthäi, Scholz, Hug, Klee, Storr, Dettmers, Stäudlin, Kuinoel, and most recently Ebrard. (Hitzig on the ground of a special hypothesis.) Niemeyer also, in the Charakteristik (Neue Aufl. i. 329), maintains most confidently from internal evidence the Johannæan genuineness of the narrative.

[2] Baumgarten-Crusius, who does not decide rightly, himself reminds us here that "there is indeed no other narrative in St John of that kind of *legal questioning* which belonged especially to the γραμματεῖς." Brückner tries in vain to invalidate this by a weak allusion to ch. v.

taught without specifying *what*—forgetting the strict parallel of ch. vii. 14. Much also has been said of the general lack of reference and point, of the interruption of the connection, and of the unnatural, disjointed sequence of the narrative. We shall see hereafter that ch. vii. 53—ch. viii. 2, must in any case be genuine, and that *this* connection must be established at the outset. But then the παλίν λεγειν of ver. 12 will badly connect itself with the ἐδίδασκεν, while ver. 2 has the appearance of explaining the scene of a specific and new occurrence. Is it not strictly in the manner of St John, to append continuous discourses to occurrences which gave occasion for them, and form their substratum, as we find in chs. v. and vi., and again afterwards in chs. ix. and x.? And is not the woman's sin strictly in harmony with the unbridled pleasure of the festival, which furnished occasion for many such like excesses? Still more, we find throughout the eighth chapter a distinctively heightened animosity of His opponents—quite natural after the shame put upon them in the early morning. Even if we should not concur with Bengel in discerning an allusion in the walking in darkness to the sin of adultery (but why not?)—yet the allusion in vers. 15, 16 (I judge no man, My judgment is true) is so palpable and obvious, that some of our more recent critics strangely enough reverse the matter. Weisse thinks that the narrative was *very aptly* interpolated as a comment upon ver. 15, and Lange adduces the same thing as a motive for its insertion in this place! This is ample testimony that such a reference *really exists*. Yet, again, how *natural* is the strong and emphatic reproof of vers. 21, 24, after this occurrence—Ye shall *die* in your *sins!* Have not the holy zealots been constrained to acknowledge themselves as sinners under the same condemnation of death! Finally, it is incomprehensible to my simple eye, that any *believing* critic should have failed to take into his consideration the significant contrast between ver. 7 and ver. 46 of the same chapter. He, before whom no man dared to declare himself ἀναμάρτητος, asks on the self-same day—which of you convinceth Me of any ἁμαρτία? In fact, this one most simple trait of sublime connection, so entirely in harmony with St John's whole exhibition of the Holy One in the midst of an evil world, throws a hundred-fold weight into the conviction that the

history of the adulteress was not afterwards patched into the Gospel by unwarranted hands.

Many manuscripts which omit the following narrative, yet contain chs. vii. 53, and ch. viii. 1, 2; and those critics who have hence declared these verses at least to be genuine (Wieseler among the last) seem to us to view the matter more correctly than those who find in them nothing but difficulty and embarrassment. For to make the *πάλιν οὖν ἐλάλησε* of ch. viii. 12 follow immediately upon ch. vii. 52, without any transition or historical introduction to a new scene—as Luthardt does to our surprise—appears in the highest degree foreign to the manner of St John; to establish this we have only to refer to the Apostle's constant wont in his transitions, and his customary method of giving a narrative setting to every new discourse. We find in this a tolerably plain indication that the section was not originally interpolated, but that it had been omitted; it appears to us as if this omission had begun now here and now there, and that the omission of these three verses with the rest was the result of inconsideration and misapprehension. It is often but uselessly questioned whether in ver. 53 the Sanhedrim or the common people is intended. As we simply read it, the *ἕκαστος* includes all the people, but pre-eminently indicates the members of the council; for some result of their stratagem and treachery we naturally expect as an inevitable conclusion. But the Evangelist, in his pregnant manner, gives a formula which explains the internal procedure by the external, and seems to say that the whole came to *no* result, that there followed no new command to take Jesus, and so forth; but that their business being unaccomplished, and their designs so far abortive, all (on that day, that is, the day last mentioned, ver. 37) disbanded and were broken up, the high council and the common people. The words do not refer to any departure of the strangers.

Εἰς τὸν οἶκον has been regarded as a phrase not used by St John, and indeed some Codd. have *εἰς τὰ ἴδια*, but it may well be allowed to stand for once to strengthen the contrast, that Jesus who had no *house* either in Jerusalem or anywhere, went

to the Mount of Olives.[1] The return of the people in the interval to the inert quiet and security of their dwellings at the conclusion of the feast, is intended to be contrasted with our Lord's, as it were, homeless way of spending the short night, who is early in the morning on the scene again. One cannot well see why what is recorded in Lu. xxi. 37, 38 may not now even thus early have taken place; it might have been the Lord's ordinary custom from the beginning to leave the brilliant misery of the city every night, that so He might compose His sorrowful and interceding heart, and collect His energies for new labours of love; preferring for his resting-place Bethany and the *Mount of Olives*, the scene thus consecrated by many preparatory prayers for His final humiliation and exaltation. But that criticism, which has not sufficient simplicity of faith to interject and interline such gracious hintings of the Holy Ghost, finds itself at a loss in this pregnant and comprehensive statement.[2]

The Lord has determined, as everything here shows, to oppose His enemies openly and persistently; and, as the Light of the world, to accomplish that which His brethren desired, but in His own way. He knows that His hour to suffer in silence is not yet come, and that their hour to hear is not yet past. Therefore, after all that had passed, He is early at His post, with equanimity and zeal still continuing to *teach*.[3] He comes first, then come naturally all the people to Him. If the previous day had been the last of the proper feast, it must not be supposed from that, or deduced from ver. 53, that *all* the pilgrims at the feast had come back into the country again, and that the temple would be left *empty* after such a festal week. The very suspense

[1] Alford's objection, that "John never elsewhere mentions the Mount of Olives" (not even in ch. xviii. 1), has no weight. If the text is otherwise approved, our simple answer, without any suspicion or wonder, is—that St John here alone mentions the Mount of Olives. [Stier omits all allusion to this habit of the Evangelist (that of giving explanations when he introduces new places) which *alone gives weight* to my remark. Alford 2nd Edit.]

[2] We shall find on ch. x. 22 a further elucidation and justification of this remark.

[3] It is just because this is the meaning, that nothing is said of the contents of His instruction—as at ch. vii. 14.

as to whether Jesus would remain, would keep many back; and when it was said that He was already in the temple again, a concourse was soon gathered. *Λαός* instead of *ὄχλος* probably was used to suggest a diminution of the number, since it was no longer composed of the masses who attended the feast; this expression, further, is rather descriptive of Israel in whose presence their Messiah was speaking, and with a certain contrast to the subsequent Scribes and Pharisees. Compare in this Gospel ch. xi. 50, xviii. 14. They whom those had scornfully designated *ὁ ὄχλος οὗτος*, St John here mentions designedly with a more appropriate designation.

It is clear that those who brought the woman into the Lord's presence, are neither the legal Judges (the three-and-twenty who, then holding their session, left their seats and came to Jesus, as Hess, Pfenninger, and others suppose), nor zealots who interpose in the matter. On the former supposition, it is incomprehensible that they should have remitted the question to Jesus as a higher tribunal, and that they should afterwards have set free the guilty person at His instance; and it is equally inexplicable that Jesus should have rendered the execution of the law dependent upon the innocence of its ministers. He terms them, indeed, in ver. 10, accusers and not judges. And by the so-called zealot-law, in itself a very questionable point, they must at once without any delay have stoned the woman. Consequently we must regard them as private individuals of the learned caste who had made themselves extemporary accusers, having heartily entered into the scandal, and regarding the occurrence as a welcome opportunity for laying a snare in the presence of the people, to entrap the Lord. For *that*, as Ebrard well remarks, was just the question at first, whether they should adopt a judicial procedure, and take the legal course with the woman, or not. Lange thinks it improbable "that the Pharisaic party should have even in appearance constituted Him a theocratic judge, at the very time when they were holding a session (were thought to be holding) in order to effect His capture; and were adopting every possible expedient to lower Him in the estimation of the people." Quite right, if they had been consistent and thoughtful and cautious in their enmity; but the Evangelist has described them otherwise,

as we might obviously have supposed. The poor woman must be made a handle of, that they may pursue the suddenly conceived suggestion of their malicious hearts, and involve the Lord in entanglement and shame; whether this device might be frustrated does not enter their thoughts, for their excited frenzy pauses not to think.

Διδάσκαλε—thus courteously do they address the Lord, as then sitting in the seat of instruction. *This woman* now standing in the midst was taken in the very act[1] of adultery, and Moses in the law commanded *us* (Israelites generally) *to* stone *such*—thus is the case stated without any obscurity. Here is the major and minor of the proposition, and then for the conclusion comes the hasty question—but what sayest *thou?* But before we notice the element of temptation in this question, we are met by an objection to the authenticity of this narrative strangely derived from the difficulty of reconciling the stoning with the law of Moses. This difficulty is indeed forced upon the passage, it does not really exist; we might simply appeal to the Mos. Recht of Michaelis and his father's dissertation,[2] where the matter is perfectly settled. In Lev. xx. 10, and Deut. xxii. 22, we do indeed read only of death; but in the latter chapter, vers. 21 and 24, we find "stoning" literally prescribed for some specific cases. Even if this points to a *distinction* in the punishment in the several cases (which we cannot suppose, as there could be no reason why the betrothed woman, as such, should be more severely punished) yet we may well suppose that those who were then speaking would not bear in mind the accurate distinction; or, as Lampe says, it might have been intimated by the *τοιαύτας* that this was one of the cases for which stoning was prescribed. We are convinced, however, with Michaelis, our scribe in the Mosaic law, that Moses, who only recognises two kinds of death—stoning and the sword—intended the former for

[1] Ἐπαντοφώρῳ is the terminus forensis, referring originally to theft (Hesych. *ὁ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ κλέμματι εὑρεθεὶς, ἔτι κατέχων αὐτό*), but subsequently and in a wider signification. Philo (see in Lampe) uses the same expression for the sin of adulteresses. The man indeed departs, and, as generally happens, escapes free.

[2] De pœnis capitalibus in sacrâ scripturâ commemoratis.

every species of adultery. The later rule of the Talmud, though earlier in the Mischna,[1] that wherever מוֹת simply is expressed, *strangulation*, the easiest kind of death, is to be understood, is altogether foreign to the law of Moses, which knows nothing of strangulation as a judicial punishment. It is perfectly plain to all who are not disposed to be captious, that the מוֹת יָמוּת must, according to its connection and general usage, be no other than stoning. Michaelis admirably supports this position by his perfectly sound interpretation of the strictly analogous passages in Ex. xxxi. 14, xxxv. 2, compared with Numb. xv. 32—35. The ancient custom of burning, obviously only the dead body, which occurs in Gen. xxxviii. 24, has nothing to do with this matter. But Ezek. xvi. 38—40, xxiii. 47, are again quite decisive for the "law of adulteresses" in general; nor is there any thing "uncertain or obscure" to us in their allusion. And Kimchi's much appealed to note, in which only the לֹא שַׁיְּמִיתוּהָ can be urged, actually presupposes the רָגַם בָּאֲבָנִים as the מִשְׁפַּט הַמְנָאֲפוֹת; and only designs to explain how in addition to the stoning the death by the sword was intended. This single passage, constantly appealed to, should be understood by the preliminary words in verse 38 (which scarcely any one has referred to); upon which the same Kimchi gives a disquisition upon the שְׁנֵי מִשְׁפָּטִים, that of the adulteress, and that of the woman who shed blood. Jerome's assumption, finally, (on Jer. xxix. 22, 23), that stoning was the death mentioned in the history of Susannah, is well-founded, though it is not so expressly mentioned in our Greek text. We close this matter by adopting an observation of Baumgarten-Crusius, that stoning was the only current *Jewish* punishment of death (although it might be unjudicial;) for which he appeals to Acts vii.

Moses commanded *us*, who are now under the compulsory bondage of the Romans, to punish such culprits thus:—in this we have already[2] an intimation that the decision for which they asked was not one self-evident, and that their inquiry was not

[1] Hence also Pseudo-Jonathan on Lev. xx. 10.

[2] Besides a perfectly harmonious explanation of the difficulty generally found in ἡμῖν.

uncaptious. Olshausen, who is disposed at last to discern in the πειράζειν merely a "well-meaning desire to gain information," has strangely entangled himself in the presumed difficulty which is alleged. If Jesus exonerated the woman, as they expected from this *friend of sinners* whose mildness they knew, and whose many sayings concerning publicans and harlots they had heard, then would He, the *Messiah*, contradict the *law* of Moses, which assuredly it should be His duty to sustain *against the* Romans, and which they therefore expressly mentioned first. But if He yielded His assent, and bade them go and stone her, He would commit again a *twofold* offence. In the first place, He would (as Ebrard says), "offend against the laxity of morals, and the general moderation of the age,"[1] and thus make Himself by His new rigour hateful to the people, especially as deviating from His general gentleness; but we would not press this too much, for it is not the main consideration. He would offend, as His words would be maliciously interpreted, against the Roman prerogative to decide upon every sentence of death, whether legal in the law of Moses, or not. The Romans did not punish adultery by death, and even though they might allow validity to the country law of the provinces, yet both their practice and that of the Jews had become most negligent and careless upon this offence. All is perfectly harmonious, when these crafty ones hypocritically bring their embarrassment to the solution of His wisdom, as if the miserable woman excited their pity on the one hand, and on the other hand they attributed to Him a judicial authority over Moses. But what sayest Thou? Wilt Thou in thy well-known benevolence take her into Thy protection, and publicly maintain Thy opposition to Moses? Or wilt Thou counsel such rigorous justice as is now generally disused, and found among so many sins impracticable? Finally, what is Thy utterance upon this case, one of many constantly recurring, in which we come into collision with our Gentile rulers—what sayest Thou as Messiah on *that question*? This last is undoubtedly the pith of the whole. And now looking back, is there anything incomprehensible or unhistorical in all this?

[1] Comp. upon this Sepp. iii. 64, according to whose account even the application of the test of the bitter water which caused the curse (Numb. v.) had been abolished.

The Lord in His wisdom and sublime repose, opposes to their impetuosity a *silent* though eloquent reply; that their thoughts and their consciences might recover their composure, before He expressly uttered any thing with His lips. He stoops down, as He *sits*,[1] and writes with His finger εἰς τὴν γῆν, upon the *ground*, delineating letters upon the dust or upon the stone. This is certainly, as most expositors say, first of all an "expression of indifference or disregard."—He acts as if inwardly pondering, and unconscious of their presence. Similar demeanour in similar circumstances may be paralleled by many remarkable passages in the classic writers. But we would not say that it was "a gesture of most supreme indifference;" nor can we allow that as exhibited by our God it could be "a *mere* expression of repulsion, of indifference, of determination not to reply." If the Lord adopts any such expedient He attaches to it a deeper significance, and we adopt the note of Meyer—"but this demeanour had probably a profound meaning." If the questioners understood it, as they indeed might, at first—"He will not engage with us in the matter;"—or even—"He must first reflect upon it, and ponder awhile"—yet would the writing upon the ground soon give *them* something to ponder, and *speak* to their reflection. We will not revive here the tasteless and crude speculations which have been hazarded upon this writing of Christ,[2] or upon *what* He might be supposed to have written;[3] but we may say at once, that in common with most thoughtful people, we discern in it something *profoundly suggestive*, a preparatory reply hinted to His interrogators in act. And this mute hieroglyphic is so various and manifold in its suggestion, that we can only do justice to its full meaning, by exhibiting the individual possible meanings in their progression, leaving to every one to choose for himself that which approves itself to his mind.

But we must preliminarily reject the notion of Michaelis as too trite and unmeaning an interpretation—"It is already

[1] Mark, once more, the connection between ver. 2 and ver. 6.

[2] Among which we do not reckon Bengel's saying—Once did God write in the Old Testament; once Christ in the New. Reflect upon the parallel of the Law and the Judgment!

[3] Scarcely the answer given in the 7th verse, as Sepp confidently explains!

written in your law, as ye yourselves say; wherefore then put the question to Me?"[1] Rather than this, it would seem more natural to expound it—God has written other things than that both in His law and in your consciences! It is significant that He writes Himself, and the interpretation has been carried further—"I also can write, even as Moses could!" (Jo. Rupert.) If that sounds too striking, it may be varied thus—"Ye bring this sinful woman before My bar—ye know not, and will not believe it, but it is nevertheless true, that before My judgment-seat all persons will finally come, and every question be finally adjudicated. How, what, and on what principles, I judge, is already written, is already recorded!" Reference has been here found to the books, Rev. xx. 12. The Old Testament expression also obviously occurs to the mind, that those who departed from God should be written in the earth. (Jer. xvii. 13. This, however, not simply meaning, as Hitzig thinks, the passing away into forgetfulness, like those who are blown away as dust; but expressing a significant contrast to the name being written before God in heaven). Or we may give the thought this turn:—"If this floor of the temple, if this whole land, could speak—what would it record concerning all of you, and what would still have to be recorded of you!" And this gives a very pertinent meaning; comp. Isa. xxvi. 21; Job xvi. 18.[2] Stoop down, rather, with Me, and read the sin of your whole people, and of all mankind—this is the first and best thing that you can do, when such an offence is perpetrated. Finally, this leads us back again into the most general interpretation:—"Oh, how much could I say concerning you, how much could I reveal and condemn, which I would rather now bury in silence—constrain Me not to speak!" Thus, as Baumgarten-Crusius says, this gesture almost intimates what is afterwards said—τί με πειράζετε,

[1] More severely must we condemn the marvellous notion that Christ would here give them to understand that the Mosaic law was abolished! "Could He have *kept silence* if He had believed in the continued validity of the Old Testament and its writings?" So Hugo in his Predigtsammlung!!

[2] But not with any more specific allusion—the woman's sin is an *earthly* offence, not pride. For the writing applied to the *complainants;* and the ground points to the abyss to which pride is referred back.

ὑποκριταί; and this "Let me rather keep silence!" coincides most simply with that first intimation—"The matter concerns Me not, I will know nothing of it judicially!" *This*, which is assuredly the most obvious meaning of His act, is vindicated by the repetition of the same gesture after the brief utterance which He gave. Only we must hold fast this, as the kernel of the paradox, that the Lord, even while He seems to decline all interference, designs to reveal to them, at the same time, His own secret knowledge and judgment, with respect to which there is no sin and no guilt which does not most deeply concern Himself.[1]

The most ancient interpretation was expressed in the gloss, which some MSS. contain, of προσποιούμενος or also μὴ προσποιούμενος (αὐτούς): but this in itself is hard to be explained. As προσποιεῖσθαι generally bore the meaning of *simulare*, this would seem to intimate no more than that He did *not* actually write anything;[2] or conversely, that He *did* actually write. But we might (with Baumgarten-Crusius) explain it, according to the same meaning of the word, that He did *not* appear *as if He heard;* or, appearing *as if He heard not.*[3] Further, as προσποιοῦμαι also signifies—I assume, arrogate to myself, Bengel interprets it—id negotii ad se nil pertinere significans. And this we should be inclined on the whole to prefer.

Ver. 7. But when, probably after a fitting pause, during which the attention of the waiting people must have been stimulated to the highest pitch of eagerness, the tempters persisted in demanding His reply, the Lord gave it to them like a peal of thunder in their ears! If they had interpreted His silent writing as a mark of absence, how fearfully were they surprised! But that seems scarcely credible; we may say with more probability that with "beating hearts" they insist upon the answer, in order to preserve their consistency before the people. How must their hearts have throbbed now, when with one little word of sacred severity He rends their snares, and turns themselves to confusion! They would terrify and entangle Him with *the law*,

[1] According to a clause added to ver. 8, he wrote ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τὰς ἁμαρτίας.

[2] So Euthymius: προσεποιεῖτο γράφειν εἰς τὴν γῆν.

[3] Euthymius proceeds: καὶ μὴ προσέχειν οἷς ἔλεγον.

when they unseasonably and perversely endeavoured to extract from Him one of His judicial decrees against a gross and public delinquency. With the same law the Lord connects His answer, yet adds something to it in His supreme authority, which was derived from the inmost spirit of the whole law, and thus approves its propriety to their own consciences. According to Deut. xvii. 7, it was the right and duty of the *witnesses* to cast the first stone (comp. Acts vii. 57)—and of this prescription the Lord reminds them by τὸν λίθον. But he does not expressly presume that those who brought the woman and the complaint were actually the witnesses, for that was not specially contained in their κατειλήφθη; but He *substitutes* another meaning of the law, as unexpected as it was convicting. Ye act as if the law of Moses, that such should be stoned, was not addressed simply to the appointed judges, but to all the people, and, therefore, also to you: then will ye at once take precedence in its execution? I have nothing to say against that, but to impose the little condition, which before God is *inexorable* in the case of all *self-assumed* complaining, condemning, and punishing — that ye yourselves be not in the same condemnation! The Lord lays it down in the broadest way:—there may be *one*, though it be but one, among you *without sin*; let him cast the first stone, and then may the others follow him! What severity against these miscreants, who were even then probably feeding their eyes upon the woman as she stood there, in the apparent admission and concession of this reply! May not this, too, be called *Irony*? These hypocritical holy ones have spoken from their serene elevation of τὰς τοιαύτας,—the Holy one does not let this pass, but asks them with the gentle but deeply piercing word—Are not *ye* actually *such*? He takes care not to say:—he who is not such as she, who is without *this* or *similar* sin—although this was included;—such an appeal is seldom understood, and for the most part misapplied. He says in the most general term ἀναμάρτητος, for sin in the strongest sense is ever the same: and He takes occasion to say, for all future time, a word which was designed to exert an eternal influence upon men's judgments. He gives the simplest and most elevated utterance to a truth which all men feel to be true, that *no one sinner may dare to condemn another*, intruding upon the sole prerogative of God,

exercising with a human will His own authority. (Rom. ii. 1.) We cannot but think, in connection with this, of that yet more horrible adultery of which unfaithful Israel had been guilty against their God; and may consider that the Lord (as in Matt. xxii. 21) pointed to the fundamental sin of the people also, as the reason that the judicial sentence of Moses had not remained in acknowledged exercise. But all this is our own deduction from the Lord's words, such as may indeed have risen to the minds of those who first heard them, in their subsequent meditation: at the time itself the great matter to them was the answer, which repelled the unauthorized haste of their complaint, and held up to their view their own sinfulness.

So that they could not charge Him with invading either the law of Moses, or the prerogatives of the Romans: *themselves*, indeed, He had very closely touched. They were now neither the Judges nor the witnesses called before the bar, but private persons answering for themselves. Thus while He detracts nothing from the typical warning law of condemnation but rather most earnestly points to its authority as *divine* and not resting upon sinful man,[1] He treats the case presented to Him in a manner which their folly little calculated upon, neither juristically nor politically, but as a διδάσκαλος from the universal moral point of view.[2] His word is so simple, so obviously true and self-intelligible, drawn so directly from the depths of man's consciousness of right, of that law written in the conscience which is the foundation of all positive ordinances, that we might suppose that every man might have seen its propriety or uttered the like. And yet He alone has spoken such a saying in all its sublime simplicity of conviction! For while He disclaims all earthly judicial functions, He in the same words exercises His office as the present Searcher of hearts, and the future Judge of all: nor did He utter a word before He had by His mysterious writing made deep allusion to the secrets which were known to Himself.

[1] Roos' remark is quite inappropriate—For adulterers to condemn adulterers is a justice which stinks in the nostrils of Jehovah!

[2] As Neander says:—He takes the sin out of the domain, foreign to His function, of external judicature, into His own distinctive province of morality. And Olshausen's fourth objection as to the invasion of official forms of judgment is abundantly refuted.

With what absolute knowledge of man's being does He first prepare their hearts, before He pronounces the words which penetrate and pierce those hearts! Who can tell whether these presumptuous ones, if He had given them this appeal as the immediate answer, would not have begun to discuss and try to moderate the meaning of *ἀναμάρτητος*—even like our modern expositors? But now, in the solemn stillness brought to some kind of consciousness and reflection, they are incapable of anything but dumb surprise, they justify the words, and go away profoundly abashed. The Lord stooped down once more, and left it *for them* to decide whether they would cast the first stone or not. *He* had not expressly accused any one of *them*. But accused and convinced by their *consciences*,[1] to which the Lord's word had made so solemn an appeal, they utter their silent though sufficiently loud, avowal of their own guilt. Olshausen enumerates this susceptibility of the Pharisaic heart as one of his historical difficulties; but we take leave to say that their consciences are aroused by the power of the word of Jesus. There are not wanting instances enough, in which men only relatively pure have had power to call up a sudden response to their earnest words even in the hardest and most malignant hearts—but what was the divine power which went forth with the voice of the all-holy Son of God at this hour! There was, moreover, in His plain and calmly spoken word, such a tone of absolute truth, and accompanied by a glance of such searching judgment, that neither a Caiaphas nor a Judas could have withstood it. He did not continue to fix His eyes upon them, being very far from desirous to take pleasure in their humiliation before the people, but rather being grieved that their *ἐπιμένειν* had enforced from Him this revelation. But all their daring is gone —no man presumes to declare himself without sin—many a man is fearing lest, by answering Him a single word, a second and more fearful thunderstroke should fall upon him, in the incontrovertible and yet more specific revelation of his own secret shame. Suffice that they gradually steal away, one after the other, and even the eldest or most elevated first. Nothing is said of a "withdrawal in formal order." The *eldest* have

[1] Thus the connection of profound meaning gives its sanction to this clause, which is sometimes omitted.

weightier burden on their consciences; and it would be quite in keeping with St John's phraseology if we *so* understood the πρεσβύτεροι, comp. 2 Jno. i. 3; 3 Jno. 1.[1] Nor is this opposed by the ἕως τῶν ἐσχάτων (doubtful also in itself), for this, as Klee pertinently says, belongs properly to the ἀρξάμενοι—till the last were gone out. The words do not specify a departure of the *whole people*, as Fikenscher thinks; but the woman remains ἐν μέσῳ before the people, as previously, ver. 3. The μόνος refers manifestly only to the accusers; describes *Jesus* as the only one with whom the sinner had now to do, and whose sentence upon *her* was now waited for by all.

That the adulteress continued to stand there, instead of stealing away also as in decorum bound, is of itself intimation enough of that *penitent feeling* which expositors have generally lost sight of, and which the Lord's word to her not only *pre-supposes* but *proves*. The anguish of death is past, but the bitterness of conscience is almost stronger than that. Alas, the poor woman had been driven by a very different thirst from that of which Jesus spoke in the feast, into the slough where His mercy now finds her! What will He say unto her? Is He also not without sin? Will He, who, in His first word, mentioned the first *stone* of Moses' obligation, now in His final adjudication contradict Moses—or confirm his decree? She stands and awaits her doom.

Vers. 10, 11. We might say at first that the Evangelist's narrative and the Lord's word itself, seem to run as if He had not expected, even as He had not seen it, that the silenced complainants would all *go away*; but it would be more correct to say that He did not actually expect such an influence of His word. This appears to us the simplest meaning of His *question*, which de Wette boldly terms "inappropriate." Yet this question has a solemn preliminary meaning for the woman herself—*seest thou?* Behold the effect of conscience! Then rises a further significance in the second, transitional question—Fear not the judgment of sinful men, who have, indeed, no right to *condemn* thee; but thou are amenable to another judgment—before God!

[1] Thus we cannot say with Sepp, that the entire section bears *no traces* of the peculiarities of St John's style!

To this she is constrained to reply; so that, rescued from her amazement, she utters one little word which speaks her own self-condemnation. And now first comes—and with what profound foresight to obviate all misunderstanding and perversion—the negative absolution now before His own tribunal. Mildly and graciously, with self-concealment proportioned to the majesty with which He must exhibit His dignity, He utters the word—*Neither do I condemn thee!* Might that for an instant be regarded as meaning—on the same grounds as they condemn thee not? No, for we well know His meaning: He alone is without sin, He is actually the supreme and final Judge of all whom external law either condemns or absolves, and in whose inmost hearts He sees the secret sin; but He is not come *now* to judge or condemn, His mission is to preach repentance and forgiveness Himself, and to cause it to be preached to the end of the world. Just so far as *we* also have become by His grace sinless and guiltless, we also accuse and condemn not others, but forgive—forgive, however, because we have been, and that we may be, forgiven. Moreover, this rule of the *kingdom of God* as it is acted out in relation to the present circumstance, does not stand in any opposition to the unaffected ordinances of civil punishment:[1] it only assumes that in the real theocratic institution even temporal punishment, which is not a matter of rigid and unalterable fixedness, may sometimes be relaxed; as, for instance, David and Bathsheba were not stoned. Certainly if a delinquent, absolved and washed (1 Cor. vi. 11) by the grace of Christ, falls not into the hands of the civil ruler, he is not bound to inform against himself and deliver himself up.

Let it be well noted, in addition to this, that the Lord says no more to the woman than that now, in His own person as He has been appealed to, and as being neither her accuser nor constituted a Judge upon earth, He includes Himself among the others who condemned her not, and does not condemn her Himself. He leaves it to her *faith*, either then or subsequently awakening, to interpret this saying which had fallen from *His* lips as an assurance of the grace of God in the forgiveness of her sin: but He

[1] If the woman had been punished according to the law, Jesus would obviously have done nothing to prevent it: this is abundantly testified in the question which had preceded.

does not expressly and directly declare it. He does not say now, as on other occasions, thy sin is *forgiven* thee! or—go in *peace!* Certainly He says nothing which could shield her from the urgent demand of the Mosaic law, the "ἐνετείλατο τὰς τοιαύτας λιθοβολεῖσθαι" of which, though unspoken of, is yet left suspended over her head. Assuredly, those Christians of the first age who suspiciously repelled a history so gracious, so instructive, and so affectingly blending warning with consolation, were too tenacious and too indistinctly acquainted with the relation of the grace and truth of Jesus to the Jewish and every other penal code;—*one only* most weighty utterance concerning which we have in this memorable saying. Rieger says with perfect truth in his New Testament, that "the Lord deals with the sin in a style of judicial severity, which, though concealed, is more decisive than if He had uttered the harshest sentence of condemnation to death against the woman." This is most conclusively affirmed by the *last* word, the warning condition of which alone gives validity to the οὐδὲ ἐγώ σε κατακρίνω and the πορεύου—καὶ μηκέτι ἁμάρτανε!

Indeed, as Pfenninger says:—"That which inveterate sinners do, the Merciful One applies to the salvation of corrigible transgressors. Jesus has ever made the most envenomed wickedness of incorrigible sinners, occasion for the most gracious exhibition of His mercy towards sinners who are susceptible of amendment." This is true, but so also is what he goes on to say—"this history gives us a lesson of *warning* as well as of encouragement;" and we would add—for the righteous as well as for sinners. Would not this woman be more profoundly and salutarily punished by this merciful judgment of Jesus, than if she had suffered with a murmuring heart, unprepared by this gracious discipline, and resenting the severity of the punishment for a fault committed under the pressure of strong temptation—the penalty of stoning itself? We may indeed conclude by the irrefragable position—that he who effects a cessation from sin, accomplishes more than all human law and judgment can do. And *this* is the glory of the Lord's superiority to Moses, the revelation of which is an essential design of the Gospel of St John.

BRIEF CONVERSATION ENSUING—JESUS THE LIGHT OF THE WORLD; HIS VALID WITNESS TO HIMSELF.

(Ch. viii. 12—19.)

The Lord once more, on this the day after the feast, takes occasion from the circumstances which had occurred to utter His *testimony concerning Himself*, and with a *new word:* the unbelief, however, of His enemies rejects a testimony which as being His own they account invalid. He replies and defends Himself, and a colloquy ensues which goes on to ver. 19, and is the shorter predecessor of that more ample colloquy held on the same day, and which occupies from ver. 21 to the end of the chapter. The connection is plain enough to us; but Lücke, after rejecting the thread of connection with what precedes, complains of the want of it, and groundlessly insists on placing the *πάλιν οὖν* several days later. We certainly gather that the festivities were just over and yet fresh in men's minds, from the reference in the new word "light" with which the Lord bears witness to Himself, to a usage of the feast just over; even as in the case of the *water* in ch. vii. 38. This remarkable additional coincidence cannot be explained as accident, except in the spirit of wilfulness.

There was originally, on the evening of the second (not the first) day of the feast a peculiar festive illumination observed; according to Maimonides it was repeated on each of the remaining evenings, and the pleasure which the people would take in such things renders his word very probable. In the court of the women, where the *γαζοφυλάκιον*, ver. 20, was, thus on the spot where the Lord was now speaking, there stood two colossal golden lamps, which were ascended by steps; their light, kindled after the evening sacrifice, diffused its brilliance, it was said, over the whole of Jerusalem. With childlike merriment (Jno. v. 35) they held a dance with torches around these luminaries, in which the most reverend men, even the High Priests themselves, took share; with, as we may suppose, the liberal accompaniment of shouting and singing on the part of the people. The meaning of this symbolical rite was similar to that of the pouring

out of the water, with which the account of that ceremony places it in connection. The people had indeed forgotten its significance, but its meaning was there, and that manifold; it had reference most obviously, partly to God's former mercies to Israel, and partly to His merciful designs in the future. The water poured out at the feast of Tabernacles reminded them of the rock in the wilderness, and the brilliant light reminded them of the pillar of fire which guided them: but even as the water spoke also of the fountain which should pour forth its streams at the Messiah's coming, so also did the light speak of the promised shining forth of God out of Zion. It is not improbable that there was even a more distinctive reference in the evening illumination to the promise of Zech. xiv. 7; since in the fourteenth verse of that chapter that time is specified as the feast of Tabernacles for all people.—It was not indeed into the midst of the tumultuous whirl that Jesus sounded forth His testimony—I am the true Light! (Lücke need not protest so vigorously against what no man would be likely to assert). But it is sufficiently obvious, nevertheless, that He does refer to the festival though past; for the minds of the people were full of the ideas connected with it, long after it was over. Even if the gorgeous illumination only occurred on the second day of the feast, yet an allusion to it would fall in with the people's thoughts readily enough; the lamps were not yet removed, and in their near neighbourhood the Lord now spake.[1]

Ver. 12. If He had merely said—I am the true Light! He would have adhered closely to the allusion of the feast. But this would have been equally inappropriate as in the case of the water; and as he there pointed further to the Scriptures, so He does now, though without expressly naming them. The reference to the extinguished *light of the feast* was only the point of connection for the sublime word which He goes on to speak, and which reaches beyond into the *Messianic promises;* but *between* these two there lies a third point serving as the *transition*, which many expositors have regarded as the essential point of the passage. It was, according to ver. 2, early morning and before

[1] Teschendorff erroneously regards the lamps as being prepared for lighting, when the Lord speaks.

sunrise, when Jesus began to teach in the temple; the woman, taken overnight, was probably brought immediately before Him, as soon as the thought had occurred to the minds of the Pharisees. Meanwhile the sun has arisen, at least it is full daylight —and why should we hesitate to think that the sun's rays gloriously lighted up the golden and marble magnificence of the temple?[1] That τό φῶς τοῦ κόσμου is the sun, the light of day (as in Heb. אוֹר is used—see the Lexicons), we find in ch. xi. 9, 10. Again, it will be seen in our quotations presently, that the Prophets speak of the light of the Messiah. Hence we may abstain from the foolish contention whether the Lord means this or that; and take, after the analogy of such figurative language with its manifold meaning, all meanings together which obviously harmonize. The first thought was—See now the glorious light of day, surpassing all illumination, more than the extinguished blaze of these festal lamps![2] But what God's sun is to the earth, that—and *more* than that am *I* to the whole sinful *world*, as the Scripture says concerning Him who was to come. Lücke bids us distinguish φῶς τοῦ κόσμου as corresponding to the φῶς ἐθνῶν of Isa. xlii. 6, xlix. 6, from the φῶς τοῦ κόσμου τούτου of Jno. xi. 9: but we must be allowed to suggest that the expression of the Prophet is also a similitude taken from the *sun*, as is proved in the Old Testament by Isa. lx. 1—3 (זָרַח יִזְרַח זָרְחֵךְ), and Mal. iii. 20 (שֶׁמֶשׁ צְדָקָה), and in the New by Lu. i. 78, 79. There we have united in one, what he would wish us to distinguish. Who can popularly preach this saying (and in such style did the Lord here speak!) and expound the full harmony of the thoughts which cluster around the idea "Light of the world," without turning his mind to the enlightening, guiding, warming, life-engendering Sun? Let it be observed, further, that in ch. ix. 4, 5, the antithesis of *day* and *night* precedes the utterance of the same expression; as in ch. xii. 35 the darkness of ensuing night is threatened to fall upon the unbelieving.

[1] Have we not here something like a probable link between the section generally thought spurious and the connection of the Gospel?

[2] Why this allusion to the extinction of the light should be "by no means harmonious," it passes our sense of harmony to say.

If the Lord's hearers, especially the opposing Pharisees who forthwith lift up their contradiction, had rightly "searched and looked" into their prophecies, they would have been able to discern in this testimony of our Lord, as far as it referred to Isa. ix. 1, 2, an answer to the question whether the Messiah should come out of *Galilee*. The Lord, who knows their ignorance, does not directly specify this; but He rather makes prominent the great fact of the calling of the *Gentiles*, which Isaiah had announced in passages better known[1]—and we cannot but involuntarily think of that former question in Jno. vii. 35.

We may reasonably, moreover, decline to enter into any further development of the whole profound meaning of the φῶς as applied to Jesus, and as corresponding to the meaning of the great expression in St John's Prologue, ch. i. 4, 5, 9. We content ourselves with pointing to the fact, that *all things* which the Evangelist has comprised in his, so to speak, philosophical Prologue, approves themselves to have been actually derived only from the Lord's own testimony to Himself. We have found the πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο in ch. v. 19, 20; and shall find the ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν in ch. xvii. 5, as before that and more distinctively, in ch. viii. 58. It is a false theology which would assume the ideas developed by the Apostles to have been derived from any other source than the words of Jesus as explained to their minds by the Holy Spirit (ch. xiv. 26, xvi. 14). And that is also a false exegesis of St John's Prologue, which declines to recognize in it the preliminary ἀνακεφαλαίωσις of the entire series of Christ's testimonies throughout the entire Gospel. Thus we take the φῶς τοῦ κόσμου as the Lord presently supplements it by φῶς τῆς ζωῆς—without forgetting its connection with the festal rite, the natural image, and the prophetic word, and independently of all these—in all the depth and fulness of its speculative meaning as a *thought* expressed in the form of a figure; and the philosophical *unfolding* of which passes beyond the domain of immediate exegesis. We understand according to chap. i. 4—12 that He who has hitherto testified to Himself as the source and giver of life, can now only mean that φῶς ἀληθινὸν

[1] This was quite suitable to the place, ver. 20. Locus ipse gazophylacii erat medius inter subdiale, in quo erant Judæi, et subdiale, in quo erant alienigenæ. Grot.

which proceeds from life and causes life, and is essentially one with the ζωή.[1] Indeed this word penetrates so far and extends so widely, that we must deduce from its right apprehension the consequence—that wherever in this dark world light had ever been, it was Himself and His preparatory witness and influence which caused it, before His coming in the flesh poured forth the full flood of radiance. For κόσμος in its universality of meaning stretches over all time as well as over all space. The εἰμί has already the full meaning of εἰμί in ver. 58.

That we might have in one word, so to speak, the entire dogmatic and morals of Christianity comprised, the Lord appends to the ἐγώ εἰμι the promised result and consequence of that faith in Him which approves itself in act. He is the Light, and it is for us to *follow* that Light. For a Light points the way of action and walk, as men follow a lamp carried before them—as the Israelites in the wilderness followed the pillar of fire, the guiding presence of their God. We cannot but discern a direct reference to this latter circumstance, which stood in close connection with the feast of Tabernacles, though it naturally springs in a general sense from the figure itself.[2] The reading περιπατήσῃ (Vulg. *ambulat*) which Lachmann accepts, appears at the first glance not so pertinent as the promising Future: yet we prefer the former.[3] We prefer it partly because the general and comprehensive expression perfectly corresponds with the ἐγώ εἰμι which was *not merely* meant of the now beginning futurity; and partly, because then the reference to the adulteress which Bengel and others have discerned, is finely and beautifully justified.[4] Carnal sins are preeminently works of

[1] This is, indeed, much more than in J. v. Müller's well-meaning translation:—"I am the key to all the mystery of this world: to him who followeth Me, all is clear." Quite true, but we must not forget the *following!*

[2] And, indeed, as Lampe observes—potius per oppositionem, ostendendo præstantiam antitypi, qui non solum Israelem, sed omnes gentes *mundi* erat illustraturus.

[3] The Fut. is a correction on account of ἕξει.

[4] Alford thinks this allusion very improbable, as out of character after His previous treatment of her, and because the accusers would not be so soon present again. I do not assert the latter myself, but according to ver. 2, many people had been witnesses of the whole circumstance. As it regards the former objection, His treatment of the

night and of darkness; and such had this adultery been. How obviously and simply does it run, if the Lord were speaking immediately in view of the preceding occurrence:—he who walketh in *that* day light of truth and of life, which ever doth and ever hath proceeded from Me, doth not the works of darkness, like that one out of many which hath just come to light and been reproved. Thus "He Himself secures His dealing with the sinful woman from all perversion"—as Rieger remarks; and thus He wisely obviates any misapprehension of His *οὐδὲ ἐγώ σε κατακρίνω*. Yet this is but an adjunct and subordinate idea; and the *σκοτία* retains the fulness of meaning which its antithesis to *φῶς τῆς ζωῆς* imparts to it, and in which we must refer it already to the final *dying in sin*, ver. 21, as to the original source of evil *from below*, ver. 23, the dark abysmal element of all human and murderous lie from the *devil*, ver. 44. Thus the entire chapter stands in one great connection, while the contrasts between the not apprehended *light* and the *darkness*, between the *truth* spoken in vain and the malignant *unbelief*, the offered *eternal life* and *death*, more and more sharply and nakedly come forward into prominence. Finally: he who follows the Lord, walketh no more and will not walk in darkness, *because* (this is the meaning of *ἀλλά*) he will *have* the light of life: and that does not mean, as superficially interpreted, whereby to direct his steps as it goes before him (semper habebit suum in usum); but as Nonnus expounded it correctly—*ἔχων ὁμόφοιτον ἐν αὐτῷ ζωῆς ἀπλανέος φάος ἔμπεδον*. The *light* is in us, as the life is in us: He who exhibits the light before His people's steps dwells in His own, even as the Father who giveth and directeth to Him dwelleth also in Him.

If the Lord had at the very beginning thus uttered His unlegitimated I, instead of introducing Himself by the Baptist's continuous preaching of repentance and the kingdom, and then by the Sermon on the Mount, and then by all that we have seen continually following—then, indeed, men might have objected, even still more strenuously, to His witness to Himself. But

woman was, as we saw, severe enough, certainly not positively absolving; and, in any case, a continued testimony against these sins incident to the feast (only one example of which has come here to light) was certainly quite in place.

now their objection springs from malignant unbelief alone, which, unable to deny the shining of the light which had long been around them, can only cry—Thou bearest witness of thyself? They have thoroughly studied out the word of our Lord's own lips, ch. v. 31, to retort it upon Him on the first occasion; but they have probably only *heard*, in its true sense, the commencing words of His utterance—*I am!* It is sometimes said that their daring goes beyond the bounds of all possible justice, in that they declare the unsupported testimony to be therefore not *true;* but we see in this only the Lord's own word retorted upon Him, for He had used the expression in that former passage; and ἀληθής is equivalent to בֶּאֱמֶן, or confirmed, trustworthy, credible.

Ver. 14. The Lord, ever ready with the right answer, gives a reply to their perverted quotation of His isolated saying; and in such a manner as to direct their thoughts to the twofold meaning of that saying, as it must be rightly understood. The word in ch. v. had declared that as *the Father* bore witness for Him, so also He essentially bore witness *in Him* (consequently, "of Myself" in that passage was only equivalent to μόνος, as an individualized man)—and the Lord now applies it on the other side, according to which it is equally true to say:—*And I testify in the Father*, with the Father. For both in themselves and in their testimony are but as one, ch. xiv. 10. Hence He answers first by responding to their contradiction in an *immediate counter-assertion;* giving the *grounds* of it afterwards. These are based, first, upon the *nature of the case itself*, alone in its kind; and then upon an appended reference to an *analogy out of the law*, partly used in accommodation, partly in irony. The argument for the validity of that witness to Himself, which was the only possible witness in this case, is twofold:—the *perfect consciousness* of Him who came from God and goeth to God, in contrast with the ignorance that now confronts Him (this is the essential, internal evidence itself)—and then the convincing expression of the same in the unselfish, *pure love* to sinners, which *doth not judge* after men's manner; again in contrast with their carnal judgment. Ver. 16 gives the *conclusion* from this in such a manner, that instead of His *witness*, the right *judgment* which is indeed ever contained in it, is substituted—I judge, speak,

testify *not* ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ in *your* sense, that is, not μόνος. To which may then be appended, with the strictest connection, the ordinance of the law concerning the *two* witnesses.

It is already understood that, in the process of our Lord's words, the κἂν ἐγὼ μαρτυρῶ is not said *conditionate*, as Grotius wrongly understood it :—etiamsi nulla essent de me prægressa prophetarum, nulla Johannis Baptistæ testimonia, etiamsi egò primus ac solus hæc de me predicarem. For we found in chap. v. the fundamental idea expressed, that all preparatory testimonies had been both the Father's witness, and the self-testimony of Him who had been from the beginning He who was to come into the world, the light that enlightened men. Can then the *truth*, as opposed to error, do any thing else than bear witness to itself, and offer itself to acceptance? How could it be *approved* or certified by anything independent of, and external to, itself? The unapproved and undemonstrated presumption lies rather in the petulant opposition to that truth. All argument for it is at last only the bringing into nearer application, and rendering more and more impressive, the claims which can assert themselves. Augustine's saying is well-known, and quoted by almost all expositors—*Lumen* et alia demonstrat et se ipsum. Testimonium sibi perhibet lux, aperit sanos oculos et sibi ipsa testis est. The Berlenburg Bible, after saying, in like manner, that "all things have their reasons implanted in them, else could they never be approved," goes on to strengthen the thought in its own nervous way :—"If the sun or the day could speak, and should say—I am the sun! and it were replied—No, thou mayest be the night, for thou bearest witness of thyself! how would that sound? Argue it away, if thou canst!" Still more pertinent is Lange's excellent remark :—"The question was one about *His own personal consciousness*, of which only Himself *could* bear witness." But we would add that, even among sinful men, it is only self-testimony that avails for internal matters, 1 Cor. ii. 11. He who is accused, and has against him the strongest apparent evidence of others' testimony, may assert his own innocence with such truth as the judge can scarcely withstand ; the witnesses of a sin hear or see only the external part of it, the internal degree of guilt can only be avowal by personal testimony. How much more does this hold good, where imper-

sonated Truth and Guiltlessness confronts, and exhibits Himself to, a world full of lying and guilt!—The Lord takes now His decisive *οἶδα* from chap. vii. 28, 29, 33, and we may recur to our remarks upon ver. 29. He who is not *convinced* by the pure and unqualified expression of the *human consciousness of Jesus concerning His divinity* which we find everywhere, but especially in St John's Gospel, because his darkness *will* not be subjected by this light, will not yield to all other evidence and testimonies, for they all rest upon that foundation for their validity, and by the rejection of that are perfectly neutralized. In the *πόθεν ἦλθον καὶ ποῦ ὑπάγω* we are not to seek a mere circumlocutio *legationis* (Grot.) or the "divine mission in its two aspects" (de Wette); but it penetrates much deeper and gives us first His coming from God in His eternal nature or personality (the mystery of the Incarnation, that He was not begotten of Joseph), and then the coming glorification of the humanity which He had assumed, after and by which the former would be demonstrated. But *ye*—thus does the Lord now explain the irony which He had employed in chap. vii. 28—know neither the one nor the other;[1] ye cannot of course know it of yourselves, nor will you believe on My—the only possible—testimony. Even *ἔρχομαι* instead of *ἦλθον*, in the repeated sentence, is a designed variation; for the Lord alone can essentially know the *ἦλθον*, while the others were only required to recognise the present manifestation in the authority of Him who sent Him.

Ver. 15. *Witnessing* leads alway to *judgment*, for the sake of which it is borne; and is in itself fundamentally a judgment, which is again only the acknowledgment of a true testimony to be confirmed in execution. There is never a *μαρτυρεῖν* which does not include at the same time a *κρίνειν*; the Lord had just declared Himself the light of the world, and thereby had imputed to the world darkness without that light. The presumptuous, deceptive witness which sinners may bear to themselves or others, is only *per catachresin* or preparatorily *per hypothesin* called

[1] For the *ἢ ποῦ* instead of again *καὶ ποῦ* seems preferable to us even on account of the variation; and especially as the *ποῦ ὑπάγω* to which it gives the more prominence, becomes, in ver. 21, the specific text of a new discourse.

here a testimony, for it is in reality not such at all—and just so it is only the judging out of the truth which is in perfect accord with love, that may be termed a real judging; and this again is as such inseparable from the testimony of truth which is borne by earnest love. And so we must not regard our Lord as declaring directly and without limitation—*ἐγὼ οὐ κρίνω οὐδενα*: the limitation, however, is found in nothing else than the condescending, protesting comparison of His judgment with that which may be termed the judging of sinners. When "judging" is forbidden to our carnal mind, we cannot fail to perceive in the use of the word with respect to us, a severe *ὀξύμωρον*; as is expressed both by St Paul and St James—*Σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ κρίνων, ὃς κρίνεις*; (Rom. xiv. 4; Jas. iv. 12).

Κατὰ τὴν σάρκα exhibits the norm of this pseudo-judgment; but we must understand this in that pregnant fulness of meaning which scriptural expressions often embody, but which our expositors will not recognise for the ending of strife:—it is both the objective and subjective norm, since both concur in the reality of false human judgment. Meyer's note is concise enough —"carnally, after the appearance, *and* in human passion"—which just expresses the meaning of the word. The Lord, in this retrospective discourse, means first of all the same as that which in ch. vii. 24, He termed *κατ' ὄψιν*, and which Euthymius explains —*πρὸς μόνον τὸ φαινόμενον βλέποντες*.[1] Lücke urges the article in *τὴν σάρκα* in favour of the *objective* norm (we cannot see, however, why it should not designate the norm generally; and, moreover, point out the strong contrast of *their* condition and of their views, comp. ch. vii. *τὴν δικαιάν κρίσιν*); but Baumgarten-Crusius protests against this,[2] and will admit only the subjective carnality of their prejudiced judgment. The truth is, that both coincide in the expression; and exegesis will never reach a satisfactory solution of this or any thing else, while it persists in separating *κατὰ τὴν σάρκα* what the Spirit of God joineth in His phraseology. The Lord assuredly intends the *κρίνειν* which His enemies had dared to exercise upon *Himself* (although His words

[1] Nonnus: *εἰσοροώντες ἐμὴν βροτοειδέα μορφήν.*

[2] On the strange ground, that the Lord would not be likely to attribute to himself in St John's account, an "insignificant manifestation," externa species, *σάρξ* in this sense.

are capable of general application, and especially may have allusion to the case of the adulteress); but we cannot doubt, also, that *now* (when His own censure is becoming more and more rigorous) He means something more than merely κατ' ὄψιν (else why not have repeated that expression), and does in fact lay bare the secret wickedness of their hearts who judged. The *pride* and the *hatred* of the carnal mind are the true cause why their judging does not penetrate and take account of the internal principle of action in Him whom they judge; he who does not look into his own heart, cannot, would not, and will not look into the secret heart of others, so as to go no further in his sincere judgment than a diffident self-knowledge will allow him.

Nothing seems plainer to us,[1] than that the following clause is to be completed thus:—*Like you*, after the flesh in the sense in which ye judge (so Cyril interpolates) I judge no man. Augustine and many others have inserted a modo or νῦν—I do not *yet* and *for the time being*; but this confuses and damages the impressive meaning of His words. We saw at ch. iii. 17 (where, indeed, κρίνειν stands in a different sense from this, for κατακρίνειν, in itself legitimate), that even there such a limitation of the meaning would be inappropriate; and this οὐ κρίνω we find in ch. xii. 47 still holding good even at the last day. As there:—it is not the design and aim of my redeeming coming, to condemn; so here:—it is not in My *divine* Will, *to judge as ye do!* I do not in truth make this My end; I have no pleasure in it, nor could I in My truth and love![2] For the rest, we dis-

[1] Although Münchmeyer declares it impossible!

[2] There is a certain truth even in Lange's startling interpretation of the supplied οὐ κατὰ τὴν σάρκα (which agrees with Cyril, see Lücke):—The essential being of man is never despised or rejected by Me, My judgment and condemnation lies only against the sad distorted caricature which man has made of his own nature. Therefore I contemn not the entire essential man as such; but have a higher esteem of human nature.—But it is not correct to make this specific point the gist of our Lord's pregnant expression, and besides that, it may be easily exaggerated into error, as follows:—"Hence the Lord would never anticipate the essential, proper judgment, which God will consummate through the matured relations of men's sin and punishment, but wait for the Father's judicial administration, &c.!" Does not the Son everywhere and always judge with the Father, even now? And does He not *utter even here a preparatory and warning judgment*, in order that He may

cern that the manner in which the Lord passes from witnessing to *judging*, and repudiates all judging Himself, presupposes a specific reference to something else, and we cannot avoid thinking of the sinful woman who had just been judged by sinful men, but whom the Lord had dismissed uncondemned. This case is, in the Lord's view, as notorious and much talked of, known to most of those who then heard Him. Though those who had gone out may not have crept in again to listen (not, however, impossible); yet the Lord might impute to these Jews as a whole, what some of them had done in this specific case. *Ye* judge—says the Lord—falsely and carnally concerning others, and even concerning Myself; but I, as ye have seen, judge no man in this manner,[1] yea, not even yourselves; but tell you only the truth in love, as it concerns your ignorance and what I have to teach. How glorious is this outbeaming of the light of Truth, this uncensorious, affectionate testimony of truth in the midst of this people of *Pharisees!* And what an evidence in this outbeaming of the ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ, of the internal clearness of the Divine consciousness in the mind of this Son of man?

Ver. 16. This conclusion follows from vers. 14 and 15 *together;* for unrighteous judging κατὰ σάρκα can proceed only from lack of *humble love*, to which point whatfollows immediately addresses itself, *or* at most from want of *clear consciousness* in the truth. But this latter in the case of sinful men has ever its secret ground in the former defect; in the Lord, however, we see the two things exhibited in the perfect unity of their reciprocal influence—the love which judgeth not at all, and the truth which cannot but judge. *His*—Neither do I condemn thee! itself puts the susceptible and unhardened conscience to the deepest shame, and is the mightiest judgment against sin. In Him is fulfilled in the highest sense of the word, what the Apostle says of the condemning and reproving nature of light, Eph. v. 13, 14. Had the

not hereafter judge and condemn? Is not *this* essentially *His* present κρίνειν πάντας —? See in this chapter, vers. 24, 26, presently afterwards.

[1] Humanly, capriciously, prematurely, proudly—with *I* like yours, independently of and without, God. So that the μόνος may be supplied from ver. 16, if rightly understood.

presumptuous accusers of the woman taken exception specifically to the gentle word which He had uttered? It is most amply shown, in any case, why the Lord, drawing now the conclusion of His first argument, adheres only to the once-mentioned *κρίνειν*, and substitutes it altogether for the *μαρτυρεῖν*. He thereby tells them that He well knows the spring of their contradiction; that it was the judging element in His testimony which excited their hatred and opposition. Their contradiction was provoked by His testimony to Himself as the light reproving their darkness, as the Saviour reproving their sin:—and their contradiction is against *the truth*. For even as *κρίσις* His *μαρτυρία* is self-declaratory, self-evidencingly *ἀληθής*. We cannot here adopt the reading *ἀληθινή*, however appropriate the idea which it would suggest; for the conclusion must coincide with the original assertion, ver. 14; and the word reminds us emphatically of ch. v. 30 (in connection with ver. 31), where it was said— *ἡ κρίσις ἡ ἐμὴ δικαία ἐστίν*. He who sendeth approveth Himself to be present with and in Him who is sent; the Father leaveth not His Son alone, in His words, His judging, and testimony, any more than afterwards in His sufferings (chap. xvi. 32): to prepared ears and prepared eyes the Father reveals Himself in every work and every word of His Son; for in His obedience, and from His revelation, the Son doeth and speaketh all things. We might at once translate, with de Wette and Stolz—I am not alone He who judgeth; but we prefer to leave it indefinite, for the force of the general expression extends further.

Vers. 17, 18. He who is the absolute Truth in God, may thus by his high prerogative exempt Himself from the obligation of being subject to the challenge and to the rules which bind sinful men: but if it is required of Him that He legitimate Himself by these human rules, He can do no other than accommodate Himself to them in lowly humility mingled with some measure of necessary irony. In chap. x. 34—36 we shall once more, and for the last time, find an impressive example of such an application of the subject in hand. Such reference to a lower analogy must, in proportion as it ill becomes the higher relations which condescend to it, expose the folly which would place them in juxtaposition, and require such analogy to be drawn. It is to

exhibit this folly that our Lord, thus constrained, submits Himself to the human standard: using the irony of lowly love, which is essentially different from that of wrath.

The tone and meaning of the whole are distinctively exhibited in the striking saying—in *your* law! Here the reference is possibly continued to the occurrence which had just taken place, when it was said with such proud appropriation, ver. 5—Moses commanded *us!* But that would be only a side-glance, the Lord's meaning extends to the apprehension of all the people. The remark of Baumgarten-Crusius is in the highest degree incorrect, that this expression "belongs to the point of view under which our Evangelist regarded Judaism and its foundation, as abolished and obsolete things!" We cannot think for a moment of any undervaluation of the Lord on the part of Jesus (for it is He who speaks and not the Evangelist); we know full well, that the law was to Him, even to its slightest tittle, a thing not passed away, but rather to be fulfilled by Him, even to the end of time. The specific prerogative of the two witnesses He recognises and honours in thus quoting and applying it; even as He confirms it anew for His future Church in Matt. xviii. 16. (Comp. too 2 Cor. xiii. 1; Tim. v. 19.) But it is a rule necessary and valid only for *men*, on account of the distrust with which among sinful and fallible mortals every individual testimony must be received. This is the meaning of the insertion of ἀνθρώπων in the indefinite citation; and ὑμετέρῳ is to be taken *with this*. The Son of God who comes not under this necessity, being beyond the reach of that distrust with which fallible men are regarded,[1] *at first* places Himself beyond the obligation, and protests against the application to Himself of a law intended only for sinful men. *But then* He condescends to proceed in sacred irony:—But if ye will persist in measuring Me by the standard, then must *I and My Father* be the two; yea the God-man Himself may reckon as the requisite *two men!* Beza's first words were altogether correct—"Ego, inquit, qui loquor, sum geminus. In uno hoc duos habetis." But he goes on, not so correctly:—"Me hominem damnatis, sed sum etiam filius Dei, atque hoc modo testor

[1] Thus Olshausen is quite incorrect in saying that "ἄνθρωποι is here merely equivalent to personalities."

de me, et pater quoque de me testatur." For the ἐγώ, concerning which the whole discourse here treats, is assuredly not the eternal Son as such, but the Son of man come in the flesh and bearing witness to Himself, *to whom God giveth witness*, Acts ii. 22. And this witness of God confirming the truth which was already evident in itself, the Lord reckons as the lacking concurrent testimony of a second *man*. We may refer to all that was said on chap. v. concerning the testimony of the Father.

Ver. 19. There are many who think with Augustine,[1] that the petulant interjection of the Jews referred to a *human father;* and Gualther (in Lampe) dilates thus strongly upon this notion:—cum risu illum excipiunt, qui hominem pauperculum, idiotam, fabrum, et qui fortassis non amplius in vivis erat, sanctissimo doctissimoque Phariæorum at qui scribarum collegio opponat. But we cannot think, after so many discourses of our Lord concerning His Father in Heaven, that the Jews could ever have represented themselves as understanding Him of an earthly father. They knew full well, nor do they deny that they understand Him to refer to *God* as His Father; but it is this very thing which gives bitterness to their question. Klee says excellently—"that the question was not well-meaning and child-like, but scornful and malicious, is perfectly plain from the connection; just as the somewhat similar question of Philip afterwards, chap. xiv. 8, approves its simplicity of intention by a reference to the whole context." Yes, verily, although there (chap. xiv. 7), the Lord was constrained to say the same thing to His disciples which He now replies to the Jews; yet was the desire of Philip something very different from the cutting mockery which returns, after the Lord's argument was closed, to the first assertion again—Thou still bearest witness to thyself! Still *alone* as a presumptuous and deceiving *man!* Luther rightly understood them as meaning to say—"We hear not any testimony of the Father!" Or stronger:—We know well that thou speakest of God who should testify in thy favour as thy father. But we know not *the* "Father," that is not our God (see afterwards ver. 54)—where is thy Father? Whence hast thou to bring him?

[1] Apollinarius also in the Catena, who would prove it from the ποῦ suiting that idea alone.

"Swift with this testimony that we may hear it!" We cannot precisely say that they thereby "denied their Old Testament faith, the faith in the invisibility and omnipresence of God;" but instead of that we may say that they deny their own ears and eyes, and will not discern the immediate manifestations of the living and true God present before them. For they cry out as blind, who say that they see (chap. ix. 41), demanding of the light of the world then shining before them—Where is thy shining? What reply can the Lord make to *this* contradiction, but mournfully to return into the same circulus demonstrationis, which lay at the foundation of the whole discourse in chap. v.?[1] There is no knowledge of God as the Father of Jesus Christ to be derived from any other voice or form than His own: He is known, as before, only through His Son. For the Father testifies *of* Him, only as He testifies *in* Him. He who rejects the Son shows on his part that He knoweth not the Father, and *will not* know Him. Thus is the reproof of chap. vii. 28, 29, enforced from Him in yet stronger terms:—see afterwards ch. viii. 37, 43, 47, 55. The *not knowing* is their heaviest condemnation; as appears once more in ch. xv. 21, xvi. 3.

The Evangelist by his emphatic ταῦτα τὰ ῥήματα gives his own observation of the mighty judicial influence of these condemnatory words, and presupposes, as we see, that the people were eager once more to lay hands upon Him, as in ch. vii. 30 after a like discourse.

But His hour was not yet come! The mention of γαζοφυλάκιον[2] is intended to indicate that Jesus thus spake openly, in a much-frequented place, as Nonnus rightly paraphrased it.[3]

[1] On the ἄν see note on chap. v. 46.

[2] See upon Mar. xii. 41. In the court of the women, where the treasury was, and thence bearing this name.

[3] In the well-considered addition—ὁππόθι πολλοὶ ποικίλα δῶρα φέροντες ἐπεστείχοντο πολῖται.

FINAL AND CONFLICTING CONVERSATION: THE DYING IN THEIR SINS; BELIEF THAT I AM HE; TRUE FREEDOM; THE CHILDREN OF ABRAHAM AND THE CHILDREN OF THE DEVIL: CHRIST BEFORE ABRAHAM.

(Ch. viii. 21—58).

This is the last great conversation with the Jews, in which will be exhibited the most rigorous conflict and opposition. Ever the same and yet ever connected with something new, His ἐγώ εἰμι is the sublime and peaceful answer to all contradiction. But He also condemns their sin with ever-increasing and more open severity, discloses to them its devilish source, denounces destruction upon the unbelieving, and promises to those who believe eternal life. *Without sin* as to His humanity, *from the beginning* as to His divinity, He confronts the children of the Murderer and the Liar! There is an unbroken connection, for every rejoinder and every advantage gained by His word is immediately taken up and pursued by the Lord. He continues unweariedly His λαλεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν (ver. 26) until the stones are actually the first time taken up.—His prophetic warning in ver. 21 gives occasion to, and opens, this entire colloquy, which we may preliminarily resolve into four parts. The *first* is the gentle reply to their taunting mockery, and is an explanation of his first saying—I am come down from heaven, to redeem from perishing all who believe in Me! That saying, however, is at the same time reuttered with yet more severity (vers. 23, 24). The *second* is occasioned by their wicked urgency for the direct expression of the Messiah-name: in it He discreetly and reservedly expounds and enforces His testimony, opening with the mysterious and humbling declaration of what He has to say and to judge *concerning them*, and appealing on account of their ignorance and blindness to the future. Vers. 25, 29.—The *third* great branch of the conversation embraces two subjects:—first, the promise

which graciously discerns at once the beginning of faith in many —*freedom from sin* through the *truth in the words of Jesus* (vers. 31, 32), and then the defence which was immediately rendered necessary by the *redoubled objection* urged by the outbursting Jewish pride. (Vers. 33—47 which we shall soon set forth in fuller detail.)—The *fourth* part, finally, contains the last and more express assertion of His divine honour and dignity against the contemptuous giving back of His own words by the Jews in ver. 48. It closes with the strongest, most open assertion of His Divine Being against the most embittered animosity (vers. 57, 58).

Ver. 21. Certainly on the same day, though after a short interval, Jesus begins to continue His testimony to Himself, in the presence of the same hearers in the main (as αὐτοῖς plainly shows) who had heard it just before. Οὖν expresses a result of their not having laid hands upon Him; in consequence of this He can thus πάλιν address Himself to them.[1] The Lord now turns to the second critical topic of ver. 14, to His ὑπάγειν: He repeats the warning which had already been given, ch. vii. 33, 34, but now impressively appends the yet more severe words—ye shall die *in your sins!* It is obvious to remark that reference should here be made to the frank silent confession which His enemies had already made, vers. 7—9, that none of them was without sin: we have already said above, that the condemnation of these sinners and servants of sin which commences with ver. 21, and pervades the entire remainder of the chapter, appears to us to be based upon this foundation of confession laid early in the morning.

I go my way! What this means and what it involves, we have seen already, on ch. vii. 33. Lange's notion that the Lord's design is to make His approaching departure from the feast a symbol of His final departure from the people generally, accords well enough with his harmony, which makes the Lord now depart. But we think with many others that He remained in Jerusalem or its neighbourhood until the Dedication: besides which this insignificant link is otherwise altogether unnecessary;

[1] Ver. 20 thus demonstrates the connection, and does not, as Klee says, indicate a breaking off of this discourse, and the commencement of one totally different.

we can well enough understand how it was that he should come to speak more and more sadly and warningly concerning His departure, even if the obvious connection with ver. 14 were wanting. The *ζητήσετέ με* by no means signifies (as we have already shown on ch. vii.) any malicious snares that they would lay, but is the ground of the immediately following warning (thus *explaining* the *οὐκ εὑρήσετε* of ch. vii. 34)—that they would then find no Deliverer from sin and death! The dying *ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ* is incorrectly and superficially viewed, if the *ἐν* is taken for propter; so also in Ezek. iii. 19, xviii. 26, xxxiii. 9, 18 (where Luther so translates) בְּדָמָם ,בְּעַוְלוֹ ,בַּעֲנוֹנוֹ are to be understood in the deeper meaning.[1] The solemn expression, well known to all who heard it, may be considered as partly referring to these and similar passages; partly, as recalling the awful and pregnant report of the chronicle upon Saul, who exhibited in his final self-destruction what was the guilt of his whole life—וַיָּמָת שָׁאוּל בְּמַעֲלוֹ. (1 Chron. x. 13.) The sing. *ἁμαρτία* is significant, and is to be distinguished from the more simple plural into which the expressions fall in ver. 24. Sin is regarded as in its deepest principle a unity, a whole, just as it is viewed in ver. 34; but this most concrete of all things must not be unguardedly reduced to a vague "in abstracto." Many from the earliest times have interpreted it as if *unbelief* were the one sin unto death, the deadly sin which plunges into destruction; but this is an anticipation of the Holy Spirit's gracious and sharp conviction (ch. xvi. 9), and is inappropriate here, where the Lord, ver. 24, opposes to unbelief the many *ἁμαρτίαι* which only by faith are to be removed. Bengel's keen observation is correct, that in this first saying the emphasis falls upon the *sin*, in the subsequent repetition of it, upon the *dying* in their sins. In sin will ye die away, ye will retain and carry it with you even to death and doom; that is, now for the first time—not free and delivered from it, inasmuch as ye have rejected Me who offer you this deliverance. Ye will die in a *state of sin*, tainted with sin (Euthym.

[1] Zeller (Beugg. Monatsbl. 1851. Nr. 4) shows the great difference between dying in their sins and because of their sins—with an excellent illustration from the two crucified thieves. Both die because of their sin, but only one in his sins.

ver. 24 συνεχόμενοι), or yet more distinctly—sunken and overwhelmed in your evil and wretchedness, which can only issue in *death*. (Nonnus has afterwards on ver. 24 poetically but sound, δυσσεβίης ἐγκύμονες.) We must be on our guard against giving this warning of Jesus too political an application to the downfall of the nation as a whole. That was indeed the great historical exhibition of what was signified; but the remark of Baumgarten-Crusius is quite correct, that in the three synoptic evangelists the last warning discourses of Jesus refer more to the fate of the people, but that in St John the warnings are pointed to their individual persons as such. Certainly in ch. viii. the latter reference is most evidently marked.

The interruption of the Jews at this point does not in the slightest degree enter into the meaning of the solemn words, but clings to the repeated ὑπάγω, and without daring to utter itself directly to Jesus any more than at ch. vii. 35, 36. It is full of infatuated malignity, being much beyond their former question of ignorant curiosity, which might have had misunderstanding as its foundation. But this descends to the most rabid and common scorn. They are obliged to show that they understand Him to speak of an absolute departure to the other world. They are fully conscious of themselves seeking to kill Him; yet they pervert his words and ask—Is this voluntary *going away* from us intended to mean that he (in despair of escaping us), will kill himself? It must be remembered, in connection with this, that among the Israelites, unlike the heathen, there existed a peculiar abhorrence of suicide. If the quotation usually made from Josephus (de bell. Jud. 3, 8, 5), does not represent the popular supposition precisely, it nevertheless is so far applicable as to suggest the malignant ὅπου which their bitter thoughts referred to the ὑπάγειν of the self-murderer—*thither* we cannot come, we the devout children of Abraham shall not indeed follow him *there!* Omitting this thought it would have been too obvious for denial that they would in death assuredly follow Him into scheol. (1 Sam. xxviii. 19). So that there is a ᾅδης σκοτιώτερος to which they now consign the Lord, as they had before sent Him to the Gentiles!

Ver. 23. If the Lord on that former occasion forebore to break silence with regard to their misapprehension, He will now speak

out all the more plainly on account of their malice; for He will not at this feast permit His mouth to be stopped, He will not refrain His lips. (Ps. xi. 9). But what an answer does He give, which passing by their scorn, bears yet more strenuously and clearly its full testimony! (Hence again *εἶπεν* instead of *ἀπεκρίθη*.) What He now utters—Ye are from beneath, I am from above—is amply and at once demonstrated in His serene and peaceful words as opposed to their audacious malice.[1] Yea verily, if no faith in them form through regeneration the bridge of transition, they can never come to the place whither He goes, and *already is* in His true being as it regards His original: they cannot even come to the right understanding of His plainest words, words which lay hold upon their consciences, and touch them where man must ever be touched, by appeal to *sin and death!* There is a gulf fixed between, as between above and below—heaven and hell. Or may this last contrast be regarded as too violent, and inapplicable here? We can scarcely believe that it is. It is clear of itself, and is demonstrated by the succeeding statement, that *τὰ κάτω* and *τὰ ἄνω* must mean something quite different from the previous saying of ch. iii. 31. But in this succeeding sentence the Lord evidently descends and softens His expression, since He says no more of Himself than what holds good also of those who believe in Him—they are not of this world. (Ch. xv. 19, xvii. 14—16.) If thus the two statements are *not parallel*, and if He had signified by His *ἄνω Heaven*, according to the analogy of all His other discourses concerning the place He came from, then must the antithetic *κάτω* necessarily, to our apprehension, refer to the extreme opposite of heaven (Matt. xi. 23). We know very well that in other places the *earth* alone is the corresponding opposite of heaven, and in similar phrase, for example Acts ii. 19; Ex. xx. 4, &c. But this does not prove that the *κάτω* standing *absolutely* here (which must not be overlooked) means, as Bengel thinks, only ex terrâ. And all the less as *this*, as a phrase indicating place simply, involves nothing essentially *evil*, as we may learn from the words

[1] Teschendorff's interpolation is so far very good—"that which ye now say troubles Me not!" Schleiermacher—"the Lord answers their dark and confused sayings as if He had not heard them; He calmly pursues His former discourse."

of the Baptist, ch. iii. 31. Ye are earthly minded (or merely *low* minded!)—is a meaning which falls far below the character of *sharp contrast* which pervades the whole chapter. If the following member of the verse is to be regarded as a descent and softening of His words, then must the ἐκ τῶν κάτω of the preceding have asserted something much deeper than merely ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου. Fikenscher writes: "if the Greek phrase could be established from the New Test. I should be inclined to expound it *from hell*; the antithesis with heaven would be then more definite." But the Old Testament must be sufficient for the interpretation of the phrase, though we have even in the New, Eph. iv. 9, κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς manifestly for Hades, whatever the new exegesis may say in opposition. For he who does not discern this meaning in the corresponding תַּחְתִּיּוֹת הָאָרֶץ (Ps. lxiii. 10, comp. lv. 16; Ps. cxxxix. 15; Ezek. xxvi. 20; xxxii. 18, and even Isa. xliv. 23, in spite of a false and superficial interpretation) must be altogether wanting in the power to read aright. This is our full justification for maintaining that the Lord now already points in this κάτω (as His discourses commonly prepare their own way) to that which, in ver. 44, is more plainly announced. (Nonnus: ὑμεῖς νερτερίοιο κατήλυδες ἐστὲ βερέθρου—Erasmus in his paraphrase, ab infernis. This alone corresponds entirely with their *dying* in their sins, which cannot here refer simply to bodily death; thus in their case as in His, whither they go is conformable with whence they come. Finally, let the deep intimation be observed as it is an actual reply; *ye* are the self-destroyers, who will cast yourselves into the abyss of despair, because ye will remain in those sins which spring from the abyss.[1]

Ver. 24. As it regards the repetitions of this chapter, and

[1] These words have been even connected with ver. 6, according to the interpretation of the writing upon the ground which was mentioned above, but we may safely leave this uninvestigated. Münchmeyer opposes my view; and comparing chap. iii. 31 (which, however, is inapplicable to the case of these Jews) sees in this κάτω only 'earthly," involving no blame; with an *advance* in the meaning afterwards—ye are *of the world!*—But I can only reply as above. Indeed, to say without any argument "I do not so understand it, but otherwise," is the undoubted right of every censor, but nothing is thereby corrected.

generally of all St John's reports of our Lord's discourses, which certain critics denominate "tedious," Ebrard has well said: —"the contradictions of their errors must necessarily consist in ever-recurring repetitions of principles, as their objections are ever, with all their differences, the same in their reality." But we would add two observations to this: first, that the nail which His testimony with its repeated strokes would fasten, is fixed in their heart and conscience, not in their understanding; and then, that this very circumstance exhibits the *patience* of our Saviour's love in a manner which never can be sufficiently observed.—Moreover, there is never any pure repetition, not even here, as we have already seen; the ἀποθανεῖσθε precedes now with more strength, and the plural ἁμαρτίαις comes home more convincingly to their actual life. *If ye believe not*—this is certainly what was intended in ver. 21; but it is now first made prominent against all misunderstanding, as the condition and the limitation of the threatened death. We detect here already the self-same utterance which at the close, Mark xvi. 16, leaves only damnation to the unbelievers! The ἐγώ εἰμι, standing absolutely here and in ver. 28, is of special emphasis. Of this we may first of all, and with great propriety say that its predicate must be supplied from all the previous sayings of our Lord, which are concentrated in this one declaration—I am the Redeemer from sin, and from dying in sin.[1] (Comp. also Mark xiii. 6; Acts xiii. 25; Jno. xiii. 19.) This, after so many plain testimonies, was manifest enough. Yet it seems to us, and to many with us,[2] that there lies in the background of this most dignified, though reserved expression of our Lord's absolute self-testimony, a *disclosure* of His innermost being and nature. For it is God alone who says unconditionally concerning Himself—*I am He*—I am what I am, the great and only אֲנִי הוּא (Deut. xxxii. 39; Isa. xxxiv. 16, 17; Jer. xvi. 22; Ps. cii. 28, especially Isa. xliii. 10, 13, xlvi. 4, xlviii. 12, hence הוּא alone has become among the Arabs a name of God.) The Peschito seems by its emphatic אנא דאנא to express the same, and we shall presently read in the sublime and mysterious words

[1] Not absolutely here—the Messiah!

[2] Storr, for instance, über den Zweck Johannis, S. 200 ff.

of ver. 25, a very apt analogon to this ἐγώ εἰμι, the הַמְדַבֵּר added to the אֲנִי הוּא out of Isa. lii. 6.

Ver. 25. It is their desire, as they impetuously and angrily press upon Him, that He should now expressly say, which He, however, does not—ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ Χριστός; this is confirmed by a comparison with ch. x. 24. But the demand is more violent and malicious now than it is in that chapter, where they bring it before Him in a more diffuse manner than in the keen and pointed question which they here hastily interject. The decisive answer is assuredly sought now, as it is expressly said ch. x. 25, 26, not by *faith* which is prepared to *hear* and receive it, but by unbelief, which, obtaining that answer, would use it as a vantage-ground for further opposition, contest, and accusation.[1] The answer which is introduced by εἶπεν (as in vers. 21, 24) does not therefore directly reply to them; it rather retreats and repels at first, for his calm and equable spirit cannot be induced by anything to go beyond the limits of wisdom and love. There could be in His case no such thing as a constrained or extorted revelation of Himself.

But how are we to understand the word which He so calmly opposes to their precipitance? It would require a volume itself, to do justice historically, philologically, and hermeneutically to the exposition of a passage which has been confused even from the earliest times; or to follow with our corrections in the footsteps of misconception playing around its truth. We may thus much presuppose, with consent of all, that τὴν ἀρχήν is to be understood adverbially; and ὅ, τι with diastole.[2] Consequently, εἰμί

[1] Baümlein (Stud. und Krit. 1846, 2) goes too far when he supposes that the question required no answer, but that the scornful σύ preceding signified—*who art thou then*, that thou darest thus to speak to us!

[2] The principium and qui of the Vulg. can scarcely be explained. Augustine's application—Hold me for, term me the ἀρχή, is not admissible on any grounds. Bengel, not knowing otherwise to escape the difficulty, read ὅτι as in a parenthesis, and connected the τὴν ἀρχήν with the following πολλὰ ἔχω, thus making the whole one complete, independent sentence; but scarcely any one (besides Olshausen and Brandt's Bibel.) will agree with him. He cuts the knot when he says—non facile distinctio ulla plus molestiæ peperit exegetis, quam punctum post hoc ὑμῖν; and places a comma instead. The Lord's meaning would then be:—At first (or principally) *because* I speak

must supplement *τὴν ἀρχήν* as the subject, and the predicate of this *εἰμί* lies in the *ὅ, τι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν*, which, however, evasively contains in some sort an answer to the *τίς*. But the critical and transitional meaning of the adverbial *τὴν ἀρχήν* is itself contested among the philologists. We agree on the whole with de Wette (see especially in the Stud. u. Krit. 1834, 4, 924) who has gained a clear insight into the whole passage, much clearer, indeed, than Bengel and many more recent expositors, and very ably refutes the false acceptations of it. *Τὴν ἀρχήν*, originally equivalent to *ἐν ἀρχῇ* or *ἐκ ἀρχῆς*, in the beginning,[1] passed by easy transition from the relation of time to the quality or relation of the thing concerned, just as in *überhaupt*, essentially, from the very beginning, radically. This is quite correct; but we must not make the distinction too broad, and reject the signification "first, first of all," for this very naturally adheres to it still, when relation to something else arises. The signification prorsus, omnino (Euthym. and Chrys. *ὅλως*) must be given up *if* it is sundered from any idea of relation to other things, and made into a mere "assuredly," and synonymous with *ἀμήν*, as Lücke regarded it.[2]

But now for *ὅ, τι*. First, we must rigorously protest against the frequent acceptation of it which interprets—omnino or imprimis *is* sum, quem me esse vobis dico; id sum, quod *loquor*, *i.e. dico* vobis. So Erasmus: Primum sum quod etiam *dico* vobis. (Yet he is more distinct in his paraphrase, which might be compatible with the truth—in primis, quod et loquor vobis). So Glassius: quod vobis annuncio et inculco, nempe lux mundi. So also Luther in the first edition: eben das, was ich euch sage. (Even his subsequent translation—*Erstlich der*, der ich mit euch rede, does not hit the point precisely, and does not justice to the

with you, I have much to say concerning *you*, &c. Mitium sermonis ab judicio infidelitatis vestræ, nunc magis etiam quam antea, jure *possim* facere, prius quam cetera promam: *sed* non tam tristia de vobis, quam salutaria de me constanter dico. Olshausen allows the *ὅ, τι* to remain in this connection—what I now say openly to you. He removes altogether the responding *εἰμί*, and places it as consequential in ver. 26—thus I am your. solemn Monitor! Similarly of late Baümlein, who places the answer yet further in the sequel.

[1] Sept.: Gen. xli. 21, xliii. 18—20; Dan. viii. 1 for בַּתְּחִלָּה.

[2] Just as Flacius had it—phrasis continens seriam asseverationem.

ὅ, τι, though we shall see that he explains the sense rightly). So Grotius very much limiting it: hoc ipsum, quod me hoc ipso tempore esse dixi, *i.e.* lux mundi. So even Schleiermacher—"before all, that which I tell you." Against this interpretation—I am that which, or I am He whom, I give myself out to be,[1] even allowing that ὅ, τι would bear that sense, de Wette utters a well-founded protest, when he says that λαλεῖν (which Grotius vaguely referred to מלל) signifies *speaking* in respect to the matter or form of the discourse generally, and is never used of *saying* any individual words. To refer τὴν ἀρχήν to the following sentence (with Tholuck, and many others, especially among practical expositors)—"I am that which I have declared myself to be from the beginning" or—"that which I have *earlier* told you," is, in spite of the apparent parallel ch. x. 25 so "violent a transposition" (as Klee says), that we are compelled to give it up.[2]

Is then the difficulty to be solved philologically, or not? Lücke has in desperation marked out a course which appears as a most unhappy way of escape from its pressure. He takes (in company, indeed, with some ancients) the whole clause as a *question*, ὅ, τι being *wherefore*; and regards Jesus as indignantly asking—"*Why do I still speak to you*, who are so little inclined to hear and understand?" And he gives the question, further, a tone which would say—"*generally*, I know not, wherefore I yet speak further to you!"[3] Apart from the suspicious turn given to the καί, we cannot but wonder that Lücke's "Christian consciousness" did not recoil from such an outbreak of *indignation* on the part of Jesus. His patient answer in chap. x. 25, which

[1] Hess: "*We are now where we were before.* I might have much to say concerning you, &c. Berlenb. Bib.:—It comes back to what I have already said to you. Klee: Truly, what I said to you!

[2] Nonnus: ὅ, τι περ ὑμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὀάριζον. The recent London Heb. N.T. scruples not to translate: זֶה אֲשֶׁר אָמַרְתִּי אֲלֵיכֶם מֵרֵאשִׁית; but even then it should be בַּתְּחִלָּה or מֵרֵאשִׁית אֵת אֲשֶׁר מְרַבֵּר לָכֶם.

[3] Whether Euthymius leaned that way, is very doubtful. His words—ὅλως ὅτι καὶ λαλῶ ὑμῖν, περιττόν ἐστιν—ἀνάξιοι γάρ ἐστε παντὸς λόγου ὡς πειραστάι—may be understood otherwise, especially on account of the preceding ἐλλειπτικὸν τὸ ῥῆμα.

is quoted in favour of the above, is something altogether different from what would be here a reiterated passionate reply to passion. It is most unseemly to think of any such thing in connection with Him whose undisturbed serenity here and everywhere stands out in perfect contrast with the tumultuous excitement of His foes; for then would He not have maintained even that triumph of equanimity over His enemies which the Missionary must exhibit to the Hindoos. This would pervert the inmost meaning and spirit of His sublime reply into a petulant and abrupt ending of the controversy; quite out of harmony with the unwearied patience which renews in ver. 26 the appeal, not speaking of *them*, but still testifying of *Himself* as the Sent of the Father, thus continuing to answer their question.[1]

But it is time now to give conclusively the true meaning, as, with more or less distinctness, it has been in later times perceived. "I *am* that which I *speak!*" Is not this as simply harmonious in the phraseology, as it is internally true? True, indeed, in a most profoundly internal sense, so that the great mass of interpretations has been constrained more or less closely to graze it. Thus "the καὶ expresses the correspondency of the εἶναι and λαλεῖν," as Lücke himself says; and that with an emphasis which is the pith of the whole.[2] "The καὶ serves to establish an identity between that which Jesus speaks, and that which He is. The meaning of the words is—Ask not after *what I am*. Give ear before all things—before ye form any conception of Me, and give Me any name,—to My sayings, and understand from them with unbiassed susceptibility to the truth, Who I am!" (de Wette). We confidently ask, whether any thing can be more appropriate to the connection? Dräseke:—"Only let Me be to you what I can approve Myself to be, as I now stand

[1] Which last Baümlein in his protest against this exposition makes strongly prominent.

[2] The late v. Meyer wrote to me that he thought this ὅ, τι καί a Græcism, and one expression—id quod, idem quod, quodcunque. He quoted in favour of this a passage from the Pœmander of Hermes Trismegistus—ὁ δὲ Ποιμάνδρης ἐμοί· Ἐννόησάς, φησί, τὴν θέαν ταύτην, ὅτι καὶ (read ὅ, τι καὶ) βούλεται; Poemander vero ad me: Intellexistine, ait, hoc spectaculum, quidnam sibi velit? Which observation is at least a memorial of the fundamental and many-sided learning with which he investigated scripture.

before you. I ask you—Wherefore understand ye not My speech?" (ver. 43). Luther himself hit the meaning in his comment, better than in the text of the translation; not so much in the words which we shall afterwards quote with v. Gerlach, as in the marginal note:—"I am your *Preacher:* if ye rightly believe *that,* ye will well know who I am, not otherwise." I am before all things He who speaketh to you; He who now speaks, and whom ye will one day know. (Ver. 28). Seek the name and the essential substance of My whole being only in the entire whole of My sayings: in them My being reveals itself, *and it is one with them.*

And now the "*first of all*" or "*first*"[1] obtains for itself that true and impressive meaning which v. Gerlach thus expresses:—"First of all, that is, before any specific *name* which I might attribute to myself in answer to your question, and which would not make *My nature* more intelligible to you, *I am* that which I also *speak* to you." He sums up the full meaning of this great word in the most profound manner:—"Seek not the knowledge of My person independently of My revelation of Myself, especially in My words.—*I am that which I speak.*—He is the collective-substance of all His sayings; in His words He reveals Himself perfectly as *the Word* who created all things. The doctrine of Christ is nothing which lies out of, or apart from, Himself; He Himself is altogether Teacher, altogether Revelation, His doctrine is Himself. Every one therefore errs, who would form to himself a notion of Christ before he has given heed to His words; *no name, no definition can supply the place of a living progressive apprehension of His word.*" This is quite in harmony with Luther:—"He will not do them the honour to say who He is. For if these perverse Jews will apprehend God, and what God is, by their own wise thoughts, if they will picture Him to themselves, and form their own notion of Him, they must not be told and cannot. No good would come of that

[1] Which Baumgarten-Crusius rejects, because Jesus would be *nothing beyond* what He here intimates! Similarly Lücke—because Jesus was *first of all* the Saviour, and not the admonisher of the Jews! Is it so? Was He not before all things the λόγος—was not the setting free from sin effected by His word, as He Himself presently says (vers. 31—32)?

—He will not be known by man's understanding, but only *through His word.*" But we must make this fundamentally sound by adding—*and this is His most essential name,* that He is *He who speaketh,* the *Word,* or that His I is one with His sayings; and thus in His own manner, and under the semblance of declining or refusing it, He has given the plainest and most perfect answer to their σὺ τίς εἶ. Thus did His wisdom give them a mystery for their after pondering, the external and most obvious tone of which was—"hear Me only, instead of asking about Me!" while its internal and profound meaning was—"*I am the Word!*"[1]

And, indeed, the Word *from the beginning.* And may not this too lie latent as the undertone of τὴν ἀρχήν? We cannot but think so, and find in this the reason of the prominent place assigned to this remarkable expression. Τὴν ἀρχήν means in its most obvious acceptation—now, before all things, for you; but then the fundamental *reason* of that is involved and included in the same word—from the beginning of all things, literally *before* all, I am what I speak, the Revelation, the Revealer of Him who essentially is. (Cyril, among the ancients, Lampe, and even Fritsche, refer it to the beginning of all.) We discern in it, moreover, a very significant prelude to ver. 58 of this same chapter. In the preface to this entire work we made allusion to the prophetic passage in Isaiah lii. 6, which Meyer has adduced, in connection with Jno. i. 1, to illustrate our present passage: and beg now to refer our readers to what was there said. Christ is, in his primitive unoriginated *Being* more than the *Messiah* of the Jews, yea more than the *Saviour* of sinful men: He is the מְדַבֵּר simply ἐξ ἀρχῆς, in whom alone, and that in absolute perfection, the ἐγώ εἰμι of God is uttered and revealed. Let the similarly profound passage (Ezek. xii. 25) be also collated; in which after the אֲנִי יְהוָה follows the essentially connected

[1] Flacius, who has dilated upon this passage *sub voce* principium, quotes "quidam ex recentioribus" who thus understood it—illud ipsum verbum sum, quod loquor vobiscum, quia Christus est verbum Patris, *vult in verbo cognosci.* He regrets this, however, but calls it an interpretatio multo planior quam ceteræ omnes superiores, neque ullum verbum detorquens.

אֲדַבֵּר אֵת אֲשֶׁר אֲדַבֵּר, which does not *only* mean—what I say shall stand, but is the perfect parallel of אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה, (Ex. iii. 14).[1] The ἐγώ εἰμι of our Lord's words, (ver. 24), approached closely this definition of God; and in perfect consistency with this we are to understand the present words:—Before all other things which may give Me designation, *I am*, essentially and originally, *that which I speak:* My whole discourse alone reveals My being, which has its outgoing in that.

We should, in conclusion, observe specifically how here the view of de Wette, shrinking from this full interpretation, is *deepened* and defended from the perversion of a superficial application. Even the Rationalists concur unanimously in saying that—we must only hear Jesus and receive His doctrine; He requires no more than this, nor assumes any other prerogative. But this doctrine of Christ, again, is nothing independent of, or apart from Himself; if He is heard in truth, it will be further found that all His λαλεῖν speaks of His εἶναι, is entirely filled and penetrated and pervaded by that. So far as this goes, the explanation—I am He, and I am that which I give Myself out to be, what I have said to you concerning Myself, is included, and *follows* necessarily from it: provided only that it be accepted in its profound internal significance. Lange says truly: "the ὅ, τι καὶ λαλῶ is *not*, as de Wette would have it, to be referred merely to the spirit of the doctrine of Jesus, but also to His *declarations* concerning His own Person." Who then would dare to exclude or efface this, except the disingenuous Rationalists, the Friends of Light—or its *enemies*?—who would efface the spots of fanaticism from the Light of the world!

Ver. 26. Scarcely has He uttered this brief and profound reply—evading their question and yet most conclusively answering it—than He proceeds, in patience and love, to add to it a further elucidation. Ye must before all things *hear what I speak;* and in this is contained also, *what I am*:—such was the

[1] Which we have interpreted in another place (in our heb. Lehrgebäude, S. 269):—One only, the Great and only one, is *who* He is, *as* He is, and *because* He is: that is, all His attributes and perfections are only the expressions of His being, which has its ground in itself. Existence is His essence, and all the possible forms of the primitive root הָיָה are but His one perfect name.

new, not yet expressed, disclosure of His meaning. But this conclusive saying is very significantly combined with all that had preceded:—*And* what I speak and testify, is *first of all* and pre-eminently *concerning yourselves*, a reproof of your sins; for it is only for your sakes, for your salvation (ch. v. 34) that I speak of Myself. The ἐγώ εἰμι is spoken, in order that ye may believe, and not die in your sins! We must undeniably think of the unexpressed antithesis περὶ ἐμοῦ in connection with the expressed περὶ ὑμῶν; but it is harsh and incorrect to understand the λαλεῖν and κρίνειν in this passage merely of His testimony concerning Himself "as if in contrast with their false notions." The discourse takes up again the thread of vers. 16 and 24. Your *sins* are *many;* I have so many things to say of your unbelief and disobedience that I must still begin again to speak of that, and must have your earnest attention while I speak of your own sins, before ye can apprehend who I am. By that and that alone; by submitting to be judged, and to see your sins in the light of My truth, can ye come to a right knowledge of Me.[1] And we may with more propriety say conversely, that in the λαλῶ ὑμῖν, ver. 25, *this* was pre-eminently intended, though not alone; for the shining of His light, *reproving the darkness*, testifies convincingly of Himself, and teaches first how to understand His cry—I am the Light. The ἔχω is absolute and direct, and is not to be understood as many understand it—I *might have* much to judge concerning you—or, I have the matter, and the right, and the power, and *might* judge you if I would—so that there must be supplied—But I restrain Myself, in order to spare you. We see plainly throughout this chapter, that the Lord did not, even as we might suppose that He could not, spare them in any such manner; He did not, nor could He, withhold any of that condemnation which was due to their blindness and folly. For what effect could that have? The restraint and suppression of the full truth would be only a withholding of the wholesome discipline which is the most powerful incentive to faith. Thus the ἀλλά of the subsequent clause must have an altogether different meaning; and the clause itself is alto-

[1] "Unbelief demands that every thing should be calmly and clearly proved to it, without any threatening vehemence. But there is no validity in proof which does not awaken the conscience." Rieger.

gether opposed to the meaning which we have condemned. But, He that sent Me is *true:* how could that suit the idea—But I say not all for your condemnation, which I might have to say ?[1] Lücke is perfectly right in interjecting something of this kind: —This pleases you not, ye contradict all that I say—ye ever turn away precipitately from the words which rebuke *your* sin, to the barren question—Who art *thou?*—but this My judgment of you is nevertheless true, as already said, ver. 16. *I cannot and may not spare you*—that is plainly involved in the words. For the Father who is true commands: as I hear from Him, I speak. His speaking is under the same law as His working, ch. v. 19. Ταῦτα λαλῶ appears to us preferable to λέγω here, as in ver. 28; although the latter might indicate the accessory notion of every individual λέγειν in this λαλεῖν περὶ αὐτῶν. Εἰς τὸν κόσμον (comp. τῷ κόσμῳ, ch. xviii. 20) is neither the same with πρὸς, nor with ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, κατὰ τοῦ κόσμου, against the world: but we regard it with the Berlenberg Bible—*into the world*, comp. Lu. xxiv. 47, Mar. xiii. 10, εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη. "A more lively expression of diffusion than the dative." And we find in Bengel: sermo concisus, *i.e.*, hæc mundo ante ignota pertuli in mundum, et loquor in mundo, ut dicantur per testes meos in mundum totum, a fide alienum, at, sive vos credetis, sive minus, crediturum. Vestram contumaciam non moror. This is a very appropriate enlargement of the first περὶ ὑμῶν, and involves the deep truth, that the Lord spoke His severe words in all earnestness to those who immediately heard them, in order to bring them to a wholesome acquaintance with their sinful selves; but that He at the same time spake those words over their hard hearts and heads into all posterity and into all the world. Thus does He perfectly discharge His Father's commission, speaking forth boldly and persistently the truth which He had brought from above:—assured that every word will in due time find its right hearer, and that none will be spoken in vain. It was of this parrhesia of our Lord's words that Luther thought, when he translated—*before the world.* Here we find the full solution of

[1] Such expositors give it then this turn:—but He remains true to His *merciful* promises: or—He will in His own time bring the truth to light, &c. All this is artificial, contrary to many parallel sayings, and opposed to the connection here.

the question, why our Lord so profusely poured out His doctrine upon these hardened Jews, whose condemnation He foreknew: we think while we read them, how brightly shine now through all the world the words which fell there upon darkened understandings; and how convincingly those judicial words which were then despised are now exercising their judicial influence upon the consciences of men.

The interposed remark of the Evangelist, ver. 27, *seems* to contradict what was said upon ver. 19; but the οὐκ ἔγνωσαν which he himself, in amazement at such stiff-necked infatuation, testifies against them, does not assuredly mean that they had altogether failed to understand that Jesus in His πέμψας spoke of God. The τὸν πατέρα will rather say that they persistently refused to understand, they would not discern (quite in unison with the word of Jesus, ver. 19) that He testified the God who sent to be in truth *His Father*, and consequently that He Himself was the Son of God. The gloss τὸν θεὸν is quite correct, if thus correctly understood, but not if the emphasis is laid upon θεός. The Evangelist interjects the mention of this, which refers less to the circumstance of the moment than to the stiff-necked blindness of these hearers generally, in order to lay the foundation for the words which follow, in which the Lord now proceeds to promise a universal τότε γνώσεσθε for the future, with regard to that ἐγώ εἰμι which He had almost in vain uttered to the world.

Vers. 28, 29. The *lifting up* here solemnly referred to, is pre-eminently the public exhibition, and universal proclamation, and glorification, of our Lord, *in order to His being known;* but it indicates at the same time specifically, as the Evangelist remarks himself (ch. xii. 32), a lifting up in death, as is incontrovertibly proved by the words—when *ye* have lifted up the Son of man! Many times afterwards did He tell them what they desired to inflict upon Him, and what they would inflict upon Him—His *death*. Here then we have the retrospective answer to ver. 22.[1]

[1] Even Schleiermacher understands the expression of the Cross according to the common phraseology of the people, and says: "If it had been to them an unintelligible expression, the Lord would not have employed it." Lange's supposition (iii. 627) that the Jews might have simply misunderstood the Lord as referring to His elevation to

But the *crucifixion*, as it took place through the development of circumstances before Pilate, through the clamour for Barabbas, and so forth, was at this time a thing so improbable and incredible to the Jews, that we may accept what Pfenninger puts into the mouth of his Zephonias:—"Among us the lifting up is a current expression for crucifying. But that could have no meaning here—for it would be madness even to think of his undergoing that at the hands of our rulers. The man doth nothing, and never will, which might involve him in a shadow of accusation before the Roman tribunal."—When, then, the Lord predicts as the consequence of His being lifted up, that is, after His glorification effected through the death of the Cross, that all who now misunderstood Him will know who He is; we must make three reflections upon His words, if we would understand them aright in their fulness of meaning. First, that He includes in one word both the knowledge of Himself through voluntary repentance, and the instrumentality of judgment—the latter commencing with historical judgment—through the testimony of the Holy Ghost (ch. xvi. 8—11) and the victory of His church. Secondly, that ὅταν and τότε stretch forward into the futurity as *beginning* with His lifting up, with the same meaning as the ἀπάρτι spoken before Caiaphas. (Matt. xxvi. 64). Thirdly, that according to ver. 26, the Lord addresses these Jews as the representatives of the whole κόσμος, and thus means, in the fullest sense:—the world will and must first crucify Me, and then will the world know Me.

How then does the sequel correspond with this? Lampe could find no connection, and therefore very harshly proposed to supply to the καὶ in both cases a "porro dixit" and "iterum dixit;" as if the Evangelist quoted two unconnected utterances in addition. It is impossible to accept this, and the connection is not so very far to seek. The former καὶ hangs in continuation upon the ὅτι, and gives a repeated exposition of the ἐγώ εἰμι; the second indeed, commencing a new sentence, adjoins an independent announcement. The first clause we are well acquainted with already, and needs no further illustration:

His Messianic throne, is altogether unintelligible to us in the connection of *this* chapter!

—excepting just to remark upon the intertwined ποιεῖν and λαλεῖν (in relation to both of which equally ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ is denied), as well as upon the profound condescension of the use of ἐδίδαξε. (Comp. upon ch. v. 20.) The second clause contains a very natural conclusion; intimating the reason of that before announced victory in death—the might and power of the Father never failing Him to the last. The ἀφῆκε refers not directly to the future, but embraces the whole extant period since His sending into the world, passing onward to the great futurity. The Aorist depends on πέμψας, as Winer remarks, but not that we should think of the "act of sending and of the οὐκ ἀφιέναι as one," nor as if He would say:—"The Father left Me not alone upon the earth, but promised me when He sent Me His constant presence and help." But the ἀφῆκε belongs also to the continuous μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐστιν, and embraces the whole period since His mission, for the confirming ὅτι with a πάντοτε follows. (Bengel points to this latter evidence). That which was said in ver. 16 is now repeated, and with a further consequence deduced from it:—*because* He who sent His Son dwelleth in Him, showing Him all His works and teaching Him all His words, as the Son who ever did that which was well-pleasing to Him—*therefore* is He also *with Him* in the sense of helping, can never disavow or fail Him whom He hath sent. The Aorist is here actually a convincing Preterite, according to Lynar's paraphrase—He hath *never yet* left Me, even till now, as ye see. The Lord Himself speaks in His humility almost the same word which His apostle afterwards used, Acts xxvi. 22. "Have ye yet been able to take Me? Behold, I stand before you all, and still bear My witness in the strength of God!" But it is, finally, *intimated*:—and *when* My hour cometh, when it will be permitted *to you* to lift Me up—*even then*, when He should most fearfully be left alone, His disciples forsaking Him (ch. xvi. 32), Israel rejecting Him, the world knowing Him not, the Father *would not* leave Him alone. Hence it is evident that *this* clause cannot depend upon the γνώσεσθε ὅτι; but is parallel with it as the ground of hope and promise. When the Lord thus once more, as often previously, but now in the most lowly possible expression, points to His own holy life *almost* (for the πάντοτε as spoken by Him could be true of Himself alone) ἐν ὁμοιώματι of all holy men doing the things which please

God, as manifest to the eyes of all the world,—we cannot but perceive a new contrast with vers. 7, 21, 24, and a preparation for ver. 46 in this same chapter, *where the Holy One places Himself in opposition to all man's sinful race.* The mediating transition will be plainly manifest in vers. 34, 35, 38.

Thus composed and dignified, thus keenly penetrating every interlocution of the excited masses in the midst of whom He peacefully stood, thus meekly, moreover, and confidingly, did the Lord on this occasion utter His solemn words. After St John had at first, ver. 27, observed of those who heard them that they οὐκ ἔγνωσαν, he very gladly goes on to say, that amid the fluctuations which the Lord's words excite in this vast sea of human spirits, πολλοὶ ἐπίστευσαν, and indeed already εἰς αὐτόν, for it was the actual commencement of that, though with equal propriety it is immediately exchanged for the mere αὐτῷ, in order to interpret precisely the character of this beginning. This faith arising through the *word* (ταῦτα αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος) was something more than that first mentioned in chap. ii. 23, 24, more than that of chap. vii. 31; yet as being a sudden impulse and excitement it is something less than that recorded in chap. x. 42 as the result of a comparison of His words and works, and the testimonies of John and of Christ.[1] A certain sincerity and truth lay in this undoubtedly weak beginning, though it did not hold out; otherwise the Lord would not have proceeded to found His remarks upon it. It is altogether inappropriate, and out of harmony with the profound spirit of this Gospel, to ask in what way these initial believers evidenced their πιστεύειν, or to presuppose that they expressed it in words. It must ever be re-

[1] The notion of Lange, which has been before referred to, supposes that they had given a chiliastic meaning to the Lord's last words, and had understood them in the Jewish sense:—"so then we must first begin to act as if we would exalt him, and when he sees that he can reckon upon us he will openly announce himself!" "So that through a *misunderstanding* they had become his partizans!" We see, in chap. xii. 34, that this lifting up sounded very differently in the people's ears. And this chapter does not speak of people "who seemed to have come to faith in Him," for the Evangelist in his account of them, and the Lord in His own words to them, both regard this beginning of faith as true and earnest.

membered that our Lord was inwardly conscious of every, the slightest impression which his words produced, just as He felt that virtue had gone out of Him on another occasion (Mar. v. 30; Lu. viii. 46); and our own analogous experience should confirm this to us, since we, his feeble servants, have some faint consciousness of the reception of our words, and can mark if they are repelled. The Evangelist either concludes very naturally from the contents of the following discourse, that it referred to these πεπιστευκότας, or by the profound attention which he gave to the progress of the colloquy, he at the time perceived this turning-point in its application.

Vers. 31, 32. The οὖν teaches us significantly how our Lord, with the most gracious and earnest solicitude to obtain hearing for His words, discerned and entered into this movement among the masses; it shows us that He directed His sayings to those who had become only *disposed to believe*, marking them out by the ὑμεῖς, although they were not so separate from the rest, as that He could regard them as a distinct company, and externally turn towards them. The gracious allurement of their faith is at the same time a test of it, for He knows well what there is in them; His words are to be interpreted by the critical *If*—ye will, indeed, not continue, ye will soon turn away again from me, when I proceed to point out the first true step to real discipleship! There is, as Kling says, in the μένειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, a certain εἶναι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ pre-supposed; but this is so weak and indistinct that only His rich graciousness recognizes it, and that same grace says enough for warning and further instruction.[1] We continue in the word, when we permit the word to continue in us, that is, to seize and penetrate us, according to its nature, yet more deeply, and find a permanent place in our souls (ver. 37, χωρεῖν); for in this case there is the constant mutual influence and co-operation between the word and faith (Heb. iv. 2),

[1] Not, however, as Olshausen maintains, that the most insincere person experiencing the power of God against his will has, through the penetration of the Logos into his nature, this beginning in himself—(the devil only being entirely free from the word of God). For this takes away the distinction between these believers and other men, and overlooks the critical point of a responsive voluntary action already presumed in the μένειν.

between the power of God and the will of man. Comp. ch. xv. 7, with respect to the *disciples*, where, however, ἐν ἐμοί is a deeper expression than this preliminary ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. Yet there is an actual ἐν, and Seiler's translation weakens its force—if ye hold firm to my teaching! So de Wette is not strictly correct: —if ye continue in my *doctrine;* for λόγος has a more internal significance: the instrument of the truth which maketh free is the power and life of God. With another reference, rather to the acknowledgment and firm maintenance of the dogma, St John (2 Ep. ver. 9) speaks of μένειν ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. This διδαχή is not *here* recognized as such, but just the succeeding ἀλήθεια. The most important and critical point here is, that every single word of Christ, in the internally felt power and truth of which we continue, involves, brings with it, and draws after it, His entire word and testimony in all its completeness. We saw, when considering ch. vii. 17, that this present promise of our Lord presupposes more, and takes a step further in advance, than the promise then given. There, the sincere will to do the legal will as revealed in the preparatory revelation was the condition in order to faith in the divine truth of the word of Jesus; this commencing faith is here presupposed, and must be again followed by a sincere *willing* and *doing* in the persevering, and deeper penetrating μένειν. We may not strictly say that this μένειν already includes practical obedience; it is rather the faith which is advancing towards that *knowledge* to which the *freedom* of the inner and outer life is first promised. The first word of the promise ἐστέ connects itself very well with the circumstances of the occasion; yet it is almost equivalent to the ἔσεσθε of ver. 36, for the ἀληθῶς which is there added involves an implied contrast, as if they scarcely were disciples as yet, indeed, were not at all. Hess:—"then shall ye deserve to be called my disciples!" For, in strict truth, the idea of μαθητής—which must be kept sacred from abuse and too precipitate assumption of its dignity—involves a persistent, increasing μανθάνειν, which leads to an essential γινώσκειν; and it is therefore much more than the fleeting impulse of a πιστεύειν which may be transitory, and which only in condescension to the germ inclosed receives the name.

The word of Christ, as the word of God, is assuredly *the truth*

(ch. xvii. 17), yet this full expression makes evident the present transition from the single word embraced to the persevering learning and acceptance of the whole of that which had been embraced by the words ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. There is therefore, and there must be, a difference, and a gradually developed contrast between λόγος and ἀλήθεια, for the whole word when *known* becomes then first the *truth* to us, in that profound and comprehensive sense in which St John and our Saviour use the expression. The truth of God *in Christ*, which sets man free from error and from sin, which redeems and brings him salvation! The fulfilment of the law and the prophets through the grace and truth which appeared in Him! ch. i. 17. And as the γνώσεσθε connects itself with the τότε γνώσεσθε of ver. 28 which it takes up and repeats (and which had then awakened their beginning faith), it is certain that ὅτι ἐγώ εἰμι is included, as the crown and fulness of the truth.

In this declaration of our Lord, the two great words "truth" and "freedom," which through the lie of Satan are ever pervading the world with false excitement, and stimulating to evil the whole life of man, are brought back to their fundamental element of truth—which, indeed, remains in them as incentive to good even in their perversion. Truth for his knowledge, freedom for his action, man ever seeks with inextinguishable right: but the only truth is in the Word of God, since the manifestation of the Son, the Word of Christ; and this alone makes men ὄντως ἐλευθέρους. The Lord afterwards ascribes the making free to the *Son* Himself, while He now first imputes it to the *truth* recognized and felt in His word; but we must not therefore dogmatically deny the distinction, and say that in the former sentence He also referred to Himself the personal Truth, according to ch. xiv. 6.[1] For there does remain a distinction between the truth which is to be known as such, in opposition to all error, and the concrete position which is contained in this abstraction, that this truth personally presents itself to us in Christ, and will live in us. Nor is it to be overlooked that the knowledge of the truth proceeds in a gradational manner: as much

[1] As the old commentators *(e.g.* Chrys. Theoph. Euthym.) after their not very discriminating manner; and many of our modern systematising expositors.

truth as there is, so much freedom is there. All freedom which is based upon delusion, and moves in an element of falsehood, is unreal, yea, is no other than the most shameful servitude. This is of itself a word of inexhaustible import,—shedding its light on all sides,—which the Lord cries to the erring world: that only the truth can make men free, is the everlasting causal-connection between the two great words. Wouldst thou *first* be free, in order that thou mightest in thy independent freedom investigate and seize the truth, where truth is not to be found—then is this an *inversion* of the right way! Further, as *faith* and abiding in the word precede the *knowing*,[1] so again the knowing precedes the *being made free;* yet this psychologically necessary priority in the gradual growth so entirely involves a living mutual action and reaction between faith and understanding, life and act, that one might almost say with propriety,—Only those who are made free, or are being made free, will livingly comprehend the truth. Lampe:—Licet ordine cognitio præcedat, ordo tamen ille ita insensibilis est, ut nullum temporis momentum distingui queat. —Unde jam facile perspicitur, cur Servator, licet effectum liberationis postponat effectui cognitionis, hæc duo tamen sibi *non tam subordinet quam coordinet*, tanquam duos magnos Veritatis cœlestis in corde hominis effectus. That sin cannot be overcome by "*mere* knowledge," Julius Müller well shows. Doctrine of Sin, Vol 1, p. 188 (Clark's For. T. Lib).

In all this we have pre-supposed in the christian reader a right understanding of the meaning of ἐλευθερώσει: it remains, however, that we indicate what is the amplitude of its meaning in connection with ἀλήθεια. We must not yield to the rash and precipitate folly which is too prevalent in exposition and would everywhere level at once all difficulties, and be misled into regarding this freedom in ver. 32 as *merely* freedom from the bondage of sin, in the sense of ver. 34. *Merely* freedom from sin! it may be cried—Is not that full and absolute freedom? Assuredly, in its innermost *principle*—it is the point from which it starts and to which it aims: every imaginable freedom in truth begins with emancipation from the service of sin, and none can be alto-

[1] Augustin: Non quia cognoverant, crediderunt, sed ut cognoscerent crediderunt: credimus enim ut cognoscamus, non cognoscimus ut credamus.

gether free but those who are altogether sinless. Yet the *idea* of freedom (for ver. 32 is spoken with most rigorous reality of idea, and not in a vague and supposititious manner) embraces the extinction of all slavery which is the penalty of sin, and bound up with it. *First of all, even, and especially,* as the sequel teaches, freedom from the *ἁμαρτάνειν* of knowledge, deliverance from the bonds of all error and delusion, which may hold our souls under its influence. (Ps. lxxii. 14. מִתּוֹךְ וּמֵחָמָס, not to be translated, indeed, with Luther, but yet referring to מֵרְמוּת וְתוֹךְ, Ps. x. 7, תּוֹךְ וּמִרְמָה, Ps. lv. 12—see my Comm. on Psalms.) The Lord speaks with a tone of invitation to all the world, coming before Him with the consciousness which is, for example, expressed in Cicero's paradox—*ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος*, with which is connected the *πᾶς ὁ σπουδαῖος ἐλεύθερος* of Philo. He further speaks to the sincere among the Jews, who feel the *πνεῦμα* which they had received to be no more than a *πνεῦμα δουλείας εἰς φόβον*, who, without the true *υἱοθεσία*, sigh under the yoke of the law; freedom from this also must be contained, consequently, in this comprehensive word, which meets every feeling of bondage of every kind with appropriate promise. We therefore do not dogmatise incorrectly when we discover in this word of our Lord the germ and root of the full and expanded apostolical teaching concerning *freedom in Christ,* even including Gal. v. 1 and Jas. i. 25. For the becoming free from sin takes place in truth only as the becoming free from the *law* of sin (Rom. viii. 2)—according to Tholuck's deep and true comment, who suggests here what most others omit in the consideration of that passage. The freedom from the law, absolution from guilt, and the transformation of absolute command into an internal and free impulse of the will in thankful love, *produces* first actual freedom from sin. "He who believes the divine *ἀλήθεια*, that God elects us sinners, doomed and deserving to perish, to be children in Christ, feels within him filial love arising in return, and freedom from all desire of evil."

Finally, there belongs to the yoke of the law something more; and that is, the analogous subjection to the pupillage and guidance of man, which in Israel was closely connected with God's law. This pervades the whole world and Christendom itself:

—whether it exhibit itself under the sanction of the name of God, or assume its own proper name, being the dominion of the ἄρχοντες τοῦ κόσμου, τοῦ λαοῦ, τῶν κλήρων. He who attains to freedom in truth through the word of Christ personally and immediately apprehended and appropriated, is *emancipated* from all human ordinances of dogma or discipline, from all servile homage to genius, from all predominance of human leaders of the blind (see ch. vii. 26), as well as from every political yoke borne only under constraint. And because all these voices more or less speak lyingly of freedom, the Lord opposes to them all His own strong Truth, by His τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ. This whole saying is an impressive and important text for preaching upon festivals whether of the Reformation or the Constitution. In the year 1847, Stolle, the missionary, preached with perfect truth and seasonableness, in Berlin, that "if all the Jews were kings they would be but slaves—and if all kings made all Jews free, they would not yet be free." The Berlin Zeitung showed little acquaintance with the word of Christ, or faith in it, when it complained of "this provocative to fanaticism among the less instructed of the community!"

Ver. 33. These poor πεπιστευκότες soon come to the end of their faith; when freedom through the truth is explicitly announced to them, they pervert the precious promise into *contumely*, and turn away in their pride as those who were already free! Let this distinctively testing word, which the Lord gives here as a type and example, be applied to many who are *true believers*, and it will be found that the same result will follow. Such a consequence is only too natural. We understand the simple and plain words ἀπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ as uttered by no other than the same men to whom Jesus had just spoken; nor have we the slightest difficulty in reconciling ourselves to this. The notion that at this point others take up the word appears to us forced and unnecessary, though we have great respect for those who maintain it.[1] It is a twofold objection against which the

[1] More anciently Heinsius and Lampe, then Tholuck and Lücke; as also Schleiermacher in the Homilies, who says that the evangelist did not sufficiently distinguish one from the other in this miscellaneous multitude. Ebrard regards it as so obvious that there was no need for John to say that they were not πιστεύοντες who spoke now. Of the

Lord has now to defend and define the word which He had spoken: *twofold* actually, although the objectors urge both in their unity. *They* will persuade themselves that *as* Abraham's seed they have never been properly in bondage, *they* will lay the emphasis on *Abraham's seed*, from which it would necessarily follow that that seed needs not to be made free.[1] But the Lord in His reply carefully distinguishes the two things which were so closely interwoven; He begins with what was in reality the *second* objection, and rebuts that vers. 34—36, then in ver. 37 turns to the *first*. And here once more He critically and defensively distinguishes between the acknowledged, uncontested external meaning of this claim, and that other meaning, according to which the genuine children of Abraham must necessarily be also the children of God. Scarcely had He gently signified this than they break in, ver. 39, with their renewed assertion; constrained by this, and again by another such violent interjection ver. 41, He hesitates not to advance His convincing condemnation to its ultimate severity, ver. 44. But He does not close with this; He returns, vers. 45—47, to the original and milder utterance—Ye are not of God!

That which the Baptist, Matt. iii. 9, had already denounced, reappears here, for the theocratic national pride of the Jews was all the more deeply rooted in proportion to the real pre-eminence which God had assigned them, but which they had lyingly perverted. For the corruptions of the holiest things are the most hard to be healed. An endless variety of the expressions of Jewish pride may be brought forward from more ancient and more modern times, all tending to shew that these children of Abraham deemed themselves the lords of the earth by the here-

same view are Wesley, Rieger, von Gerlach, and Richter among practical expositors. The last says, "now answered, without being questioned, the unbelieving spokesmen of the crowd of hearers." So the Berlenburger—"now come some others and put in their shrill cry." But is this latter *ἀπεκρίθησαν αὐτῷ*—? Should de Wette translate it—"*some* answered him?" Brandt's Bibel says rightly, on the other hand, "when Jesus says something which, being misunderstood, offended their self-love, they soon show by their contradiction that they had not the right kind of faith in him."

[1] In Lampe's words—we are already free de jure and are so also de facto.

ditary, inalienable prerogative of race, and all mere variations of the theme—כָּל יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּנֵי מְלָכִים הֵם. But after God had done so much to humble these kings by servitude, they being at this very time subject to the Romans; *how could they say* that they needed not to be made free? Lange seeks to remove this difficulty by an acceptation of the words never to our knowledge suggested before. They had, he thinks, clearly observed that Jesus would speak of freedom in the spiritual sense, and had, therefore, themselves also designedly passed over to this sense, in order to constrain His avowal, that even in this the matter concerning them was not spiritual slavery. We never, they would say, yielded ourselves up to any man in the *spirit of slavery!* They had ever been free from error, and even in external servitude had always been inwardly the free sons of God in the house of God; they therefore needed no deliverance into freedom through the *truth*, however much they might need redemption, through the power of the Messiah, from the Romans!—We cannot but wonder if other expositors will fall in with this view; for ourselves we cannot; since such a subtle transition to the mediately apprehended spiritual language is opposed to the notorious Jewish mind. Besides which, the Lord's solemn answer with His ἀμήν would in that case have directly met such effrontery—(we know what thou meanest, but we are by no means the servants of delusion or of sin!)—to say nothing of the οὐδενί in their specific language. We think most certainly, in common with all other expositors, that they rather perversely passed by the word *truth*, and clave to the stumbling words *make you free.* In some *slight degree* they heard and marked that the Lord spake of something spiritual and internal, but not enough to enable them to understand the deep words concerning "knowing the truth," and to fix their thoughts upon this great word; they therefore revert in *unconscious evasion* to the external sense;[1] the Lord's ἐλευθεροῦν seems to them a discordant note, too injurious a word to express the Messianic deliverance which they had longed for, and altogether suitable to slaves. "The same men who were wont to chafe against all subjection to the

[1] According to the uniform analogy of almost all such answers in the Gospels!

heathenish yoke of the Romans as a disgraceful servitude, now feel their theocratic pride aroused, because the Lord describes them as servants who must be made free." (Neander.) Thus is the natural man without any fundamental apprehension, even when under the influence of strong seeming emotion; if the salvation is brought home to him, which he greatly needs, and which is freely offered, he finds it altogether needless, and repels it with foolish petulance and boasting.[1]

Lücke's opinion is more worthy of notice:—Since it was impossible that the Jews should have utterly forgotten their past and present political subjection as a people, we are driven to the supposition that they referred the Lord's words, not to the common political freedom of the nation, but to their *individual civil freedom*; and they might intelligently and honestly say that they had never served any man as *slaves*. Similarly Teschendorff (who makes some evil-disposed persons, standing by, the speakers) —"the more feelingly they resent their present political bondage, the more anxious are they to establish and make the most of their individual freedom, at least." Similarly Hess:—They had never, however, sunk into slavery—remarking further that "this was probably a soliciting hint that they would rather hear Him speak about political freedom." This view, even with this last doubtful modification (which is not, however, like Lange's), would be fair enough in itself; but the σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ with its pre-eminent emphasis too evidently embraces the *whole people* as such (with which the present individuals incorporate themselves by their ἐσμέν); and in this connection the μηδενὶ πώποτε, as an implied *necessary consequence* must assuredly go back to the very beginnings of this seed of Abraham. We hold therefore with Kling, that the denial of proper δουλεία is uttered *in relation to the entire history of the people*. It is, further, as impossible that they could have *forgotten* their bondage in Egypt, and Babylon, and so forth, even for a moment, as it is that they could have meant (as Bengel thinks)—*we*, at least, have never been in

[1] And this Jewish boast the German-Catholic Dowiat took for his text, as a word of Scripture, as an "old but ever new word" (3 Oct. 1845 at Offenbach)—called upon the Elbe and the Rhine to echo his greeting to his people—"we have never been slaves to man!!" Verily there is no martyr like Scripture!

such bondage as our fathers were subjected to. For this last notion is contradicted, as we have said, by their evident assumption that no seed of Abraham could in the nature of things ever δουλεύειν. Thus they fall into flagrant opposition to the humble and profound lamentation of their fathers in Holy Scripture, such as Ezra ix. 8, 9; Nehem. ix. 36; Lament. i. 1, v. 8;—but we must not convict them therefore of the madness of impotent lying, as Augustine does.[1] For their proud language only means to say that the temporary oppression which their people had at times endured, the slight supremacy of foreign rulers which did not affect their national character, but left them the appearance of independence in the enjoyment of their own laws and their own worship, had never reduced them to the degradation of perfect *slavery*:[2]—that they had ever been, and had ever felt themselves to be, in spite of everything, the noble and unsubjugated seed of Abraham in the sight of God! (Lange: "they no more acknowledged their subjection to Rome, than later Rome acknowledged the temporal authority which contradicted her hierarchical views." That is freedom in the *theocratical* sense, but not on that account in the *spiritual*). It is at least doubtful whether they then thought of that prohibition of their God, so careful of their honour and dignity, which rendered it impossible that any born Israelite should become a bond-slave to his brother Israelite. But it is very certain that, blinded by their pride, they speak very inconsistently, for it was their constant expectation that the Messiah should *free* them from the Roman power; and *this* is to be explained by the spirit of contradiction into which the half-heard and obnoxious word *truth* had thrown them. A promise of *deliverance from bondage* in another connection and not made dependent upon the knowledge and persevering abiding in His word, might probably have extorted a voluntary admission of their bondage, and been received with gratitude.

Ver. 34. The Lord's calm, lucid truth gives His first answer

[1] "Is not this the people which made bricks in Egypt? How did God then for ever remind them that He had led them out of the house of bondage? Were your fathers slaves, and are not ye? How is it then that ye pay tribute to Cæsar?" &c. See in Klee.

[2] This is the truth in the former exposition.

to their confused thoughts, and this may be viewed under a threefold aspect. He speaks directly of the true *slavery* in the commission of sin; and then through a very significant but commiserating and reticent transition (embracing the ideas of *slavery* and *sonship* in their several relation to *God*), He places in opposition to that servitude the true *freedom* of the children of God—who alone are also the true children of Abraham. In *ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν* the article is of strong significance; and in connection with it the *ποιῶν* involves more in its meaning than אוֹשֶׂה, and the whole expression is made equivalent to the Old Testament פֹּעֲלֵי-אָוֶן, *ἐργαζόμενοι τὴν ἀνομίαν*. (Comp. 1 John iii. 4, 8, 9). Thus it is not he who at any time, or sometimes, yet sins; but who in obedient villanage of submission performs the deeds of *that sin* (as above ver. 21), against the lusts and the accomplishment of which the law, and his own conscience, and the personal experience that it is ruinous, still testifies—who consequently lives and walks in habitual contradiction to himself. He is verily and indeed the *servant* of sin! And in the full sense of the subsequent apostolical teaching in Rom. vi. 12, 16, 20; 2 Pet. ii. 19. Lücke was not justified in hazarding the assertion, that throughout the Old Testament the idea of slavery to sin never comes forward, near as it lies in Gen. iv. 7. For this very Gen. iv. 7 (comp. Ps. cxix. 133) is plain enough; and in the typical manner of the Old Testament we have it spoken of (to say nothing of the secret promissory meaning of Ex. xx. 2), where Ahab, as one example, is represented as having *sold* himself, in and by Jezebel, to do evil before the Lord. (1 Kings xxi. 20, 25, to which, as we think, Rom. vii. 14 expressly looks back). And who then, in the meaning of the prophetic Spirit, are the prisoners and slaves of the strong man, Is. xlii. 7, xlix. 24, but the slaves of sin and of the devil? Oh that our theologians would purge their eyes when they come to the Old Testament; and look at it with at least as much clearness of vision as the Jews did, who developed from it their own Rabbinical doctrine, sometimes so deep and so true! In the Sohar in Exod. fol. 48 col. 192 it is said concerning the wicked, איהו תחות רשותיה כעבד תחות רביה—he is under the power of his wickedness, as the slave under his lord; and many similar pas-

sages Wetstein has accumulated upon this verse. And the heathen, too, were deeply impressed with the slavery of sin, so that Lampe has adduced many analogous sayings out of their writings.[1] Thus the Lord utters here a declaration, in His own plain and unambiguous and impressive words, which lay unexpressed in the heart of the entire Old Testament; and one too which is responded to most incontrovertibly by the consciousness of all mankind. But we must not soften and qualify His words to mean that he who continuously practises sin, makes himself by so doing gradually and surely more and more the slave of sin. No, he *is* actually such already; as is shown by his doing that which he himself is constrained to term *sin*. "In every act of sin there is a bondage." That is, in every individual act of sin I perform *the* sin which is known to be such. And what must be the slavery of a life spent in habitual acts of sin? But here we may appropriately observe with Olshausen, that in this an enslaved better I in men is acknowledged and appealed to; though it must not be overlooked, on the other hand, that the slavery of this inner man is declared to be original, and clinging to his humanity by nature.

The addition τῆς ἁμαρτιάς[2] we regard as absolutely genuine and essential; it necessarily belongs to the definite explanation of our Lord's answer, in which he cannot be supposed to continue the abstract mode of speaking hitherto adopted. It may be said that ver. 25 immediately afterwards makes prominent the abstract

[1] Seneca: Vides autem, quam malam et noxiam servitutem servaturus sit, quem voluptates etc. Ostende quis non servus sit. Alius libidini servit, alius avaritiæ etc. Nulla servitus durior est, quam voluntaria. Stobæus:—Οὐδεὶς ἐλεύθερος ἑαυτοῦ μὴ κρατῶν. Δουλεύειν πάθεσι χαλεπώτερον ἢ τυράννοις. Plato: Τῶν ταῖς αἰσχραῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ἐπιχειρεόντων ἐλεύθερον μηδένα νομίζε. Τῶν γὰρ τοὺς τῇ τυχῇ δούλους κεκτημένων πολὺ βαρύτερον οὗτοι δεσπόταις τοῖς καταναγκάζουσι ταῦτα δουλεύουσιν. Cicero: Quis neget omnes improbos esse servos? Arrianus: Βούλεσθε ζῆν ἁμαρτάνοντες; οὐ βουλόμεθα. Οὐδεὶς τοίνυν ἁμαρτάνων ἐλεύθερός ἐστι. Epictetus: Ἐλευθερία καὶ δουλεία, τὸ μὲν ἀρετῆς ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ κακίας. And much else similar.

[2] Klee—"it appears to be a gloss." Baumgarten-Crusius:—"Mill, and more recently Tholuck, have regarded it as omission. But we doubt not its spuriousness." Von Gerlach will have it read—Every one who committeth sin, *is a slave*. Neander quotes and expounds it, as if the matter were quite settled, without τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Brückner defends the addition, on account of preponderating authority.

ideas of δοῦλος and υἱός; and Baumgarten-Crusius thence maintains that "it would be exceedingly hard, if the Lord had used the name of servant successively and immediately in relation to servants of sin, and servants in relation to God! But this apparent difficulty is not thus to be removed, for ἐλεύθεροι in ver. 36 assuredly proves that in ver. 34 δοῦλος τῆς ἁμαρτίας must be *intended*, and not here already servitude in relation to God. The whole passage would be disturbed, and would lose its popular clearness and its conscience-piercing force, if the *slavery of sin* is not regarded as expressly coming forward first. The Lord's design was to speak graciously, and with mitigated severity concerning truth and freedom; as if He might presume upon their apprehension of His meaning. But their proud folly, as He indeed expected, traverses his purpose, and constrains Him to proceed, "If ye will not otherwise understand, or have not yet understood, I must recur to My former severe and solemn words, in which are included all my speaking and judging concerning you (vers. 21, 24)—ye commit *sin*, and he who committeth sin, is no other than the servant of that sin!"

Ver. 35. No one has yet—it seems to me—clearly apprehended the subtle and profound connection in which *these words* are interwoven with the preceding. The greater part pass over the difficulty, as if it had no existence; others speak about it without fundamentally removing its weight. It lies in this, that suddenly and abruptly the figure is deranged, and the absolute δοῦλος is viewed in an entirely different relation. Just before, sin was his master; but now God is represented as such, retaining and bearing with him in His house. How then can Jesus be intelligently understood in so speaking? We might supply the clue thus:—He who is the *servant* of sin, thus being generally in a slavish spirit and condition, will moreover *in relation to God* be regarded as no more than a slave; yea, he is a false apostate, serving the Lord's enemy in the Lord's house. This is very true, but we must seek for the deep reason wherefore the Lord omits this profound and weighty intermediate thought, although it is presupposed for the right understanding of His words. His discourse, hitherto so clear, seems suddenly to pass into obscurity, through a twofold, yea, threefold, swift transition:—from the servant of sin to a *servant* in a quite different relation

(which is not even expressed as such); from this servant to the contrast of the *son;* and finally to the *rights* of servantship and sonship in the house. We think that we can perfectly understand this strange manner of speaking by a reference to the relations of those who first heard the words; and that they will be seen to have been perfectly intelligible to them. The *relation to God* was not expressed, but naturally taken for granted in a controvery with *Israelites;* it was the essential foundation upon which they built their proud σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ, for that assuredly meant no other than—We are the dear children of our God (Deut. xiv. 1), Israel was His first-born Son delivered from Egypt, before all the nations of the earth, and we should not be declared to be slaves who must be set free. When the Lord contradicts their assumed *freedom* by a reference to their true and fearful bondage to sin, His *gentleness* admits for the present, what in ver. 37 He even confirms by οἶδα, that they as the seed of Abraham stood in a *certain peculiar relation to God;* but He denies that this is the free relation of children, by declaring that they are the servants of the Lord, abiding as such in His house, and occupying His land. This is true of the people as a whole, according to their own words; yet are they, again, only servants of the Lord on the assumption and expectation, and under discipline to that end, that they learn to do the *will of God,* and not the works of *sin.* As a servant of sin even the Israelite cannot in the issue remain a servant of God and member of His household; and this applies to the best among them, so far as he is not yet free from this other master, God's enemy. * Here is consequently shed a clear and penetrating light upon the entire Old Testament economy of God's dealings with this seed of Abraham as a whole; either that relation of servant leads to something further, and this title of God's domestics—not essentially befitting sinners indeed, but vouchsafed to them in God's grace and forbearance—leads those to whom it is attributed to the possession of that true freedom and sonship which was its designed end;—or the inner contradiction must finally explode itself, and issue in the sinner's being cast out. All this may be easily taken for granted in our Lord's quick words. We should all find it easy enough, if we could only transpose our thoughts into the fundamental ideas of the Old

Testament; these *ideas* were very familiar to those at least who then heard our Lord, and therefore He could thus concisely and comprehensively speak to them. It would, moreover, almost appear, that the certain obscurity which pervades His saying was intended to cast down their presumptuous impetuosity, which would prematurely regard His words as *understood*, and thus to transform them into reflecting and *pondering hearers*, showing them that there were depths in the relation between servitude and freedom, as He treated these things, which they must not suppose that they could instantaneously fathom. If they had entered into His words with docility as μαθηταί, He would probably have followed them up by explanations altogether different from those which they enforced from Him by their malignity.[1]

We may assume it impossible for any one to deny that the whole clause concerning the servant and the son in the house, abstract as it may appear, must be immediately referred to the household or family of *God*. The words are uttered with this conciliating generality, thrown out, as it were, like a preparatory enigmatical proposition, in order to avoid outraging their feelings at once by a positive declaration: but they enter directly, and most impressively, into the concrete relations of those who heard them. It has been thought, because εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, לְעוֹלָם is also the terminus of the law for enduring slavery (Ex. xxi. 6; Deut. xv. 17), that οὐ μένειν is an allusion to the setting free in the seventh year (Ex. xxi. 2), and the year of Jubilee (Lev. xxv. 40; Deut. xv. 12); but *such* an allusion is most inappropriate here, for that coming out of the house was a good thing which led to freedom, but here a *casting out* is hinted at, a "dismissal to that alien master" (who will then pay his awful wages!). Lücke gave that view the preference, because οὐ μένειν in his opinion must express something lying in the idea of the δοῦλος itself; but it is plain that he has not understood the whole

[1] The forgotten Rationalist Hezel gives here the sense, in a very fair approximation at least:—"In such most wicked posture of mind are ye slavish Jews. Now think—the *servant* has a hard *lot*. His master can cast him out, when he sees that he is no longer of use to him. Now think of *God*. In any case (I would say instead—*at best*, as ye are the servants of sin) ye are His *servants*. Since ye serve sin, God can no longer tolerate you in His house," &c.

passage according to its *theocratic* meaning, because he adheres to a specious abstraction. On the other hand, the allusion which he thinks too far-fetched, is the *right* one :—namely, to the casting out of him who was born of the bond-woman unto bondage, of Ishmael who showed the slavish mind of enmity against the real son of the house (Gen. xxi. 10). So that in fact the typical interpretation given to that event by the Apostle Paul in Gal. iv., is here already hinted at by our Lord. We can scarcely understand how Lücke could allege against this allusion, that the example would not correspond, Ishmael being at the same time a son of Abraham! That very fact reconciles the whole, for were not these Jews also the seed of Abraham *according to the flesh?* (Lücke's error arises from his persisting to regard this transitional verse as an independent and *general* position). To this Calvin too, and Cocceius and Lampe have found subordinate allusion; and Bengel gives its foundation very correctly when he says—*quia* de Abrahamo quæstio est.

On the other hand, we agree with Lücke, in opposition this time to Kling,[1] that the article before the *first* υἱός as before δοῦλος makes these nouns *generic*. Else, in addition to the sudden transitions already remarked upon, there would be a fourth; and that would be indeed an abrupt leap from the figurative and historically convincing contrast, before it had been fully set up and established. The Lord manifestly speaks first of all *hypothetically* of a *son* in the house of God, who should be neither a servant of sin, nor stand in a hypocritical proud relation to God, not even in the relation of a servant to the master of the house who was estranged from perfect obedience. *If there be* such an one, He will say, *he* has the family right and right of inheritance *to remain in the house for ever*, he will assuredly not be cast out![2] And this opens up to us, finally, a very

[1] Who is disposed with Lachmann to alter the punctuation, putting a full stop after the first αἰῶνα, and thus connecting more closely the two clauses with υἱός. The οὖν is supposed to prove the identity of the υἱός in both clauses. But son is first used generally in contrast with servant, and then the words make a transition to Him who is such alone in a pre-eminent sense.

[2] What Euthymius says of the right of inheritance in the son, not in the slave, is very good; but when he refers the δοῦλος to Moses in

remarkable reference, in which not only the *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα* finds its reason and ground, but even the whole expression of *μένειν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ*. The Lord, to whom everywhere and always the deep-meaning and prophetical sayings of the ancient Scriptures were close at hand, speaks in the words of the twenty-third Psalm; and not merely as using its accidentally coincident words, but as a citation giving its genuine, spiritualised sense, educing its inmost kernel of meaning. David in Ps. xxiii. assures himself of abiding in the house of the Lord לְאֹרֶךְ יָמִים, that is, assuredly, here equivalent to לָעוֹלָם, even after his passing through the valley of the shadow of death; and that is an Old Testament expression of faith and hope in the *filial* mind to which the Lord might well refer, especially as this was a well-known and universally applied Psalm. But still more! Just as the Lord here sets out by assuming the possibility of their being sons of God in the theocratical house as opposed to servants in that house, in order to set forth *Himself* in the second *ὁ υἱός* as the One only Son, in whom this hypothesis is perfectly realised—so this citation is found to be chosen in perfect harmony with this design, since these preparatory sonships and filial hopes of the Old Covenant, never in themselves altogether freed from the servile spirit, were essentially no other than typical prophecies of Him, the true and pre-eminent Son. Consequently, He appropriates to Himself this Davidical Psalm (which remarkably follows on Ps. xxii.!) as such a prophecy. And this, finally, in its back-ground would involve, to the Israelite who weighed the words which were thrown out for his after pondering, a similar reference to the victory over His enemies as found in Ps. cx.[1] Put to death the Son, send Him down to the valley of the shadow of death! He feareth not, His God will spread a table for Him much more glorious than that spread for David, will anoint His head with oil, and *give Him an abiding place* in another, heavenly house, the essential house of God, for evermore. For with the casting out of the

contrast with Christ (as also Cyril, Chrys., Theophylact, and recently Klee) he mingles something quite inappropriate.

[1] The reader who possesses my commentary on the Psalms may consult what I have further written upon this subject there.

servants the entire earthly economy will be broken up, the new and heavenly house will be established in its place, to which this One perfect Son will translate, and in which He will receive His hidden ones.[1] What marvellous fulness of intimation and reference in the words which are usually so swiftly disposed of!

Ver. 36. The inferential *οὖν*, which Kling regards as proving that the *υἱός* must be absolutely the same in both clauses, is to be resolved, according to our view of the passage, into the intermediate thought:—*Since*, as I continually testify—and ye were willing to believe My testimony a while since—*I alone* in fulness of truth am *the Son* of the heavenly Father, the Father of your household and your God (ver. 29)—your sole emancipation as servants of sin, and therefore servants of God doomed to be cast out, must and can proceed only from Me. The Lord here speaks assuredly of this as the *act of His prerogative* which sets free and declares absolved from bondage. "No *δοῦλος* can make another free, or make himself such. In order to the setting free of another it is requisite that a man should be free himself. This involves the idea of the Son—he alone can have the authority actually to emancipate the *δοῦλοι*." (Kling.) But when Grotius refers to the in Græciæ quibusdam civitatibus, forte et alibi usitata *ἀδελφοθεσιά*, the right of the Son to adopt others as brothers, he presses the forensic application too far. This is then the starting-point, but it must of course be understood that the merciful declaration of freedom is also an actual setting free from sin, the evil master; else the former clause would still retain its force. Thus if the Son shall *make you sons!* In the *ἔσεσθε*, finally, the Lord gently but decisively returns back into a direct application to themselves; and the full answer which they deserved—yet are ye not free! is made parallel with the previous *γενήσεσθε* which they had rejected. But with the *ὄντως* He rebukes for ever all lying outcry of

[1] Hengstenberg on Ps. xxiii. refers to the house not made with hands, the *church*, where the children of God's household abide for ever, after the desolation of Matt. xxiii. 38. But we make more prominent the reference to the *upper* house, for we take it to be closely connected with the צַלְמָוֶת (in which Gesenius with the LXX., Chald., and Kimchi, recognizes the מָוֶת).

being or being made free; and prepares His own way for returning to the former objection, and establishing a distinction of ὄντως εἶναι in connection with the "seed of Abraham."

Ver. 37. Now, first, can this original protest of the Jews be rightly set aside. The Lord has never failed to admit that the Jews as such were, and had been, from the beginning, through the gracious calling and election of God, in His house; and He now repeats this admission with οἶδα, which, as here standing, signifies—As ye hear Me say, I know it well and allow its full force. *But* with all that—what kind of people are ye? Rebellious servants, who would cast out and put to death the one true Son of the house and of your Lord! Tholück expresses his opinion decidedly that those who sought to kill Jesus, could not *possibly* be the same who had previously believed in Him—and very many feel constrained to regard this as full evidence of a change in the persons addressed. But we cannot see any reason why our Lord should not, in spite of that evanescent and indistinct impulse of faith which did not, however, restrain them from at once uttering their proud protest against His salutary promise, mingle them again indiscriminately in the general mass of the people whom He now addressed, and whose more or less conscious enmity He had again and again revealed to them with this strong expression of its prospective consummation.[1] And wherefore do they hate Him? Because He bears the testimony of His truth against their sin; because His word, instead of finding welcome in a believing acceptance, *can find no place to lay hold of them.* Thus negatively gentle is the Lord's word at the first, the positive and severe ὅτι follows afterwards in ver. 45.

Χωρεῖν does not, as Lücke observes against Kling, mean originally, or, indeed, ever, merely *to have place*—but always involves the idea of *movement*, extension in space, the filling it up. Hence every translation which is limited to the former notion must be rejected as inadequate:—such as the locum habet of Erasmus, or the frequent correction, so called, in many editions of our Bible, of "hat nicht Statt," or the London Heb.

1 "Throughout the whole of St John Jesus sees His death before Him, and carries His life upon the point of every word, towards Jerusalem. The issue showed Him right." Herder.

translation of New Test. יִלְדְּרִי אֵין מָקוֹם בָּכֶם The frequent interpretation "proceed, go," (Matt. xv. 17; 2 Pet. iii. 9; Wisd. vii. 23), does not so much suggest the idea of having room, as of making room; according to Tholuck's *locum facio*, scil. *mihi*, *occupo*. The finished emphasis of the word as developed from its etymon is thus actually *press forward*, advance, *προσκόπτειν*. We should not, however, invalidate this by applying to it the standard of ordinary human phraseology, as apprehended and established by philology alone, for we always find that the tendency of that is to lower the emphasis—thus Elsner and Kypke regard *feliciter succedere*, *proficere* as all that is meant. (Lampe: non procedit. Lücke: since it does not find that entrance or that progress among you, which as the word of truth it should find). *In that case* either *εἰς ὑμᾶς* must have been in the text; or the *ἐν ὑμῖν*, if not harshly put *instead of* that,[1] must be translated with Luther—and Lücke thinks it the least doubtful translation—*among you*. On the other hand we say with Baumgarten-Crusius—"The connection of the passage points too definitely to the *inner* life of the Jews, and the hindrances which lay in that." And is not all simple enough as before understood? To make *room*, to press forward, advance, *spread around* (Schelier-macher well says—to seize, place, and plant its roots within them) —is an expression which indicates the active influence and operation of the living word in its independent energy; thus not merely a *penetrare*, but a *capere* too. Luther felt this, and therefore translated, following the true sense, fähet (fasset) nicht,[2] grips not; only that he should have continued—*in you*. Olshausen's remark that "the previous idea of motion must be followed by the corresponding idea of rest, which latter as completing the former, must be held fast in the *ἐν*"—points very properly to the fact that the end of the *χωρεῖν* is certainly a *μένειν* in us; but we think that it is the influential progress of the word which is here significantly alluded to, and not as yet its abiding, con-

[1] Grotius has curtly *vadere* and *ἐν* pro *εἰς*. Nonnus not much better —*οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ποτε μῦθος ἐς ὑμετέρην φρένα δύνει.*

[2] Lange yet stronger "does not force itself into you"—better than, a few lines further, "rebounds without any saving influence."

summated indwelling.[1] Klee more properly says—"The word is already *within them* through hearing, but it does not penetrate deeply into them. The Lord designedly and expressly puts it conversely, not—*Ye* embrace not, hear not, understand not My words (as follows, ver. 43) but—My living word seizes you not, attains not place of influence, progresses not into your souls. *Οὐκ εἶπεν· οὐ χωρεῖτε τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὐ χωρεῖ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ ὑψηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῶν δογμάτων ἐπιδεικνύμενος.* Chrys. On which Klee remarks—"The blame of this not entering rests not upon the doctrine, *than which there is nothing more effectually penetrative*, but on the Jews themselves." That is perfectly true, and where the word of God itself cannot press in and prosper in the soul, and accomplishes nothing, the guilt of withstanding must assuredly be great indeed. As Origen alleges—*διὰ τοῦτο οὐ χωρεῖ, ὅτι ἀνεπιτήδειοι ἦτοι κατ' οὐσίαν, ἢ κατὰ γνώμην.* This, however, which those who were thus rebuked must themselves have inferred, should not be translated instead of the clause itself, which as an *ὀξύμωρον* points to it—*Ye* are worthless for My word.[2]

Ver. 38. What preceded was the undeniable, visible *fact*—*Abraham's seed* and *the Son of God* do not feel in concert, there is between them no peace and friendship; or, still more plainly, these children of Abraham hate Christ with murderous hatred; instead of giving His words, full of grace and truth, place in their hearts, and allowing them to exert their full influence there. All this is in the secret consciousness both of Him and them. That they seek to kill Him (even if only meaning that He was their aversion unto death, and would yet be more so, when He earnestly pressed home His words) *they* knew very well, and He also knows it; and just so, He knows that His word does not lay hold of their inner being while He speaks it, nor can they deny it, but give the plainest proof of it when they, being more penetratingly addressed, bound from it and turn

[1] Bengel has a pregnant antithesis between the passivity of man, and the activity of the word—homo *manere* debet (ver. 31), sermo *capere*.

[2] The Peschito, misunderstood by Lampe, in למלתי לא סבקין אנתון would just express that *ἀνεπιτήδειοι*, comp. סבק, sufficere, Matth. xxv. 9.

against it in opposition. Then these things are undeniable, palpable *fact*, on which both parties are fundamentally agreed. And from this the Lord draws the equally undeniable conclusion, going straight to the original source of this :—Consequently *ye* must have a *father* who is opposed to *My* Father. That father cannot possibly be Abraham, the friend of God, whose glory was to be the type of a man walking before God in faith and obedience. Your rejoicing in this your forefather is a false rejoicing, since ye are in spirit children very unlike to him.[1] We cannot say with regard to the verse generally, that the Lord here, as often elsewhere, uses the *speaking* and *doing* in the two clauses of one sentence, interchangeably; for He is literally referring to His own words, and to their acts. What the child has ever seen *with* his father, in his society, he doeth naturally and gives testimony of it in his own conduct:—this general position would come out into yet stronger significance, if the μοῦ and the ὑμῶν could be proved spurious. Assuredly, there lies in the contrast something like an ironical juxtaposition—We follow our father on either side, but assuredly not the same![2] He who cannot discern the true spirit of such an *irony*, misapprehends the fact, that the sublime serenity of truth as triumphing over the contradicting lie must ever be connected with a certain irony. On the other hand, there is gentleness enough in this manner of expressing Himself, which only at first hints its meaning. The οὐδενὶ δεδουλεύκαμεν might have been responded to by the direct mention of Satan, whose lusts they do while they willingly bear his yoke; but he is merely hinted at, and that as a father instead of Abraham and God. And finally, παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ is milder than the subsequent ἐκ τοῦ πατρός.

Ver. 39. His hearers proceed to give evident proof that they will not, and that they cannot, hear; that His word makes no progress in their hearts: instead of remarking and pondering the penetrating and convincing words of Christ, they hold fast

[1] Tract. Kidduschin in Deut. xiv. 1, 2 says—as long as ye act as children, children ye are; and no longer.

[2] The ἠκούσατε which Lachmann and Tischendorff substitute in the latter clause, would almost destroy the point of this analogy; and we cannot otherwise accept it. It appears to have arisen from the idea that the seeing in connection with Satan's works required qualification.

their own wilful declaration at the first—Our father is Abraham! We do not think, with Lange, that they are here entering keenly into disputation; but rather that they reutter their former words in mere obstinacy, and without any direct reference to what Jesus had said, further than the word πατήρ which they lay hold of. This one expression they throw back upon Him, as proudly as ignorantly:—What dost thou mean by thy two fathers? Let thy words leave us alone in possession of our true father, as the seed of Abraham![1]—But the Lord does not leave them alone; He pushes His words, in unwearable and imperturbable earnestness, yet further. The ὑμεῖς ποιεῖτε of the former verse He now dilates upon, vers. 39—41, and proves them to exhibit evidences of a very different disposition and derivation from that of Abraham. When, hereupon, the Jews leave their Abrahamic parentage, and lay claim directly to that *of God*, the Lord is constrained in the severest terms to convict them of being the *children of the devil*, vers. 41—47, and by a two-fold series of inferences which we shall more carefully examine in due time.

We are not inclined to enter at large upon the question of the various readings here—the substitution of ἐστε for ἦτε, the omission of ἄν, and the preference of ποιεῖτε; the hypothetical form in the received text is the only correct one, since the νῦν δὲ which follows is manifestly the minor from which follows the conclusion in ver. 41.[2] On the other hand, we join Olshausen and Kling (and earlier Origen) in maintaining that the τέκνα is here to be distinguished from σπέρμα; the latter was indeed conceded as true after the flesh in ver. 37, but τέκνα (genuine children like their father) is denied in ver. 39. Rom. ix. 7 is an illustrative parallel of this distinction in the phraseology, which, though it is not directly founded upon the lexical origin of the words, harmonizes well with the true distinction of the synonymes. Mark how the Lord, who elsewhere bases every thing, like His Apostle Paul, upon *faith*, here also lays stress, like

[1] "Be it so, the children are like their fathers: our father is Abraham, if the distinction is thus made,—*judge thou, who thy father must be!*" Similarly Baumgarten-Crusius—"They care not to know who may be *his* father; only *their* father is Abraham."

[2] Ποιεῖτε as Imper. would altogether disturb the sense.

James, upon the evidence of *works!* He Himself recognises and distinguishes the *works of Abraham!*

Vers. 40, 41. The opposition of their spirit and acts to the faith and works of Abraham, exhibits itself in a threefold progression. They would kill *a man*—more than that, one who has told them the truth (understand—just on that account!)—finally, the truth as derived and transmitted from God. Both the fact and the reason of the Lord's representing Himself meekly to be a man, in the presence of such as are now incapable of receiving the declaration of His divinity,[1] are perfectly clear; as also that His words point to the fearful truth which is undisguisedly announced in ver. 44, of the Satanic and Cainite enmity in man against God, the unity and progressive consequences of the spirit of lying and the spirit of murder.[2] We must not, in the following clause, weaken τοῦτο into tale quid, nor make οὐκ ἐποίησεν—that would he not have done in similar case! But the τοῦτο impressively combines the whole accusation in one, and the οὐκ ἐποίησεν is said ironically and per μείωσιν—the holy patriarch, whose piety ye rightly glory in, acted in his faith and love towards God and man, in a manner very different from this. The rigid conclusion should now formally run—consequently ye are *not* the children of Abraham. But it goes still further than that, even to the *other* "father" of ver. 38. Twice is this father left unmentioned, for the suggestion of their own minds.

And they might very well understand this manner of speaking. The prophets had been accustomed to point the apostate seed of Abraham to an origin consistent with their spirit and mind, *e.g.* Ezek. xvi. 3. They were very well acquainted, too, with the father and author of all evil, the great enemy of God and man. They appear actually now to mark whither our Lord is aiming; but they designedly retreat before His meaning even while they seem to press more closely upon Him in contradiction. Their entering, so to speak, upon another subject of

[1] Nonnus has in his way interjected—οὔτε γὰρ ὔμμι δοκῶ θεὸς ἔμμεναι.

[2] Schleiermacher: "This is a profound mystery in human nature, that incapacity for the truth and opposition to it, invariably glide into enmity against those who bring the truth." Yes, verily, a mystery going beyond human nature!

argument is indicated by the Evangelist's *οὖν*. Thus enforced, they let go the paternity of Abraham; for, at least abstractly, the proof is too clear that unresembling children have no right to value themselves upon their progenitor; but, instead of that, they insist now upon being the children of God! Thus they understand[1] the Lord to be speaking of *spiritual* paternity; consequently their words now concur with His meaning, and *consequently* *πορνεία* is not to be understood otherwise than spiritually. This expression should not refer our thoughts to Ishmael, for Abraham's connection with Hagar was not fornication; but rather to the hated *Samaritans* (see afterwards ver. 48), that spurious, bastard race—as Klee suggests, following Theodor. Mopsu., and Theophylact. For they mean bastards as resulting from the adulterous connection of the Jewish people with *false gods;* retaining a distinct remembrance of those ancient passages in which this was denounced against their fathers as a crime. Ex. xxxiv. 16; Lev. xvii. 7; Judg. ii. 17; Hos. i. 2, ii. 4; Isa. i. 21, lvii. 3; Jer. iii. 8; Ezek. xvi. 15, &c. To these false Gods they oppose the *One true God*, from whom it is their pharisaic pride to assert that they had never departed since the captivity; and this seems the simplest meaning of *ἕνα πατέρα*. "Not, one father with thee; but we all have one father." So explains Baumgarten-Crusius; but we doubt whether the Scripture intelligence of these speakers would go so far as to refer to Isa. lxiii. 16. Lange views it otherwise; referring the former clause still to Abraham, and regarding the second as introducing the additional relation to God, asserting that—We and thyself have (despite thy words) one and the same Father, God![2] But this is not so plain as the

[1] "They had understood before; but now would no longer appear to decline the argument, and evade the spiritual application." (Klee.) In the sense of disputation, of course; the thing itself they certainly evade.

[2] The former would be—"We are not suppositious children imposed upon Abraham." But still they feel that the lash is not removed—they feel themselves to be at a disadvantage merely as Abraham's sons as opposed to the Son *of God*—especially as they are conscious that He justly charges them with departure from Abraham's mind. They leave therefore, in their confusion, *their own* position of hereditary prerogative, in order to arrogate *His* loftier position to themselves. "As they could not finally deny that He was like themselves a son of

obvious reference of *πορνεία* to idolatry; and we may illustrate it by the words of Philo, quoted by Lücke: *πολύθεος δὲ ὁ ἐκ πόρνης, τυφλώττων περὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ πατέρα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλοὺς ἀνθ' ἑνὸς γονεῖς αἰνιττόμενος.*—Suffice, that they are urged by the spirit of contradiction to arrogate to themselves the prerogative of freeborn children, exhibited now first in its truth by Jesus; and to call *their God* (as the usual phrase runs in the Old Testament, see ver. 54) with all their sins *their* father. Comp. Mal. ii. 10 with Mal. i. 6.

And now the Lord is constrained by their boldness to refer openly to that father whom He had twice hinted at without express mention. He does this in the closest connection down to ver. 47 by two series of arguments. The former proceeds as before; God's children must *love* God's son (ver. 42)—but ye, on the other hand, do not even know or recognize *my speech* (ver. 43)—consequently ye are the children of the devil! But this *conclusion* itself is in ver. 44 shown in a threefold form. Ye do the lusts of your father—for he is the original murderer, and a liar utterly without truth from the beginning—*every such liar, therefore, hath him for a father!* (which must be preliminarily noted for the interpretation of *πατὴρ αὐτοῦ*). The second argument goes backwards in its order:—ye believe not the truth (which position, laid down in ver. 45, is convincingly established in ver. 46)—but he that is of God, heareth God's words—consequently *ye are not of God* (Quod erat demonstrandum; at the same time a qualified and gentle return to ver. 38).

Vers. 42, 43. Once more the same deductio ad absurdum, differently applied. Previously it was—ye hate and seek to kill me; now it is—as the children *of God*, ye would for ye must *love me*, the Son before all others, the express image of your father! Ye would be constrained to come to me with the most joyful acceptance of my claims, as having come from the Father and come unto you! This is the abiding and decisive protest against the Rationalism which honours the All-father and sets Jesus aside; against all who imagine that they believe in God

Abraham, so they thought that He would not be able to deny to them that they were, equally with Himself, children of the one Father, God." Acute enough, but I fear too subtile for this text.

and think to be His children, while their cold, loveless, or unfriendly relation to Christ makes it plain that their faith in God and their filial presumption are based upon a wrong foundation. Before it was—My word seizes you not, does not lay hold upon and influence your spirits; now it is stronger and in perfect contrast with love—ye know not, ye receive not, ye understand not and will not bear even My speech! *Λαλιά* is here more decisively distinguished from *λόγος* than in ch. iv. 41, 42. The *λαλούμενος λόγος* as such, the *λαλεῖν* of which, in its perfect consonance with the matters spoken of, perfectly intelligible to the mind which is in harmony with those matters, was not understood by them, has reference to the *tone* and *manner* of His speaking, His essential style of expression; *λαλιά* is therefore here almost equivalent to idioma, dialectus, as in Matt. xxvi. 73, comp. Cant. iv. 3. Sept. for מְדַבֵּר. Ye understand not "the mother-tongue of God's children"—although ye should be accustomed to it in the whole Old Testament, and would have been perfectly familiar with it, if ye had been in the true and proper sense of the Old Testament the genuine children of God and of Abraham. Every God-fearing man, when the Spirit of God begins to speak, hears Him speak in *his own* tongue:[1]—this preparation of spirit is the fundamental condition for hearing and understanding aright; and where it is wanting, all the highest words are spoken to the wind or into deaf ears. *Love understands*, even desire perceives and anticipates the meaning. And if we would understand our true position, we must not scruple to apply this *highest hermeneutical canon* in the confusion of the church of the learned and unlearned. "He who *wills* not to understand the thing, will find the words in which it is clothed unintelligible." (Fikenscher.) Whatever perfectly harmonizes with our fundamental views and opinions is at once understood in its expression and tone. Whoever takes objection to the expressions and utterances of Jesus, is not at one with the mind and the heart of Jesus." (Braune.) Moreover, it is to be understood that this *λαλιά* which those

[1] And this is the inmost meaning of the Pentecost miracle; the mockers understand not the language, but, being themselves the drunken, hear only a confused babbling. See Isa. xxviii. 9—14, a passage which is to be thoughtfully pondered and compared.

born in God's house will recognise, is not to be applied merely to the external use of language (and this is the truth of Lange's protest against this view); but is to be viewed *spiritually* as referring to those fundamental ideas, those essential truths, those eternal promises, which are spoken by God to the mind and heart of a man, and the tones of which he at once catches and comprehends. The two foci of the speech of Christ, protested against by the false Jews as Galilæan or Samaritan, and now by false Christians as *Jewish*—in which revolves the purest and most consistent consummation of all speech which had ever been current and intelligible in the true house of God, as heard in the Saviour's voice, are—*sin* and *grace*. He who understands in his heart these two words, which no human Lexicon (though ten times better than Schleusner's) can make perfectly plain, will not be at a loss in any of the idioms of Christianity, will not be baffled even by the hard saying of "the eating and drinking of the flesh and blood." But the *οὐ γινώσκειν τὴν λαλιὰν αὐτοῦ*, which is too evident in many expositors, makes it clear that in that essential point they are not sound.[1] The following clause with *ὅτι* is by no means to be carried over to ver. 44 (as Hezel does, to avoid a presumed tautology); nor must it be included (with de Wette) in the question—wherefore understand ye not My speech, (so) that ye cannot receive My words? But the Lord answers the *why*, which so keenly penetrates their consciences, in their stead (as again in ver. 46):—I will tell you, I must reveal it to you, because ye *cannot* in your fundamentally evil mind and will.

This *οὐ δύνασθε* forms the final transition to the final charge, by laying the foundation of that fearful conclusion that they are of the devil, of him who never stood in the truth, who never admits the word of God into his being. Though *λόγος* is more than *λαλιά*, yet on the other hand *ἀκούειν* is less than *γινώσκειν*; and the point of the sentence lies in this *πλοκή*, this change

[1] Now, after that Christ has appeared, we may, by the Old Testament rightly understood, and by Heathenism placed in the right relation to it, construe a priori the language of the last and perfect Revealer of God's will to man; and thus, as it were, theanthropologically reconstruct the vocabulary and style of Christ. A good problem for an Apologist.

of the expression. Those who ought at once to have recognised His speech as the tone and idiom of the house, and to have been taught its meaning by the instinct of love,—*hear not, understand not* that which is plainly spoken in that speech![1]

Ver. 44. And now is plainly uttered the final word of thunder, penetrating their hearts, whether it find hearing or not, with its flash of conviction, disclosing the secret principles of their sin. Your unlikeness to Abraham shows that ye are not his true children; your want of susceptibility to the word of the Son of God, whom you fight against, shows that ye cannot possibly be the children of the same God; your likeness to him who was a liar and a murderer from the beginning, the spirit of contradiction and hatred, the false antigod—demonstrates your actual origination from *him!* This is the other father whom I meant! *Τοῦ πατρὸς* is without doubt the true reading, and the omission of the article is to be explained by the ambiguity of the idea of a father of Satan. *Διάβολος* must have the article, and *τοῦ πατρὸς* in connection with it seems to say—the devil is *the* father for you, your father, of whom I have already twice spoken.

One of the most important verses in the New Testament, says Braune, containing an utterance of the highest moment, is this saying of Jesus concerning the Devil, one which goes back to the first prelusive intimations of the speech of God in the beginning of His Book, and which all should understand and will understand, in proportion as they rightly understand the first chapters of Moses. We might expect of an age which has become so rational, that it would be rational enough no longer to apply the idea of *accommodation* to this dogmatic discourse of our Lord concerning the personal character and works of Satan —a testimony so unforced, and yet so overwhelming in its condemnation of the representatives of the people of God. Further, we might be justified in imputing to the age conscience enough to abstain from declaring that in this testimony concerning the *Liar*, the True Witness has Himself been deceived, or involved in theories untrue.[2] But the otherwise acute Baumgarten-Cru-

[1] Assuredly we must regard hearing as preceding knowledge; but it is overstrained to translate with the Berlen. Bible—ye can or ye will not even give heed to me, will not let me finish my words.

[2] And we might suppose that a genuine *Philosophy*, which has its

sius is blind enough to say—"In this application especially (vers. 45—47), it is clear that the figure of Satan is used only as a *figure*—the conclusion, ver. 47, almost avoids and leaves out the frightful figure!!" This is as vapid as Hezel's words long since —"the spirit to whom *ye* ascribe all evil, inspires you with all that ye speak and teach! Christ speaks *the language of Jewish theology*"—which is an apt illustration of ver. 43.[1]

Not ποιεῖτε now, as in ver. 38, but θέλετε ποιεῖν. Even Winer has no hesitation in saying that this is emphatically—ye will, ye are determined to do. This points indeed to the fearful purpose mentioned in ver. 40 (hence the following ἀνθρωποκτόνος); but the generalised tone given to the sentence, and which is the ground tone of the whole verse, says with deep significance—that which ye do as the slaves of sin, and from the paternity of the devil, is not the less on that account inexcusable and *voluntary*, as the accordance of your will with that which has become and still becomes, devilish. Thus it is not, as we too frequently hear—the *poor*, and *wicked* children of Satan! That is the "servitus voluntaria" of Seneca, of which Augustin writes: Anima *miro quodam modo* sub hac voluntaria quadam ac male libera necessitate *ancilla* tenetur et *libera*. Ancilla propter necessitatem, libera propter voluntatem: et quod magis mirum magisque miserum est, ideo rea quod libera, eoque ancilla quo rea; ac per hoc eo ancilla quo libera.[2] That is the psychological *mystery*, and at the same time the manifest *fact* of

base in conscience as the surest consciousness, would have conscientiousness and reasonableness enough to acknowledge what Martensen quotes from Daub—"How oft both in life and divinity the observation is turned away from the devil as a person, and he is explained away as a phantasm. Yet does the sincere enquirer ever come back to the truth, and find himself constrained to make his personal existence a fixed object."

[1] In an excellent though forgotten book, Historia Diaboli by J. G. Mayer of Würtemburg, we find the same argument:—dicta Christi, qui in capitali illo loco et primario, in gravissima sua objurgatione—coram ipsis declarat: ὑμεῖς κ.τ.λ. Fac, hæc locutum esse Christum, nec tamen esse diabolum, personam—sed fictum, commentitium, imaginarium, *quæ, qualis, quanta objurgationis inanitas!* Fac, ad pravas Judæorum ἐννοίας se adcommodasse Christum—quæ agendi, dicendi, objurgandi ratio erit illius, qui se ipse ἀλήθειαν profitetur!

[2] And such self-chosen slavery to Satan these liars have previously termed their *freedom!*

that evil, the opposing character of which ever goes onward in the children as in their father. And the remark of Origen applies to this θέλειν—that the internal will of itself without its external accomplishment, is sufficient to constitute children of the devil; for they also will what he wills, accomplish his lusts. The ἐπιθυμίαι correspond to the θέλειν; and even in the devil they are specified as the internal principle *preceding* his works and words, his murder and his lies. But the plural shows the endless unrest, the measureless and boundless impulses of this central principle of iniquity.

And now as to the ἀνθρωποκτόνος, by which this fearful ἐκεῖνος is at once characterised! There have ever been two interpretations; one of which now predominates, though the other is not without its defenders. Origen, Chrys., Aug., Theophyl., understand the seduction of the *first man* into sin, which plunged him into bodily and spiritual death; with them agree Luther, Calvin, Tholuck, Olshausen (to mention only leading names), with Paulus, Kuinoel, Meyer, Frommann. On the other hand, Cyril. referred the expression to the first historical murder of man in its common sense, to Cain's wicked act under the inspiration and in the spirit of the devil. And then strangely enough Cain himself (like Judas) is the διάβολος here; and is opposed to Abraham as the spiritual *father* of the Jews. With this agrees his reading at the end of the verse—καθὼς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ; thus—ye Jews derive your origin from Cain, as he was the first son of the devil![1] In this form no one could accept this exposition; but, modified in such a manner as to make Satan referred to as the instigator of Cain's murder, Dœderlein, Nitzsch,[2] Lücke, de Wette, Schulthess, Kling, Köstlin, Reuss have adopted it. We could not indeed agree with Olshausen's unqualified assertion that this reference to the isolated

[1] Epiphanius paralleled further *Judas* with Cain, and others the future Antichrist. A Jewish fable gives a caricaturing echo of this truth, making Cain the offspring of Sammael's commerce with Eve.—Hilgenfeld finds here a *father of the devil*, the Demiurgos, the God of the Old Testament! Nonnus thus seemed to read the καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ, for he has—ψεύστης αὐτὸς ἔφυ, ψευδήμονος ἐκ γενετῆρος.

[2] In the well-known treatise, theol. Zeitschrift von Schleiermacher, de Wette, und Lücke, 1822, drittes Heft. The other view was maintained against Nitzsch by Barth and others.

fact of an external murder superficialises the whole thought. For Cain's murder is, as being the first, no isolated fact, but in the significance of a primitive record, the prototype of all following murder. (Comp. on the significance of Cain at the fountain of human history, Augustin. Civ. Dei, lib. xv. cap. 5, 7.) We fully admit that an allusion to Cain is quite in keeping here, and that the whole context forces it upon us. The typical parallel between the righteous Abel and Christ, the curse-stricken, outcast Cain and the Jewish people, is based upon a deep foundation; but the various aspects of this question we must decline entering upon now. We must protest, however, with all earnestness against the opinion that this is the only thing to which our Lord alluded; nor can we consent to exclude all reference to the original Fall of man.

Euthymius has united the two views, and with a very proper sentiment; Nitzsch's complaint that he has done this in a very awkward manner, applies only to his placing Adam first and Cain afterwards.[1] The truth is that our Lord refers all those who are now in a satanic spirit lusting after murder, to the first type of all who are of the Evil one, to the *first murderer* in the likeness of the great murderer—just as we find in 1 Jno. iii. 10—12, which parallel must almost have the weight of a commentary. But in this very reference he intends to direct their thoughts further back to the devil himself, whose mind ἀπ' ἀρχῆς lusted for the death of man, and consequently to the corruption of man, of which indeed Cain was born. The exposition which refers it directly to the Fall is not indeed false, but fails in not perceiving the immediate point of connection in our Lord's discourse, through which it goes back as an inferential conclusion to the ruin of Adam.[2] In 1 Jno. iii. 5, we find *he that committeth sin* generally, standing before the allusion to Cain, and this is Adam; now if Adam's first-born son was of the devil, we may assume that the same devil had already wrought his mischief

[1] Τὸν πρῶτον ἄνθρωπον κτείνας, τὸν Ἀδάμ. Αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸν θάνατον προσεξένησεν. Εἶτα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἄβελ ἀνελών· αὐτὸς γὰρ καὶ αὐτῷ τὸν ἀδελφὸν Κάϊν ἐπανέστησε κινήσας τῷ φθόνῳ. Similarly does Theod. Heracleota connect them.

[2] This Kling is somewhat disposed to admit, see Stud. u. Krit. 1836, 3. S. 669. note.

upon the father of such a son. It is a very arbitrary assertion in which Baumgarten-Crusius takes refuge, that in ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς there is no more reference to an individual occurrence intended, than in ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐχ ἕστηκεν—and that therefore the former is to be referred *neither* to the Fall *nor* to Cain's murder! No, the Lord reminds them evidently of the fact indeed of the first murder;[1] but it is His design to point back to one earlier than that, on this occasion *where the character of His whole discourse generally consists in His leading their thoughts to ultimate and most spiritual principles.* This of itself seems sufficient reason for not interpreting the whole solely of Cain. Lange well protests against the alternative between the two expositions. "The passage manifestly goes back to the Fall, and seizes the murder of man as effected by Satan, in its actual origination. But since Cain's act first brought it to an open manifestation, this also must be regarded as included in the reference to what Satan did at the beginning." This is incorrect only in the order of reference, like Euthymius: it should be.—The reference to the first manifested murder is included in the allusion to its deeper root and principle.

Nitzsch and Lücke misapprehend the profound and comprehensive nature of this spiritual discourse, when the former says —"To involve the first perversion of man, is to interrupt the internal parallelism of its consecutive thoughts," and the latter—"the devil was doubtless a murderer of man in the spiritual sense,[2] as he brought sin into the world, but this thought disturbs the connection, since spiritual murder could not here be alluded to in reference to Christ." Excluding this, the reference to their intention to kill Christ would be much too strongly emphasised; for it only furnishes a point of connection for a

[1] With Nitzsch: "to a definite primitive historical fact, which bore to the murderous lust and activity of the devil, the relation of *beginning* and first external manifestation." Jul. Müller remarks truly that the narrative of that brother's murder contains not the slightest hint of a seducing influence exerted upon Cain"—and refers Nitzsch to the similar ἀπ' ἀρχῆς of 1 Jno. iii. 8. But neither must it be forgotten that the murderous mind of Satan broke out in Cain after a most special manner, and, as it were, became incarnate.

[2] In the sense, that is, of the book of Wisd. ch. ii. 24; comp. with ch. i. 12, 13.

perfect and exhaustive characterisation of Satan, the true and complete *historia diaboli*. And then—as if in the Scriptures the spiritual meaning was not always the fundamental meaning! as if here, and amid the circumstances in which He spoke, the Lord would characterise Satan in so transcendently significant a manner, merely in connection with an accomplished *bodily* murder. The exclusive reference to Cain, we are now compelled to say, weakens the Lord's great utterance, which penetrates to the true ἀρχὴ of sin and ἴδεα of the devil.

The essential point in the work of Nitzsch, already quoted, raises not so much an exegetical as a dogmatic question; it is not so much a defence of a special exegesis, as an attack upon a dogma which the opposite exposition establishes, or the scriptural *view* of it which is held by others. Hence, he places "the relation of this description to the debatable facts in the Scriptural primitive history of man, regarded in itself," among the critical points which must be settled before the "connection of our Lord's discourse." Nitzsch concedes that "the sin which caused mortality is itself a kind of dying," that the Fall is in a sense death,—*but* cannot reconcile it with the New Testament teaching that the tempter whose guilt entered into it should be exhibited as a murderer." Wherefore not? It would require, indeed, a treatise longer than his own to confute all the deeply pondered arguments of such a man; that being impossible we must attempt briefly to supply its place. He is in a certain sense right, that Adam, man generally in him, did not *wholly die*; —"that the enemy may be said rather to have made an assault upon man's life, than to have entirely and finally triumphed over it." But after all, is not such an assault, even without success, an actual murder in the judgment of God? Is not the ζητεῖν or θέλειν ποιεῖν reckoned as the accomplished deed? Is it not on that account that our Lord speaks in such precise and measured terms of the ἐπιθυμίαις of the devil, before He mentions the fact by which he became an actual and manifest ἀνθρωποκτόνος? Here we have united, to use Nitzsch's own words, "the murderous inclination and energy, with the *beginning* and open announcement of it."[1] But when he goes on to

[1] His System, § 117, renders it doubtful whether this estimable writer designs to modify his views as expressed in that treatise.

maintain that "in the exposition of the Adamite Fall the New Testament does not involve the question of spiritual death or murder"—we must be allowed, in the name of the New Testament quite otherwise understood, to utter an entire contradiction. His error is partly in laying too much stress upon the result of the ἀνθρωποκτονία, too little upon the design contemplated in it; and in adhering nevertheless too closely to bodily "mortality."[1] The state of death in sin which Christ and His apostles ascribe to the natural man, independently of the intervening grace which never left him from the beginning, is regarded as "having reference not so much to a lost and extinguished life, as to a life not yet attained." And here we have the dogmatic point of divergence between our respective views of the scriptural doctrine. The one makes Adam's sin rather a checking of development, or a diverting it into the way of grace through sin; the other, which is ours, regards it as a *Fall* in the strongest sense of the term, out of a life infused of God into *the* "death" which is inseparably identical with "sin."

We appeal once more, on behalf of this latter view as applicable also to Adam, to 1 John iii. 8, as also to ver. 15 of that chapter, since Adam, who had no brother to hate, did at least in hatred instead of love repel and proscribe to judgment the wife given to him as a helpmate, Gen. iii. 12. We hold confidently to the assurance, that Christ, in the full meaning of the doctrine derived directly from the Old Testament as we find it in Wisd. ii. 23, 24 compared with i. 11—13, terms Satan a murderer

[1] Asserting it to be contrary to sound religious feeling to term that hurt of mortality an ἀνθρωποκτονία, which had been only mediately inflicted upon man by Satan, and which by intervening grace had been established as a law and transformed into a benefit (quite correctly, אֲשִׁית Gen. iii. 15). But it is still more contrary to our exegetical feeling that Christ's words should be restricted here to the mere external manifestation of bodily death and murder. The words מָוֹת and θάνατος are scarcely anywhere, that is, when dogmatically used, denuded of their spiritual reference. It is a very false view, which even Jul. Müller upholds, that it is not spiritual but bodily death which the record of Genesis iii. and the subsequent use of it in the New Testament, derive from the fall of our first parents! Bodily death would assuredly signify nothing, and would not be truly death, if it had not its ground in death spiritual.

from the beginning;[1] that He does, indeed, introduce this in connection with a more immediate reference to Cain, but regards this *Cainite murder typically*, as pointing forward to all individual hatred and actual murder in the future, and in its *backward* reference as the first achieved result and fearfully speedy manifestation of the lust of Satan—of his desire, that is, so to ruin and destroy man spiritually, as that he might like Satan himself manifest and confirm by murder his own internal death. It is not that the "devil bears the guilt of all the individual results of death in the world," as the good Roos improperly says; but he bears, according to his own design and deed in the first attack upon humanity, the guilt of that great and most essential Fall into death, out of which God saves and restores to life, as Adam, Abel, and Seth, so also all who are penitent and believe. We appeal against Nitzsch in favour of this meaning of *ἀνθρωποκτόνος* to the universal type of scriptural teaching. As von Gerlach says: "It is never expressly made prominent in Holy Scripture that the devil seduced Cain and such as he to commit murder; but it is even said that death entered into the world through the devil's lie—Ye shall not surely die."

It is now time to examine more closely the accompanying words. And first the *ἦν* (for which we must not with Klee read *ἐστί*), the sound of which indicates that the Lord is pointing backwards from the *ἀνθρωποκτονία* which startled His hearers:—See, this *was* he ever, *in this he fully betrayed* what he had been and what he had lusted for from the beginning! Furthermore, the *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, which does not directly mean—"this was his first act, to murder man;" nor is it to be interpreted as simply an *ἀρχαῖον*, occurring between the creation and the deluge—"that first murder, in the beginnings of history, was his work." But it means here as in Matt. xix. 4—from the beginning of known human history, from the time when men were for him to murder, since he first—who already before existed, *ἦν*—appeared and attacked the human race.[2] The *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἁμαρτάνει*, 1 Jno. iii.

[1] Comp. the passage quoted from Sohar chadasch, according to which the נָחָשׁ הַקַּדְמוֹנִי whose children the wicked are, killed—קַטְלִיל—*Adam* and all sprung from him.

[2] Not, assuredly,—from the beginning of the creature; as Lampe assentingly quotes. Nonnus: *ἐξότε κόσμου ἐξ ἀρχῆς τετέλεστο θεμείλιον.*

8, is spoken with the same reference to men, and that which is known to man; pausing before the dark portals of the first pre-adamite fall of spirits—through which, however, we shall see that our Lord gives us here a dim yet impressive glance.

"The world is a den of murderers, under the devil's rule. If we would live in it we must be content to be guests, and in an inn where the host is a knave, and over the door of which is the sign—To murder and lying. Christ Himself set that mark over the door, when He said that he was a murderer and a liar. A murderer, to destroy the body, or liar, to ruin the soul. This is his business, this is what goes on in his hostelry." These words of Luther may serve to introduce the next expressions, though we are not to regard him as being rigorously exegetical in applying murder to the body, lying to the soul. We should rather say that the lie, which is first negatively the not standing in the truth, then positively the bringing forth in speech and act of its own, is the deeper and earlier internal or spiritual principle of all corrupting and destroying act, the most essential *sinfulness* of sin. Inasmuch as the ἀνθρωποκτονία indicates an external manifestation in act, there must correspond to it and causally precede it, an internal condition; and it is *this* of which the Lord, looking further back, proceeds to speak.[1] It is scarcely a delusion, that we regard this ψεύστης in immediate connection with the ἀνθρωποκτόνος as referring to the first lie revealed in the primitive record, the great fundamental lie of the deceiver.[2] *By*

From which that strange doctrine would follow which makes Satan fall immediately on his creation. Comp. Aug. civ. Dei. xi. c. 13. See the right view, agreeing with our own, in Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, I. 377, 378.

[1] Jul. Müller (I. 195) differently expounds this dichotomy. "The *lie* is the cowardice of selfishness, *hatred* its proud overflow. But both mutually develop themselves; *hatred springs from lying*—from aversion to the truth comes rage against him who represents it; *hatred begets lying*, because it finds it needful for the accomplishment of its ends." Quite true. But Christ here places ψεῦδος in evident contrast with the divine ἀλήθεια, as the inmost and first principle of evil. Comp. Nitzsch System § 105, where, strangely enough, the dictum classicum of Jno. viii. is unalluded to.

[2] It might be hard to find in Cain's history a positive and evident illustration of the lie! But in a *spiritual sense* it is true that Satan did not so much murder Abel through Cain, as Cain himself by the lie which misled him to kill Abel. See in 1 Jno. iii., where the mur-

lying to murder, was the Enemy's lust and first act—thus did he encounter man as the only object of his attack between the inaccessible angels and the evil spirits who shared his fall. But in this, finally, He revealed himself as one who had *become* a liar *out of himself*, contrary to the truth of God in which he must have been created; his lying contradiction to the word and commandment of God exhibits him to us as one who had already fallen from the truth of God, in a *previous beginning* beyond the ἀρχή of men.

And does the Lord then really intimate this ultimate fact? Does He give us in this οὐχ ἕστηκεν a definite utterance (more definite and explicit than Lu. x. 18) concerning the fall of Satan? That is, may we translate with Luther—er ist nicht bestanden; with the Vulg. non stetit, *i.e.*, non perstitit; with the Eng. vers. abode not; and the Dutch en is in de waerheyt niet staende gebleven?[1] The philologists forbid it, because of the Greek idiom according to which ἕστηκα has only a present signification; indeed, the older Greek fathers acknowledge this, and their judgment has its weight. And Mayer (Hist. diaboli p. 164)—non tam *lapsum* quam *statum* diaboli describi a Christo putes. Neander regards Christ as giving here the definite idea of Satan, as the spirit estranged from truth and goodness, "lie and sin having become his second nature; he *stands* not in the truth, and can find no resting-place there." Nearly so Bengel[2]—Non assecutus est statum in veritate; and after him v. Gerlach—"he finds no footing, no resting-place in the truth, because his inmost being is alienated from it." This would make his case parallel

derers are exhibited as being in death and murdering themselves! Thus did Satan, too, *will* to destroy the second Adam, that is, his enmity, hardly tempting His love, would have cast Him out of His life in God.

[1] A writer, who outwits himself, perverted this in his Versuch einer biblischen Dämonologie, as follows—"The views of him and his power have never been founded upon truth. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ, there is no truth in the devil and in the Jewish notions concerning him." See this contemptible criticism in Mayer Hist. Diaboli, p. 149. The existence of the idea is an argument of the existence of the reality, for "Satan could be invented by none but Satan." (Daub, Judas Ischarioth, II. 411.)

[2] Who, moreover, incorrectly supposes—hoc comma cupiditatem homicidii memoratam *non antecedit*, sed sequitur.

with that of these his children, who seem at first to be πεπιστευκότες, but do not stand fast in the word of truth and *cannot* give it place in their hearts. Bengel's view, as we see, has a certain bias towards the past sense; and in Lange this is still more marked—"he did not take his stand in the truth;" or in Beck (Lehrwissensch. I. 255)—"one who did not establish himself and take his position in the truth of life." What can we say better than Olshausen's words—"We must be driven to a view of the words very similar to the ancient interpretation of Satan's apostasy; and this admits of a grammatical vindication. Ἕστηκα has the signification of *enduring*, as Lücke and Tholuck acknowledge. The declaration—He abideth not in the truth, does not, indeed, explicitly assert his fall, but contains it implicitly. Only that the fall of Satan is not so much regarded as an isolated fact, but as a continuous conduct and state." This last point may admit of doubt: Nitzsch admits that the οὐχ ἕστηκεν "points to a *fact* apart from the history of the fall, and out of the domain of history generally." The expression of Jude, ver. 6, is more direct—μὴ τηρήσαντες τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀρχήν; and Nonnus may be thought to have arbitrarily altered and added to the words *here*—οὐδ' ἐνὶ θεσμῷ μίμνεν ἀληθείης θεοπειθέος; yet we cannot but trace in the origination of that use of the word which is too much pressed on the opposite side, the notion of *abiding* in a former fixed place.[1] And if we take this root of the expression, this ἕστηκε indicates an ἀρχὴ in which he was created in the truth, who now stands οὐκ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ; inferring in this great mystery the lapsus from the status.[2] Instead of many passages which have been unfoundedly quoted, we would point to Acts xxvi. 22, where the ἕστηκα with the ἄχρι must be interpreted—*I have held firm and continued.* This is certainly something other than the mere οὐκ ἔμμένει, οὐκ ἀναπαύεται of Euthymius, or the "relation of an eternal centrifugal repulsion" in Klee.—Thus we escape at least from the undogmatical and

[1] Hence Sept. for עמד, Nahum i. 6; Mal. iii. 2.

[2] So that Martensen (Dogmatik i. 224) simply says—"this *beginning* of his fall it is which the Lord here hints at when He says that the devil did not abide in the truth." And again (S. 227) he shows that "father of the lie" can only signify an intelligence, a personal self-consciousness. We do not, however, understand father of the lie, but of every liar as being the first—which comes to the same thing.

untheosophical rigour of the Present,[1] which would make the Lord *only* say—"he falleth ever away from the truth," and *only* characterise (according to Lücke) the ἴδίωμα of the devil as being an eternal *falling away*, without any intimation of that first fact of original *apostasy*, which must be presupposed to any unbiassed apprehension. Such a rigorously present description or characterisation, cutting off all reference to an originally good created character, would tend to open the way for the great Manichæan error, or serve as its apology. But the Lord could not so speak; and therefore introduces the ἀλήθεια of God in connection with the abstract *possibility* of Satan being in it and it being in him; and further, gives us in the οὐχ ἕστηκε, as we cannot but apprehend, a positive allusion to an original *actual* being in this ἀληθεία on the part of this present ψεύστης.

As he *now is*, and as he *has been* from the beginning of our history, it is said of him—οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτῷ. Spoken of Satan, this has an infinitely deeper meaning than when it is said of unfaithful men (as in the passage sometimes compared 1 Macc. vii. 18)—οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθεία; or (as might have been more aptly cited) in Deut. xxx. ii. 20, לֹא־אֱמֶן בָּם, there is no truth in them (Sept. πίστις), no sincerity corresponding to truth and which may be relied upon. The change in the form of expression gives us this meaning:—*because* he abideth not and hath not abode in the truth, therefore the truth cannot be in him; just as previously in vers. 31 and 37. For the truth is here, in the second as in the first clause,[2] the objective truth of God, not the subjective sincerity of the creature; the latter is only included as the ground of the subsequent lying, since it follows as the necessary consequence that from him in whom the truth is not, there can proceed no truth; he cannot speak *it* but lie only.[3] Hence it follows at once, that we must take the ὅτι not œtiologically but syllogistically. Thus did Augustin regard it (de civ. Dei, xi., c. 14): Subjecit autem *indicium*, quasi quæsissemus, *unde ostendatur*, quod in veritate non steserit. So Calvin, Beza, and Lampe; the latter appealing to Glassius for

[1] As Lücke repeats it against Martensen: Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1851.

[2] Although Lücke and many others deny this.

[3] As his deeds everywhere bring *death*, so his words breathe out lying.

this undeniable use of ὅτι. It is according to Piscator an argumentum ab affectu, nor do we find in it any thing "forced." He is *in fact*, as all his deeds and words from the beginning show, bare of all truth: this is the evidence of an οὐχ ἕστηκεν, of a falling at his beginning into that condition from another; and so "not" is almost equivalent to "no longer." But the ἐστίν ἐν αὐτῷ should not be weakened, as Hezel weakens it: "Truth was never any matter of his—and never is—nor is it to be sought in him!" But this *most internal* truthfulness makes the transition to the ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων in this compact and strictly connected series of positions.

When he speaketh the lie—can therefore by no means be an admission that he sometimes may speak the truth; for here the well-known saying holds true—If the devil speaks the truth that is his foulest lie. But the λαλεῖν τὸ ψεῦδος in connection with ὅταν recognises his abiding, systematic, and sole manner of acting. It comes *out of his own*, he acts and speaks thus because he cannot and will not do otherwise, because he is essentially a liar. But the explanation—"consistent with his character"—is not enough: nor is de Wette's translation—"in his proper kind." The individuality or personal self-character of this creature sundered from God, and opposing himself to God, is here declared to be the element of lying and sin, in which he was not created, but into which he had fallen. Could the Lord speak more plainly to understanding ears and attentive minds? Could words have been chosen more precisely adapted to distinguish between the devil himself, and his deluded and enslaved children? For in their case as such the lie is not so absolutely and wholly their own, self-chosen element; they have become subject to it through the deceitfulness of Satan, whom alone no predecessor had ensnared and led astray.

Finally, there are two methods of expounding the last word. The greater part of the commentators, ancient and modern, refer αὐτου to ψεῦδος;[1] and Nitzsch pronounces this *necessary*. This ψεύδος is either found in the distance of the previous clause (as by Glassius, referring to Acts viii. 26, where, however, αὕτη does not apply to the way but to Gaza); or, less harshly, with

[1] Martensen was named before. Also Daub, Judas Ischarioth I. 203.

Winer is regarded as latent in the concrete ψεύστης, and brought forward again as its abstract in a manner the converse of Rom. ii. 26.[1] This would suit very well, but we cannot see the necessity for it; the reference to ψεύστης itself, which Lücke regards as more obviously grammatical, is certainly not more harsh, when we take into account the very concise and unusual character of this discourse. The difficulty is simply that of taking this word, the predicate of the devil, immediately as an abstract or collective term—the liar generally, or every liar. "We may hesitate to say which is the more difficult sense of the two"—true enough.[2] Lucke finds nothing inappropriate in construing πατήρ with the *abstract* ψεῦδος; but we think it very unapt in this connection, where the aim and gist of the whole discourse is to evince these men to be children of the devil. Oetinger's words are very pregnant: Satan has not only spoken but begotten the lie—but still πατήρ must here have reference to persons, in order to lead back to ver. 38. We have already in our general analysis shown that the conclusion following upon the strictly logical process of the whole argument, must be—Consequently *ye* are children of the devil—ye, who oppose to My truth the lie of which ye are conscious in your hearts, with enmity against Myself which stops not short of the desire to kill Me. Thus the connection demands this sense. (Bengel: et pater cujusvis mendacis.) Meyer and Lange hold to this; Baumgarten-Crusius modifies it somewhat after the example of Erasmus' ejus rei—of *such like*, but with personal reference to ψεύστης; thus—he who lies is his son. Let it be noted how graciously the Lord pretermits at the close the direct address!

Vers. 45, 46. We have already pointed out the retrogressive character of the argument here which strengthens itself by most emphatic repetition. The Lord majestically opposes His own ἐγώ, as of one τὴν ἀλήθειαν λέγων (mark the subtile change—not λαλῶν), to the archliar and all his progeny. Not to believe *Him*,[3]

[1] So Erasmus—pater ejus rei.

[2] At any rate De Wette is not justified in declaring the reference to ψεύστης impossible.

[3] This believing *Him* is the lower degree as in ch. v. 46, x. 37. Comp. the Baptist's words, ch. iii. 36, where we have both at once, and on which Roos excellently comments:—He who believeth not the Son, as a Teacher *who tells him* that he should believe *on Him*.

and *because*, not ὅταν but ὅτι, He telleth them the truth, is on their part a wilful opposition after the devil's manner. And then comes the sublime and so much contested *evidence* that He speaketh the truth, derived from His *sinlessness* as exhibited before themselves and challenging their ἐλέγκειν περὶ ἁμαρτίας! The history of the exposition of this word presents us with a remarkable phenomenon. The apparent obviousness of the meaning as derived from the connection deluded most of the ancient expositors; but in later times they have penetrated with general consent to a deeper and more appropriate interpretation of our Lord's meaning.

Because ἁμαρτία stands in contrast both with the preceding and subsequent ἀλήθεια, it was thought impossible to evade the conclusion that the meaning must be—Who can convince me of error? Thus Origen: τὰ λεγόμενα ἡμαρτημένα; and Cyril with more definite and express opposition. So Calvin, Beza, Melanchthon, and alas Bengel too: me errare et a veritate abesse! And thus interpret, as we might suppose, Wolf, Kypke, Morus; Fritzsche also against Ullmann (who incorrectly appeals to 1 Cor. xv. 34 and Tit. iii. 11); Strauss too of course; and even J. v. Müller, putting it in the worst form—"Can ye prove against me any error in my conclusions?[1] Tholuck makes the pertinent remark that if this had been His meaning the Lord would in this connection have opposed ψεῦδος to the truth. Many, from Cyril down to Fritzsche, have interpreted it—de fraude;[2] as may be found literally in a lexicon in New Testament. Lampe tries to extricate himself by the vague and insipid observation:—ἁμαρτία hic latissime est accipienda pro quocunque defectu morali, *etiam levissimo*, nec solum pro vitio in factis, sed etiam pro *errore in verbis*—according to Jas. iii. 2.

[1] Brandt's Schullehrerbibel decks out this view to the utmost by laying the stress upon the ἐλέγχει—who can *demonstrate* that I am incorrect, that I am in error? They never in their contests with Him adduced any *proof*. But this would be still more doubtful, since it is well known that among the contentious the judgment as to sufficiency of reasons is altogether obscured. Christ may challenge sinners to convince Him of any sin; but to demand from them *proof* against the *truth*, even hypothetically, is altogether *unseemly*.

[2] Baumgarten-Crusius speaks strangely of a deception of the people, which arrogated a higher meaning to itself!

Fikenscher comes independently to the same conclusion: "Jesus represents every defection from the pure truth as a sin against God!"

But at the very outset, as Lücke protests—"How feeble would it sound, if He had asked: Or do I speak any untruth, is there any error which ye can allege?" Especially after having by ὅτι maintained that He spoke the truth![1] Moreover, how utterly does that interpretation forsake the *scriptural* meaning of ἁμαρτία in this chapter, as found throughout the whole Gospel, the entire New Testament, and all the Scriptures! St John must, in consistency with his phraseology, have set down πλάνη or ψεῦδος. Have we not in ver. 34 ἁμαρτιά in contrast with the *truth*, which makes free from sin? Has not the Lord just been showing how *falsehood* and *sin* are connected together, as derived from the devil? And are not *in His own case* the two things essentially and necessarily connected, that He did no sin, and spake only truth,—just as in all His testimony to Himself He always combines together His ποιεῖν and λέγειν? Kling makes a further objection to Lücke's view. "He makes the sense to be, that the only thing which would justify them in not believing Him, would be the possibility of their alleging and proving Him to be a sinner; since He could only lay claim to their acknowledgment of Him as Christ, on the supposition of their trusting in His moral purity." This Kling will not allow, since the truth which was disbelieved was not His declaration concerning His own being, but His complaint of their sin; and he therefore substitutes—"I challenge you to point out any defection in Me from the path of the Divine will, and thus to make it plain that I unrighteously oppose Myself as the true Son abiding in the house to you as the slaves of sin." This more definite reference may admit of discussion, but it does not touch the main point that ἁμαρτία means *sin*, and not error, oversight, or wrong conclusion. But we do not altogether echo Luther:[2] "Christ here graciously demands of them the cause wherefore

[1] Compare Ullmann's vindication, Stud. u. Krit., 1842, 3, 674 ff. De Wette brings forward a sound reason why ἁμαρτία, like ἀδικία, ch. vii. 18, cannot be error. According to that supposition, *faith* would be the fruit of reflecting test.

[2] See his sermon in the collection of Niethammer.

they do not believe, since they can find nothing to blame either in His *life* or in His *doctrine*. His life is unblamable, for He says—who can convince Me of sin? His doctrine is also unimpeachable, for He says—Thus I tell you the truth," &c. But the great point is *this*, that the sinless life is made valid *proof* of the truth of the doctrine;[1] and this itself is a great and profound truth which penetrates and convinces every conscience, and to *prove* which in this place where it is so dogmatically asserted, is beyond our present province. See in addition what was said upon ch. vii. 18.

Undoubtedly, this does not assert directly the absolute sinlessness of Christ, since men as such, and especially these his enemies, could not look into the heart; and the most unimpeachable external life might yet conceal sin visible to God. But in the whole treatment of this question in later times, much stress has been laid upon the truth that *Christ* could only have uttered such a challenge, in the perfect consciousness of His own sinlessness before God. In truth, He speaks it absolutely and definitely and solemnly; He does not affect before men the semblance of sinlessness! From any other lips than His own, such a declaration could only be sincere and permissible when referred to external sins which may be alleged; but when He so speaks it would be *sin* if there were in His mind any reserve of sinful consciousness; this very word would be sin! He who does not *feel* this is not to be argued with; and we wonder at Ullmann's patience in discussing the points with those who are ἐξ ἐριθείας.

What humility, once more, appears in this dignity! He submits to be rebuked by these sinners, if they can! comp. ch. xviii. 23.[2] As the Holy One of Israel (Zeph. iii. 5; Deut. xxxii. 4), He stands and waits their accusation. We are to

[1] Assuredly thus, and not conversely, as Tcschendorff (Nikodemus, S. 118, 119,) labours to maintain, in order to reconcile exegesis with dogmatics:—Where there is no defection from the truth, there it must be concluded that sin does not exist! In that case, as De Wette says, faith would be the fruit of reflective test; and even *in us* as certain a criterion for *such* testing of truth-speaking, as the *conscience* certainly is for the sin-rebuking truth of the Holy One.

[2] Where, however, the κακῶς or καλῶς touches the sinfulness of His so answering, not the untruth of what was said.

suppose here a sublime pause to intervene. He has put the question and is silent. They also are silent; their slanderous spirits have not a word to allege in His presence. His question was redoubled: Am I a sinner? If not a sinner, but True, *wherefore, wherefore* believe ye not Me? (Who hath bewitched you, that ye will not obey the truth? (Gal. iii. 1. The answer comes from 1 Sam. xv. 23,—the devil as the arch-deceiver!)

Ver. 47. He then takes up the word again: I will answer *for you* to the *second question*, since ye have answered the first by your silence. What I have *said* to you is *true*, and it is now the only answer—He who is of God heareth the words of God; *therefore* ye hear them not, because ye are not of God. The sublimest argument of God's speaker confronting unbelieving men, and in the simplest possible words! It is the condensation of all His sayings in this chapter from ver. 14 downwards; specially a final conclusion repeated from ver. 37, but repeated in the gentle negative form—not of God. The Evangelist cites this great decisive Word for all the future of the world and of the church in his first Epistle, ch. iv. 6.

The Jews are smitten by the truth which fell upon them from the lips of the sinless Son of man; and should have been overcome by the most gentle tenderness with which His rigorous truth opposes *their* sin; by the profound humility with which the Son of God confronts their pride. But they do not yield as vanquished; they do not sink into silence; but rather begin in good earnest now—to revile and blaspheme. St John here mentions "*the Jews*," otherwise than in vers. 33, 39, and thus indicates that they are not the πεπιστευκότες who now take up the word, but the most malicious and virulent who represent the mass. The raising of objections is at an end; and the arrogant men who had been listening for a while in restrained vexation, now come forward, determined to retaliate in yet fiercer invective the contempt which He had cast upon the seed of Abraham. And their words are the delayed answer to ver. 46—but what an answer do they give! What contradiction of sinners is here (Heb. xii. 3)! The two words of scorn which they give vent to have a manifest allusion to the Lord's two inculpations, and this

gives them their distinctive meaning. *Thou hast*—not *the* devil, but *a devil.* This is, indeed, the current formula provided by their vocabulary for madness by possession, especially of the evil spirit of pride: but the word here has not the same meaning as in ch. vii. 20, x. 20. "Thou art a fool, or fanatic" would be much too little; "thou art possessed by a spirit of pride" would also come far short of the meaning, after "Samaritan." They deepen their emphasis just as the Lord had done—not from *Abraham*, not from *God.* Perfectly to give back His second reproach would have required—"thou mayest thyself be of the devil, his son and not the son of our God!" But neither their accustomed phraseology, nor their present daring, extends as far as the utterance of such a word; they content themselves with δαιμόνιον ἔχειν, intending it to signify this much, at least:—thou who speakest thus art more likely to be in league with Satan. Thus they cast Him out of the fellowship of the God of Israel in the latter word; even as in the former they had cast Him out of the fellowship of Israel.

For it is obvious that this is what they mean by *Samaritan*, a term far surpassing in contemptuousness the formerly used "Galilæan." Thou art a heretic—"one who knoweth not the God of Israel, and denieth Israel's orthodox faith."[1] This was the term of foulest scorn which they could apply to any individual, and nothing but δαιμόνιον ἔχειν could follow it. The later Jewish writings abound with the most extravagant expressions of this kind, which we need not now quote; and Eisenmenger i. 633, 634, has shown that the Christians were afterwards called Cuthites (כּוּתִיִּם from כּוּתָה, 2 Kings xvii. 24), this word being equivalent to גּוֹיִם.[2] The point, however, of their malicious daring lies in the question placed before both words of reproach, and which He was to answer with yes—οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν; this may indeed be softened, with Bengel—cum aliquâ adhuc formidine horrendam contumeliam pronunciant; as if the question betrayed some lingering uncertainty. But we prefer to give it in its rigour

[1] Origen: ὡς παραχαράσσοντα Ἰουδαϊκὰ παραπλησίως τοῖς Σαμαρείταις.

[2] The Talmud says, *e.g.*, (Tract. Jebamoth fol. 47)—a Cuthite can be no *witness!* which is very pertinent to this passage.

with Grotius—nonne merito inter nos dicere solemus; or with Baumgarten-Crusius—*Have* we not said rightly? This last interpretation only suits, strictly speaking, the second calumny which had been before uttered; but in their wilful rage they apply it to both—as if it had been a long settled question with them, that He was a Samaritan!

Jesus now begins the last part of this colloquy by asserting against the ἀτιμάζειν of their reckless scorn, the honour which was laid upon Him by the Father, including His own divine dignity in such a manner that their *three* contradictory words are gently but most clearly replied to. He answers their first word in ver. 48 by the three precisely corresponding clauses of ver. 49, and then in vers. 50, 51 His most condescending patience vindicates the testimony which He had borne, by declaring that He spake it not for His honour, but for their salvation. Their second rejoinder, vers. 52, 53, which springs from the word with which He closes, He replies to in vers. 54—56, taking their objections in their backward order. This requires Him, finally, to place Abraham, who was dead, in his true relation to Himself, the Giver, according to His divinity, of eternal life.

Ver. 49. The answer in these words advances backwards to its climax: and this must be carefully observed for the right apprehension of its individual expressions. Thou hast a devil—*I have not a devil!* Thou art a Samaritan—*I honour My Father!* Say we not rightly—no, *ye do dishonour Me!* How luminous, and how full of repose is this reply! "Oh that men would learn from the Lord Jesus how in tranquil repose in the will of their heavenly Father, to defend the truth." (Rieger).

But what gentleness too—the more daring and insolent His opponents, the more mild and humble is He! This "*I have not a devil*" is the type and model of all future reviling not again—1 Pet. ii. 23, comp. Acts xxvi. 25. But He does not go on to say—And I am not a Samaritan—for two reasons. Lampe gives us one in a graceful though subtle form—cum jam inter Samaritanos haberet, qui in eum credebant. Or, as we may put it with more precision—How could He take this name of mockery, which involved in contempt a people called to salvation, upon His lips; and by repelling it sanction the injustice done to those, many of whom He had already treated with grace? See, with

what most scrupulous care His truth and His love avoid entering for a moment into the impure element of their polemical language![1] To our minds there is another reason which also has its force. The repeated retort—*No*, it is not as ye say! would have given the appearance of excitement and passion to His reply. Instead of that, He passes over into the style of teaching and vindication—I honour My Father! Lücke well says—"For I announce only His word, and His truth," and therefore am no heretical teacher of error, such as ye would describe Me by the word *Samaritan*. In the gently maintained assertion of the Present ἀλλὰ τιμῶ, however, it is at the same time declared—I cannot speak otherwise, I *must* speak to you as I have spoken for the honour of God; I must testify against your God-dishonouring sin and lie, and similarly assert the truth *for My own person*. So that it is both: I only indicate God's honour against you—"I justify Myself only against invective,"[2] and this only because your insult lights upon the *Father* in Me His Son. Thus it is not in the madness of pride, but in obligatory *obedience*, that I discharge the duty of My mission. But *ye* (the same antithesis as in their ἡμεῖς and σύ!) say not καλῶς what ye say, but dishonour—one might expect My Father or God, but instead of that—*Me!* For the accusation that *they* denied God His honour was already included in the previous clause; and He is constrained now further to intimate "that the Father's honour and His own are one and the same thing"—as Luther here says. In deep *sorrow*, which is one with gentleness, He utters this; for His pure divine consciousness *resents* humanly the insults cast upon Himself and His Father. Ἀτιμάζειν has a softer meaning here than *e.g.* in Luke xx. 11; for the Lord, or St John according to His meaning, prefers the general indefinite, and, as much as might be, negative word, says not ὀνειδίζετε or λοιδορεῖτε, but abides by the pure antithesis of His τιμᾷν. The reading ἠτιμάσατε (which the Vulg. and Erasmus adopt) has no external grounds of support: and it would refer the Lord's protest, which

[1] The explanation of Roos is not enough; to wit, that He did not reply to the imputation of being a Samaritan, because His adherence to the Jewish worship was a sufficient vindication.

[2] Which Baumgarten-Crusius alone makes prominent.

is urged against their disposition and life generally, too specifically to the particular words of invective which they had used. Finally, the καί between the second and the third clause belongs to the consummate peacefulness and mildness of the words of His victorious benignity. It is not to be resolved as—*Although* ye dishonour Me, this does not prevent Me from honouring the Father; nor is it to be interpreted as a more severe accusation—*and nevertheless* ye revile Me! But it is designedly a simple *and*, which points out the threefold gradation of the reply, and declares that all is even so in spite of their contradiction.—Choose, ye contradicters of this day, who will not honour the Son as ye honour the Father, believing His own testimony—take your choice in the dilemma of this chapter. Whether are the Jews right, or He! There is no third and intermediate opinion imaginable. He who does not worship in Jesus the Son of God, and yet does not perceive in Him a δαιμόνιον teaching error, and inspiring Him with fanatical presumption, has not thought deeply upon this chapter, has not heard and read its sayings to any purpose.

Vers. 50, 51. This calm assertion is followed by a renewed and unwearied appeal, which, while strictly connected with what precedes, introduces a new justification, warning, and entreaty. The justification is the already often vindicated absence of self-glorification; the warning points to the future judgment; the entreaty returns this time too into an offer of eternal life! Even as every sincerely pious servant of God would be at the utmost remove from presumptuous and self-assuming error and fanaticism, so Jesus also sought not His own honour—not *although* but *because* He knows that the Father hath honoured and will honour Him. Ζητῶν still refers most assuredly to τὴν δόξαν, and reminds us of chap. v. 23. The Father's *will is*, that men should honour the Son, and therefore bears *testimony* to Him (chap. v. 31, 32); but on that very account He will one day *demand* it of those who now refuse. (Deut. xviii. 19, אָנֹכִי אֶדְרֹשׁ מֵעִמּוֹ.) All these significations of ζητεῖν are wrapped up in one great idea; but the last (as *e.g.* 2 Chron. xxiv. 22) makes the transition to the κρίνων. But we are not to make δόξαν again the complement of this latter word, for this would be

contrary to the language;[1] but rather—God my Father will *judge* in what concerns Me, between Me and you, in regard to your ἀτιμάζειν. And here it is perfectly natural that, without contradicting chap. v. 22, the judgment is in this case left with the Father;[2] for the Son of Man humbly places Himself as one party confronting His slanderers before the tribunal of Him who will judge rightly, and to whom He commits His cause, as any other righteous servant. (Ps. xliii. 1.).

We are not to understand a pause between vers. 51 and 52; but the strictest connection subsists,—as we have shown before. I seek not mine own honour in all the words which have provoked your wrath, but *your salvation*, your deliverance from *death!* Entirely in the sense of chap. v. 34. Do not *judgment* and *eternal life* belong to each other in this passage as in that? God will judge them who persistently refuse to honour Me by believing My words, in the day when He makes manifest My glory; but I would save you from this great evil, and pluck you from the hands of the liar and the *murderer*.[3] The gracious promise, uttered so often before, stands here in reminding connection with vers. 21—24 of this chapter. The Lord begins again to attract and beseech them: it is as even Lampe says a novum tentamen gratiæ.[4] The τηρεῖν of ver. 51 (שָׁמַר, Sept. τηρεῖν and φυλάσσειν) has been by some inappropriately limited to those believers who are to be presupposed as having already accepted and admitted His words. Hence Teschendorff: "The Lord here turns away from his opponents, to those who had exhibited faith in His word." But such a distribution disturbs the profound unity of the whole, and misses the essential point,

[1] But not with Allioli, uniting the two absolutely,—there is one that seeketh and judgeth.

[2] Not in the sense of the words of a Rationalist—In all the dogmatic of Jesus *God* remains ever the *Judge*.

[3] So little fellowship have I with Satan, who promise and give *life*. This allusion, remarked upon by Augustin and Beza, is safer than the questionable observation of Bengel. Epiphanius makes the Samaritans to have been—Sadducees!

[4] It is by no means *unnatural* (as de Wette thinks) that Jesus should make this sudden utterance to those who were radically unsusceptible. "After a pause, and weary of strife," He is regarded as having turned again to the believers of ver. 31. Weary of *strife*, indeed,—we have nothing to say against that; but not weary in His seeking love.

that the Lord *does not turn away* from these His enemies, but begins again in His compassion to utter promises to them. *Τηρεῖν* means generally, to pay respect to His word, hence to perceive and admit its meaning, and give it proper regard: it includes the whole obedience of faith from its first admission to its full confirmation. So we find it in chap. xv. 20, and there we have its best parallel. *Ἐάν τις* as in chap. vii. 37. *If* (even among you) any man yet sincerely marks My word, lays hold of it, and retains it! For it is very certain and self-understood that *λόγον τηρεῖν* does not here mean keeping the commandments in act; but the living word of Christ is the seed of divine and eternal life, which being sown is to be kept in the heart until all its fruit is borne. He who bears this within himself will not and cannot in the essential meaning of the word, *die!*[1] Chap. xi. 25, 26, dilates most copiously upon the great thought, and pursues it into its full meaning; *here* for the first time in this Gospel the negation of death as a positive promise of life occurs in a new phraseology, that of not "seeing death;" although chap. v. 24, vi. 50, 51, 58, had most obviously prepared the way for it. In chap. vi. the resurrection stood in connection with the not dying, but the intermediate death of the body was still acknowledged; now, however, the expression is much more strong and absolute—shall not *see death*, that is, not know death at all as such. See Ps. lxxxix. 49, xlix. 10, xvi. 10; Luke ii. 26. Thus this great promise denies the being of death in dying itself;[2] and in proportion as the eye of faith can behold and penetrate this word of Christ, and the soul can hold it fast, believers in Him pass through all the bitterness of bodily death, and all the final anguish of the soul, without any dread of ultimate condemnation, fearing, indeed, no more evil (Ps. xxiii. 4)—and thus "in the act of dying feel not and see not death." Rieger: "As he who walks towards the sun, sees not the shadow behind him."

These Jews, indeed, cannot apprehend all this, for they know not what *θάνατος* essentially is. They pretermit the answer as

[1] For spiritual and eternal death is essentially such, physical death is only such figuratively. Let ver. 51 show what Jesus thought of in ver. 44!

[2] The emphasis lies upon *θάνατος*; not upon *εἰς αἰτὸν ὦνα*, as it has been explained—mortem in æternitatem, *i.e.*, mortem æternam!

a whole, and take offence at the least paradoxical word of it, instead of pondering the Lord's meaning. Thus they swiftly discover that this word is sufficient proof of the foul charge which *they* had just brought against Him! The νῦν ἐγνώκαμεν, manifestly more than the previous οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν; they seem to admit, half in self-betrayal and half in seeming condescension, some uncertainty in their previous allegation: but now they can maintain—It is clear, at least after this, that we were right; this leaves no more doubt! In bitter stiffneckedness they will adduce to the last *their father* Abraham; and now associate with him for strong proof and confirmation all the prophets too. They, certainly, all kept the sayings *of God*, and are not the less *dead* on that account? Are *thy* sayings more than those? When they repeat His words, the meaninglessness of which they exhibit, as it were, for His own acknowledgment that He knew not what He was speaking of, they use *tasting* instead of *seeing*; and this, though not a designed *perversion*,[1] yet is, as Lange remarks, a designed *intensification* of the word. They use, in order to signify bodily death, the expression which obviously makes prominent the special bitterness of dying; an expression which does not, indeed, occur in that sense in the Old Testament, but is very frequent in the Rabbinical writings,[2] and was ordinarily used even in the time of Christ to designate death, see Matt. xvi. 28. When they thus limit the word to its exclusive reference to bodily death, they falsify the saying of Christ by misunderstanding it; for the believer may, indeed, in that sense experience the bitterness and sting of death (as the Lord Himself did pre-eminently for us all, Heb. ii. 9)—and yet through this death, which he sees not and knows not as death, pass into higher life. Art thou greater than our father Abraham? Thus do the Ἰουδαῖοι, whose boast is to know, speak with the same spirit of folly as in ch. iv. 12 the woman of Samaria. The ὅστις, which is certainly genuine, has in its full emphasis the "fuller meaning" which Baumgarten-Crusius would require ὅτι to express. Τίνα σεαυτὸν [σὺ] ποιεῖς is, after all that has passed, much keener than the similar

[1] They did not pervert the truth by the change; for he who seeth not death as something frightful, tastes it not as anything bitter. Roos.

[2] Without necessarily requiring any allusion to a cup or goblet.

formula, ch. i. 22. There it is still questioning, but here it is condemnatory too; comp. ch. v. 18, x. 33, xix. 7.

In vers. 54—56 the answer travels backwards through the objection, just as before. *What makest thou thyself?* Answer: I honour not myself in any such self-assumption (ch. vii. 18, v. 31) as would be indeed an *οὐδὲν*, like all lying self-commendation of vain man; but My Father honoureth Me! The same, whom *ye* vainly call your God, and yet know Him not. Vers. 47, 42, 19, ch. vii. 28, 29. *Art thou greater than Abraham?* The answer does not go at once and prematurely enter into that question, but asserts:—I know God *as My Father*, I hold fast and fulfil the word which He has given Me as My commission.

Finally, *Abraham is dead*—no, I say unto you, Abraham liveth, although he is dead, and knoweth now, in the joy of eternal life, of my manifestation, which once in his lifetime he longed and waited for.

Ver. 54. *Δοξάζων με* embraces all in one, which had been and still is spoken of. It is also equivalent to *δοξάσει*, as the *ἔστιν*, parallel with ver. 50, shows: He will one day assert My honour. But it is here, first of all, as an answer: *ἐδόξασέ με*, He has bestowed upon Me the honour which in word and deed I must bear witness to and maintain; He has imposed it upon Me as a commission that I, for the sake of His honour in Me, should represent Myself to the world as what I am. This is then the *λόγος αὐτοῦ* of ver. 55. If ye knew Him, ye would also know and acknowledge Me; but ye *say* only that He is *your* God.[1] Almost all expositors glide rapidly over the most weighty assurance given here, in which Jesus declares *His father* and the God who revealed Himself in Israel, though by Israel He was not truly known, to be *the same*. He thereby protests, as against all Gnostic distinction between the Demiurgus and the New Testament God, so against all the Rationalist or semi-believing misapprehension of the Old Testament which prevails in our own day. The consequences which are to be deduced from this one saying of Christ extend much further than many are willing to

[1] The response by their *ἡμῶν* is incorrect. Jesus is very far from taking their lying words into His lips, and retorting them, as they had done with His.

follow them; are such as many show themselves unwilling distinctly to realise. If "God the Father of Jesus Christ" be actually one and the same with "Jehovah, the God-King of Israel" (to use de Wette's words), this gives of itself ample assurance that He could never in old time have essentially otherwise revealed Himself than in after time. We should carefully maintain and keep inviolate the historical and economical distinction between the Old Testament and the Christian, the failure in which has betrayed Zinzendorf, for example, into much confusion: but we should be still more careful that we do not regard the Old Testament as a collection of Jewish books, and deal with them as we deal with the literature of any other people, just as if there were no New Testament to reduce all which God has spoken, to one vast, comprehensive, and connected Revelation. The same God who spake to the fathers before He finally spake in His Son, and in whose progressive revelations no appearance of contradiction can be supposed ever to have been permitted, must have in some degree announced the glorious and perfect future in the preparatory imperfection of every age, and given it more or less to be known. The Christian expositor, therefore, of the Old Testament has not the task imposed upon him to become a Jew again (impossible as that is in itself!), and to reproduce the twilight of intelligence which before the great Fulfilment was all that could visit the souls of men in those ages. His province is to inlay and interweave the great explanation which Christ has given of all that the God of Israel, who is His Father, meant to say from the beginning; thereby becoming himself more and more assured, in this way, of faith leading to knowledge, that after all he has not in reality inlaid anything into old scripture, but only expounded and *opened* their original and true meaning.[1] This is not to abolish the true distinction which subsists, but only to reveal the true unity subsisting in their difference. As there is no *Christ* or Messiah but He of whom the prophetic word bore witness, *even so there is nothing essentially Christian, which could possibly form a pure and per-*

[1] According to Lu. xxiv. 27 and 45, the disciples did indeed understand in the prophetic Scriptures *more* than the writers of these Scriptures were themselves conscious of; but nothing more than what the Spirit of Christ in them had spoken from the beginning.

fect contrast with anything actually pertaining to the Old Testament.

And here, finally, the biblical theology of the Old Testament must shake itself free from another inveterate and ruinous evil, that of confounding two distinct things—that which proceeded directly from *God*, the Father of Jesus Christ, and that which, in their half intelligence, their misapprehension, or their entire perversion, *the Hebrew people* constructed out of it. The same sentence of our Lord, in which He declares that this people's God was His Father, imputes also to this people an *οὐκ ἐγνώκατε αὐτόν*—and not referring simply to this present generation, but to their similarly unbelieving fathers. (Acts vii. 51.) Indeed, according to the measure in which faith was wanting, a lack of knowledge was necessarily involved even in the case of the sincere. We know that the people, as the people of a calling and election, were already furnished with all that was needful; but that the people misunderstood and perverted the word of God as well as their own way, is manifest from their own historical and prophetical archives, which exhibit as a whole that great conflict between the Holy One of Israel and His called ones, which at length at the manifestation of Christ reached its fearful climax. Even as that "Christendom" which has been gradually formed among the nations and through the ages, with all its dogmas and ecclesiastical constitutions, is far from exhibiting in its purity all that was given unto man in Christ; so still less must we think to find in the so-called "Hebraismus" or the "predominant faith" of this people, the *λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ* which were intrusted to their unfaithfulness. (Rom. iii. 2, 3). This is undeniable, as it respects that supreme crisis when Pharisaism, called orthodox but perverting the essence of the Old Testament, crucified the Messiah; and why may not the same fundamental distinction be applied to all these ages!

Thus indeed most assuredly "the idea of the Supreme God, the Creator of heaven and earth, was limited and restricted by the popular notion of the national God of the Israelites."[1] But the Lord condemns as a lie the false element of particularism in

[1] De Wette erbaul. Erklär. der Psalmen, S. 15. Only not in the holy books themselves, in as far as and where they contain the *λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ*!

this, when He says—λέγετε ὅτι θεὸς ὑμῶν ἐστι; the truth in it, as connected with God's special covenant, He in the same words confirms. He does not protest against the θεὸς ὑμῶν unconditionally, but against their λέγειν. He might have said—He is indeed *your* God as I am *your* Christ, only not in the sense in which ye appropriate, without understanding the word. Yea more! This misapprehension in its *lesser degree*, and not having lost the reality of fellowship with God, was foreseen in man's weakness and in its time borne with, by God Himself; just as Christ endured the Jewish limitation of His apostles' notions of the Messiah, until the final opening of their understandings. But the full intelligence of Scripture came to them through the Risen Saviour and His Holy spirit; and it perfectly harmonises with the words which He spake unto them while He was yet with them. (Lu. xxiv. 44—47.) The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (as He is soon termed at the outset of the apostolical history) is not, because He entered into the fellowship of election and covenant with these holy patriarchs, therefore the isolated God of these men and their seed after the flesh; Abraham rather understood him aright as the Judge of all the earth (Gen. xviii. 25), and knew that the goal of the special covenant was the salvation and blessing of all the families of the earth. Again, the peculiar relation of the people of the covenant to the same God who is also the Father of Jesus Christ, is far from being abolished in the New Testament (see Acts iii. 25, 26); yea, rather, *His* own prediction confirms it even to the end of the days, and gives us to expect in the great futurity the full development of both covenants in one, the new covenant returning back again into that which was of eternal validity in the old. The Lord utters it as an ὀξύμωρον, containing both a severe reproach and a meek lamentation:—Ye know not *your God*, and your λέγειν concerning Him perverts the unknown truth into a lie; ye know not how graciously this God of your fathers declares Himself through Me and My work, as your, and your children's God!

It is, more particularly, not merely the moral substance of the law, as coinciding with the natural law in the conscience, which is the indispensable foundation of the Gospel's forgiveness and salvation from sin, but the testimony concerning the guilt and ruin of the natural man before this holy Law. The history of

the *Fall* at the beginning of Scripture, (to which, therefore, ver. 44 in our ch. necessarily pointed), the progressive factual confirmation of which the history of Israel, by the prophetic Spirit[1] of God was intended, when viewed aright, to exhibit; then the *Law* itself condemning this sin, in connection with its propitiatory economy which brought no propitiation (Heb. x. 2—4); thus the *revelation of sin and death* pervading the whole Old Testament is the most essential *preparation* for the Redemption; —so that the Lord's saying in ver. 51 must necessarily be hailed by every true Israelite with the joy of Abraham or Simeon (comp. also Lu. i. 79), as the *coming time*. From the Book of Job to Malachi—the *fall* and *redemption*, *nature* and *grace*, are the true great fundamental truths which the ancient Scriptures everywhere presuppose and announce. Their practical misapprehension was the reason that the Jews did not know and understand Christ; the same, at least in a lower degree, is the cause of much exegetical obtuseness concerning the unity of the Old and New Testaments—as will be seen presently in ver. 56.

Ver. 55. The conscious knowledge of God which Jesus predicates of Himself, and which did not come, or was not taught to Him as to us from without, but sprung from his essential unity of nature with the Father, is expressed in this *οἶδα* as for transcending the sense of any *ἐγνώκατε*. This He *must* testify, because he bears witness to the truth, and is the truth. I *cannot* say *οὐκ οἶδα*—let it not be taken wrong that I avow Myself before you to be what I am! Thus almost in tones of intreaty He asserts Himself; yet it is impossible but that this pure truth should at the same time condemn these *liars*.—I cannot, because I am not, and can never be, *what ye are!* *Ὅμοιος ὑμῖν* may be more verbally correct than *ὑμῶν*; yet the former and better authenticated word might be designed to give that specific emphasis which Bengel seizes;—then should I be *of your kind*, that is, a liar. (Even de Wette—like you, a liar). But ye are liars in that ye now and generally speak of God as being your God for your father Abraham's sake, while ye know Him not as Abraham knew him. Olshausen finds a difficulty, too favourable to Socinianism, in our Lord's saying of himself—*τὸν λόγον τοῦ*

[1] By means of the historical writers of the Bible, as נְבִיאִים רִאשֹׁנִים

θεοῦ τηρῶ; but we discern in it, on the one hand, the *human* fidelity of obedience of the Son of man who exists in and with the Son of God, the profound truth of which only the old one-sided theology misapprehended; and, on the other, we have shown already that this λόγον τηρῶ signifies in its most obvious connection the fulfilment of his commission to bear this testimony. (Comp. the ἐντολὴ, to give up his life also, chap. x. 18, xiv. 31, with the ἐντολὴ, τί εἴπω καὶ τί λαλήσω, chap. xii. 49). It is His severe task, but His bounden duty, to fulfil this commission faithfully, even in contest with such contradicters as these! Thus in the use of such expression the Lord condescends to *our level* in ἀλήθεια, though not in the ψεῦδος (hence in chap. xv. 10—καθὼς ἐγὼ τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ πατρός μου τετήρηκα); but Bengel's fine distinction must not be forgotten, that while *we* must *first* receive and retain the word, in order to come to the perfect knowledge of it (vers. 31, 32)—He places His οἶδα before the τηρῶ.

And here we may pause for a moment to consider the *practical* teaching of this whole colloquy, as it is a symbolical pattern for our Lord's servants' disputing witness in all ages:—As the Gospel for the Judica me Deus Sunday in Passion time, it furnishes an inexhaustible text. Suffer thyself to be reviled! If the charge have any ground of truth in *thee*, who art not without sin, aggravate not thy sin by reviling again, by denying the truth in the slightest degree before God, or by permitting thy love to fail before another's wrath. Seek not *thine own* honour; else may thy God seek out thy disgrace and judge thee as thou deservest. But, on the other hand, sin not by denial of the truth which thou knowest before God. Recede in everything which concerns thine own person, but in nothing which affects thy God. Keep silence, instead of justifying thyself, in every case in which absolutely no more is involved than—thine own honour.[1]

[1] As Melancthon took until the next morning for reflection, in his disputation with Dr Eck. The latter taunted him—This is not to your honour, Philip! When Philip replied—We have not to do with our own honour, but with the Lord's. (Comp. Matthesius, die 12 Pred. v. Luth. Leben). Great word! Would that it were written in letters of gold over the professorial chairs in many of our academical halls.

But where the truth is concerned, and the bearing testimony against the liars for their own salvation, let not thy mouth be stopped, and let not thine heart be led astray: speak out until they take up stones, with the same meekness and firmness combined as thy Lord's! A high art is this! and a most pressing duty! A task committed to us, as to Him, as our business in the world; but which only by His spirit within us we can perform!

Ver. 56. If we have not been altogether mistaken in our observation upon the distinctly and pervasively negative tone in the three answers to the three objections (here as in ver. 49), it will now shed light upon this obscure verse, and determine thus much at least—that it contains a *protestation against the assumption that Abraham was dead.* But because in the ordinary meaning of the word to which the Jews clung, he was incontrovertibly dead, we must have recourse to the supposition that our Lord would set the true meaning of His promise uttered ver. 51, in the strongest light, by an assurance which apparently expresses the general paradox, but in reality solves it:—"Abraham lives yet, though he is dead! He so lives in the enjoyment of the reward of faith, that he is not properly speaking dead, and *that* is my meaning!" Further, because the objection of the Jews had also improperly opposed Abraham and the prophets as living and dying without Jesus, to those who were in after time to become immortal through *His* (not God's) words—it is the design of our Lord, whose answers are still precisely pertinent to the questions they reply to, to show that Abraham's faith while he lived, and its reward after he died, had direct reference to *Himself* as the Expected of the fathers. Thus much, it seems to me, we may assume a priori (if the expositor may use such a word), from the connection and consistent sense of the whole, for the meaning of the following retrospective saying, even before we have read it. If anything could disturb my clear conviction, it would be the mere historical fact that most expositors both in the older and the later church have failed to take this view. And are the words themselves so very obscure? Assuredly not, they are the simplest and most common expressions:—rejoicing in the thought of seeing what when seen gives yet greater joy (the contrast being very express), on the one side; and *the day of*

Christ on the other, which no one familiar with the scriptural and Jewish phraseology can hesitate to interpret aright. What causes then the obscurity, in which so much expository vision has seen erroneously? We cannot but think that the παρερμηνεύειν in this passage is simply the result of the general assumption that the thing itself is *not to be believed!* There are many who address themselves to its exposition with the foregone conclusion that to make the passage teach Abraham's experience of Christ's life after his death, is too bold a theory to be tolerated: and *in consequence* they interpret it otherwise. This is the first and most obvious meaning of the words; and those who deny it must do so under the influence, more or less unconscious, of that assumption.

Even Abraham, *your father*, as ye call him again and again, and as I in the beginning (ver. 37) admitted him, and still admit him to be, in respect to your derivation after the flesh—bears witness for Me, whom he waited for, and in whom he rejoiced, but against you, who in that respect are altogether unlike him, who neither understand aright the hope of his lively faith, nor know concerning him what he is and enjoys now that he is "dead."[1] In *My* day he rejoiced by anticipation, that he should see it—this cannot possibly indicate any thing but the manifestation of Christ in the flesh. When afterwards in the New Testament the day of Christ refers to the reversionary hope of His second coming, the distinction is made perfectly clear; but here, where we are carried back to Abraham's time, and the day of Christ is made the goal of a hope which afterwards had its fulfilment, it *must* necessarily mean that which the Jews generally designated as יְמוֹת מָשִׁיחַ in the most comprehensive sense, and especially, of course, the then present days of His life in the flesh. So in Lu. xvii. 26 we had the days of the Son of man in connection with the ἡμέραις Νῶε; and previously, ver. 22, μίαν τῶν ἡμερῶν manifestly referring to His first manifestation in the

[1] The second, and not merely practical reference (intimating to the opponents how little they resembled *their father*) which Chrysostom observed upon, is not, as Lücke thinks, too farfetched, but enters into the spirit of the whole colloquy. But we should hesitate to agree with Klee that a contrast is hinted between Abraham's joy and their endeavour to *extinguish* His day.

flesh vainly wished back again. (See on this our exposition). Thus does the Lord immediately after this discourse, and echoing its thoughts, explain Himself in ch. ix. 4, 5, where He says: As long as I am in the world as Light, it is day; soon will the night come. And this is very significant, as it adds to the profound and comprehensive discourse as a whole, the new thought that the time of Christ is the longed for time of *Light*, the consummation of all the prophecy and promise of the preliminary starshining and twilight: (comp. 2 Pet. i. 19). *Therefore* it is called here *the day* and not the days.[1] Further, the recent expositor Lange is perfectly right when he bids us distinguish, as in perfect contrast, the joyful hope and expectation of Abraham resting upon the promise that he should see the day of Christ, from the seeing itself.[2] Similarly Ebrard: "The Old Testament gives us no such contrast in the life of Abraham as that between the waiting for the day of Christ, and the actually seeing it." Such a specific crisis of vision as might be reckoned to be a fulfilment of his desire, and as distinguished from that desire, must, if the Lord were here speaking of a matter of history, have been on record, so that the Lord might appeal to it as something well-known. If ἰδεῖν is compared with the θεωρήσῃ of ver. 51, it still can be no other than an actual living in and experiencing; the καὶ εἶδε, however, must be unconditionally taken in the same sense as the ἵνα ἴδῃ.[3] If we compare Matt. xiii. 17, and Lu. x. 24, which form a very important parallel, we find that the true *seeing*, which brings with it joy, can only have place in the very days of Christ. There as here the Lord witnesses

[1] Hence also it is clear that it is not just the *birth* of Christ which is referred to, as Ebrard and Lange think.

[2] But we cannot see why Abraham as the father of the Jews should be distinguished, in contrast, from Abraham as the Seer of the day of Christ; the unity of the one Abraham lies at the foundation of the whole discourse!

[3] We must not introduce into this ἠγαλλιάσατο, by a pregnant construction, any idea of *wishing* (as Grotius too surely expounds the מָשׂוֹשׂ); the main point is a confident waiting for, which by anticipation rejoices; as Nonnus simply gives it—ἰδεῖν ἠγάλλετο θυμῷ. The ἵνα does not stand instead of ὅτι, for the object of the joy, but defines this to be in the assured and promised future:—He rejoiced in this, *that he should see*. Lampe: quod visurus esset. Comp. chap. i. 8.

the truth, so decisive for the unity of the Old and New Testaments, that all the faithful of former times hoped in *Him*, and waited for *Him*; even as, according to 1 Pet. i. 10—12 did the collective *prophets*, whom the Lord does not now include, in order that He may the more definitely single out their father Abraham. We have here the evidence that the Lord attributes to Abraham (like the Epistle to the Hebrews, and even yet more plainly) a profound understanding of the Messianic aim of all the promises given to himself.[1]

And now Abraham hath actually *seen*, with greater χαίρειν, that day of Christ, the expectation of which itself had been to him an ἀγαλλιᾶσθαι! This cannot, according to the reasons which we have already assigned, have been a vision which took place in Abraham's own life-time, and not in the time of Christ. The acute Schleiermacher assures his hearers that the Lord here spoke of nothing more than what took place in Abraham's own time, and of nothing more than the promise which was given to him; after which promise he rejoiced that he *should see* My day. But this most incomprehensibly omits the following words —*And he saw it!* Equally inexplicable is Kurtz' rigid adherence to the solution by Abraham's theophanies. No, the Lord does not mean—if we may mention the leading errors of exposition—the manifestation of the Son of God among the three guests at Mamre,[2] nor the birth of Isaac at which Abraham laughed,[3] nor Isaac's restoration from death, Heb. xi. 19.[4] Nor is the view correct which predominated in a later age, and which understands it of a *spiritual prospective view* of the day of Christ (the πόρρωθεν ἰδόντες καὶ ἀσπασάμενοι, Heb. xi. 13)—even

[1] In connection with which we need not have recourse to the Jewish notion that God had specially revealed to Abraham the entire futurity of all his seed; and especially the Messianic times. Still less are we (with Baumgarten-Crusius) to include "the idea, that the old fathers referred the Messianic expectation to their own times!"

[2] Gen. xviii. 10 being then emphasised—I will return unto thee; and explained of a mysterious visit accompanying Isaac's birth, as a pledge of His future incarnation! So Moldenhawer, but also the Hirschb. Bible, and Hess in the Leben Jesu.

[3] So *e.g.* Ernesti; and also the Berlenberg Bible!

[4] So Grotius with many of the fathers. Euthymius says most arbitrarily—ἡμέραν αὐτοῦ λέγει τὴν τοῦ σταυροῦ.

specifically, with some, the *great* day of revelation in judgment. Lange's position is incontrovertible, that all prospective vision, all prophetic vision (even Roos' "extasy not recorded by Moses") must be contained in the first clause. Yet Origen, Augustin, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Beza, and so forth, maintained this interpretation, which has become the common tradition. Even Bengel went so far astray as to apply it to the anticipation of the day of the Lord's glory.[1] Olshausen lays much stress upon the connection with ver. 58, from which it would necessarily follow that the Lord spoke of a seeing in the lifetime of Abraham. But, however specious this sounds, it is much more important that it disturbs the more necessary connection of the previous sayings of Christ, according to which Christ would establish the fact of Abraham's not being dead. The connection on the other hand with ver. 58 is not so very strict, since the new, and bitter, and blind objection of the Jews has intervened; and the Lord now places His eternal and divine nature in opposition to this, as we shall see. Suffice that it is altogether inadmissible to place the καὶ εἶδε in Abraham's life upon earth.[2]

The only sound interpretation we most positively assert to be, that the day of Christ is, as Cyrill. declared, ὁ τῆς ἐπιδημίας αὐτοῦ καιρὸς; and thus that Abraham's seeing that day in his

[1] Diem *majestatis* Christi, qui dies omnia Christi tempora, etiam in oculis Abrahæ, præsupponit. *Alii sunt* dies carnis Christi, alius Dies Christi ipsius et gloriæ ejus. Vidit diem Christi, qui in semine, quod *stellarum* instar futurum erat, sidus maximum est et fulgentissimum. Et *quia* hunc diem plane vitalem vidit, mortem non vidit. *Sic* Judæorum instantia retunditur. (!) *Non* tamen vidit ut Apostoli, Matt. xiii. 17. This strange interpretation is reproduced in an English Irvingite work, with special reference to the restoration of Israel.

[2] Not, finally, as Baumgarten-Crusius resolves it. He first makes a very proper remark as to what must have been involved ("thus I *quickened* Him,—this being in the connection, that the patriarch himself had received life from Him")—but then weakens this down to a figurative life, the refreshment of his soul in the midst of the longing ungratified expectation. And with all such Rationalism as this must fall the mystical interpretation of a joyful "birthday of Christ *in the heart*"—see in the otherwise beautiful little book of G. H. Schuberth, die Wiederkunft des Herrn, Petersburg 1820, S. 222. Thus does faith graze the limits of infidelity.

living condition must be placed after his death. This was first[1] clearly and definitely stated by the Jesuit Maldonatus: Cum dicit *vidit*, haud dubium, quin eo modo vidisse dicat, quo videre dixerat tantopere concupivisse. Non autem concupiverat solâ videre fide, — — quia fide jam Christi diem videbat. Vidit ergo diem Christi *re ipsâ*, quem ad modum et ille et patres omnes videre concupierant. Quis enim dubitet Abraham et cæteros patres, qui cum eo erant (sive ex revelatione, quam in hac vitâ habuissent, sive ex revelatione, quam tunc, quum Christus venit, habuerint de ejus adventu) *non ignorasse Christum venisse*, etiam antequam ad eos post mortem veniret. In favour of this declare themselves Lampe, Mosheim, Kuinoel, Tholuck, Lücke, de Wette, Maier, von Gerlach, Lange. And it may be hoped that this will always be accepted now as the simple and straightforward interpretation of these plain words: for even the Socinian distortion, (which Tittmann accepts)—Abraham *would have rejoiced*, had He survived to My time!—rests upon an admission of the direct and inevitable meaning of ἰδεῖν τὴν ἡμεραν. Moses and Elias at the Transfiguration teach us that for the fathers in blessedness, but waiting in blessedness, even *intercourse* with Christ manifest upon earth was possible and actual, especially in the case of those who occupied a theocratic and prophetically significant relation to Him. And may not this hold good of *Abraham*, so far as that the εἶδε καὶ ἐχάρη shall be accepted from the Lord's lips as an actual truth, just as the words run? Yea, we are disposed to regard the mere ex revelatione non ignorare (which we have placed in a parenthesis in the quotation from Maldonatus) as saying too little; and would prefer to understand an actual intercourse, though secret, between Abraham and Christ. For although we must decline any deeper penetration into this hinted mystery, yet we cannot but say that the past tense seems to us to refer to some special historical period, which as such was already past. In any case the Lord gives a sublime assurance that He was privy to the actual joy of Abraham at His manifestation in the flesh, as the object for which he had while in the flesh waited with the joy of hope.

[1] That is among those known to us. Certainly this view has not been altogether wanting in the church of any age.

What a word for these Jews! They understood it, as we see, so far at least, that this Jesus standing before them brings His own day into immediate conjunction with Abraham. To them it evidently and convincingly said—*If* the Messiah is come, certainly father Abraham will know, and have some experience of it. And as this was so plain to them, the *confidence* with which Jesus announced it would have been evidence enough, if they had been disposed to hear and to feel. But *now* (though not in ver. 52, concerning the tasting of death) they maliciously, whether consciously or unconsciously, pervert His words in order to make them appear absurd. Abraham hath seen Me—Thou hast seen Abraham! These two things are very distinct, since in the former Abraham's continuance till the days of the Son of man is alone presupposed (which they believed, but had altogether lost sight of in their reference to death); but in the latter Jesus, and, as they regard him, a mere *man*, must have already lived in the time of Abraham! Baumgarten-Crusius discerns here a second perversion, as the Lord had not said that Abraham had seen Him but *His day*. Quite right, but the question still arises, whether the Lord, who would not speak too plainly of these secret things, might not have intimated in those words the actual seeing of Himself. In such things there is often much more, and more wonderful mystery, involved than obviously appears in the words: of this we have a symbolical example here, for the Jews in their misapprehension pervert the Lord's words into what they think an absurdity, viz., that Jesus would make Himself to have seen Abraham—and this is after all strictly correct! For though not this man Jesus, yet this I in Him, was, according to His higher Personality now united with humanity, before Abraham, because before all creatures! They measure His time by the half-century not expired—and He is the eternal I Am![1]

[1] Grotius: certe nondum semisæcularis es. This seems most simple, eighteen centuries being between Him and Abraham. It is not necessary to resort to any proverbial reference to the year of Jubilee, or the time when the period of actual levitical service ceased. We need not think of any premature old age, or any marred appearance (as Clem. Alex. comp. Vavasor de formâ Christi); of any misunderstanding of the Jews who inferred, either from His πολυπειρία (Euthymius) or from the solemnity of His spiritual devotion, that His age was greater.

Ver. 58. What the Prologue had declared, ch. i. 1, 2, is here asserted as the testimony of the Lord Himself. Dorner (Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi, neue Aufl. in der Einleitung, S. 90), remarks that the critical idea of His *pre-existence*, which St John, in harmony with St Paul, places in the forefront of his Gospel, in contradistinction from the Synoptics, is nevertheless not altogether wanting in the Synoptics themselves; and he is quite correct. To the passages which he adduces (Matt. xi. 19; Lu. ix. 49, Wisdom—Matt. xi. 27 the Son who alone knoweth the Father), we take liberty to add Lu. x. 18 and Matt. xxiii. 37, according to our exposition of it,—without mentioning many other consequential inferences elsewhere to be deduced.

It remains nevertheless true, that only in St John are to be found the literal and plain, and express testimonies of Jesus Himself concerning His Being before men, and before the created world. This passage, ch. vi. 62, and ch. xvii. 5, are the three great texts, which only wilful and blind sophistry can pervert. The Socinians (like the ancient heretics, qui hominem dicebant Jesum præcognitum et prædestinatum, qui ante adventum carnalem substantialiter et proprie non extiterit) have made the being before Abraham a quasi-existence in the divine appointment and predetermination;[1] and many not bearing that name resort to the same refuge, though sometimes idealistically disguised:[2] but with such people there can be no exegetical contest, and we can only point to the ἐγώ, which, connected with the εἰμί, cannot signify any decree or counsel concerning this I, but just this personal ἐγώ Himself, about whom the Jews were speaking, in the identity of His personal

The conclusion to which Irenæus comes is historically remarkable—that Jesus was actually above forty years old; and the ancient reading, forty instead of fifty, evidently leaned that way.

[1] If not actually with Faustus Socinus: Before Abraham became *Abraham*, that is, the father of the people!!

[2] Baumgarten-Crusius, comparing Rev. xiii. 8; 1 Pet. i. 20,—thought of and decreed, that is, essentially and virtually I was already in being! De Wette: Pre-existence, but of course only in an ideal sense! Schleiermacher: Before Abraham lived, I was He upon whom all truth was based, to whom every glimmering of hope had reference; from the beginning have I been the centre of all divine promises!

self-consciousness. *Πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι* does not mean antequam *esset* (for which Grot. refers to ver. 33, ch. xx. 27, i. 6, 30; Acts vii. 38, xiii. 5 and elsewhere)—but antequam *nasceretur*, as Erasmus has it. (Comp. Nonnus, *πρὶν γένος ἔσχεν*). Most assuredly, as de Wette admits (who rejects the idea of being born or *becoming* in any sense), the *γενέσθαι* in this brief and pointed discourse forms a contrast, as a being introduced into time, with *εἶναι*—a contrast which Bengel finds most undeniably in such passages as Mark iv. 22; Acts xxvi. 27; 1 Cor. iii. 18. And the Syr. translates in the future—עדלא נהוה אברהם. For Christ now goes altogether beyond His former words; the ignorance and the wilfulness of their objections admit of no explanation; the gulf between Him and them has become too great for any conciliation; and the Lord therefore overwhelms all their contradiction by a conclusive word, which is not so much a continuation of the preceding argument, as a sudden flash of revelation from the depths of *His own eternal consciousness*. That He should have finally spoken thus is not to be wondered at, on the supposition of this eternal consciousness abiding ever with Him: rather is it wonderful that He should have ordinarily and as His rule restrained it so much. Thus here, too, He restrains Himself; and does not go on to say, as afterwards in the prayer to His Father—*πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι*; though this *πρὶν γενέσθαι*, in antithesis with His own *εἰμὶ*, could mean no less than this, comp. Ps. xc. 1, 2; Isa. xliii. 13. To degrade this *εἰμὶ* into a Present used for an Imperfect,[1] is altogether inapplicable, especially in connection with the *γενέσθαι*. Consequently, we must adhere to it that the Lord asserts of His own I, the same whose higher nature He had indicated to them before in ver. 25 as going forth in the *λαλεῖν*, a timeless *Being* before the becoming, or coming into existence, of Abraham, and not only so, but as a necessary consequence of its universality of expression, *before all created being*. Thus He testifies of Himself, as His Spirit afterwards speaks by Paul, Col. i. 15—17, who terms Him the *πρωτότοκος πάσης*

[1] To which Grotius bends the *ἐγὼ πέλον* of Nonnus; but the Syr. to which he refers has the verb substantive אִיתַי quite plainly.

κτίσεως, καὶ αὐτός ἐστι πρὸ πάντων.[1] He distinguishes His γεννηθῆναι (of which ch. v. 26 gave testimony) most rigorously from γεγονέναι; and utterly rejects every ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦμην, His Being going back into the divine eternity. This ἐγώ εἰμι incontrovertibly includes in itself the divine אֲנִי הוּא; in the sacred idiom this essentially present Being as opposed to becoming, could not be otherwise expressed than by the אֶהְיֶה or אֶהְיֶה אֲשֶׁר אֶהְיֶה which is the name of the self-revealing God in Ex. iii. 14. This gives the μείζων τοῦ Ἀβραάμ, from which ver. 53 the discourse proceeded, but which is now in sublime dignity omitted, its most appropriate and transcendently sufficient answer.[2]

As, according to ver. 56, His appearance in the flesh appears to be the longed for goal of all Old Testament promise; so now His eternal divinity in a definite ἡμέρᾳ incarnate, appears as the original fount of all revelation and creation. Learn from this the relation and the unity of the Old and New Testaments! And learn from this how to adjust and understand aright the saying of Lactantius, which, although connected in him with an imperfect Christology (see Dorner S. 785), is not in itself heretical, scarcely (as Cellarius thinks) dangerous:—Christus docuit quod unus Deus sit, eumque solum coli oportere, *nec unquam se ipse Deum dixit:* quia non servasset fidem, si missus, ut Deos tolleret, et *unum* adsereret, *induceret alium, præter unum.* (Institt. 4, 14). For He assuredly could not announce Himself to be a *distinctive, second*[3] God, and therefore, as He stood before men uttering the specific ἐγώ of the eternal Son, He could not directly say—ἐγώ θεός εἰμι. And this *not merely* because it would be necessarily exposed to a blasphemous misapprehension, but because it would be in itself no more right than to say—ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ πατήρ. On the other hand, I and My Father are one—bespeaks the true *divinity* of Jesus Christ, and it is this which He everywhere avows; so that according to ch. xvii. 3, the Father as αὐτόθεος may

[1] In the Pastor of Hermas, Simil 9, 12, antiquior omni creatura.

[2] Whereof Grotius now says rightly—quod ipse innuere quam prædicare mavult.

[3] The phrase of the schools—δεύτερος θεός—is an altogether unsuitable and dangerous one.

be called ὁ μόνος ἀληθινὸς θεὸς, although in a very different sense from the heretical μονώτατος of Arianism. This gives rise to no tritheist error, nor is the honour of the Father thus invaded by the Son, who is God only from and in and with Him—nor does it contradict the truth that the Son was nevertheless before the world κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν with the Father. The apology contra eos, qui dicunt Christum nunquam se in Evangelis aperte Deum dixisse (on which Peter of Clugny wrote; see Neander's Bernard S. 186) requires to be very carefully handled, lest the truth underlying the error should be denied.

But instead of *worship* follows—*stoning*. Such was the issue of all the Lord's sayings, after they had reached this climax! Not because He abased their father Abraham, as many think (how did He? by the γενέσθαι?), but because they rightly understand the arrogation of divinity, and the assumed βλασφημία (chap. x. 33) of His words. Where did they at once obtain these stones? An idle and petty question this, which, however, as it has been put, may be answered out of Joseph. Ant. xx. 8, where the building of the temple is recorded as going on in the time of Christ, and Ant. xvii. 9, where an instance of stoning in the temple is narrated. Stones with which the visible temple was being built are to be cast at the corner stone of the Old and New Covenant! To understand in the ἄιρειν a going to fetch them, disturbs the whole aspect of the sudden crisis, especially in connection with the ἐκρύβη which is its immediate result.[1] Jesus *hid Himself*, and this is to be regarded as similar at least to Luke iv. 30. We are not to take ἐκρύβη as adverbial in conjunction with καὶ ἐξῆλθεν, as Glassius does, making it *occulto exiit*; it has itself the strong emphasis, and means in relation to the pressing eagerness of these His assaulting enemies, much more than the ἐξένευσεν of chap. v. 13 (although it at the same time allusively anticipates the meaning of chap. xii. 36—He had now spoken enough, and therefore withdrew or hid himself from

[1] Out of this Teschendorff constructs a marvellous scene. "They at once ran to fetch stones. And in the midst of this confused tumult, when every one was blindly shouting, pushing, and running hither and thither, it was easy enough for Jesus to escape unperceived. So that when they came with the stones, the victim of them had vanished!" This is certainly making the most of the simple ἦραν οὖν.

them!) To interpolate, instead of the conclusive καὶ ἐξῆλθεν—"And then when the tumult had passed away—presently afterwards;" is a total violation of St John's style; and hence Winer himself prefers to allow that the Evangelist records a miraculous ἀφανισμὸς. But the רַיַּסְתֵּרֵם יְהוָה of Jer. xxxvi. 26, may after the sublime word of ver. 58 be attributed to Jesus *Himself*.

To translate with Hezel—"He *sought* to hide himself"—must be repulsive to every mind which has, as Winer says, a sense of the character of the *Gospel*." Lücke regards His "safety as having been effected in a natural way by the prudence of Jesus," and makes him to have sought concealment "in a house favourable to Himself;"[1] and Lange suggests that "the faithful were probably on the spot and encompassed Him about"—but we must take liberty to say that while such an external procedure is not to be utterly denied as impossible, it seems to us altogether needless to suppose it. For St John certainly makes no mention of it, does not distinguish thus between the miraculous and the natural, but refers His "safety" altogether to the ἐκρύβη as the result of the putting forth of the divine power of Jesus.

Is the additional clause, omitted by Griesbach, Lachmann, and Tischendorff, genuine or not? It may have been taken up from Lu. iv. 30, and the παρῆγεν may have been derived from the immediately following παράγων of ch ix. 1. It is significant, however, that the Peschito translates in full—וַעֲבַר בֵּינוֹתְהוֹן וְאָזַל. For ourselves we would retain the latter part of it with Bengel, who vindicates καὶ παρῆγεν οὕτως because the καὶ παράγων presupposes it as being a mere repetition; because the similar καὶ in both cases explains the omission of the former; and, finally, because without it the whole chapter too abruptly closes, while the οὕτως has in it a special concluding emphasis.[2] On the other hand the literal similarity of διελθὼν διὰ μέσου with St Luke, is suspicious; he who added it was anxious to

[1] And hence it is accounted for that St John omits to add his usual οὔπω ἐληλύθει ἡ ὥρα αὐτοῦ.

[2] Lampe well explains it: Id ergo vult Evangelista, Jesum (1) non instar fugientis præcipitasse gradum, sed placide deambulando ex templo descendisse—(2) illum Judæos tanquam incurabiles malitiæ suæ reliquisse.

provide against any misunderstanding of the concealment, but the Evangelist's παρῆγεν does this quite sufficiently.

After their first astonishment, the Pharisees (as Teschendorff on this occasion well enlarges) might boast of their perfect victory, and pride themselves on having driven Him from the field —not indeed with their *stones* but with their arguments! In spite of their own consciences they might mockingly cry—He had many things to say of us, but at last he could only fly! He left their blinded pride in possession of this seeming victory. This was the beginning of His submission to his reproach and His cross; but it was likewise the beginning of their deserved judgment, of His devotement of *them* to their doom.

THE MAN BORN BLIND. ANSWER ON THE CAUSE OF THE EVIL. WORKING BEFORE THE NIGHT COMETH. THE POOL OF SILOAM. HIS MANIFESTATION AS THE SON OF GOD.

(Chap. ix. 3—7, 35—37.)

St John gives us now in his Gospel *the last public and great testimony* of Jesus concerning His own Person and salvation; that is, in the more restricted sense which suits this Evangelist's plan. Although the Lord continues down to the end to testify of Himself by work and word; although He exhibits Himself at the grave of Lazarus, before many Jews in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem, as the resurrection and the life; makes His public entry in the midst of hosannas, and utters in the hearing of the people, His final words to the Greeks, to ch. xii. 37—yet all this is of a very different character from that of the great colloquies and discourses which end with the tenth chapter. Let the reader compare them and judge for himself! And all that which the Synoptics record of the period after the Feast of Tabernacles and the Dedication, and especially of the final week, from the first prediction of His passion. Matt. xvi. 20, 21, down to the woes denounced upon the Pharisees, has an altogether different stamp, being uttered to the disciples and individual men, or in answers to public questionings, being partly in parables, and partly at the close in explicit and open reproofs.

But His testimony and proclamation, as it were *ex professo* that He was the Life-giver, the Giver of blessedness, *the Son*, in whom is the Father and who is in the Father—comes to an end with the tenth chapter, and therefore ch. x. 38 indicates a great preliminary *conclusion*.

All that chs. ix. and x. contain, down to that conclusion, forms but one section and connection. The Lord bears witness to Himself:—in relation to the now sufficiently illustrated *influence* of His coming, as the Light, through which the blind are made to see, and those who see are made blind; in relation to the design of His love, not willing this latter, as the Good *Shepherd* who knoweth His sheep which hear His voice, and layeth down His life for *all;* finally, in relation to His *Personal Nature* as such, as *One with the Father*. What He had spoken after the Feast of Tabernacles, and at the Dedication, John connects closely together, even as the Lord himself had done. All these discourses have for their historical occasion and starting-point the miracle performed on the man born blind, to whom He reveals Himself as the *Son of God*, the self-evidencing and yet rejected Light that hath come into the world.

It was certainly not upon a following day, but immediately on His way from the temple after ch. viii. 59, that the Lord saw the man born blind. For even if the previous παρῆγεν is not genuine, the καὶ παράγων, ch. ix. 1, must in *St John* connect itself with what immediately precedes; it might have been in the Synoptics a general and indefinite initial formula.[1] The man sat as a beggar, according to ver. 8; and therefore very probably not very far from the temple, as the manner was. It was natural enough that *the disciples* should presently gather around the Lord after the tumultuous breaking up: but it excites objection in the minds of many that the feeling and tone of mind which must be supposed in Jesus and the disciples on this occasion, is out of keeping with what is immediately recorded. But we are not to suppose that our Lord was in any kind of excitement; and it is most obviously improper to regard Him as in haste to make His escape. He had not been provoked or

[1] Even de Wette, who objects to the same day, because Jesus is here too *calm* (after the flight!), is obliged to confess that μετὰ ταῦτα is wanting.

embittered, though deeply grieved; nor had He lost for a moment the profound and unbroken repose which is conspicuous throughout the previous chapter. His departure, therefore, was not flight; but a withdrawal from the aggression of the people, before the hour of God's counsel was fully come. Why should we suppose Him ever indisposed or rendered incapable of looking in kindness upon the poor and the miserable, among whom He finds His way? And would He pass by one who might by His mercy be more readily won than those hardened enemies from whom He turned away? It is from the Lord's *seeing* the unhappy man, that is, from His lingering, sympathising regards fixed upon him, that the whole narrative takes its rise.[1] At this point the disciples ask their question, and the objection seems more specious when applied to them; for it may be thought that the interest here exhibited in the profound problem of the relation between sin and suffering, is inconsistent with the state of mind in which they would leave the excited scene. Yes, if we take the question in its isolated form as here given; but might not such a question as this have been prepared for long before in their thoughts? And now when a critical case presents itself, and they see their Master calmly and sympathisingly contemplating it, as if nothing ungentle had transpired, it appears to us rather *significant* and natural, that they should share His tranquillity, and direct to Him the question which we read.[2] Moreover, we are not to suppose that our record contains absolutely all, and that these words passed with such rapidity; such questions were generally prepared for by observations within their own circle. Pfenninger has imagined the development of the inquiry thus. Judas began—His parents must have heavily sinned; Thomas replied—Or God foresaw great sin *in him;* John adds—I know not what to think thereon; Peter finally breaks out—Master, tell us who—? This is poetry and not

[1] We may compare this gracious looking upon the blind beggar now, after the scenes of ch. viii., with His beholding the poor widow, Matt. xii. 42, after the woes and parting denunciations of Matt. xxiii.

[2] My feeling altogether revolts against Lange's notion—unsupported by any shadow of evidence in the text—that the disciples, still terrified by the thought of the tribunal of heretics, asked, not for the sake of the answer, but to warn their Master not to have anything to do with this child of sin.

exegesis, but exegesis must leave room for such a supplementary imagination. Whence did the disciples know that he was *born* blind? Either they were already familiar with him, lying on the way to the temple;[1] or he had begun, as they drew near, his accustomed cry—Take pity on one *born blind.* We need not trouble ourselves to explain how it was that he did not earlier apply to the helper of the miserable, or was not before brought to Him by others; we never find that no objects of misery were left unhealed—see Matt. xxi. 14 at the close, and Acts iii. 2. Such people as these are ofttimes altogether shut out from what is passing in the world. Pfenninger invents again as follows:—"Seek out the Prophet who has already healed many blind people;" to which advice he replies—Alas, good Sir, I was *born* blind; and the rejoinder then is—"That alters the case, then patience till the kingdom of God!"

The disciples themselves think of no healing. The slight and indirect intercession which some have understood in these words has but a very slight foundation; hence others have regarded them as meaning—"Wilt thou have anything to do with a man who bears in himself so special a curse for sin?" We agree neither with the one nor with the other, but regard them as led by the Lord's pondering regard to contemplate the man themselves, who having been *born* blind *must* remain blind to the end. But this obligation, which they regard in their ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῇ as a divine purpose, is very mysterious to them; and since the Lord cannot, or rather *may not,* cure such connate defects, they would receive from Him at least some solution of the mystery. It seems to us that St John designs to shew that the Lord's *repose* so far communicated itself to them, that they could take this as a fitting time for their question; the very contrary of Lange's supposition, who thinks that "in their *excitement* they had fallen back into the common popular habit of thinking."

They do, indeed, speak according to the popular notion, for

[1] If he had sat there for any length of time, Jesus might have observed him before; but that is not said, and He did not always look round upon every one as He passed. Schleiermacher assumes, far too boldly (to serve a purpose) that Jesus had probably often seen this unhappy man, but had passed by without doing anything for him.

they had never risen out of it, and therefore could not fall back into it; the Lord had appeared, also, to confirm it sometimes, as in the case of the paralytic and the impotent man at the pool of Bethesda. Thus they remain in the undisturbed supposition that special sin is the cause of special evil; and that the poor man was an instance of this, being most fearfully born ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, as the Jews malignantly say, ver. 34. But instead of, like these, imputing this with an uncharitable ὅλος to the man himself who was thus born, they go astray upon the matter of the specific guilt of the sufferer, and hence their question. The *or* is simply to be explained—This man himself, or since *we cannot imagine that*, his parents? And this means, again,—And has he been forced from his birth to suffer such misery, without any special guilt of his own? *Consequently* they were constrained to ask the first question, and the only possible answer to it which could float before their minds, was that which Pfenninger gives as the most simple and obvious—The foreseen sin or sinfulness of his life, punished beforehand. In this we agree with Tholuck; such anticipation of punishment,[1] in the administration of God, who knows the future in its beginning, is not so meaningless or unrighteous, especially when contemplated in the modification which von Gerlach gives —"since all earthly punishment involves even as recompense a transition to redemption from itself, God suspended the punishment before the sin, in order to abate the virulence of its outbreak, and to awaken all the more keenly the sentiment of contrition." It is in this spirit that men so frequently make the common remark that it was well for such an one that he had such and such infirmity, else what would he have been! This is much more admissible than the previous notion of von Gerlach, that the *Or* is not to be so rigidly taken as a dilemma, but that a *common hereditary family sinfulness* is spoken of. No, in that case the answer would have been long before given in Ex. xx. 5—but of *that* the disciples are not thinking, because the personal affliction appears to them so grievously severe; and

[1] Compare Esau's rejection, which itself afterwards makes manifest his reprobate spirit.

the problem which they propose lies evidently in the dilemma of this *either—or*.[1]

Thus might we despatch the question, the right understanding of which belongs necessarily to the apprehension of the answer given; but we must briefly allude to and reject those mystifications which we by anticipation have declared to be needless. What necessity is there for supposing that the disciples thought (as Lücke, with Lightfoot and Keil, assumes) of his sinning in his mother's womb? This, however, could only be tolerated, if they are withal supposed to have further thought—But this also is *not imaginable!* But it is a gratuitous and forced hypothesis that they thought of the *pre-existence* of souls (as Cyril supposed), or of a *metempsychosis*, as since Beza's time so many have imagined. It is now pretty generally admitted that this heathen philosophema is not to be attributed to the Jews, even of the time of Christ. True, the *later* Rabbins meddled with this notion, and have many vapid babblings thereupon—such as that the soul of Nabal even entered a stone, and that the builders of the tower of Babel passed into mill-wheels, and the like. The pure Jewish Cabbala itself knew nothing of metempsychosis at first, (there is no trace of it in the book Jezira); and the later only teaches the Gilgul (גִּלְגּוּל נְשָׁמוֹת rotatio animarum) and Ibbur (עִבּוּר gravidatio, prægnatio). As to this latter distinction, according to which a previous soul possessed or entered into a soul already born, thus signifying a *double personality*, compare Eisenmenger ii. 85—88. Deep thinkers may have their own thoughts about this last, which in itself is not so meaningless;[2] but the Gilgul is opposed by the ἅπαξ of Heb. ix. 27, and by the entire Old and New Testament, which knows nothing of it at all. Hence the Jews were utterly unconscious of it, until this dogma came to them from the Oriental-Egyptian-Pythagorean-Platonic Syncretism; consequently we have nothing to do with it in connection with our passage. The passage

[1] In a certain sense and degree Euthymius is right in understanding: —Neither is reconcilable with our notions, the one drives us to the other, backwards and forwards; help us to a right decision!

[2] See Meyer's Blätter für höhere Wahrheit iv. 263. 264.

in the Book of Wisdom (ch. viii. 19, 20) which is often thus expounded, admits of another most simple interpretation;[1] and that which is adduced from Josephus is palpable misconception.[2] Finally, to put the extreme case that among the learned this heathenish doctrine had begun sporadically to show itself—what did the blessed disciples know of that?[3]

Ver. 3. The Lord gives a twofold answer to the question—in *word* and *act*. He removes the dilemma of the present case by an οὔτε—οὔτε; points forwards to the works of God to be manifested; and then immediately by an act of healing gives palpable evidence that this man was not born blind in order that he might sit in darkness till death, but that he might see the light of God in a special and most glorious manner. When Strauss asserts that the Lord's saying refers only to this individual case, while elsewhere, as in chap. v. 14, and Matt. ix. 2, the general Jewish notion is confirmed, he simply forgets that those two were also specific cases. But there was a truth in the Jewish notion, which brings it into accordance with the entire Scripture, and was only rendered error by an overstrained application to individual cases; and this the Lord cannot and will not deny. It is an abiding truth that sin alone is the ultimate cause of all evil as it regards the human race as a whole,[4] and hence also as it re-

[1] Although Buddæus Instit. i. 2, 32 adduces this (with the spirits of ch. xvii.) as teaching the προϋπαρξις animarum, and Jul. Müller (v. d. Sünde ii. 100) presupposes this as acknowledged. See, against this, the protest in Schmieder's Vortrag über das Buch der Weish. (Berlin 1853), S. 9, 10. The ἦμην in *parallelism* rather than contrast with ἔλαχον is not to be urged as the παῖς connected with it (certainly not the pre-existent soul!) shows. Εὐφυής is well known to be used of the soul, its good gifts and talents; thus a "noble nature" in body and soul, but which requires the grace of God in order to ἐγκράτεια. The ἀγαθὸς ὤν is only opposed to the ἔσομαι. See the translation in Kleuker's salom. Denkwürdigkeiten: "Ich war ein kind von guter Art. u. s. w."

[2] Antiqu. 18, 2; and especially bell. jud. 2, 12, where, as well the ἀναβιοῦν as the ἕτερον σῶμα in spite of the μεταβάινειν certainly means no more than resurrection and glorification.

[3] The folly of attributing this to them convicts itself in Isidor. Pelus. (see Lücke) who makes them say—οὗτος, ὡς φασιν Ἕλληνες, ἢ οἱ γονεῖς αὐτου, ὡς φασιν Ἰουδαῖοι.

[4] Schleiermacher: "That all the evils of life are bound up with sin, is a connection of thought which the human mind has never got free from." In the midst of all the delusions and follies of heathenism,

gards the connection and transmission of evil between parents and children, in which the unity of the race consists. It is as true that the misdeeds of the fathers are visited upon the children, according to the words of God Himself and the history of all families and people, as on the other hand, that the assurances of Deut. xxiv. 16; Ezek. xviii. 19, 20, protest against perverting this fundamental principle of the Divine government by dispensing with all reference to personal guilt, or by making the evil involve eternal consequences at once. Rieger's remark, again, is perfectly true, that we may not make our Saviour's utterance a universal salve; or regard it as a release of all parents from all participation in the guilt of their children's external or internal transgressions. "Our conception and birth is the channel through which sin and death continue to pervade the world of mankind; and in which the original heritage of evil in body and soul may ofttimes be greatly increased. No human judgment can impose the penalty of this upon any man, but neither can he shake himself free of it, until he has received his justification from Jesus himself by the testimony of His Spirit." Grotius had a strange notion, based upon the mention of *both* γονεῖς,[1] that the disciples thought of a violation of the law of Lev. xx. 18, from which violation bodily defects often sprung, in the opinion of the Jews. Assuredly these questioners did not go so deeply into the matter; but as it regards *ourselves* there is a general truth involved in the remark of Grotius, that children may and do inherit in many cases corruption as the result of wickedness in sexual commerce, and therefore that in many particular cases the lips of Omniscience, and even the consciences of the sinners, might say in this most specific sense—The parents sinned, and therefore the child is born thus.

But as it regards this present case the Lord *denies* any specific sin on either side as entailing this penalty; and with such an earnest decision as manifests His own superhuman penetration into all its circumstances. Of course, it must be understood that

the idea of *guilt* as the source of evil has lain deep in the universal consciouness of man.

[1] This may be, of course, without any detail—either one of the parents or both.

He does not exempt them from having sinned generally.[1] "Neither hath this man sinned—that is, more than those who are not blind; nor his parents—that is, more than those who have seeing children." (Beck, christl. Reden i. 208.) Still more obvious is it that even in the rejected supposition that the disciples had thought of any transmigration of souls, the Lord's expression οὔτε οὗτος ἥμαρτεν does not by any means imply that He admitted and confirmed such an idea.[2] For the case here is very different from that of Lu. xxiv. 39, where the πνεῦμα as the subject of the position is admitted as something actual, and the belief in incorporeal spiritual appearances is confirmed; if the question had been here put—Did he sin before his birth? the answer would signify—That *could* he not, and ye are right in thinking that an unimaginable thing.

But what is the solution which the Lord gives, of the *general* difficulty which is exemplified in this peculiarly mysterious case? First of all, He does not appear to enter at all into the general question—contrary to His wont, to deduce from specific cases general principles. He restricts Himself to this particular case:—God's design with regard to this man is this, that His works should be made manifest in him, inasmuch as I shall make him an illustrious witness, both in his physical and spiritual sight, to Myself as the Light of the world. But this answer (quite parallel with ch. xi. 4) contains in itself a universal principle too; and we rightly apply it to the many who were possessed, especially in the time of Christ, in whom should be illustrated the casting out of devils by the finger of God. But in the plural τὰ ἔργα there is involved a hint of transition to its universal applicability in all similar cases. What then is its meaning as a solution of every Job-mystery? As we understand its warning and hortatory meaning, it is this—Ask not with too much subtilty, ye children of men; penetrate not with

[1] Hence Chrysostom: He did not simply say—οὔτε ἥμαρτεν, but adds—ἵνα τυφλὸς γεννηθῇ. Not giving this as a reading necessarily, but as an exposition.

[2] This is stated with precision, because there is more belief in this transmigration, and more tendency to hunt for it in Scripture, than is generally thought. Schubert deals well with these subjects in his Geschichte der Seele. S. 621 ff.

blind curiosity into the backward abysses of the connection between guilt and evil, as if ye could, or as if it were necessary that ye should, bring into the clearest light what is deeply hidden in the mystery of God! But look forward, rather, in waiting hope, to the coming works of God's restoring, evil-removing power and love![1] *This* is the Theodicèe, in fact, which God Himself exhibits, and will sooner or later everywhere approve it; all history bears evidence enough to this to induce us to remit confidently to the same God all that still remains obscure. Fikenscher: "If God has been sought and found in misery, the end of affliction has been gained. To investigate further, becomes not the children of God; uncharitably to sit in judgment upon others, is all the more sinful, as short-sighted man knows nothing with certainty, and should think much more of his own guilt than of others'." Beck (a. a. O. S. 209): "Invade not the business of God's majesty—that of sitting in judgment! Thou mayest and thou shouldst co-operate with the Supreme Father in an altogether different business—that of correction, benevolence, and restoration!"

Thus the *works of God* are primarily His healing, delivering works;[2] and if we rightly understand the spirit of the word of Jesus, as well as the spirit of the typical act with which He accompanied it, we shall ourselves, in our own sphere, and according to our best ability, work unweariedly these works of God upon the miserable around us. And if any one appear to our thoughts to have been, through grievous guilt, born to special wo, we shall have this answer ready for all overcurious inquiry —He is also so afflicted that we may take pity upon and help him, or comfort him at least. But, withal, the *universality* of this designedly comprehensive utterance furnishes another and final meaning; for *the works of God*, which will *all* be manifest finally, are very manifold. Can God not heal and help even in connection with the heaviest guilt, the soul for the sake of the salvation of which He so often leaves the bodily evil unrelieved —then are we led to the conclusion, that *misery* in its connection with sin will one day be manifest as a *work of God*, that the

[1] Comp. the beautiful sermon of Nitzsch, Lechste Auswahl S. 60.

[2] Nonnus: ἔργα θεοῦ γενετῆρος ἀλεξικάκοιο.

most singular "freak of nature" will be connected with the hand of the faithful Creator; and that there will be also made manifest those various operations of God's Providence, working secretly and *mysteriously* under these afflictions, which have been ever leading to salvation and life. Just as on the present occasion the poor blind man, beholding the Son of God and teaching the learned, declared plainly the secret blessing of his past blindness.

Ver. 4. Advancing now further, the Lord declares more explicitly what works of God He more especially meant—the works of healing and salvation which He was Himself to accomplish in the world. To effect these was His mission; and He must accomplish them all in the sacred obligation and unalterable counsel of pitying love. Therefore there is a work of God to be wrought upon this blind man. Many think that there is a reference here to the fact that it was the Sabbath—Although on this day My enemies would not permit the works of God to be done. Ebrard sees "a glimmering of this;" but to us the Sabbath does not seem to be referred to at all, or at least to be taken up into that greater *day* for working, of which Jesus here speaks. That His own earthly lifetime is meant, the end of which was not far distant, appears evident from the ἕως, and the reference to ch. viii. 56, and the explanation which follows in ver. 5, and, finally, the parallel of ch. xi. 9—10 where the period of His unhindered working is most plainly indicated. This is clear enough, but makes it all the more obscure, in what sense He could oppose to His own period of working the works of God, a *night;* and in what sense He could apply that expression in His own case. The simplest and quickest way of despatching the whole saying is of course to understand it as a common proverb:—"Every man has his day's work, no one can work in the night."[1] This would mean—I shall not cease to work in the world until I can work no longer; for a faithful ἐργάτης only ends with the ending of the day. Quite right, but as soon as we look deeper into the matter, and seek to find, as we should do in all our Lord's words, the deeper

[1] Thus Pfenninger in the Philos. Vorlesungen über das N. T. upon the question of taking the first evident meaning of Scripture.

significance of this application to His own Person, we cannot but regard the *night* as something strange, as also the emphatically universal—ὅτε οὐδεὶς δύναται ἐργάζεσθαι. The absurd comment of Paulus, who takes this as referring to that particular day, and makes the Lord say that the night was coming when He could no longer effect the cure, has this spark of truth in it, that it was actually drawing on towards evening, and the Lord drew His illustration from that circumstance—The day of My great work is declining.[1] But chap. viii. 56 gives us already the occasion of the saying, and this therefore is unnecessary; nor does it modify the question as to what the night is which approaches for Jesus. What else can it be than the time of His *death*, which is opposed to the time of his life? From this another interpretation does not divert us—"the time of grace and the time of the power of evil"—for the latter or the hour in which the might of darkness bound His wonder-working and healing hands (Luke xxii. 53; John xiv. 30) coincides with that of His death; and, moreover, it is too expressly said ὅταν ἐν τῷ κοσμῷ ὦ, ver. 5. Baumgarten-Crusius, indeed, expressly declares—"Day and night cannot possibly signify here life and death; there would be something strange and *heathenish* in the words, and quite inappropriate to the person of our Lord, especially in St John's gospel, since only after the death of Christ was His true spiritual might put forth." But when he opposes the νὺξ of ver. 5 to the "time of His immediate divine energy or saving power," which is the period of Christ's life, it comes precisely to the same thing; and furthermore, the Lord Himself is certainly included in the οὐδείς. *Heathenish* it is not assuredly, but Jewish and Scriptural, that a man can *work* only as long as he lives in the body upon earth; and the Lord's words thus echo the sentiment of Eccles. ix. 10. And under this rule and process of human activity Christ as the Son of man assuredly stands. It may be said, indeed, that His work then begun again at once in Hades, the great work of opening the prison house and preaching

[1] So von Gerlach: "It is probable that the day was then declining, and He must hasten the cure; this might *give him occasion* to remind them all that His great work to enlighten the world, was connected by God's counsels with certain definite periods."

to the dead:[1] the night, in which no man can work, could put no restraint upon Him; when He entered the darkness it became day, when He entered death it became life. And it is assuredly true that it was His resurrection and exaltation which began a more glorious day; so that it may be conversely said,—*No man* besides Himself could ever before work the works of God, but now first they proceed in their true and great accomplishment through the power of the Spirit in His apostles. All this is by no means denied; for the Lord is very far from saying literally that the entire period from His death to His return would be the night.[2] (This has not even relatively an objective truth, for see Rom. xiii. 12; 2 Cor. vi. 2). The truth of His declaration, and its application to Himself, lies in this, that now in the days of His flesh, including His death as the final and consummating act of His victorious life, *the foundation was* laid for all future working whether below or upon the earth, for all the glorious sequel of the development and spread of light and life through the power of the Holy Ghost. The hours of His day of life were thus truly counted out to Him, wherein to perform the duty of the hours; for every word which He spoke in the flesh, every act which He performed for a testimony to the world, during this seed time for the future glorious harvest, was one living grain of corn more which should spring up in the harvest of the Spirit. As He, according to His own designedly used expression, is the Light, it could not befall Him as it did the admonished unbelievers of ch. xii. 35; He abides ever the Light in the profoundest darkness which may close around Him, He continueth ever to work even as His Father worketh ever! Yet is that subsequent working distinguished from the preceding, even as the harvest is distinguished from the seedtime; and *in that respect* His great redeeming working day is comparable, though under transcendently different conditions, to the working day of every man's life. He can therefore regard the critical

[1] Zeller im Monatsblatt—"We might say that He there performed His night work."

[2] As Müralt in v. Meyer's Blättern iii. 361 comments; whose exposition, with all its ingenious though perilous consequences, we cannot now enter upon.

period at which His foundation-laying work is ended in death, as men regard it; and term the *hour of death* which awaited Him (though not including any subsequent *state of death*!), in harmony with human feeling, not unknown to Him, concerning living and dying,—*a night* which breaks off His living day. It is a subtle, though not insignificant observation that the article is not prefixed. *The* night of death comes to all men in its more rigid sense; and also for Me, there comes, in a certain sense, though differently to be understood, such *a* night. The conclusion then passes into the universality of a proverb—*such as that* of which it is said that *no man* can work in it. Thus does His saying retain its deep fulness of truth; and the *condescension* of its use here appears in this, that by it He speaks pre-eminently of His humanity and the accomplishment of the works of God within the limits of prescribed time; looking away from and omitting His eternally uniform working as God. It is natural that the attempted stoning should lead His thoughts more deeply to ponder and dwell upon His impending death. Thus, thinking of that glorious day which He will open up to His servants for their working in His divine power, it was His gracious design to represent Himself to them as a *type* of the faithful redemption of the time of human life; this designedly symbolical sense of His words explains to us their peculiarity of structure, as well as the origination of the reading ἡμᾶς instead of ἐμέ.[1]

Ver. 5. In explanation, as already said, of the Lord's meaning in the word day, comes now the intimation of the great distinction between His own and every other man's day of life. Afterwards in ch. xi. 9, 10, the Lord speaks yet more condescendingly in a manner which holds good only of others; and leaves it to His disciples to make its much modified application to Himself. But He could not have *there* spoken as He did, if He had not *previously* testified what is written *here*. Others see the light of

[1] This as it were lamenting ἔρχεται νύξ may be taken in its especial reference to unhappy *Israel*, for whom He so gladly performed individual works of blessing, at least; a long night was to come, and has come, upon this people, since the light of the world was cut off. But I doubt whether the κόσμος of the following verse would harmonise with this view.

this world, there is day and light *for them* through the gift and working of God; but He bears the light in Himself, He *is* the light, He makes the day of the world as long as He is in it.[1] Thus His words redeem themselves and obviate all possible misapprehension. And thus it passes further—for it is ever the Lord's pleasure to speak thus comprehensively in words chosen to include every reference—into a promise of that specific work of God which was now to be accomplished upon this blind man. Bodily and spiritual enlightenment, quickening, and deliverance are always embraced together in the view of the Spirit; the one not only points to the other, but leads to its attainment. Thus the Lord yields to His own mercy towards the wretched man, and is ready as ever to perform the acts committed to Him of the Father, however well He may know that the Pharisees would be as much hardened against this miracle as they had been against others; and that the night of darkness was not yet to be broken by His miracles—even though the raising of Lazarus were among them. (Comp. Lu. xiii. 32, 33.) He can do no other, for He is the Light of the world; He shines forth in His majesty like the Sun in the heavens, without keeping back one ray on account of the darkness which was advancing from below.

Vers. 6, 7. How may we suppose the blind man to have listened when his ears caught the sound,[2] so different from what he had been accustomed to hear—Neither hath this man sinned nor his parents! That works of God, long destined to be wrought upon him, were now to be accomplished! When the man of God, who so spake, called himself the *light* of the world, his whole soul assuredly cried out—O God, whose works towards sinners are so marvellous, send *light* even for me!—His overhearing the conversation upon his own case took the place of any other preparatory address to himself; so that we may suppose, in harmony with our Lord's conduct towards him and his own obedience, that there now existed in his soul the beginning of that faith which his healing required. We have already given some explanation at Mar. viii. 23, vii. 33, of the application

[1] On account of the ὅταν we agree with Kling (Stud. u. Krit. 1836), against Lücke, that it is—as long as.

[2] And this regard to the listening man was part of the reason why the Lord, without entering further into the question, turned the answer at once into a promise.

of the spittle, the external and symbolical accompaniment of the miracle; but let it be further carefully noted how St Mark and St John accord! The adherence to a human custom, that of occasionally, and especially in diseases of the eyes, applying saliva as medicinal,[1] is the smallest part of the question; more important is the analogy with the Old Testament miracles as always linked to external means, from the tree at Marah to the salt for the waters of Jericho; but most weighty of all is the fact that here only the humanity of the Lord Himself appears as co-operant and instrumental. We shrink from believing (with many, Hess, for example, and more recently Baur) that this was intended, as being something like work, to assert that the Sabbath was the proper time for such an act; for any such *positive* design seems to us altogether opposed to our Saviour's uncaptious feeling for the day, and the general humility characterising the whole miracle. After He had given the man something for his faith to lay hold of in the clay upon his eyes,[2] He sends him, as a further stimulant to his faith, and as a duty for it to discharge, to the pool of Siloam; just as Elisha had sent Naaman to the Jordan, 2 Kings v. 10. Certainly not *merely* to "wash" away the clay, which may be supposed to have wrought the cure;[3] and still less are we to suppose (with Neander, and the Berlenb. Bible, resting upon ἑώρακας, ver. 37) that the man could already see a little, sufficiently for the purpose of going.[4] But it was that the blind

[1] See the instances in Olshausen. Döpke pushes this too far, speaking of the "common operation."

[2] Thus he *had* eyes; not as Nonnus fables in his detailed description of their creation. He makes the man come into the world as βρέφος ἀνόμματον; and the application of the clay, twice recorded, he explains—ἀνέρος ἔπλασεν ὄμμα that is, ἐκ χοὸς ἀνδρογόνοιο.

[3] Very dangerous, at least, is the use made of it by Tersteegen (Leben heiliger Seelen, I. Band 5 Kap. am Ende) speaking of the "good Armelle,"—the Lord purified her by means of the sin and temptation which she became sensible of. Though Grotius, too, saw in the clay the impedimenta of the natural man which were to be taken away; and Lampe thus dilates upon it:—the sinner must first feel his misery, as coming from the earth, and made manifest by the Lord's words; must leave the temple and the law, &c. If the clay must contain any such-like allusion, it would rather be to the blindness which the Lord used and turned into blessing.

[4] As counterpart of this, we have Bahrdt's exposition—Wash

man, like him in St Mark whom the Lord led away from the public road, might go into the undistracted solitude of God's works to look around him first. One leading him by the hand is obviously to be presupposed. An important point remains to be noticed, and it is one that is very generally overlooked altogether. The Lord (like Elisha) refers the man away from *His* hand and *His* word to the Divine powers and energies which are everywhere really flowing forth in nature, but especially for Israel in the holy land. And in exhibiting this great miracle to the Jews, He orders it so that it seems as if their "refused waters of Siloah" had wrought the cure.[1]

The Evangelist's parenthetical etymology points our attention to the significance of the sending to *Siloam*. This is certainly not to be explained away as a gloss (it is not found in the Syr. and Pers. translations, because in them the word was self-explained); though Lücke, "in spite of all manuscripts, will regard it as an ancient gloss of an allegorist, and never be persuaded that it is St John's!" It is neither trifling, as a token of its unapostolical origin, nor is it verbally incorrect (Strauss asserts both); but it is to be understood by every mind which enters into the whole character of this Gospel, though its exposition may involve the uncertainty which attends all their dimmer intimations. Undoubtedly שִׁלֹחַ might originally mean a "spring," or rather "aqueduct" (as Stolz here translates!); and so far fall in with the variation שִׁלֵּחַ, Neh. iii. 15, comp. מוֹצָא, 2 Chron. xxxii. 30. But this does not interfere with or hinder the prophetic use and interpretation of the name, which begins already in Isaiah. As it respects the *passive* signification of the form, the first sense in which it could be taken would doubtless be—outpoured waters, or waters sent. But the obscurity of the Hebrew development of forms makes this doubtful; and we may be permitted to refer to our own Lehrgebäude

thyself there diligently, and thou shalt be in very few days fully restored!

[1] Similarly, only with too much emphasis, Lange brings it into connection with the feast: "The spring of Siloam was at this feast the third great word! Thus He brought the sanctuary of the Jews into co-operation, and exhibited the co-operation of Jehovah in an evident manner before them."

thereupon.[1] Even as this was a fountain sent or given of God (which man could do no more than conduct) and streamed forth out of Zion, so is there in a higher sense a water sent from above, the renewing power of the Holy Ghost, the power of the Spirit from on high. When the Lord, having in mind the old interpretation of the prophets, significantly said—Go, wash in the pool of Siloam (ὕπαγε νίψαι εἰς—comp. ver. 11), that signified most pertinently—"to the water, which bears the healing name, the Godsent water!" But when St John expressly points his readers, ignorant of Hebrew and that old interpretation, to this true meaning, it is for us to compare what the Spirit of Christ has further taught, and what our humble investigations may suggest: to despise and reject as spurious, in spite of all manuscripts, what we do not understand, is not consistent with our principles. The Lord of glory may some times act, and his Evangelist offer a comment upon it, in a manner *beyond* our instant comprehension. To our humble apprehension, the Lord connected together two designs. He would refer *Israel*, as we have already said, by this prophetic symbol, to the well of salvation which already to faith flowed in their midst, and which was only refused by unbelief; but then also He would shadow forth for the new futurity of His church, how He would send believers after His own first anointing to the washing and first fully illuminating bath of the Spirit—the true *Baptism*.[2] But inasmuch as the Spirit is one with the Lord, even as the Son is one with the Father, Christ himself remains the essential Siloam, who sends from Himself to Himself; and this may be involved in the masculine ἀπεσταλμένος which the Evangelist uses. Thus there is here no conflict between the conducted water and the sending of

[1] The form גִּבּוֹר § 37, Nr. 9, which through the resolution of the Daghesh and the lengthened syllable, becomes קִימּוֹשׁ, corresponds with this—see the examples in the note. We find in the nomen verbale the construction of the participles especially into these varying forms which § 93, 4, 2, speaks of—see the examples in the note upon the letter S. Even a nomen infinitivale like שְׁלַח is to be resolved passively and concretely, see § 95, 5. Hitzig gives the right view, upon Isa. viii. 6.

[2] Which allusion to Baptism, Schleiermacher himself (in his Homilien) makes prominent.

the Spirit, nor between Israel's fountain of grace and the fountain of Christianity, nor between him who is sent to the one or the other—all is here united in the typical fulness of meaning. All who are truly versed in Scripture, know that such teaching in such symbols is the earnest and frequent method of the Spirit, and find nothing trifling or unworthy of it; nor will they take objection to that method as exhibited in our Lord's own words.[1] It remains, further, to be observed, that the Lord does not, like the ancient prophet, prescribe a seven-fold washing, but one only; as also that the blind man obeys with a more childlike faith than Naaman did yielding to the proud objections of his own reason.

The subsequent *investigation* and *rejection* of the miracle, as an attestation to Jesus, is thus minutely detailed for its manifold instructiveness and significance; and for the sake of placing the fact fully and luminously before us in its historical truth. The narrative vindicates itself and tells its own tale by its exact marks of characterisation throughout—though only to unprejudiced and attentive ears. And inasmuch as the narrative exhibits the motives of our Lord's words to the restored man, vers. 35—37, and gives us the right principle for their interpretation, we must not pass on without at least a general glance at it.[2]

The investigation of the miracle—evident as the light of the sun—was conducted first by unprejudiced common people, and afterwards by prejudiced and hostile Pharisees: hence a directly opposite conclusion is the result in the two cases.

The *first* investigation proceeds in three questions. The first asks about the healing generally—Was not this man (who now sees) once blind? and the decision of that point comes from the

[1] Bengel's view (accepted by de Wette as St John's meaning) appears to us too stiff and external,—that Siloam must have been so called from antiquity, because Christ would in due time send this blind man thither! As Euthymius: προεδήλου τὸ μέλλον, τὸν ἀπεσταλμένον ἐκεῖ τότε τυφλόν. And Nonnus: ὕδωρ στελλομένοιο προώνυμον ἐκ σέο πομπῆς. Not to mention the reference to Shiloh, Gen. xlix., in Grotius, and other perversions.

[2] It scarcely needs to be mentioned that we are not obliged to think of the same day, but that the whole may be regarded as continuing through several days.

healed man himself, vers. 8, 9. The second question follows —*How* did this healing take place? and receives also a simple, pertinent answer, vers. 10, 11. The third, naturally arising—Where is this wonder-worker? remains ungratified, ver. 12. It results that the matter is brought before the Pharisees, that is before the judgment, ver. 13. Assuredly a *very unbiassed* people, who receive this "I know not" and bring it at once before the caste whose motto is "We know"—without any further design, either for or against Jesus.

Now follows the *second* investigation of the attested miracle by the prejudiced party, and the rejection of its testimony to Jesus. In ver. 14, the Evangelist prefixes the note that the day was the Sabbath, and yet Jesus had done it! intimating that no other than what followed was to be expected. The process of the whole embraces five questions.

First, the same proper question again—How did the healing (already attested) take place? But the simple repetition of the tale gives rise to a discussion about the person of Jesus, for the faith of some present already ventures to reveal itself, vers. 15, 16.

The second and disjointed question refers to the wonder-worker, but in a different spirit from that of ver. 12, and hence —What sayest thou of him? This receives a terse and sound answer, ver. 17.

The third question goes back some steps, and should have been the first. Unbelief is frightened at Jesus, and gropes into the evidences—Surely he could not have been blind and now sees? He is confronted with the parents, who, fearful instead of thankful, refer them to the son![1] vers. 18—23. There stand they, ashamed and rebuffed, but do not commit themselves.

The fourth question exhibits a stupid *cunning*, which would intimidate the restored man into a denial of Jesus (this man —as they scornfully say); it is answered at first with much modesty, and referred again to the evident *fact*, vers. 24, 25.

The fifth question, finally, begins in profound embarrassment, but receives a bolder answer, and one which challenges faith in Jesus on the part of the questioners, vers. 26, 27. The

[1] Who could, indeed, as soon appears, speak very well for himself!

result is simply that the innocent truthfulness of the man's incontrovertible testimony for Jesus is turned against himself, in the bitterness of scorn. The restrained enmity to Christ bursts forth in all its violence; although it condescends to what seems to be reason for its conduct, vers. 28, 29. This is still more boldly refuted by the healed man, provoked by their folly, who teaches them to apply an admitted principle to the present case —but the investigators cast out the witness to truth! vers. 30 —34.

The unbiassed party had been content with the simple and assured answer of the healed man himself—*I am he!* Their following question springs from the mere eagerness of curiosity; but the reply is very well-considered, relating as simply as possible the circumstances which had occurred. He *therefore* says (though *thinking* as in ver. 17) without any dogmatism—*a man*, and so on. This means—More I cannot say about the *how*; judge yourselves whether this man has not healed me in the power *of God!* How artless is the word—*I went*, as if a matter of course; and that in regard to a matter which (according to ver. 32) was a thing unheard of in the world! In general let it be remarked how terse, concise, and pertinent are the first replies of this honest man. Ver. 15 is yet briefer than ver. 11; not only, it is probable, in St John's narrative—for the man, questioned again, presupposes the knowledge of the circumstances, which they are inquiring about.[1] He adheres to this character in vers. 17 and 25; until at last in vers. 27 and 30 he waxes earnest and eloquent against the provocation of their obstinate rejection of the truth.

In ver. 15 (let it be noted!) the πῶς ἀνέβλεψεν pre-supposes the truth of the circumstance brought before them. But in ver. 16 follows a most perverse influence! In ver. 9 the diversity of opinion is removed by the man's own simple affirmation; but here the σχίσμα is thereby *excited*, because the

[1] Therefore not naming specially either a man or Jesus, but—he put, &c. (For the man had observed the enmity intimated in ver. 14 as likely to be provoked). Hence *clay* is placed first—that was all which was to be seen, the whole of the Sabbath work! Finally, the incontrovertible καὶ βλέπω, in the emphatic utterance of delight which one before blind would feel.

liars divert the question. They say—*this man;* just as the healed man had said before, feigning themselves unacquainted with this *Jesus!* They reply, however, by their "*not of God*," to the inward declaration of their own consciences simply; for the man had not said this. (Comp. chap. viii. 47). *Because* he keepeth not the Sabbath day:—this sounds right enough generally, but contains two malicious and insidious errors. It was not the Sabbath ordained of God which was broken, but the substituted Pharisaic Sabbath; the *not keeping* is asserted as if the habit of life, while this was a special case, with special circumstances. The *others* are not certain of the common people mingled with them; for ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων embraces the ἄλλοι as well as the τινές. Hence we must assume that there were several Nicodemuses among these judges, who bring with them and interject their very honest πῶς δύναται.

Ver. 17. They could not, in their embarrassment, have proposed a more stupid and inappropriate question. That which *they* are summoned to decide, they prematurely ask this man to tell them, so that the instruction he immediately gives them comes as the answer which they themselves sought. At once he says, briefly and plainly—*He is a prophet!* (In this he is as prudent as modest, for he knew from his parents that the question was whether this man was *Christ.*) What else could they expect? This makes them pause in their impetuosity, and they reflect. Certainly such would be the necessary inference; it is better for us if we can, *not to believe* what was done, not to believe the man himself on whom it was done. (Contrast with vers. 9, 10). And now they cautiously make inquisition of his parents[1] concerning the matter, to guard against all deception: but their concerted *excommunication*[2] has already begun to react upon themselves, for no one will answer these questions, who can elude them. "He is old enough, ask him!" This declaration, which is at the sametime somewhat ironical, sends them back to

[1] Not necessarily, as Ebrard thinks, aged beggars themselves.

[2] It is doubtful whether the several stages of excommunication existed in the time of Jesus; but the συνετέθειντο indicates something official, for which time enough may be supposed. Be it observed that they do not venture to attack Jesus Himself, but His confessors. Another decree, directed against his own person, had not yet been matured.

the original convincing testimony. They then feign themselves to be more mild, and begin to act hypocritically. The holy formula of Josh. vii. 19 they pervert in their own way; arrogate the glory for *God*, while they mean *themselves*, in opposition to God.[1] "We *know* that this man is a sinner" is in striking contrast with ch. viii. 46. This examination and sentence was designed to overpower the poor common man; it was his place to acknowledge some *deceit* in the matter—for that was the drift of the whole, though they dare not with all their infatuation openly say this, even as they could not have actually thought as much in their own minds.

Ver. 25 exhibits in the first οὐκ οἶδα a pure and genuine humility, though without any of the parents' fear; it, however, involuntarily passes into irony; for the good man maintains his own knowledge of the matter, which was quite independent of their authority; nor is he to be brought to call his benefactor a *sinner*. With his incontrovertible ἓν οἶδα, the utterance of which is rightly taken as a model for all who have been enlightened through Jesus, he stands, like the impotent man (Acts iv.), as a manifest type of the future church of Christ in the presence of the world. He has from the beginning been a pattern, speaking in brief and precise words in reply to the questions which were put to him. And even now he avoids the reproach of ver. 34; modestly evading, and pointing them to the undeniable *fact*. But when these inquisitors, thus driven in a circle, return again, ver. 26, to the beginning of the matter, his patience gives way—he begins himself to put the question, not proudly and bitterly (as Lücke says), but keenly enough. Will ye also be his disciples—like others, *to whom I have told the tale*? This is not spoken in true earnest, but is as much as to say—Are ye indeed such enemies to Him?[2]

[1] *Give God the honour!* That means only—Tell the truth, acknowledge some error or deception, submit to an infallible authority! Not, as Nonnus inserts, Thank God, *who has healed thee*, and not this man! For the healing is supposed not to be a fact.

[2] Braune seems to us to do the blind man a double injustice, when he condemns the bitterness of his words. He who had so long and so patiently submitted to inquisition, is not now suddenly become bitter; the artless reply which bursts forth at last is altogether natural and unblamable.

Now breaks out, on the other hand, their *wrath*. *Μηδαμῶς θέλομεν*—thus does their whole being madly cry out in self-condemnation before God's judgment. *Μαθητὴς ἐκείνου*, whom we had well-nigh stoned already as a Samaritan, a possessed, a blasphemer of God—the very thought or mention of this is to them scarcely less than *λοιδορεῖν*. They put the question—truth answered them—they scorn and reject it at once! As with the people at Capernaum so now, *Moses* is fled to as a defence—that Moses who cried out against their sins and wrote about that future Prophet whom all must hear or be cut off. The disciples of this Moses they term themselves, even while their unbelief is involving them in his denunciations—but as to *Him*, whose gracious and significant Jesus-name (expressed in ver. 11) they never once took into their lips, they had *known* before that He was a sinner;—such an one, however, as had continually convicted them of their sins, but whom no man could ever convince of sin in Himself! And now *they know not* His *πόθεν ἐστίν*; as He himself indeed had told them—because they knew not God. They fly for refuge to the longpast speaking of God with Moses, against whom, however, they rebel as their fathers did; thus vainly endeavouring to escape from the present which offends and penetrates their eyes and ears. They have no thought of the meaning of *Siloam*, the water of God's power now become as that of *Bethesda!*

We know not! And because they know not, therefore none of the poor sheep of these wise and good shepherds is to dare, under ban of excommunication, to know. But the blind man, standing before them, sees now: so much he knows! The Son hath made him free in order to his knowledge of the truth, before he knows and can name the Son. Neither contempt nor entreaty can move him to fear or submission. In the extreme impatience of his holy indignation against their suppression of the truth, and yet, unlike these scorners themselves, still thoughtful and modest, he says: *Ἐν γὰρ τούτῳ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν*—in all this matter there is this one thing marvellous, the greater miracle of the two, *that ye know not!*[1] Your becoming blind

[1] Thus we understand the words in the sense which the other reading *ἐν γὰρ τοῦτο* would only render more definite. And Nonnus was quite

shows as strangely hardening an influence of this Jesus your opponent upon you, as in my case ὅτι τυφλὸς ὢν ἄρτι βλέπω. Thus have we something like our Saviour's final decision by anticipation here! And now the seeing man begins to lead and to teach the blind, lays down the universal position, the truth well known in Israel for which he asserts the οἴδαμεν of all, in order that he may then in vers. 32, 33, through the case in hand arrive by the soundest logic at a certain and irrefragable conclusion. He takes it for granted, in his fundamental sense of truth, that Jesus, though he had not seen or heard Him do so, had *asked in prayer* the power which healed him; and thus anticipates what this same Gospel afterwards declares for the full understanding of all the miracles of our Lord, ch. xi. 41. It has been said that the position of ver. 31 is not of universal force, but only in the application here intended; and it might further be added that it is the expression of simple and erring Judaism. But it is better to say that it is the pure truth; and to be understood in a very scriptural sense, indeed like many similar sayings in the word of God. Job xxxv. 13, xxvii. 9; Ps. xvii. 1, xxxiv. 16, lxvi. 18, cxlv. 19; Prov. xv. 8, 29, xxviii. 9; Isa. i. 15, lix. 1, 2, &c.

These unrighteous judges end the matter by casting him out. The seeing man is decreed back, by those who finally deny away his seeing, to the supposed curse of his blindness! The ὅλος means (like ch. xiii. 10) the entire man as he was born;[1] but here the διδάσκειν shows that it meant further—blind in body and soul! By this ἐξέβαλον ἔξω, which is first to be understood in its literal sense, he became an ἀποσυνάγωγος, although (which Klee needlessly contests) he had not yet confessed Jesus to be the Christ.

Vers. 35—37. The matter is swiftly spread abroad. Jesus hears of it. (Here we may interpose days, or one day at least.) The Good Shepherd seeks His poor sheep cast out by the wicked ones; the Son of God will reveal Himself to him who, for His name's sake, is reviled and evil-intreated of men; and He rejoices against the whole host of the Pharisees over this one

right: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ θαῦμα πολὺ πλέον—your ignorance is a greater wonder than my healing!

[1] Theophylact: πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γενετῆς.

mendicant soul whom He has won. We may be assured that the good man himself would long *to see* the man of God, who was called Jesus. We can only account for his not hastening to Him immediately after his cure, by calling to mind his first tumultuous amazement on recovering his sight, and the strangeness of all objects through which he must make his unaccustomed way. The wondering neighbours surrounded him at once with their investigations, and after that he was led away to the Pharisees; so that in him there had been nothing wanting. Dost thou believe in the *Son of God?* This remarkable question has been turned by some into a direct form—"I see thee to be a true Israelite, who believeth in the Messiah—and the Person, in whom thou hast already believed as a prophet, is He—thou hast approved thyself a dependent and confessor of Him, who is not merely a prophet, but the Christ himself!"[1] But it appears evident through this whole Gospel (see especially ch. x. 33, 36; xix. 7) that υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ was not even to the learned, much less for one of the common people, equivalent to Χριστός; and Lücke was not justified in reproducing the old assumption of the "popular sense" of this formula. How inconsistent in that case would be the fact that Jesus should forbid (like the Sanhedrim) His disciples to announce Him as the *Christ*, and Himself constantly and carefully avoid that name—all the while persistently testifying that He was the *Son of God.*

This therefore does not satisfy. It is manifestly our Saviour's purpose to reward the honest and unfaltering avowal of this man, who had known and confessed Him as a Prophet and as *of God*, by guiding it to its fullest consummation. But how is it that He *asks* after this very faith? This will not be difficult of apprehension, when we remember the *transitional, helping* sense of this gracious question. It may, indeed, sound at first as a most suggestive and prompting inquiry—Believest thou *already!* But then it passes over into another meaning: Art thou not now ready to believe, if thy Healer now fully reveals himself to thee—as the *Son of God?* Lampe: Tune ille es, qui propter fidem in Jesum, quem dicunt esse Christum, acerbi-

[1] Hess. So Tesçhendorff—"Thou hast witnessed a good confession; thou believest on the Son of God!"

tatem nostrorum magistrorum expertus est? An tu post has molestias *etiamnum* in filium Dei *credis?* Quite right, down to the last word, which we would substitute, as its interpretation, by—*credere vis?*

The questioned man understood all this very well. He naturally recognises *Jesus* at once, though He had not seen Him when he was healed, by His never-to-be-forgotten voice; and it was impossible for him to think that He would refer him to any other than Himself. He *feels* the meaning of the question. But because "Son of God" is a word which goes beyond his previous knowledge, he remains true to his incomparably self-possessed and tranquil character. He does not think, however, or ask about this new dogmatical term, the inmost truth of which, indeed, had been already almost expressed in his anticipating παρὰ θεοῦ, ver. 33; but his answer in itself is quite sound:—I know not yet the Son of God, and how can any one believe on a Person unknown? Yet He does not utter this last directly, but proceeds at once to a καὶ τίς ἐστι; which involves as much. His reply is affirmative and *believing* by anticipation, it promises faith as soon as *Jesus* shall say who He is. It means as much as —Art thou He thyself? And then comes the answer—*I am He!* going beyond ch. iv. 26. This distinction conferred upon him, the honour of hearing such a word, superabundantly compensates him for all the contumely he had endured. Thus there are many who have received much grace from Jesus, but know Him not yet perfectly, though they boldly avow what they do know in faith; but there is a full revelation awaiting all such, and the Lord gives here a symbolical type of all such cases. Remark, finally, that the Lord in His grace does not say at once—I am He; but places first—*Thou hast seen Him!* This He speaks in sympathy with his new power *to see*; as it were entering into his own joyful ἀνέβλεψα and ἄρτι βλέπω, vers. 11, 15, 25. Thou who now canst see Him while thou hearest Him who speaks to thee! It is certain that the ἑώρακας in the physical sense signifies his seeing at the present interview—even when He was asking thee if thou believest in Him;[1] but it is further probable at

[1] Certainly he had not seen the Lord before at his healing. Nor can we limit it to Tescbendorff's sense—"Thou hast beheld Him

least that the Lord has also a spiritual meaning—Thou knowest Him, yea in thine implicit faith thou hast already acknowledged Him, without knowing Him by this name. Thus the Lord's words most strikingly pass over into what follows, ver. 39, concerning the *seeing* of the blind.

LAST PUBLIC TESTIMONY OF JESUS CONCERNING HIS PERSON AND WORK. THOSE WHO SEE BY FAITH; AND THOSE WHO ARE BLIND THROUGH UNBELIEF. THE HIRELINGS AND THE TRUE SHEPHERD.

(Ch. ix. 39—x. 18.)

We can scarcely suppose that Jesus "in the public way" announced Himself as the Son of God, and received this man's worship. It is not recorded whether His disciples, or any of them, were present; but even this is not probable. Ver. 41 requires us to assume an interval of time, and a change of place, between vers. 39 and 40; but after that all is strictly connected down to ch. x. 18. The incident just recorded, with its concomitant spiritual enlightenment of the blind man in order to his faith, and its manifestation of the blind infatuation of the unbelieving Pharisees against Him, gives the Lord occasion calmly to exhibit, and gives Him words to illustrate, the *contrast between faith and unbelief*, which constantly and for ever separates men from one another. His smitten opponents still lurk in the way, and answer Him once more by a reckless challenge. He answers them, at first, by a direct, explanatory confirmation of His words; and then appends a parable which exhibited the wicked pastors of Israel in their true character, while it gives to all who still *hear His voice* a final great testimony concerning Himself. And in this light it must be viewed in connection with its continuation at the feast of Dedication down to the utterance of ver. 30, and its vindication down to ver. 38.

already, in the healing power which came to thee!" though this has its truth in the subsequent and additional spiritual sense which we assert.

Ver. 39. This saying is addressed to the disciples, and intended to set them right upon all that had transpired; the result and issue of which is, according to the Lord's wont, comprised in one pointed and easily remembered expression. Even if this blind man had not at once come to see in order to faith in the Son of God, the Lord might still have spoken as He does; for He allegorises continually, pointing from every outward appearance to its indwelling significance; and His example may encourage us to do the same, in spite of the warnings of a cold sobriety. But on the present occasion His doctrine has a literal fact for its base. The Lord beholds shadowed forth in this occurrence—and beholds it not in scorn, but in sorrowful indignation—the consequence of His coming into *this* world.[1] Inasmuch as this *result*, in the relation between light and darkness, between divine truth and man's perverseness, is a result foreseen and necessary, it may be stated in the much contested ἵνα to be purposed and aimed at; although it is self-understood that the Light of the world, in its first and original design, would rather make all men see, and would blind none. Κρίμα (a form which, as contradistinguished from κρίσις, chap. iii. 19, embraces rather the effect and result) is assuredly not simply equivalent to distinction, but signifies an actual *judgment*, since it must be right and well-pleasing to God that His truth should be concealed from the wise and prudent, for their deserved punishment. (Matt. xi. 25, 26.) What is said in Matt. ix. 12 of the whole and the *sick*, amounts almost to the same: there as here the sense must be supplemented—*in their own eyes;* in this passage, then, those who knew themselves to be blind and those who regard themselves as seeing. It corresponds with St John's peculiar selection of the discourses; and the expression refers here preeminently to contemplation as knowledge.[2] We are spiritually by nature *born blind*, and to know and confess this our blindness is *our* first and sole seeing; out of this the grace of the Lord can bring a full

[1] Τοῦτον *here* is used with a distinctive emphasis, and can be better felt than paraphrased.

[2] The remark of Drusius, that in the Rabbinical writings the wise are termed חֲכָמִין, see Buxtorf. Lex. may be a uselessly learned reference, yet there is something instructive in it, comp. also Ex. xxiii. 8 with Deut. xvi. 19.

restoration of sight—and this is the kernel of the word in its relation to the occasion which gave it birth. The *being made blind*, however, as happening to those who are essentially blind already, is partly an ironical expression for remaining blind, and partly points to the further truth that unbelief tends to *increasing* blindness and hardening. The rigid antithesis will scarcely allow us, with Tholuck, to subdivide the second clause,—they are made blind, either in their own eyes when they waken up to self-knowledge, *or* in their more consummate blinding. For the former is already more rightly indicated in the first member as βλέπειν; and those who suppose themselves βλέποντες *cannot* return back as such into a *saving* blindness—this is the very *judgment* denounced!

The question of ver. 40, which bursts forth from their offended official dignity, is certainly not uttered in such scornfulness as would say—are we then, with our sound eyes, blind—bodily blind? Nor are we to regard them as "acting as if they supposed that Jesus was speaking of physical blindness alone." (Fikenscher.) O no, they understand the Lord full well; they note, at least, that He describes *them* in opposition to him who now *sees* as *blind*, and indeed as *being made blind!* (which is much more than Olshausen's—"He speaketh against us!" such generality being here not to be thought of). But they go on proudly, betray what they have noted, and have neither time nor inclination to dissemble. Consequently, it is most obvious to understand—Are we then already become blind in thy light? And it is not to be alleged against this that the answer of the Lord is not immediately pertinent to that; for He really desires for them only that proper blindness which might be healed, of which *His own* word had spoken, instead of that evil incurable blindness denied by themselves. The only thing which could tempt us to understand them as referring to themselves alone the *first* μὴ βλέποντες, would be the καί as interpreted in connection with the proud official ἡμεῖς—are *we* also blind, like the ignorant people, so that thou must make us see too? But we think that this is not even to be appended to the meaning—making the sense: How meanest thou this of us? Are we still blind—or become totally blind? For in these words, which immediately seize upon the Lord's, their τυφλοί can only retort His τυφλοί;

and they are too insolent to let such a word pass their lips, even in scorn, as—Must we then also become thy disciples (ver. 27) that we may see? When the faction of Korah spake unto Moses —Wilt thou put out the eyes of these men? there was at least the evidence of their senses that he had not led them into the good land, but had killed them in the wilderness. But here shone the Light of the world with His brightest effulgence, here was the last and greatest sign undeniably before their nevertheless denying eyes—and even then they ask—Meanest thou *us!* Are we then also *blinded!*

Ver. 41. Then does the Lord press them more severely with His word, and makes their daring λέγειν their inexcusable sin. *If ye were blind*—cannot possibly now be regarded, contrary to the connection of the previous discourse and their own question, as ascribing to them any actual *seeing*.[1] Kuinoel gives it rightly,—If ye held yourselves, understood yourselves to be, blind. Glassius also maintained the same, because the antithesis of the second member required it. The comparison with ch. xv. 22, 24, tends to confuse, for the thought is there quite different, and viewed under the other aspect of the question. As we have said, the sincere soul sees in this light its blindness; and that of itself is a measure of seeing which is salutary and admissible. "Ah that ye thought and said—We are blind, heal thou us! Then would your sin be soon removed by the knowledge of the truth; then would ye at least be saved from the sin of wilful and lying unbelief!" The Lord explains their question—"are we blind?" by their saying, "We see!" In this word, however, there lies the greater sin of infatuated

[1] As Cyril in Lampe. Hezel: "Since ye have understanding enough, ye confess and feel it yourselves!" Olshausen: "if there were wanting in you all capacity to know the divine," and so Lücke. Similarly Neander: Ye have more knowledge and perception, use it only aright. This does not apply, nor does von Gerlach's: "they were in a certain sense seeing, but this should have served to show them that in a higher sense they were blind." For Christ attributes to them in no sense a βλέπειν, He rather condemns their λέγειν ὅτι βλέπομεν. The analogy of sick and whole does not suit; for if the Pharisees were in a certain sense the whole, and on that account the more sick, yet that certain sense in which they were whole, was only—*in imagination!*

enmity: comp. Wisd. xiv. 22. This is the sin of *unbelief*, which *will* not see or become seeing; and for this ch. xv. 22 is a correct parallel.[1] De Wette contends against this on account of the *μένει*, according to which *ἁμαρτία* would be only their present sinful condition, as ch. viii. 21, 24. But to his view is opposed the *οὐκ ἂν εἴχετε* of the first clause; according to which the *ἁμαρτία here* must be the sin which is added to all the former, which hinders forgiveness and healing, and which is the sole condemnable sin here referred to. And the fact that this guilt, as consisting in their infatuation and obstinacy, *remains* in its very nature, is unpardonable, and not to be healed as such, gives its keenest edge to this discourse; and places these words, essentially speaking, on a level with the word concerning blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. *Ἔχειν ἁμαρτίαν* stands for *guilt* not merely in ch. xv. 22, 24, but also in ch. xix. 11, in the same sense as here.

The beginning of *parables* which is intimated with regard to the Synoptical arrangement of discourses in Mar. xii. 1 (see our exposition, Vol. iii.), begins somewhat earlier both for the blind rulers, and the common people at large; yet St Mark is so far right as this *παροιμία* is not distinctly a *παραβολή*, as we shall show more fully. The connection of the unbroken discourse is not far to seek. That "*we also*" of official pride, signified—we also, the leaders and the pastors of the people! The Lord now speaks, with a gracious intention to awaken some of the better-disposed to self-knowledge and healing by an exhibition of their blindness,—I will now hold up the mirror to you, and show you what kind of "shepherds" you are, and who alone is the true Shepherd! It is an idle and needless supposition that His words were occasioned by the neighbourhood of the place where the sacrificial sheep were kept, or any thing of the like kind (such as Neander's view of a flock in the field); the occasion itself was

[1] "No man is blinder than he who will not see, and this refusal to see has here an interest at stake." Kant, über die Buchmacherei, S. 20.

[2] Jul. Müller improperly maintains "that it indicates only the actual fact of sin, the *ἁμαρτάνειν* or *ἡμαρτηκέναι*." (i. 238).

quite sufficient introduction to one of our Saviour's current figures, and the Pharisees versed in Scripture must have thought, as soon as He commenced, upon such places as Ezek. xxxiv. and Jer. xxiii.—many of them indeed probably upon Zech. xi. So that the Lord utters this equally profound and gracious similitude, which reflects light upon the past condition of Israel as well as upon the great future of his new flock, for the good both of the learned and the common people; taking it from the Scripture for the one, and from common life for the other.[1]

The *central point* of the whole is the Lord's *testimony to Himself* as the good Shepherd in the highest sense of the word. First, however, He speaks preparatorily, vers. 1—6, concerning human shepherds generally, anticipating and paving the way for what follows: He then, ver. 7, speaks clearly of Himself in His ἐγώ εἰμι, but at first only as the *door*; He then designates the *shepherds* as also sheep, who must first go in through Him, and (with the sheep) go out; *from this follows*, finally, ver. 11, the plain declaration, that One alone, Himself, is both the *door* and the *shepherd* of all shepherds and sheep alike. The beautiful text has been much obscured, and its exposition has been very much perplexed, by the failure to apprehend this simple development: either the whole has been regarded as one continuous παραβολή, every separate sentence coming under the same general interpretation, or all connection between the first and second part has been, on the other hand, effectually severed. We shall therefore strive to give, yet more precisely, a glance over the whole which may adjust every part.—

I. Concerning the true and the false shepherd generally,—yet so as that the latter does not merit or receive this name *at all*—in order to a transition to Christ himself, who is in the *fullest* sense the Shepherd. The fundamental difference, or the *entering in* to the fold through the right *door*, vers. 1, 2. The difference as to the result, or the *leading out* of the sheep:—the true shepherd (as the *consequence* of the former) is admitted by the keeper of the door, is acknowledged by the sheep as their shep-

[1] This is the only time that in detailed, parabolical exhibitions *animals* occur; the distinction, however, between this and the *fable* is strictly maintained, since the animals appear in their own nature, and besides that only in their relation to man.

herd, and leadeth them out, going before them as they follow him: but the stranger they follow not, from him they flee. (Vers. 3—5.)

II. Medium of the transition, coming out more definitely—concerning Christ as the *door*, which must signify no less than the only Chief-Shepherd. First—the door to the sheep, for all true under-shepherds—I am the door, and whosoever comes in *before* Me (independent of, besides, πρὸ ἐμοῦ being opposed to δι' ἐμοῦ), is a robber! (Vers. 7, 8.) Then more comprehensively—I am the door *in general*, both for shepherds and sheep. (Ver. 9.)

III. *Consequently I am the true and the good Shepherd* in the sole and supreme sense! This is now fully exhibited as the object to which the introduction tended; first, however, in a previous contrast, then absolutely, and without figure, in plain words, and passing into prophecy.

1. In contrast with the *enemy* and his servants.
   - *a.* The *first* contrast with the *thief*, has regard to the design and result—the thief wills to destroy, I will give life, vers. 10. (In the German, vers. 10, 11. Here begins preparatorily the abstract discourse.)
   - *b.* The *second* contrast with the *hireling* and the *wolf* in regard to their relative *behaviour;* in which the hireling, however better in other respects, is like the robber, and *all* who are not shepherds are regarded as confederates of the wolf, and servants of the enemy. I give *my* own life for the sheep (the prophecy already begins), but the hireling leaves their life to the wolf, οὐ μέλει αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν προβάτων. (Vers. 11—13.)
2. Christ the good Shepherd described independently and in Himself. The figure is continued at first, but gradually recedes, and then at last the words are plainly and expressly spoken. Thus there is first the mutual knowledge and bond of love between the Shepherd and *His* sheep:—asserted in itself ver. 14, then more fully described in its ground, expression, and final aim, vers. 15, 16. Then is clearly declared the death and resurrection of the *Son of God*, by which he approves Himself the great and good Shepherd of the sheep, of the men who are to be, and suffer themselves

to be redeemed. (The close of the whole testimony in the plainest assertion and prophecy). This is the good pleasure of the Father, or the wise counsel of His love; but it is also the voluntary expression of the love of the Son; and thus it is, in the sense of ver. 30 afterwards, the commandment or commission of the Father to the Son. (Vers. 17, 18.)

If expositors had not been so generally indisposed to make or to discover the arrangement and plan of these discourses, they would not have been so much at a loss with this interwoven *παροιμία* and *μαρτυρία*. Lampe, for example, does not generally contemn or neglect formal systematising, but his arrangements are rather stiff and logical than organic developments of the sense; hence he falls into the error which was so common among the Fathers, and prematurely refers every thing in this paragraph (vers. 1—6) to Jesus himself.[1] In consequence of this, the whole and entire fulness of meaning is more or less dissipated by forced applications. Nothing can be plainer than that he who entereth in at the door cannot be properly as yet the door itself, although every shepherd, being what he ought to be, points to *the One*, true and and ideal Shepherd.

Vers. 1, 2. As soon as the Lord began to speak of sheep, they who were addressed in His λέγω ὑμῖν must have perceived His aim, and thought to themselves—these are the sheep of God's pasture (Ps. c.) whose shepherds *we* are! The article τὴν αὐλὴν presupposes this ability to apprehend His meaning, and indicates no less than if it had been said—God's sheepfold, Israel. Αὐλή, we need scarcely remark, signifies a fold or inclosure under the open heaven—Heb. מִכְלָא or בָּצְרָה, Chald. בְּצִירְתָּא, Micah ii. 12. That is not the pasture itself, or the space enclosed, but the external demarcating bound, such as Israel alone as a people possessed in their Theocracy, (ver. 16). A thief asks not for the door, cares not if it is shut, he leaps over and in, wherever he can; see Joel ii. 9; Jer. ix. 21. We cannot understand what Lücke (3 Aufl. S. 406) means by saying that the *door* and the porter have no distinctive import in the parabolical theme; nor how he precisely interprets them, for he does give

[1] As Neander also does, and in part Schleiermacher.

an interpretation, and does not deny the subsequent application to our Lord. The door may certainly, at the outset of the investigation, be intended to intimate the true calling, the authorised and valid appointment to office in the church of God (the opposite in Nonnus—*σκολιὴν ἐπηλυσίην*), and thus primarily the external true vocation to appointed function in the theocratic economy: and thus the *casus obliqui* of the interlopers into office of that age were by anticipation condemned.[1] But if the Pharisees were disposed to rest there, ver. 7 would enlarge their views. The external ordinance, however right, may be lacking in internal fitness, in the true calling and entering, that is, through the Chief Shepherd, in His name, and through faith in Him. The shepherds of that day entered in without humble and genuine faith in the God of Israel, without a true perception of the fundamental point of Israel's doctrine, not as the ministers of the expected Messiah, and as preparers of His way in whose person God Himself would be their Shepherd. They came rather with vain imaginations and gratuitous delusions of a false God and a false Messiah; consequently in reality they made themselves the door, they came in their pride and prejudice among the sheep in their own way, that is, *ἀλλαχόθεν* in opposition to the right door; and that, too, under the name of shepherds. But the Lord declines to give them this title, and chooses one more suitable to them. (Comp. Matt. ix. 36, *μὴ ἔχοντα ποιμένα.*) Similarly does He deal with the beautiful designation of the *sheep*. It might appear at first that all Israel was referred to, all who were embraced by the inclosure of the theocracy, but ver. 3 shows us that this is not the Lord's intention. He now signifies only the susceptible, those whom He foreknows, as the proper object of the pastoral office, those who through unfaithfulness were scattered. It is essential to the whole discourse that this should be accurately noted, for it is made evident by vers. 8 and 16, and 26; and is also in the installation of Peter, ch. xxi. 15—17, which refers back to ch. x., incontrovertibly proved. They are the *τεταγμένοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον*,

[1] Semler: Illa descriptio videtur tangere istorum temporum pravitatem; pontifices et Synedrium utebantur variis artibus et adjumentis, ut propositum suum consequerentur etc.

Acts xiii. 48,[1] or the עֲנִיֵּי הַצֹּאן הַשֹּׁמְרִים אֹתִי Zech. xi. 11, comp. upon Matt. x. 16. They are true sheep, in their genuine nature as their types exhibit themselves: he who does not distinguish the voice of the Shepherd, and follow him to pasture, is no sheep but a goat (Matt. xxv. 32), however he may seem to be in the flock. Luther says of sheep, "this simple creature has this special note among all animals, that it quickly hears the voice of the shepherd, follows no one else, depends entirely on him and seeks help from him alone, cannot help itself, but is shut up to another's aid." Yea, such as are after this sort, are the sheep and they alone! The poor sheep is unprotected, exposed to the danger of wandering, weak and infirm in going, and so forth, but yet tractable, docile, and patient. "It is so created as to require of necessity a shepherd,[2] and can never do well except under his protection and care." (Fresenius). There is much in all this which may be superciliously laughed at as trifling, but which finds its full justification in the accordance of scriptural and natural symbolism.[3]

Ver. 3. The *porter* in the similitude is a servant whose province, according to ancient custom (Mar. xiii. 34), was to remove the wooden bolt from within, and guard the door which was generally but ill secured. We cannot admit that there is nothing in the interpretation which can correspond to this expression; more especially as it directly leads to a new and critical point:—he who enters through the door, is thereby known and acknowledged to be the right, he only therefore *can*, properly speaking, *enter in*. The opening on the part of the porter, and the hearing on the part of the sheep, are correlatives; and the θυρωρὸς is thus also a keeper of the sheep, who stands in close connection and

[1] But this must have no predestinarian application: see our Auslegung der Reden der Apostel, Th. i. S. 380.

[2] This has been literally true, from the time of Adam and Abel. The domestic sheep is a legacy of paradise. The beasts generally are not tamed from an original wildness, but appear rather to have lapsed into wildness, just as this alone is the truth with regard to man himself. Comp. Andr. Wagner. Gesch. der Urwelt S. 498.

[3] Steinmeyer says truly—"There is no similitude in nature which so aptly exhibits the dependence and essential helplessness of man." But more than that, none better exhibits what his docility and devotion to his helper and guide should be.

concert with the ποιμὴν. The porter and the Shepherd know and understand each other full well! Whom then must our interpretation make the former? This will compel us to penetrate that preparatory undertone of meaning which we have already attributed to this first section. The shepherds here are indeed under-shepherds; but the singular which embraces them all, as well as the one door through which they enter, indicates that every under-shepherd must come only as the representative of Him, who is essentially the true Shepherd. This it is to which the porter belonging to the door has its true reference. It is not (as Fikenscher, with good intention, says) that Jesus is door, and porter, and shepherd, all in Himself—for why then are vers. 2 and 3 in distinctive juxtaposition? Nor is it, as according to Bengel, God the Father who opens an entrance for Christ, and all who come in His name, for Tholuck is quite correct in his view that such a ministry would be inappropriate to the *Lord* of the flock.[1] But it is, according to the opinion of antiquity, *the Holy Ghost*, the guardian of the Church, who opens the door of the Kingdom of God, co-operating with the Redeemer and His Shepherd-office. It may be said, in the comprehensive sense, that the spirit of God opens every thing that is hidden in things pertaining to man's salvation; hence Origen (in his epistle to Gregory, Philocal. c. 13) promises the reader who knocks at the door of Scripture, that this porter will open to him its hidden mysteries. But what is it that in this case He opens? Obviously, first of all, the door of the fold, the fold itself. But what does this mean? We must go deeper into its meaning and not be content with the mere freedom to preach and to call (the door of the word, Col. iv. 3; 1 Cor. xvi. 9; 2 Cor. ii. 12), for he who does not reach the sheep themselves, to however little purpose, cannot be said to have *entered in* to them. Now, as this opening of the door is the preparation for the hearing of the sheep which follows, we must understand that the opening of their hearts is also intended, Acts xvi. 14.[2] For although in

[1] Not to mention other interpretations, which rest upon a false historical basis, such as Moses or John the Baptist!

[2] With which again Acts xiv. 27 corresponds, and teaches us how manifold are the comprehensive applications of this "opening of the door" in scripture.

another point of view the hearer himself must open to the Lord (Rev. iii. 20), yet must this be through the influence of divine grace. Of such as close themselves against the good Shepherd, conspiring with the thief as the stolen property already belonging to *him*, or anticipating the figure, cast themselves under enchantment into his jaws, the discourse is not *now* making any mention. These are not *sheep* of the *fold* as here intended: with them the shepherd, seeking in the desert, has to do, but not the shepherd as he is represented coming into the fold and leading his own to pasture.

All now proceeds according to consistent and well-grounded *order*, according to the natural course of things in the shepherd's duty in the East, the spiritual pastoral operations strictly corresponding. *Preaching* in general is no other than the calling of individuals, and finds its consummation in the special *care of souls*: the leading out to pasture requires then the *going before* in his own life and example. For as Steinmeyer says—"he who cannot guide himself, but is contented with calling others, may be a teacher or even a counsellor, but is worth nothing as a *pastor*." No pedantry shall deter us from interpreting the whole thus; else should we oppose that most living and blessed exposition which the Spirit of the Lord has never failed to give of these words in His Church. The whole resolves itself, at last, into the profound and gracious close—the sheep *know* the voice of the shepherd! The reading φωνεῖ lowers the sense, and is wanting in the living force of καλεῖ which suits the ὄνομα, and makes it manifest that the sheep are intelligent souls. Not only in the ancient Bucolics and Idylls of poets, but even in our times and in the West, shepherds are found to give the literal sheep distinctive names. But the calling of the redeemed by name has a very profound significance in the similitude, compare, *e.g.* Isa. xliii. 1, xlix. 1; Ex. xxxiii. 12.[1] The *Lord* knows and calls by name the *souls* which are His, just as He knows and names the host of heaven, Isa. xl. 26; Ps. cxlvii. 4. And this is in

[1] Something very much more, because referring to the individual, than Schleiermacher thinks, who, with his customary infelicity, finds here no other "prophetical word" than such as gave His *people* Israel a name.

a sense appropriate to every under-shepherd, though perfectly and absolutely true only of the one Chief-Shepherd.

The calling by name is an evidence of mutual knowledge, and this again is an evidence of the right of propriety, exhibiting the confidential familiarity and fellowship of possession; hence the emphatic τὰ ἴδια. Lange (following the ancient view, in which the Hirschb. Bibel and Richter concur) understands by these ἰδίοις "his own sheep in a peculiar sense, His own elect and beloved ones, already acquainted with His voice," whom then the residue of the flock rush after! But this rends the unity of the whole figure, and is contrary to the very letter, which exhibits *the sheep* as without distinction knowing and following the shepherd. We hold with Bengel—omnes sunt propriæ, coll. ver. 12, sed hoc epitheton magis congruit cum appellatione nominatim factâ, quam cum auditu. We have already said, moreover, that ἴδια only gives the *ground* of their being called κατ' ὄνομα.[1] It is an equally false interpretation of the *leading out*, which regards them as led away from the rest: for how should these be left in the fold without pasture, who yet are His sheep, who have *heard* His voice, that is, according to vers. 6 and 8, have acknowledged it in obedience? The interpretation which, based upon the rejected notion that Christ is here immediately and alone the shepherd, considers them to be led by Him out of the Old Testament into His new church and dispensation (so Lampe), is entirely perverted. We may surely call this exegetical trifling: but do not lay ourselves under the same imputation in making a remark which may represent the innermost sense of the expression, viz., that the αὐλὴ is only the external constitution of the church for the protection and repose of the flock, but is not the pasture itself, and, consequently, that they must be led forth to the fresh, free pastures of God, instead of being left to the too much prized dry provision of the *penfold* (or *church*)!

[1] It may be thought better, with Lücke and Baumgarten-Crusius, to say, that *each* individual shepherd distinguishes his own division of the congregation of folds under many shepherds. But however true to the figure this may be, the Lord does not pursue it so far, but adheres in His whole description to the one, true Shepherd.

Ver. 4. Whether τὰ ἴδια πάντα is to be accepted with Lachmann and Tischendorff in the repetition of the words, we must leave undecided; certainly it gives an additional emphasis—he leaves none behind! Ἐκβάλλειν is manifestly the same with the mere ἐξάγειν, as we remarked before on Matt. ix. 38; the Sept. uses it for הוֹצִיא, 2 Chron. xxiii. 14; xxix. 5, 16. Any stronger meaning derived from βάλλειν would contradict the genius of the passage, for the meek sheep are supposed to recognise their names, they already know the voice, and are so tractable that the shepherd needs only to go before them. This *going before*, moreover, points already by anticipation to Him who is the one great leader, in the full sense of the word; just as the *knowing the voice* reverts to ch. viii. 43. In relation to this, Oetinger (in his Evangelien-Predigten S. 365) remarks that the voice of the true Shepherd, which is heard in every one of His servants, is no uncertain sound, but brings its clear evidence. We fully admit this, and add that it brings its full power also, so that sincere souls perceive by their understanding, on the one hand, the rational evidence of fundamental truth, and, on the other, feel in their hearts the experimental and quickening power of the word. Both are strictly connected, indeed, the latter, in many cases, predominates in the instinct of the sheep, not yet developed into full intelligence. And this may be the true point of distinction between the hearing of the voice by all, and the understanding of the name given by the better trained. Let me be pardoned for saying that this παροιμία, this εἰδύλλιον of the kingdom of God, is itself like a solemn and earnest melody played upon the shepherd's pipe, and cannot be fundamentally understood without something resembling a "playing" upon itself.

Ver. 5. The *stranger* is an immediate transition from the οἴδασι to which it is linked. The same no-shepherd and intruder is thus indicated who was before named a thief and a robber; but he is thus differently described in order that his various methods and degrees may be observed. Ver. 1 laid down the principle in its generality, that in his true character, as the Ἀμὴν Ἀμὴν impressively aims to show, *every one* falls under this judgment who enters not by the door; but the ἀλλότριος now more definitely states this, and under two aspects. In severity—And

this thief would pass himself off as the shepherd, *calleth* also the sheep. More gently—Or he knows not that his presumed pastoral care is in reality a robbery and destruction, he regards himself in judicial blindness as a shepherd, without any deliberate and intentional malice in his coming. This is as the *hireling* appears afterwards, although more gently regarded. The plural τῶν ἀλλοτρίων seems to indicate such variety in the cases, while the singular τὴν φωνήν combines them all again. It is as if the Lord would say:—Are ye *strangers*, unauthorized ones, not conscious of the false basis on which your office rests, to wit, that ye come not through the door—then mark it in the *result:* do ye reach the simple souls, who are God's true Israelites? Are ye known and acknowledged by these *true sheep*, with whom your office should have to do? Casting our glance forward into Christendom, we find here once more (as in Matt. xviii. 17—20), in the words of our Lord, the deep-laid principles of the Apostolical, now called Presbyterian, constitution of the church. The flock must be asked—Wilt thou have this shepherd? But it must be the true flock, and not the mass. Yea, the door-keeping Spirit of the Church, who watches over, not only the entrance into office generally, but the special entrance into hearts also, must be the supreme arbiter of the Shepherd's voice. Oh that some of our ordained and introduced pastors would press the inference upon their consciences—The sheep know me not, then am I not yet rightly ordained and inducted! But how is he, a stranger, to know the sheep, as *bonâ, i.e. malâ fide pastor*, and detect their "protest" in the midst of the goats' uproar of *applause*, who welcome every release from the fold? The true sheep will not fail to announce themselves! Even in the most wicked time (such as this to which our Lord refers), there will not be wanting a blind man restored to sight who will oppose the proud "*we* know" with his "one thing *I* know!" What this case exemplified, and ver. 8 shows to have taken place in the past history of Israel, the Lord predicts as an invariable rule for all futurity —οὐ μὴ ἀκολουθήσωσιν,[1] ἀλλὰ φεύξονται—as Lücke says, they will not indeed follow, but certainly flee! The latter strengthens

[1] Lachmann ἀκολουθήσουσιν, which, however, betrays itself as a correction.

the former; if the strange voice persists to call, it terrifies them altogether away. So that this *fleeing* from the stranger is not only permitted as conformable to nature, but it is commanded and ever made a mark of the sheep. The patient, helpless sheep *do* nothing more to the intruder; but they reserve themselves for the true Shepherd, and wait for Him, till He come to investigate all.

The parenthetical observation of the Evangelist, ver. 6, is to be understood and modified in the same way as ch. viii. 27. That He meant concerning them what He spake *to them*, they failed not to observe; but because they would not, they did not fully *perceive* or *understand* τίνα ἦν. It was to them as if spoken ἐν παροιμίαις, ch. xvi. 25. As it regards the current assertion that St John here calls παροιμία, what the Synoptics term παραβολή, it is not, despite its universality, strictly true. True it certainly is that the hellenistic phrase for מָשָׁל does not always rigidly distinguish these two synonyms (they occur together Ecclus. xlvii. 17.); hence we find, Lu. iv. 23, παραβολή employed for a single proverb. And there is a natural reason for this, the figure and comparison being common to both, (Nonnus has here ἔπος παράτροπον); and proverbial language, including the illustration of universal truth by an individual type, has ever for its foundation figure and comparison. Yet we doubt very much whether St John would have given the name παροιμίας to such παραβολὰς as the Synoptics record, if he had narrated them. The difference between the two is not to be so rigidly pressed as it is by Quinctilian or Erasmus; for orators and poets may use transitional forms, just as living nature exhibits them, which defy the elaborate systematizing of theory, but do not disturb the true and real distinctions which exist. The discourse of our Lord on the shepherd and the flock would then have been only a *parable*, in the established sense of that word as the other three Evangelists have exhibited it, if it had run in continuous narrative:—there were certain sheep in a fold, and thieves and strangers came,—then came the true shepherd—and when the wolf broke in, he laid down his life, and so forth. The *mere* παροιμία, sharply defined, we have in Matt. ix. 36; here it is the simple foundation of the similitude—the shepherd and his sheep. But this foundation of proverb is, to say the least, so amplified after the manner

of a parable that a continuous narrative is silently intimated and thus we have a medium between parable and proverb of profound and manifold significance which may serve as a storehouse of materials for many parables. St John, therefore, does not term it simply παραβολή, but an amplified παροιμία. And even the παραβολαὶ of the Synoptics so far approximate to this intermediate character, as that they often exhibit, not single and definite narratives, but figurative sketches of what is occurring at various times and in various ways. See our Exposition of Matt. xx. 1—16, Vol. iii.

Ver. 7. We find the same feature here, as we have seen in the parables: the Lord sets out with explaining the similitude which was not understood, in its fundamental and starting point—what is then the *door?* He does not, however, adhere to a simple interpretation, but develops and continues the figure. The assertion that a new similitude, without any connection with the former, is now to be expounded, plainly contradicts the ἐγώ εἰμι of vers. 7, 9, 11, 14. The Lord speaks now more plainly, because they would not understand. He terms Himself *the* door, not one of many through which men as shepherds may reach the sheep; and thus progressively deepens the first meaning of ver. 1, as we said before. Entrance into the fold, and such office in it as had been been well-grounded and justified in its results, had from the beginning been through Him alone; for He, as the Chief-Shepherd of His people and angel of the covenant even before His coming in the flesh; as the Perfecter of all fruit-bearing influence and object of all true faith and faithful teaching; as the future Messiah, in whom the God of Israel reveals Himself; He and He alone *had been* this door *to the sheep,* even as He *is* ever such under the more plainly revealed new covenant. But this obvious sense has not given satisfaction; and many, because in ver. 9 ἡ θύρα stands absolutely, have denied it altogether, and substituted—I am the door *for* the sheep,[1] thus translating τῶν

[1] Thus van Ess briefly, and Seiler by paraphrase—through which the sheep enter in. Thus Chrysostom, Augustine, Euthymius, Nonnus (πάνδοκος εἰμὶ θύρη προβάτων πολυχανδέος αὐλῆς), Maldonatus, Lampe, and recently Fritzsche. Steinmeyer preaches upon it—Christ is the door to *glory,* which is, in any view, one-sided and artificial, for the fold and the pasture are certainly not first in heaven.

προβάτων ver 7. And what shall we say of this? Assuredly the Lord is, generally, (according to ch. xiv. 6), the θύρα τοῦ πατρὸς, the accessus ad Patrem, and also the ὁδὸς or θύρα τῆς ζωῆς, but does He include this in His meaning here? It is, indeed, to be subordinately understood, but not as the direct meaning; and thus, as Tholuck sees, we must resolve the strife for a one-sided exposition. In vers. 7, 8, He terms Himself, conformably with the figure, the door to the sheep, through which the shepherds must come to them; in ver. 9 He extends the idea of the θύρα, so that shepherds and sheep alike must *go in and out*, finding pasture for themselves and others, only through Him; in ver. 11 this entrance effected by Him into salvation and peace, life and abundance for all, is [illegible]fated of itself and independently. Let this deepening development be well understood, as our summary exhibited it at first; the second *follows from* the first, and the *door* thus becomes evidently the one, and only *Shepherd*.[1]

Ver. 8. Our preliminary glance showed how we dealt with that much-contested exegetical problem, the interpretation of πρὸ ἐμοῦ.[2] Certainly all who lay any stress upon internal criticism and the unity of connection, should be agreed in discerning in this expression an antithesis to δι' ἐμοῦ, ver. 9, or, what is equally incontestable, to διὰ τῆς θύρας, ver. 1. Any other sense must necessarily be wrong. Kling is quite correct in affirming that the mere idea of time, ante me (that is, before I came!), disturbs the whole figure, because it effaces all reference to the door.[3] We must add that this interferes with the relation of the whole discourse to the *future* church of Christ, which is as much contemplated in prospect, as Israel's past is viewed in retrospect. (A point of view for the whole, which, as far as we know, Herder alone has done justice to). The thieves and robbers come as cer-

[1] As Neander also admits—the door of the penfold in a twofold sense, for the sheep and for the shepherds. So that He Himself is the *door*, and this distinguishes the true Shepherd κατ' ἐξοχήν. This is not "obscurity" (as de Wette protests) but profundity.

[2] The reading which omits it has no value, evidently only leaving out a difficulty. Yet Roos lays hold of this, and thinks that Jesus having said "All that ever came!" reserved the conclusion in his own mind, which, however, may be easily understood.

[3] Steinmeyer:—that we are not to think of the mere process of time, the last Prophet has most plainly told us, ch. i. 15, 27.

tainly *after* Christ as *before* Him. Consequently, we cannot concur with the common meaning of πρό; and all its qualifications fail to stand the test, since the Lord does not surely intend to reject *all* the teachers and guides of the people who came before His own appearing.[1] It is manifestly false to lay stress upon the ἦλθον, making it bear the meaning of a self-authorized coming,[2] for Jesus uses the same ἦλθον in ver. 10. Concerning Himself, consequently, it is not in this word, but in the πρὸ ἐμοῦ that we must seek their error. To understand both, when united, as intimating that all are referred to who had ever made themselves Messiahs, or had given themselves out to be the door, is to contradict the expression itself as well as all history.[3] Their history knew not any pseudo-christs in number sufficient to be spoken of as πάντες ὅσοι, nor can this limitation be established in the connection of the words; so that our most recent and unfriendly critics are obliged to impute this to St John as an anachronism. "They are not true and false Messiahs who are spoken of, but true and false pastors of souls." (Ebrard). The Lord is dealing with false and corrupt shepherds! If this is admitted, then can the *ante me* be maintained only by restricting the whole question to the time of our Lord—all who have come recently, and just before Myself.[4] We are told that "Jesus might say this, generally, of the Pharisees of His time"—namely, that they were thieves and robbers. But we cannot think that the Lord would have used words so liable to be misunderstood as πάντες ὅσοι, when there were some exceptions, however few; besides which

[1] As Marcion, and such as he, apply it.

[2] As Euthymius, Jerome, Theophylact. This last says:—Πρόσχες καὶ τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῆς λέξεως· ὅσοι ἦλθον φησὶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅσοι ἀπεστάλησαν. Steinmeyer concisely explains it that to come *before* Jesus is to come in their own name, to come *after* Jesus is to testify of Him, to prepare His way, and engage in His service; but we may reasonably ask—how does this appear?

[3] Although F. J. M. Helferich, in his Predigten S. 364, repeats this after antiquity.

[4] Bengel artificially pressed the εἰσί into this service, and thought: —verbum subsequens, εἰσὶ, *sunt*, in præsenti, indicat, ἦλθον, venerunt, accipiendum esse de tempore præterito proximo. Lücke adheres to this, without naming Bengel (which he seldom does); and Ebrard follows in the same track: "Jesus terms Himself *the first (of his time)*, who truly cared for the common people."

He himself admitted in vers. 1—5 that there had been, and still were, true shepherds who entered in at the door. Thus ἦλθον is not to be pressed down to a *tempus præteritum proximum*, for it belongs to the interpretation of the preceding figure, which embraces all time in its application. And certainly, to supply a restricting and damaging clause, as Nonnus does—πάντες ὅσοι πάρος ἦλθον ὑποκλέπτοντι πεδίλῳ, is altogether inadmissible. We are thus shut up to one exposition of the preposition which enters into the spirit of the whole *figure*. Now it is evident, first, that ἐμοῦ is equivalent to τῆς θύρας, for this follows from the δι' ἐμοῦ: consequently for our *interpretation* πρὸ ἐμοῦ is perfectly equivalent to πρὸ τῆς θύρας. But what does it mean, to come *before* the door, *in sensu temporis*? This has seemed to many unintelligible, and they have therefore preferred to render it—pass *by* the door, thus making πρό bear the sense of præter, beside, daneben, ἀλλαχόθεν. (Camerarius—qui ostium vitant). But this cannot be accepted, at least in this form; nor is "instead" better, as Lampe, Wolle, Wolf, Tittmann, Schleusner assert, corroborating it by Euripides.[1] A certain combination of the two, indeed, will not be found altogether groundless by those who know how to appreciate the force and fulness of meaning which, in the original construction of language, belongs to the *prepositions*,—a domain of inquiry not sufficiently cultivated by our philology, which is too micrological and forgets the philosophy of language.[2] The original unity of *vor* and *für* in the German [*before* and *instead of*] should teach us to regard a precipitate, self-obtruding "instead" as possibly involved in the πρό; and, in this sense, Jno. v. 7 has been appealed to,—another steppeth in before me, instead of me, *pushing me aside*.[3] The language would, generally speaking, allow this: but then we should be brought to the false Messiahs, which cannot be admitted; and,

[1] So the Hirschb. Bible, though hesitatingly: "passing by Me, yea, taking my place." So Lange, also; but see afterwards.

[2] Olshausen is not right in saying that this meaning of the preposition has been abundantly refuted. We shall bring some evidence from the context.

[3] So Lange: "who came not as My forerunners, but as superseding Me, into the fold." So Kling: "going before Him, they obtruded themselves into this territory"—while men should follow Him as the *living* and *moving* θύρα.

further, the living person of Christ would be too directly substituted for the door, thus too abruptly losing sight of the figure. If the Lord were speaking merely of *Himself* without similitude, this would give a pregnant meaning:—the shepherd must enter in as following Me (Jer. xvii. 16, רָאָה אַחֲרֶיךָ), not before Me, that is, not push his way in without Me or altogether instead of Me. But we maintain that ἐμοῦ must perfectly coincide with θύρας; the *door*, however, does not *come* (so that it is not to be filled up by—before I came or come), but Christ was the door of all the shepherds, appointed and really such long before *His own* actual coming. We must not too much restrict the many-sided development of this figurative discourse, and confound too hastily the shepherd of ver. 11 with the door as such.[1] It is, indeed, true that *πρὸ sensu loci*, לְפָנַי or עַל פָּנַי, may pass over into a *præ* or *præter*. And for this we might appeal to the עַל פָּנַי of the first commandment, Ex. xx. 2, Sept. πλήν, Onkelos בַּד מִנַּי, Luther *neben mir*,—and to Gesenius' de præstantiâ, præ, cf. Deut. xxi. 16. But to apply this meaning *here* would be to abandon the figure of the door, and to think only of the Lord Himself, before whose view those who came would make themselves as great as, or greater than Himself!—What then is the truth, after all this refutation? Our view and translation holds somewhat with that of Camerarius — qui ostium vitant, and takes the *præter* as *beside* or ἀλλαχόθεν; but also with that of Elsner—*ante* januam. We think that ἦλθον πρὸ τῆς θύρας does not mean—they went by or passed *beside* the door: nor—ante januam *abierunt*, since the ἔρχεσθαι is not a going away, but a *going in*. What is it then? They want in, *before they came to the door*. They broke in *precipitately and prematurely*, just as thieves and robbers do, *before they had taken time even to seek the door*.[2] For this they sedulously avoid, on account of the vigilant porter! We must leave it to the judgment of the reader,

[1] This is seen in the *mystical* interpretations given by some:—They who came before Me, that is, before I came to them and into them, before My inspiring influence took possession of them.

[2] Here we are at one with von Gerlach. "This difficult expression is best explained in closest connection with the *figure*:—If any man leaps into the penfold, before he comes to the door, before the door."

whether this may be πρὸ τῆς θύρας, and, figure and interpretation running into one, πρὸ ἐμοῦ; to us it appears plainly conformable both to the word and the matter, though certainly very concise. If we are disposed *now* to make prominent the emphatic ἐμοῦ, it would be,—Before they sought and found Me *as* the door, *before* they came *to Me* in order to enter *by Me*, which would then be the counterpart of that other,—Before I came into the world or to them.[1] And we think that this alone is the true sense of πρὸ ἐμοῦ, as it makes the Lord the door for all past time; for the ἐγώ εἰμι embraces the whole of this time past, just as in the parable of vers. 1—5. To it corresponds, by a similar presentation of the great historical figure, the εἰσί in the case of the thieves, as is shown by the ἤκουσαν with which it is interchanged.

This fact, that the *true* sheep never belonged to the false shepherds, never gave heed to their voice, was by no means true merely of the time of Christ, but is attested throughout the whole history of the flock and fold of God. Lücke understands no more than that "the people in general were susceptible to the voice of the Lord;" but this itself we very much doubt, nor can we understand how the people in general were so hostile to the Pharisees, fleeing from them, and not acknowledging them.[2] *The sheep*, as we have already shown, are by no means "the people in general," but those sincere and guileless souls who had ever known the voice of the Lord, the true Shepherd; the children of God already in Israel, even as the same expression is used in ch. xi. 52, prospectively concerning the Gentiles, susceptible of faith.[3]

Ver. 9. Now first, as has been said, the meaning of the figure "the door" extends or rather deepens into an almost identity

[1] This expression is one of the hardest problems for our revisal of the popular German translation. If the easily misunderstood *vor mir* must not remain, that no common reader may understand it of time; and if a parenthetical explanation (nicht durch mich) is not allowable; nothing remains but the terse and too concise *mir voraus* gekommen, that is, not waiting for Me, precipitate and rash, before they came to the *door*.

[2] Sepp maintains "that the people's respect for the priesthood at that time had entirely departed"—but the entire history of the Gospels shows the reverse! Jno. vii. 26; Acts iii. 17.

[3] Steinmeyer misses his way here, understanding by the sheep the people at large:—To follow, without joy or approbation, but with the

with "the way" of ch. xiv. 6. Yet only almost, since here it is not so much the access to the Father, as obviously to the pasturage of life, to salvation. Kling's protest against Olshausen is too harsh, since the latter only fails to exhibit clearly what he really means. In this parabolical discourse, which moves freely and livingly from one to another figure, there are two bye-paths of exposition which must be avoided. We must not prematurely let go the figure, and press onwards at the wrong place to the thing signified; nor must we too one-sidedly restrict the many-sided application of the figure itself. The solution of the difficulty of the ninth verse lies in this, that every other (under) shepherd besides the One, through whom as the door he must enter, is himself a sheep, and when he becomes a shepherd, is such only as one of the flock going before the rest. (As in Acts xx. 28, by the ἐν ᾧ, *in the midst of* which and not *over* which, the overseers appointed by the Holy Ghost are made one with the flock.) *This* thought forms the process of transition to a generalisation of the whole, so that He who is the door now appears as the one sole Shepherd of all the pastors with their flocks.[1] As Erasmus hit the meaning well: non est salutaris aditus in ecclesiam, nisi per me, sive pastor esse velis, sive ovis; similarly Hess expresses himself (though prematurely on ver. 7). No man can enter, whether as shepherd or sheep, but by Me. The transition to this extension of the subject is indicated in a threefold progression:—by the indefinite ἐάν τις which only seemingly applies to the shepherd as shepherd; by the σωθήσεται which at once makes him one with the sheep, and finally, and most plainly, by the *going out and finding pasture* which is added to the going in. Thus, the going in and out *here* is *not merely* the proverbial בּוֹא וְצֵאת of Deut. xxviii. 6, Ps. cxxi. 8, which indicates secure walking, living, and working (though connected with that), but (just as in Num. xxvii. 17, 21, this is applied to the pastor's office) the leading out of the flock after

secret sting of conscience, and with a perpetual protest in their hearts, was not *obedience!* Compare the very different teaching of Rom. ix. 8, vi. 10.

[1] These "subordinate ideas" (rather *fundamental* ideas) lie not beyond the range of the parable, as Lücke says, but essentially *within it.* Cannot the door in the midst be regarded, in the actual figure, as the passage for the sheep to their pasture?

the entrance in such wise as that the shepherd himself belongs to the flock. Thus the *νομὴν εὑρίσκειν*, which is parallel with the *σώζεσθαι*, is not merely the "official blessing," though Lücke compares 1 Cor. iii. 15, which, however, does not apply its *σωθήσεται* merely to office; but he shall find pasture for himself and the sheep, he shall save himself and them that hear him. (1 Tim. iv. 16.)

Ver. 10. We have already seen that thief and stranger were fundamentally one, though not absolutely the same; just so is it now, when *the thief* (we must add in thought—and robber) recurs in the original antithesis with which the discourse set out, though it now proceeds further to speak of the hireling and the wolf. See the analysis already given. The article in *ὁ κλέπτης* primarily belongs to the parable; but, inasmuch as the unity of the contrast is by it more impressively exhibited (One true Shepherd, ver. 11, and, opposed to Him, One thief), it already contains a transition to a plain disclosure of the deepest mystery of the matter. As in all the shepherds the One Shepherd is manifested, whether as represented by them or approving in them His presence and work, so also the manifold thieves are only types and ministers of *the* thief and murderer, whom we already forecast in these words! Those who are termed in Jer. xxiii. 1 מְאַבְּדִים וּמְפַיְצִים have no other *design* than that of selfishness: and here we have the *ἵνα κλέψῃ* immediately following upon the *κλέπτης*. But they are not content with the milk and the wool, they desire *to feed themselves*, to eat the fat and to kill them that are fed (Ezek. xxxiv. 2, 3)—and with this the whole shepherd-figure suddenly finishes its exhibition from common life, and as the *tertium comparationis* the affectionate *shepherd-feeling* which cares alone for the sheep, remains. This brings out the touching analogy of man's protecting and solicitous love for the lower creation, as it reflects the pastoral love of Jesus, the highest expression of the loving-kindness of God. Yet the common shepherd of ordinary life will in the end partake of his slaughtered sheep: and this is the ground for the charge in this insufficient similitude,—Such shepherds are not shepherds, but thieves for themselves! Thus the *θύσῃ* follows quite naturally. But are we to take the *ἀπολέσῃ* which is added, with Bengel, as referring to the destruction of the pasturage? (In

which sense it should contrast with the περισσὸν ἔχειν). We think not, for the poor sheep remain the only object; and the περισσὸν belongs to the ζωή, since the life *giving* pasturage, which is one with life itself, is spoken of. Thus the *destroying* strengthens the killing; not merely exhibits it as loveless cruelty, but passes over into the disclosure of the wolfish mind in the thief, who finds his sole pleasure in killing! Baum.-Crusius distinguishes rightly "they kill for their own gain, *and* only for the sake of killing." The best translation would be—*kill* and *murder*; both together being the יַחַרְגֵּן of Zech. xi. 5. History shows that the selfishness of all such self-feeding pastors has deepened into such a malicious and destructive spirit; even as that was in the beginning the ground of all selfishness.

And now come the plain impressive antithesis of ἐγὼ ἦλθον—One alone has *life*, in its most essential sense, to bring and to give, and that is He! The *two words* ζωὴ and περισσὸν, with the emphatically repeated ἔχωσιν include the whole fulness of all the good which we have in Jesus Christ. (Philem. 6). In order that ζωὴν ἔχειν may not be taken too limitedly, or in a negative sense alone—continue to live and not be destroyed,—the second expression immediately follows. Only where *the Lord* is himself the Shepherd, does the self-evident conclusion follow—I shall want *nothing* (Ps. xxiii.), thus Jesus here arrogates to Himself a divine power, and all-sufficiency; but the positive expression περισσὸν ἔχειν (which Luther has, unhappily, somewhat enfeebled by "volle Genüge") oversteps the Old Testament לֹא אֶחְסַר, is even more than Jer. xxxi. 14. (The *fulness* of my gifts, yet in Heb. only אֶת־טוּבִי יִשְׂבָּעוּ, *enough*).

Vers. 11—13. The rendering "*a* good Shepherd" in our ecclesiastical translation is only to be lamented and corrected. The article, with its emphatic repetition, is *primarily* generic, and, as belonging to the parable, intimates—a Shepherd, such as he should be, the ideal of all shepherds (καλὸς being almost tantamount to ἀληθινός), in contrast to all false and wicked shepherds, down to him who feeds his flock in hell; see Ps. xlix. 15, according to our commentary. But Israel had been already prepared for this great shepherd-figure, a Shepherd, *who should come*, had been fore-announced; and we will not argue with those who would

deny a reference in the word of Jesus to that prediction. From the time when the shepherd Jacob spake the words of Gen. xlviii. 15 throughout the entire Old Testament, God the Lord is exhibited as Himself the Shepherd and Keeper of His chosen, His people—Ps. lxxx. 2, c. 3, xcv. 7, lxxiv. 1, lxxvii. 21, lxxviii. 52; Isa. lxiii. 11; Ecclus. xviii. 13. But when the Messianic Future comes into view, it is promised that the Lord will come and gather His flock around Himself—Ezek. xxxiv. 11—16; Isa. xl. 11. Hence the Messiah, the servant David, is also called a Shepherd, (Ezek. xxxiv. 23, xxxvii. 24). This is one of the most gracious among the names which the Scriptures give to the Lord Jesus;[1] and the early church, as is well known, took peculiar delight in representations of this figure.—The following clause, as a transition to the plain statement and interpretation, must be understood in a twofold sense. If He says, as a general declaration, that a good shepherd, or every good shepherd, gives up his life for the sheep (see 1 Sam. xvii. 34, 35)—yet does this great word assuredly pass over into the *prediction* which presently in ver. 15 stands alone; more especially, as the ἐγὼ ἦλθον and ἐγὼ εἰμι had already preceded. Bengel rightly observes that in this last and highest expression of self-devotement, all else that belongs to the shepherd-feeling is involved and embraced—*So dear are they to Him!* Most perfect antithesis of the killing and destroying in ver. 10:—He dies Himself, rather than allow them to die, or become a prey to the wolf! And in this the vicarious sense of ὑπέρ is already prepared for and actually included, though assuredly not in the juridico-dogmatical meaning. The formula, peculiar to St John, ψυχὴν τιθέναι (see, upon this, Lücke), finds no perfect analogy either in classical Greek or in the Septuagint: for it is neither the Homeric παρατίθεσθαι, nor the Latin animam deponere in Corn. Nep., ponere in Propert. spiritum deponere in Valer. Max., or Cicero's ponere vitam; nor is it even the Heb. שׂוּם נֶפֶשׁ בְּכַף, τιθέναι ἐν χειρί, though this is connected with it. It proceeds certainly from "a laying aside or laying down," hence in ver. 18 the taking again corresponds; but to go no further than this (with Lücke, who even compares

[1] As they are given, with almost too great fulness, in A. H. Francke's Christus der Kern heiliger Schrift, § 64.

the laying aside and taking again of the garments, ch. xiii. 4, 12) is quite out of the question, as it would most unseasonably weaken the emphasis of the offering of His life. Thus the laying down is rather a casting away, a voluntary devotion of the life; or, as we might properly substitute—a *venturing* or *staking* life for the salvation and deliverance of the sheep. This deepening of the meaning follows from the closely connected *ὑπέρ*, and Isa. liii. 10[1] is a correct parallel, although we cannot certainly say that the Lord directly referred to it. And the Peschito was here the same word, נַפְשֵׁה סָאֵם, also translating *ὑπὲρ* by חֲלַת —*instead*, as Matt. ii. 22.

Döpke quotes from the Bava Mezia fol. 93. col. 2. fol. 106. col. 1 a similar parable concerning a *hireling* who left the sheep in peril, in contrast with Moses, who, according to Ex. xxxii. 32 offered his own life for the sheep, Jalkut Rubeni fol. 108. col. 3. We need no such parallels to help our understanding of our Lord's words, as they spring out of the matter which He speaks of. He *extends* now finally the contrast of those who are not shepherds in such a manner as to include all, and even the best are now set over against the true Shepherd; the *shepherd-love* is distinguished as a great characteristic from every thing in common life. The *strangers*, who call like the shepherds, were, above, the beginning of this transition; but now, every *μισθωτὸς*, hired servant, who exercises the office of shepherd for wages from the Lord of the sheep, is even as a stranger—*he is not a shepherd*, although so called, and, in ordinary life, rightly so. It is not to be forgotten, that in ancient times even rich proprietors of large flocks were themselves pastors of their flocks, yet, of course, needed under-shepherds too; and these latter *might* and *ought*, with true shepherd-feeling, to take care of the flocks for their master as if their own. But the *parabolical* idea of the hired servant passes over into that of the mercenary, as in ver. 13—*ὅτι μισθωτός ἐστι* in the true, and worse sense of the word! By this it is not said that every under-shepherd serving for proper

[1] Altogether missed by the LXX. The תָּשִׂים is not the second person, but נַפְשׁוֹ is a significant nominative and accusative at once, in order strongly to emphasise voluntary self-consecration. Even Rosenmüller resolves it into—אִם נַפְשׁוֹ תָּשִׂים נַפְשׁוֹ.

and necessary wages must have in his heart an *οὐ μέλει αὐτῷ περὶ τῶν προβάτων*; but, in the spiritual and deep apprehension of all these relations, it is intended to be said—that a servant, who loves the sheep as his own (here, at the same time, feels himself related to the sheep) is essentially the *shepherd*; while, on the other hand, the *lords* or possessors of the sheep (קוֹנֵיהֶן, Zech. xi. 5) by false dominion alone can kill and destroy them. Finally, in the issue, as the Lord will correctly assign every thing its place in the *interpretation*, the *hireling* is not altogether or from the beginning a stranger; for the door is open to him, the sheep flee not from him, he has led them forth and protected them until—*the wolf cometh*. Then, indeed, when the fearful cry, well known in shepherd-fables, is heard, or when, as here, he *seeth* the wolf—the test is applied which finally distinguishes between shepherd and not-shepherd, in the keen and penetrating sense of this *παροιμία*. He who had hitherto protected them, now *leaveth* the sheep, which fly not from him, but rather fly in tumultuous fear to him for protection—but he, *οὐκ ὢν ποιμήν*, *fleeth* himself, and prefers to sacrifice the life of the sheep rather than his own. Thus is the hireling such an one as "without any evil intention, but also without any love, does the work of a shepherd." (Baum.-Crusius.) He is, or appears to be, at first better than a stranger—but when the test is applied, the "evil design" of selfishness becomes manifest, and he *leaveth* the sheep at last to the essential *robber of the fold*.[1]

And that is the *Wolf* in a pre-eminent and fearful sense! We find, in Acts xx. 29, and Matt. vii. 75, *wolves* mentioned and men meant (comp. Zeph. iii. 3)—but such in this parable were the thieves and robbers, and the wolf here is beyond the circle of evil shepherds, he is the perfect antithesis of Christ, the one good shepherd, consequently, he is a personality opposed to His,—*the great enemy!* Not merely "every enemy of the theocracy"—to establish which Lücke resorts to a most inappropriate abstraction, "the testing danger, every anti-theocratical power," finding no trace of the Devil here. We, for our own part, regard all abstraction as contrary to the spirit of the living figure, and plainly *see*, in the whole process of the parable, in which the

[1] What Klee adduces from Augustin, S. 282, in favour of the hireling, does not fit the circle of ideas in this similitude.

sheep from the beginning are exhibited as needing protection against the wolf, this great robber of the fold *coming*. Lampe opposes this interpretation, on the ground that the ignorant hireling could not know and see that it was the wolf of hell coming—but this might be regarded as questionable in many cases in the application, and, furthermore, the similitude is not to be too literally pressed. To the eyes of the hireling it may appear often to be "dangers" and "persecutions" simply, but the Lord, speaking of them, names the wolf alone whom every one ought to be supposed to know who would assume to be a shepherd. *To this point* tended the second description of the thief in ver. 10, so that we may carry our interpretation a little deeper:—the wolf is a thief, and every thief is already a wolf, like unto him as being his agent and confederate. And now comes the lamentable picture of a flock devoted to destruction: the wolf tears and eats what he can, the remaining sheep he at least *scatters*, so that the *flock* exists no more. Yea, still more, "the wolf is the most havoc-committing animal on earth; when he comes (fully) into a sheep-fold, he first bites all the sheep *to death*, and then begins to eat." (Herberger). The infernal wolf, finally, has most insatiable jaws! And what of the hireling called shepherd? He fleeth, that he may not be also devoured, and says—*salvavi animam meam!* Properly speaking, he thus becomes himself a wolf after his kind.—Here the *parable* reaches its highest point, and breaks off; and the words which follow are in plain language. For as, in actual life, it can scarcely be regarded as absolutely *imperative* upon a shepherd to fight with the wolf, but rather, like the poor sheep themselves, to fly and save at least himself—so, in the interpretation, strictly speaking the stronger one alone can contend with the enemy. Even the best under-shepherd must often take care of himself, and commit the rest to the chief shepherd; he *can* do no more than in his strength sacrifice himself for the contest. So that everything drives us to the centre of the whole, to the ἐγω εἰμι ὁ ποιμήν.

Vers. 14, 15. The Lord still remains in the same similitude, in as far as He still speaks of shepherd and sheep; but the fundamental idea of the figure is already plainly brought out, and it is this—the mutual knowledge and the bond of love between the shepherd and *His* sheep. Thus there is in the distinctive expression τὰ ἐμὰ the first plain indication that there are *false sheep*,

as there are false shepherds; but *this* already passes beyond the circle of ideas hitherto contained in the parable. The discourse is not of merely *knowing* in the ordinary sense; we must not, however, be misled by the apparent contrast with *οὐ μέλει* into interpreting the *γινώσκειν* as if it meant "caring, protecting, curare." This is not permitted (as Lücke remarks) by the evident connection with vers. 3, 4, and still less by the following *καθὼς γινώσκει.*[1] It is evident that this saying contains the essential theme of the whole discourse, and that as such it must be interpreted in the sense of 2 Tim. ii. 19. Yea, the Lord knoweth His own, and even before they know Him He sees in anticipation their faith and their following of Himself, and because He does see it He calls them; it follows from *His* knowing first that it can afterwards be said—*γινώσκομαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν*, comp. 1 Cor. viii. 3; Gal. iv. 9.[2] The knowing is on His part the acknowledgment and acceptance of His love; on our part the consciousness of being loved awakening love in return. As the *Son of God*, which now must be spoken plainly out, Jesus knows and acknowledges His own; for He sees them coming, receives them and loves them as given to Him by the Father (ch. vi. 37)—yea, as the sheep of the Father, with whom He is one, see afterwards vers. 29, 30. We shall take occasion to consider, upon ch. xiv. 20, xv. 10, xvii. 8—21, the profound sense in which our fellowship with Jesus is likened to His fellowship with the Father; Lu. 22—29 must be brought into the comparison, as also for the mutual *γινώσκειν* between the Father and the Son (Matt. xi. 27.)

Therefore, because He, in the unity of the Father's love, loveth the objects of His redeeming grace, He layeth down His life for them! Again, *by this* is He known by His own to be the good Shepherd! This reciprocal meaning lies in the *καὶ*. Let the

[1] Can the Son be said to care for the Father? Hezel translates, "I care for the Father's honour, the fulfilment of His will!" Erasmus improperly severed ver. 15 from ver. 14—"as the Father knoweth me, I know the Father!" To what purpose this aimless parenthesis? Still worse, in relation to ver. 15, is Semler's *probare* for *γινώσκειν*.

[2] Augustin: Aliquando se ipse nesciunt oves, sed pastor novit eas, secundum ipsam prædestinationem, secundum ipsam Dei præscientiam. The *aliquando* here says too little, the *prædestinatio* too much.

present τίθημι be well noted, spoken prophetically to the enemies who stood before Him ready to execute their purpose. Because His ψυχὴ, like His σὰρξ, is life, the sheep should receive life from Him, strictly speaking, through His death; in the foundation of the ὑπέρ there lies the true substitution. The good Shepherd become a Lamb, surrenders Himself to the will of the wolf, who cometh against Him in the person of the shepherds and sheep turned into wolves; and here He points to Isa. liii. 7, as well as to the scornful rejection of the good Shepherd in Zech. xi. 11—13. For *the* sheep:—these are, assuredly, *His own*, foreseen as such, for whom alone His death becomes actually available; this restriction, which before, in ver. 14, and after, in ver. 16, plainly recurs, cannot be done away with. (It has been said that now we do not find—*My* sheep, but—for all). This sense is not open to any objection, any more than the περὶ πολλῶν of Matt. xxvi. 28, and the not praying for the world, Jno. xvii. 9. It does not gainsay the great fact, that in another and prior sense, He died for all the straying sheep. (Isa. liii. 6).

Ver. 16. The prophecy stretches forward; its glance extends to the widest and largest range of view which belongs to the two great words "*Shepherd* and *fold*"—in order that from this elevation it may look down again, or rather descend to the depths of the foundation of this salvation, the death of the Son of God. Let it be observed, with what majestic clearness and fulness of comprehension the Lord adjusts, and arranges from beginning to end, the thoughts which shine through the figurative expressions of this discourse, which issue from the depths of the sacred anger and love of His shepherd-heart! The *prophecy* stretches forward; here, as elsewhere, the calling of the Gentiles is exhibited as the fruit and immediate consequence of the death of Jesus upon the cross. Not only in ch. xi. 52 does the Evangelist derive his perfectly parallel expression from this saying of our Lord; but the Lord Himself repeats the promise in the hearing of the Greeks, (ch. xii. 32.) Malicious hearers might have mockingly answered His beautiful words in ver 14—"Yea, verily, thy sheep are a wretched little company in the land;" and the Lord in his dignity anticipates and answers these thoughts. The *other* sheep are, assuredly, not (as Wolf and Paulus shortsightedly interprets) the Jewish diaspora; *of* this fold includes

them already, as belonging to it, though not precisely in it; all Israelites regarded themselves as one great whole separated from the heathen. It appears to us probable that, *now* (it was too soon in connection with the ἐξάγει) the ἐκ gently indicates that the *flock* of Jesus cannot, and should not remain in this *fold* (which indeed was broken up). Bengel's remark may be received with confidence. It does not say, out of or in *another fold*,[1] for the heathens who were to be called, although already foreseen τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ, predisposed to faith, were nevertheless διεσκορπισμένα.[2]

The Saviour knows them, and *has* them already as His sheep, just as in Acts xviii. 10 He has already much people in Corinth. We see that the discourse remains throughout faithful to its original manner, which is, to enlarge and anew to interpret in succeeding words the sayings which had been already used; for here again the γινώσκω τὰ ἐμά is extended to apply to the foreknowing of all who *should* hear His voice, and to whom He himself is not yet known. In Jer. xxiii. 2, and Micah ii. 12 (not to mention passages which contain the same figure, but not so plainly) a gathering together of the dispersed of Israel into one flock, and one fold was promised; but this is here enlarged to embrace all the peoples of entire humanity, as in Ezek. xxxiv. 30, 31. That the Son of God will in due time construct for the protection and

[1] Although the Gentiles may be asserted to have been in some sense under a divine "guidance," yet this did not place them in such a relation to the theocracy that they may be regarded as having been only in another fold:—"the great Proprietor of the flock having more than one αὐλή." Not a syllable of this is in the text. The emphasis must be made to lie upon *fold*—not out of this *fold*; not, as preachers are wont to say, out of *this* fold! Else how can we understand the *bringing*?

[2] The historically permanent *type* of this is the diaspora of the Jews; hence in the prophets the gathering together of the children of God is referred to by this expression. By an error of exposition, which cannot be too severely condemned, the great Schleiermacher (Homil. über John ii. 207) makes these *other* sheep *all* other men, and founds upon this passage the doctrine of universal restoration. And this, too, in connection with the following outrageous interpretation appended:—Because Jesus as the Son of man knoweth *all* men even as the Father knoweth Him, and not merely beholds all men as His own, but is (as being man) so one *with all men* as (in His higher nature) he is one with the Father!

government of these other sheep, an *αὐλή*, though not such as that in the Old Testament; yea, that this new fold is to be only the continuation and consummation of that already existing in the Old Testament,—is decisively declared in the *ἀγαγεῖν*, which Theophylact rightly explains by *συναγαγεῖν* (Glassius: vel *προσαγαγεῖν*); for the authentic interpretation of St John himself, ch. xi. 52, runs—*ἵνα συναγάγῃ εἰς ἕν*. Lange's imagination plays him false when he says—In the *night time* of the Old Testament there was a fold, but afterwards in the *day* only a flock, no longer folded. Oh no, even the New Testament has its external christendom, its outward exhibition of fellowship, its pastoral discipline and care. *But*, as soon as the New Testament church[1] forgets its unaccomplished mission; and whenever an *individual interim church* pharisaically stands alone in its exclusiveness, this utterance of the *great* Shepherd of *the* or of all sheep (Heb. xiii. 20) protests against it, testifying for ever against all bigoted arrogation to one fold of the privileges common to all—I have *other* sheep! perpetually crying, too, as an exhortation—them also I *must* bring in![2]

This is a *Must* resting upon the love of Him who has given His life for them—and in the unity of the Father, whose righteous love embraces the world, and all in it who should believe. The Lord speaks of what His apostles and their successors do, as if it were done by Himself; the preached gospel is no other than *His* voice, specially for all who are actually sheep, who shall *hear* and understand the Shepherd's call. Great Missionary Promise, with which His servants may for ever confirm their confidence, and console their hearts, when met by unbelief, even as the Lord himself does, ver. 26—They are not His sheep, even as He said. *One fold, one Shepherd*—the great conclusion of this *παροιμία*, itself a concentrated proverbial saying, but also formed upon the prophetic promise of the *one Shepherd*, Ezek. xxxiv. 23, xxxvii.

[1] Münchmeyer discerns here quite correctly a "polemic against Missions resting upon the basis of individual churches distinctively:"—the same may be found in my Keryktik, § 47 (especially in the second edition).

[2] To this point, that is, to church against church, we may refer the application of the incorrect emphasis—not of *this* fold! The Lord does by no means say, *γενήσεται μία αὐλή*—though the English translation characteristically enough confounds the distinction by its *one fold*.

24; the latter of which passages had reference to the separation between Judah and Ephraim, ver. 22, as the *type* of all future divisions among the people of God. And the saying in Zech. xiv. 9 (which evidently has a yet wider range of meaning) may be compared with these. This promise begins in its internal truth to receive its fulfilment even in the New Testament age; for the true sheep see and hear no longer every man in his own way, but all constitute, in separate folds, one great flock in one common pasture. But all demarcations are finally to fall away, when all are led to the living fountains of water in the new world; and one common eternal praise will redound to the *one Shepherd*, whose name alone worthily closes all. When the elect are gathered from the four winds; when the πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν has come in and Israel is restored; when the *scattering* of the not destroyed sheep—the work of the wolf under a thousand forms—is turned into its glorious opposite; when the apostasy has driven the saints in united patience and love close around their saving and protecting Shepherd—then will there be a preparatory and still typical fulfilment of the great μία ποίμνη, εἷς ποιμήν. It does not merely intimate (though *primarily* it does) the union of Jews and Gentiles;[1] but the εἷς ἕν reaches to the full meaning of ch. 17—24.

Vers. 17, 18. With the last ποιμήν the λαλεῖν ἐν παροιμίαις altogether ceased, and He here already begins to speak to them plainly of *the Father*. The last and deepest ground in the Son Himself, which can be disclosed to us, is His relation to the Father, His subordination and His oneness, together and in concert; this mystery, indeed, which can be apprehended by us only in the words Father and Son, is itself in a certain sense a παραβολή. The Lord returns back to the central utterance of His Shepherd-love, that by which His sheep in Israel should first come to a right knowledge of Him, and by which His sheep without should also in due time come to know Him—*I lay down My life!*[2] He at the same time sums up in one the two great

[1] Nonnus narrows his interpretation to this meaning alone:—καὶ μία ποίμνη ἔσσεται ἀμφοτέρωθεν ἑνὸς τελέθουσα νομῆος.

[2] Moreover, He had not previously said—I am the *great*, the only, the highest, the true Shepherd, or the like, but—the *good*, the true Shepherd, rightly qualified for the exercise of that office!

truths which so marvellously follow one another in vers. 15 and 16, shewing how their procedure is: I die and—I am still the good Shepherd, calling and bringing into the fold other sheep. Thus the solution is the Death and Resurrection of the Son of God. The Father *loveth* Me—here is the true interpretation of the previous γινώσκει. But He loveth Me no otherwise than as the Father in His compassionate love to the world *not sparing* His own beloved Son, but *giving Me up*. We act in perfect union (We are one, ver. 30)—I gladly fulfil the good pleasure of the Father, for I in like voluntary compassion give up Myself. *Because of this*, even as in this and for this, the Father loveth Me! But now it must be understood that the Son of God, dying so wonderful a death, cannot Himself be holden of death (Acts ii. 24); that the Redeemer only submits to the enemy that He may thereby overcome him. Thus the ἵνα πάλιν λάβω, is most assuredly and essentially τελικὸν, although many of the ancients scrupled at this;[1] see chap. xii. 24. Without the conscious design to overcome and redeem, the death of Christ would neither be permissible nor possible. Yea, we may truly assert "that to lay down life, *in order to* take it again,—is in an analogous sense the great work of the members, even as it was of the Head." Thus does the Lord remind us once more of His first word, chap. ii. 19. To those whose will is to, and who will, put Him to death, the Lord utters His prospective testimony—I will give Myself up to your power according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God; I will not resist you. (Jas. v. 6.) With force and compulsion, admitting no possibility of His eluding or opposition, no one *taketh* (αἴρει) His life from Him:—neither man, nor angel, nor He who hath the power of death, the Prince of this world, who, indeed, even now hath nothing in this holy Son of man as such. He lays down and gives up His life with the most perfect voluntariness, and with the highest energy of doing in suffering; as is witnessed throughout from the falling backwards of those who would lay hands on Him in the Garden (ch. xviii. 6) to that last παραθήσομαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου—now will I die! In this lies manifold evidence of the divine power and dignity of this dying Man; it is His

[1] Euthymius: δηλωτικὸν τοῦ πάντως ἐσομένου.

indwelling ἐξουσια as the Son of God, to die and to live again, as He wills in the will of the Father.[1] The second Adam has as such in virtue of His sinlessness the *posse etiam non mori;* if besides this the Son of God in this humanity should die otherwise than voluntarily, in order to obtain life for Himself as the Head of many members, in His death there would be neither merit nor power of redemption, no cause for the love of the Father. Beck, christ. Lehrwissenschaft i. S. 513—517 speaks correctly and profoundly on this point.[2] This *commandment,* to lay down His life and *take* it again, (from the Father's hand, but with His own) He received from the Father. (Ch. xiv. 31). Without this obedience, it would not be the atoning and redeeming aid of the Son of God; but rather (to speak foolishly but with perfect truth) an unwarrantably offered, therefore not accepted, yea even sinful offering for the sins of the world.

Finally, let us observe that no sooner has the Lord, in the highest climax of His consummated parable, assumed His supreme dignity and authority as the One Shepherd of all God's sheep to be gathered by Him into one, than He retreats and descends, with that *temperamentum majestatis et humilitatis* which is impressed upon all His sayings, into the *obedience* of the Father again. As He must, even in connection with this submission, maintain his own dignity and power in the mighty ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν over His death and His life,[3] He yet finally softens

[1] Baumgarten-Crusius exhibits in his "may indeed" the repugnance of his conscience to the rationalism of his assertion—"ἐξουσία may indeed have in the two following clauses a difference of meaning—My own power, and My conceded, permitted power!" That would be marvellous ἐξουσία, and it must then have run—καὶ ἐξουσίαν λήψομαι τοῦ λαβεῖν αὐτήν.

[2] Where he rightly explains (1 Pet. iii. 18.) "We must not interpret θανατωθεὶς σαρκὶ—put to death *by* the flesh; and no more should we interpret ζωοποιηθεὶς τῷ πνεύματι—quickened by the Spirit, but *in the Spirit.* This quickening in the Spirit follows from the divine power in the self-energy of Christ, even as the weakness which underlay the death of His body rests upon His *self-acquiescence.*"

[3] Here, as ever in the history of the Godman, we have the unity of things otherwise in opposition. "In other cases the *commandment* concerning a matter takes from him who receives it, the power over that matter; but in Jesus it was otherwise. He was at once Lord and Servant—one with the Father, and yet also obedient to the Father." (Roos).

this again on the other side by the expression which is designedly emphatic, and—though in a different sense—alike true of His humanity and His divinity, ἐντολὴν ἔλαβον—which therefore none should dare to explain away or impair.

AT THE FEAST OF THE DEDICATION. EXPLANATORY AND ENLARGED REPETITION OF THE FORMER TESTIMONY: I AND MY FATHER ARE ONE!

(Ch. x. 25—30.)

Though the intervening remarks of the Evangelist in vers. 19—21 especially indicate the conclusion and the result of what had previously transpired, yet they give to the ἐγένετο δὲ—καὶ περιεπάτει of vers. 22, 23, the tone of an immediate sequence and strict connection. And the substance of the new discourse, so closely consecutive as it is upon the former, confirms this impression. Thus it is impossible that the two months from Tisri to Kisleu, which intervened between the two feasts, or even a portion of that time, can be interjected here as having been spent by our Lord elsewhere than in Jerusalem. We cannot allow that He had entirely left Jerusalem, and after many occurrences in Galilee during the interval, had returned to the feast of the Dedication. St John assuredly does not signify this, and it is his wont accurately to demarcate the Lord's visitations of the feasts. That system of harmony which assumes His departure and return, and interpolates here a whole synoptical section of "Christ's final residence in Galilee," outrages all exegetical feeling, and does violence to the words of the Evangelist.[1] Tho-

[1] How strikingly does it appear in Lange's words—"But John *transports us suddenly* into the midst of the Dedication festival!" He says, indeed (III. 679), that my arguments to the contrary have not convinced him, and have not weakened the force of the opposite arguments. I have not expressly argued on the point, not writing a harmony; yet it appears to me that what I have said above is a strong argument—and not an *assertion* merely, as Lange says, asserting like myself. Even Neander admits that *if* we hold to the representation of John alone, we must accept the tarrying at Jerusalem; but this does not "preclude further inquiry of his own." But we follow the text of St John, though he is only kept in doubt by it.

luck, Olshausen, Lücke, Schleiermacher, all feel this in common, as Hess had before them, and adhere to Bengel's assumption, the only one which is reconcilable with the Scripture—that Jesus had *remained* from the feast of Tabernacles to the feast of Dedication, in Jerusalem or in its near neighbourhood.[1] This gives us the longest residence of our Lord in Jerusalem, of which we have any account; and His persistent tarrying there is easily explicable as the final experiment of His love in persevering testimony against the enmity of the Jews. Very different from this, and indeed almost inconceivable to us, would have been a special return on occasion of this subordinate, modern, and little frequented feast. Certainly *this* would have been a very different case from the earlier visit to the highly esteemed feast of *Purim*, which, indeed, had its place in the Canon.

But we have already said, that as a departure and return cannot be interjected between vers. 21 and 22, so neither can the greater part of those two months. For the reference to the former discourse in vers. 26, 27 (whether καθὼς εἶπον ὑμῖν be genuine or not, it is there in effect) will not suit so long an interval: and it is more important to observe that in St John's order of thought, ver. 24 depends upon ver. 19, so that the σχίσμα ἐν τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις gives the prospective motive for the urgent question of these same Ἰουδαῖοι originating in that division. Consequently, we must assume certain intervals in the section, chs. vii.—x., to be interposed at ch. ix. 8, 35, 39. This might have extended to weeks, while the impression of the miracle continued and increased, as we see that it did among the people; consequently, the first shepherd-discourse, as Bengel says, might very well fall in the middle of the interval between the two feasts, and then the connection of what follows is perfectly natural and obvious.

Instead of that *uniting in one* of the true people of God which had been predicted in ver. 16, as the consequence of hearing the voice of the shepherd, a *division* arises among these *Jews* as the result of His word, for they are not His sheep! A new evi-

[1] Thus we may see how the notice of ch. viii. 1, which it has been sought to make spurious, is confirmed as an intimation which extends to all these chapters.

dence that this expression *does not always*, and does not here and in ver. 24, designate simply the Rulers and Pharisees:—see also ch. vi. 41. There, as here, the word designates in its connection the whole of the people generally, in the widest sense.[1] *Once more* there is a division, as in chs. ix. 16 and vii. 43; but this time it arises upon His *sayings*, with which His works are then brought into comparison. The enemies are πολλοὶ, the well-affected are merely ἄλλοι. Unbelief repeats the only saying of ch. vii. 20, viii. 48; and we have already said that δαιμόνιον ἔχειν and μαίνεσθαι may be regarded here in their *difference* as well as being synonymous. Although the following—μὴ δαιμόνιον δύναται, may not (as Klee thinks) absolutely *prove* that the expression is used in its proper and essential sense, since the opposite view may cling tenaciously to the common usage of the time, yet is it obviously to be assumed that such is the case; and the argument that μαίνεσθαι must be in all cases regarded as the explanation of δαιμονίζεσθαι is much more certainly false.[2] Two things had especially offended His enemies in τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις:—the reference to the Gentiles, and the assumed prerogative to lay down, and take up His life. At least it would seem that the final impression upon their minds resented rather what had just been spoken than the polemical attack upon the wicked shepherds which they had first heard. They do not only themselves recoil and turn away from what He uttered, but they demand of others also, that they should not continue to hear Him.[3] The commencing *faith* of these hearers, however, is not so easily cast down; it compares the words with the works; first appealing to the collected, composed, and calm testimony of the words themselves, and then to the concert and harmony between the works and the words, as furnishing additional evidence of the reasonableness and truth of the latter. They especially refer to the last great work per-

[1] Neander: it embraces under the common idea of Ἰουδαῖοι both the predominant party of Pharisees, and the multitudes from Galilee.

[2] "Else must all forms of speech, used out of their proper meaning, destroy the very ground from which they arose." Von Meyer in his Aufsatze von den Besessenen (Frankfurt 1812), S. 50—a treatise well worth reading.

[3] Strongly expressed by Nonnus:—Φθεγγόμενον βαλίῃσιν ἐάσατε τοῦτον ἀλλαις—ἄφρονα τοῦτον λείπετε.

formed on the blind man, but the plural τυφλῶν embraces all similar works which had preceded it. They who are *possessed* (not merely mad!) may do many things extraordinary, and out of the usual track of nature, but not anything benevolent or healing: to open the eyes of the blind is no work of the devil, but the work of God alone. (Ps. cxlvi. 8).

In the midst, and during the progress, of this contest concerning Jesus, so exciting to the people, the feast of the *Dedication* came on, which—as we now well know—was a feast of more recent and human institution, to be traced up to 1 Macc. iv. 52—59; 2 Macc. x. 5—8. Thus we see the shadowy and dissembling devotion of these Jews to their theocratic feasts and festivals continuing ever to run parallel with their decline, apostasy, and unbelief! The good Shepherd, the Lord of the Temple soon to be desolate, remained there until then, and *walked* in it, seeking and waiting for any stray sheep that might hear His voice. Behold, I am with you *yet*!—thus did He by this walking present Himself to their acceptance. It was χειμών—this is hardly a mere chronological remark for foreigners, intimating that the feast fell during the winter; but it gives the reason why our Lord sought refuge in *Solomon's porch*:[1] it was winterly, and foul weather, as in Matt. xvi. 3, xxiv. 20. Then *came round about* Him, urgent and pressing, the *Jews*, as it were holding Him fast (now must thou answer us and abide the test!) These Jews are to be understood with the same generality as in ver. 19, a mingled multitude of Pharisees and common people, but now more especially the opposing party. To think of the leaders of the people taking him aside in such a public place (as Lange seems to do) is to our mind quite inappropriate, and little in harmony with the general scene. Since chap. viii. 25 the urgent desire to hear the plain declaration—"I am Christ!" has gone so far, that they now utter it themselves as assumed by him —*If* thou art the Christ, tell us it out plainly and in literal words! The peculiar use of αἴρειν τὴν ψυχήν has something of obscurity in it, but the connection helps us to its right interpretation. We find it in Euthymius (equivalent to ἀναρτᾷν), and Grotius (equivalent to μετεωρίζειν)—thus μετέωρον ποιεῖν, dubium

[1] After the pattern of the old temple. It is quite uncertain whether the tradition is right which states it to have been a relic of the former temple of Solomon.

suspensumque animi tenere. This is quite in harmony with the fact and the phraseology, as our modern expositors acknowledge; Erasmus substituted "suspendis" for the indefinite "tollis" of the Vulg. De Wette opposes this (Stud. u. Krit. 1834. 4. 931) and reduces it to "excite us to *expectation*"—but this is a superfluous refinement and scruple. The straining their curiosity and expectation is, indeed, the predominant idea, but not as unconnected with uncertainty also. Lange interprets:—"how much they suffered under His mighty influence, while they were refusing to allow their souls to be *laid hold of* by Him"—and this is quite in accordance with his artificial application of the whole, of which more will be said hereafter.[1] For what is it that these people here desire? Are they disposed to believe, and do they use the words with a good meaning and in earnest? Then would the answer be very different. Moreover the decree of chap. ix. 22; had already been issued; and further proceedings against Himself were only suspended till they could provoke an express declaration from His lips—the only thing wanting. If He now acknowledged Himself to be the Christ—what then? The *πιάζειν* which follows, nevertheless, in ver. 39. The judicial investigation and condemnation of blasphemy, as in Matt. xxvi. 65. Lange's exposition, which regards the rulers of the people as making a final experiment to induce Him to declare Himself a Messiah in *their* sense, ready to be a new Judas Maccabæus against the power of the Romans, seems to us fitly to belong to his unexegetical Poesies.[2] We cannot allow even an

[1] It is incorrect to compare *ἐπαίρειν*, LXX. 2 Kings xviii. 29, for הַשִּׂיא (comp. Jer. xxxvii. 9) which the translators interchanged with הַסִּיא; for that does not (as Tholuck supposes) signify "to keep in suspense." The *ὑποκλέπτειν* of Nonnus pointed that way, but cannot be supported. And we must reject Bengel's (and Elsner's, whom Lücke refers to)—quamdiu nos (quasi) enecas, exanimas! Fikenscher indulges us with a curiosity of exposition—"*αἴρειν τὴν ψυχήν must* have the same meaning as ver. 18, *till when then wilt thou take our life?* They in mockery termed Him, from His former words, the taker of life, and will have him now predict to them till when he would cause them to remain in death—tell us plainly when we die that we may prepare accordingly! The *εἶπον ὑμῖν* of the answer suits this well." How far may well-meaning exposition wander!

[2] Lange's answer to this (iii. 619) is justly as severe as my words. But why exchange compliments, when the unity of the faith in love is

admixture of mockery and earnest in the dilemma to which they might seem to fasten Him—Now make preparation to take thy kingdom, *or*—We will not permit thee longer to speak and act as if thou wert a king! It is altogether untrue, as our Lord's distinctive answer assures us, that their minds were in uncertainty and suspense. Their perfect understanding that He had said so already, is as obvious as their will not to believe it; consequently the hesitation, suspense, and uncertainty to which they complain that He subjects them, is a petulant and hypocritical taunt.

But the Lord gives a gracious and solemn reply, such as His truth and His love in their combined majesty alone could give. Let any one propose the question and receive the answer, and *feel* the contrast! He instantly repels the pertinacious unbelief which the specious question cannot conceal from Him; without any indignant rebuke (just because *they* spoke in bitterness) uttering the simple declaration of fact:—Ye indeed believe not, either My words or My works, because ye are not My sheep! leave me then alone, we have no sympathy with one another! But then for the sake of others (those disposed to believe, ver. 21, some of whom were certainly present), He adds a most gracious and yet weightier *promise*, continuing the figure of the sheep—and carries this to an extent of open avowal even beyond that which they had sought, as to who and what He was—*One with the Father!* Thus their enmity does not cause Him to falter in His appealing invitation, or to discontinue His testimony and predictions, even to the end.

Vers. 25, 26. The εἶπον ὑμῖν standing first is itself a plain *Yes;* the καὶ with the Present πιστεύετε means—*and* (or *but*) while I say it unto you again, ye nevertheless believe not. That is, ye adhere to your unbelief because I am the Christ in a different sense from yours—be it so! The mention of the *works* in addition to the word refers manifestly to ver. 21. But we must

fully assumed? I cannot bring myself, however, to perceive in the text a "Chiliast disposition to believe on the part of these Jews generally." As I understand the entire history of Jesus according to the four Evangelists, I am bound to conclude that *this Jesus*, just as He was, as He spoke, testified, and condemned, could never be to the Jews in Jerusalem a *persona grata* to *their* expectation of Messiah, although this might have been the case among the multitudes in Galilee. Lu. xix. 14 tells us—we will not have *this man* for a Messiah!

not emphasize *my* sheep, as if a distinction from *other* sheep was intimated: for this would contradict the previous παροιμία, by the analogy of which we must emphasize. Ye are not My *sheep*, ye are not souls which are disposed to hear and to follow. This fold (this temple) is of no avail to you! Καθὼς εἶπον ὑμῖν we cannot regard (with Erasmus, Casaubon, and others) as a gloss, for the insertion of it would be unaccountable. But when did the Lord say what is here referred to? We need not at once go back to ch. viii. 45, 46, or any thing similar; but there where He had been speaking *of His own sheep* it had been indirectly and per oppositum said to them that *they were not* of the number. Here is necessarily the point of *junction* between this word and the former. Expositors, and editors, and the Codd. themselves doubt whether the clause is to be construed with the former or the subsequent words: the question does not much affect the sense, since it forms a transition in either case; but we prefer the former—*As I said lately*, My sheep *hear* My voice; this do not *ye*, therefore ye are not My sheep. This categorical declaration and rejection of our Lord opposes Lange's assumption that He designed to attract these interrogators by His promise.[1] No, in the contrast between the true sheep, by them vainly mocked and persecuted, whom He will protect, we discern the condemnation of *their* continuous and obstinate enmity against the Shepherd and the true little flock.

Vers. 27, 28. It is a good arrangement of these words, which makes ver. 27 the preliminary repetition of the description of the sheep, and ver. 28 the threefold promise which follows: yet since condition and promise are strictly intertwined, as well in Christ's word as in the reality itself, we may more properly regard "*I know them*" as already anticipating the promise. To hear and recognise the voice of the Lord as the voice of the Shepherd is the true *hearing*, by which the sheep are known and distinguished.[2] (Comp. Jno. xviii. 37, and Rev. iii. 20). *To hear* and *to follow*

[1] He takes it in a political sense:—They would willingly trust themselves, in common with the people, into the hands of Jesus, as against the hands of the Romans! Such a false view of the question leads to an entire perversion of this so gracious, and so entirely spiritual promise.

[2] "One may hear the *words* of the Lord, without submitting to His *voice*. The voice of the Lord is the spiritually quickening influence of His words upon the heart of man." (Zeller im Monatsblatt).

—these are the two great and all-important designations of the character of the sheep as such; but the transition from the former to the latter is effected by the gracious assurance of the Lord for the obedience of faith which comes between them; by this it is that strength is imparted for the obedience of the life. That assurance is—I know thee, thou art mine! This word is given to them by the Lord for their consolation and defence against all the misconception and contempt of their enemies, just as the man born blind had found it; then follows with a repeated *and*, which simply confirms and corroborates it, the cumulative assurance. *I give unto them*—not indeed the temporal good of such an earthly Messiah-kingdom as ye have expected, but instead thereof what is infinitely better—*eternal life!* Mark, too, that it is the present tense δίδωμι, not the future δώσω. Because that is a life concealed in God, "the sheep in this world of goats may seem to be defenceless and wretched" (Berlenb. Bib.)—but they are blessed by the grace of their Shepherd with the assurance, notwithstanding, of eternal security. The perishing or being lost (Matt. xviii. 13, 14, comp. on Jno. vi. 39) is obviously parallel with the ἁρπάζεσθαι, for the δέδωκε here, as in ch. vi. 39, is set over against both; there is, however, a difference, for (as Bengel rightly observes) the former indicates rather the danger of erring from within and through their own fault, the latter the danger from external force. They perish not, because they have and retain the *life* which has been given to them; and because the Son *knoweth* them as His own, loveth and mightily defends them, *no man* can pluck them from Him. Least of all can ye evil shepherds do this, who cast them out of your synagogue, and by so doing only drive them to Me! This is the most direct meaning, but it goes further, and extends to the wolf, whose ἁρπάζειν had been already spoken of in ver. 12. Compare the prophecies of Isa. xl. 10, 11; Ezek. xxxiv. 22, 25, 28. *Out of mine hand*, the power of the strong One, anticipates the *ground* of this assurance, which the two following verses disclose.

Ver. 29. My Father hath *given* them to Me—see ch. vi. 37, 39. He is greater than *all*, for πάντων is evidently masculine, corresponding to τίς,—He is above, more mighty than all enemies, than all who have any power. If God is for them, who

can be against them?[1] The truth that in *another* sense the Father is also greater than the Son (ch. xiv. 28) has no application to this passage; for here the unity of the Father and the Son is the truth which is to be plainly attested, and indeed it is attested by this very evidence, that those who are given into the hands of the Son remain yet in the hands of the Father. In this passage promise and assurance predominate, but it must be understood that they who are preserved by the power of God, are, however, only preserved through faith unto salvation (1 Pet. i. 5); and it would be a sheer perversion to give the Lord's words a predestinarian force, as denying the possibility of falling away. They are secure if, and as long as, they remain *His sheep*, that is, follow Him, and depend upon Him according to His knowledge of them. If they cast off their dependence upon Him, then, indeed, they perish, but not as His sheep; no enemy, in that case, has plucked them away with mightier power, but they have destroyed themselves, and suffered themselves to be plucked away. "It is a protection of omnipotence working outwardly from within, which is here asserted; not a guarantee against our own selves. The possibility of backsliding proceeding from ourselves is not excluded by such passages as these; the freedom of man, who may anew engender sin in his own soul, is not taken away in the condition of regeneration." (Thiersch, Vorlesungen über Kathol. u. s. w. II. Aufl. II. 164.)

Ver. 30. This great saying supplements and explains the parallel words in ver. 16. We may thus supply the intermediate thoughts—No man shall pluck them out of my hand! Or does that seem too lofty a word? Should I rather say—out of My Father's hand? Then I say this also, and quite truly; but not as if my power were not enough. For know, in fine, what I now openly declare, and however little ye desired to hear it, that My hand, and the hand and power of God are the same—*I and my Father are one!*" Another inappropriate collocation with chap. xvii. 11, has induced many to speak of a unity of *will*, of disposition to love and protect the sheep, and then to argue from this "that true unity of will must necessarily imply unity of nature."

[1] The ancient reading ὃ and μεῖζον, which is in the Vulg., and followed by the Latin fathers, is entirely inapplicable.

But we can neither admit this last argument as incontestable,[1] nor the premise from which it is deduced, that unity of will is referred to.[2] Epiphanius against Noetus (hæres. 57, 10) has *διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἐν μιᾷ ἑνότητι θεότητος, καὶ ἐν μιᾷ γνώμῃ καὶ δυνάμει*, but we cannot see the propriety of this *γνώμη*, since it is the *hand* or *δύναμις*, which is obviously, distinctively, and indeed exclusively spoken of, as the *οὐδεὶς δύναται* most abundantly shows. There is no question as to whether the Son and the Father might *will* to suffer one of the sheep to perish or be plucked away; this injurious thought does not enter the discourse, but *μείζων πάντων* simply means *mightier* than all the power of their enemies. That is a marvellous *μετάβασις* by which Baumgarten-Crusius resolves the meaning into: —"for what *I do* and what God *wills*, is one!" But that the unity of divine *power*, that is, of omnipotence, can only rest upon unity of *nature*, is most evident and irrefragable; if Christ had not been God with the Father, but only man, it would have been most injurious to the honour of God, to declare his own and the Father's *hand* to be the same. It is to repel and silence this very objection, that He adds at the close the *personal* ἕν ἐσμεν. Fritzsche may decree, in his faithlessness to the plain words—ut *vero* unitatis nomen in hac disputatione nonnisi *similitudinem* indicare *potest!* Assuredly not so, for ἕν can signify by no possibility anything but ἕν. Compare, further, with this, the words of chap. xv. 15—*all* that the Father hath is *mine!* Here we have an incontrovertible dictum probans for the Trinitarian dogma, and Bengel's remark is as keen as it is lucid—per *sumus* refutatur Sabellius, per *unum* Arius. Although we can scarcely establish an original neuter in the language of the country which the Lord may have used, yet the Holy Spirit, through St John,

[1] For in chap. xvii. 11, 21, 22 there is a real difference between our union with the Son, and the unity of the Son with the Father,—see the last expression in ver. 26.

[2] The interpretation seizing only this idea, as Novatian introduced it and as adopted by the Socinians (which Teschendorff follows in his Nicodemus, p. 135, though whether in his own person, or in that of Nicodemus, is uncertain) is in fact not only one-sided, but essentially and utterly false and inharmonious.

lias strictly defined the Greek ἕν, and not εἷς.[1] The Father and Son are, indeed, ἓν οὐσίᾳ, but not τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ or τῇ ὑποστάσει. (Orig. Selecta in Ps. cxxxv.) Not as Swedenborg teaches, one person Deus-homo, of which the Divine is termed the Father, the Human the Son—not the Sabellian υἱοπάτωρ—not, as according to Praxeas and Noetus, the Son would have said, I am myself the Father! But the mystery of the personal distinction is as profoundly as clearly maintained—I and the Father; We —in the unity of nature, are *One*. Nothing more remains to be expounded here; let doctrine and speculation seek to penetrate this great mystery, but let it be in faith!

ASSERTION OF THIS LAST SAYING AGAINST CONTRADICTION. THE MANY GOOD WORKS. THE "GODS" AND THE SON OF GOD.

(Ch. x. 32—38.)

Stoning is *once more* the reply to the most piercing and luminous words of God, spoken as they had never before been spoken by man. That which is recorded concerning Moses the man of God, who bore the reproach of Christ not only before the Egyptians, but typically before Israel also (Ex. xvii. 4; Num. xiv. 10), must have its fuller accomplishment, and unto greater glory, in the Lord. Then, "stoning" was merely spoken of once;—now they take up stones, and, indeed, the second time, bring stones with them. The repetition significantly rises in force. In ch. viii. 59 it was merely ἦραν,—they took up, in an impetuous paroxysm, the stones which lay in the way, rather, however, for symbolical demonstration than in actual earnest; and the Lord suddenly withdraws from them. But now ἐβάστασαν, which indicates a more deliberate and earnestly significant rolling along of larger stones; and the Lord —? Peacefully waiting He stands

[1] As the Heb. New Test. found אֶחָד necessary. Nonnus serves himself by the paraphrase ἓν γένος—which, however, is inadequate, and might have been used concerning father and son among men.

still! As it was fit, His patient love also advances and keeps pace with their malice. "They seize the stones, He seizes their hearts." (Berlenb. B.) The Evangelist beautifully introduces His words with ἀπεκρίθη;—as if the interjection of the stones was but a continuation of the colloquy, and meets with this gentle response.

Ver. 32. His answer consists in a *question* which seeks to soften their stony hearts; and such is the sway which His words exert over their excited souls, that the stones at first remain unused in their hands, and are then laid down in order that they may answer *Him*. He imputes to them the full and fearful guilt of the act as if it had been accomplished; and does not qualify or abate the judgment pronounced upon it. This is not all which λιθάζετε involves; it further exhibits the voluntary submission to it on His part, provided He only knew *wherefore!* He speaks of the works of benevolence which He had shewed them from the Father, but seems not to be capable of reflecting upon His own power to help Himself. I will lay down my life—this He had said before and now confirms it. But there is already indicated in this question the *evidence* of His claim to be one with the Father, the same proof from the *works* addressed to those who disbelieve the *words*, to which He refers again in ver. 38. And still we perceive majesty and humbleness blended;—that which He had exhibited to them, as the might of *His own* hand, is no other than ἐκ του πατρός μου, from the hand and power of the Father with whom He was one, in whom He lived, and from whom He received all things. For in ch. vii. 21 He had made mention of that one latest work only at which they had taken offence, although that involved a reference to multitudes of others; but now He expressly mentions His *many* works, and vindicates them as purely καλὰ ἔργα, deeds of benevolence, and proofs of love—comp. vers. 25 and 21. I have not merely given to your blind their sight, to your deaf their hearing, to your dumb their voices,—καλῶς πάντα πεποίηκα, Mar. vii. 37. Is it thus that ye thank your physician and benefactor, ye foolish and infatuated people? There is an undeniable tone of irony in this question, especially in the piercing διὰ ποῖον; that is, which of my works has been so unhappily performed as to deserve the compensation of stoning? What has been the stamp and character of my

acts that, aiming at benevolence, I should find this the result? Answer me this! But what lamenting sorrow and entreating humility is at the same time in this irony!—Here finds its fulfilment what was foretold in Ps. cix. 5—and they have rewarded me evil for good, and hatred for my love! As it is set forth afterwards in the apostolical preaching: Him who went about doing good, and healing all who were oppressed of the devil—they slew and hanged on a tree! (Acts x. 38, 39).

There is sufficient good feeling left, however, in these Jews, to induce them to admit the series of good works which is thus pressed home upon their souls; they pause to contemplate them for a moment, but only that they may subvert the merit of these good works, and neutralize their own admission, by enforcing the guilt of blasphemy. The world is commonly content with the divine works of the children of God, but their approbation is always qualified by the requirement—say not that they are of God! Make them not a testimony of truth in thee in opposition to ourselves! They are ready enough here to concede the πολλὰ and πάντα καλὰ ἔργα, and do not contest the ποῖον αὐτῶν though they use the somewhat derogating Singular; they do not even contradict the ἐκ τοῦ πατρός, nor do they cry out this time—all this thou hast done through Beelzebub! *But* their obstinate unbelief can discern nothing in all this to abate the βλασφημία which attributes to man a *oneness* with God; and this is what they now design to say. We have already on ch. v. 18 exhibited their meaning on this; it is the final prelude of the condemnation before Caiaphas, and the complaint before Pilate.[1] This absolute abhorrence, however, of the union of the divine and human nature, of an incarnation of the Divinity, of the human manifestation of the Angel of the Covenant who is the Lord Himself, must not by any means be explained as the true Old Testament position. Our recent theology returning to the true faith, has here one final ψεῦδος derived from Rationalism to shake off, before it can in self-abnegation become perfectly one with the scriptural faith of their fathers, and with the Scripture itself. Dorner (Entwickelungsgeschichte S. 64) after a process

[1] It is also, as Olshausen observes, another proof that Χριστός ver. 24, and υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ now, did not signify one and the same thing *to them*.

of investigation which contains much misapprehension of the Old Testament, comes to the conclusion that "according to the Old Testament position, it was an *impossible* assertion that *a man was God*, or the Son of God, in a sense not merely figurative, but actual and metaphysical"—alas, if this be so, then it follows from this impossibility that the outcry of *βλασφημία*, and the legal *λιθάζειν* as its punishment, were strictly justified! Then were the Jews, unprepared for this unheard-of *θαῦμα* of the manifestation of Jesus which contradicted the whole Old Testament,—not simply exonerated, but justified, when they thwarted the wise counsel of God, and crucified the Lord of Glory. Then was *this* Christ, who declared Himself the *Son of God*, not properly He who was to come! And was this theology altogether unconscious of the consequences of such a view of the Old Testament? Dorner asserts still more plainly and boldly that "the word *Son of God* (already) in the Synoptics, cannot be referred back to the signification of this expression in the Old Testament." (p. 79.) But how then does the Lord Himself[1] refer it back to the *Scripture* which cannot be broken, to their *law?* How could He have done so, if the root and germ of this testimony to His own oneness, the oneness of a man, with God, was not to be found in that Scripture? Or did He this in an enfeebling accommodation, contrary to exegetical truth? He might have appealed to those fundamental passages, acknowledged by all ancient exposition, which in many ways indicated the divine nature of the future Son of man, yea, literally asserted it, such as that in which He receives the all-holy, incommunicable name *Jehovah*, Jer. xxiii. 6, xxxiii. 16; comp. Is. xlii. 8. But He penetrates deeper, as we shall see, and condescends to the level of the *Elohim-title* for sinful men, in order to show how by that title the rigid contrast between man and God, which *false* Judaism would urge against Him contrary to the true understanding of Scripture, is already broken and removed. Lange says much more to our satisfaction than Dorner with his well-meant but very dubious positions—"The upholders of the *arrested*, retrogressive, and therefore *corrupted*, Judaism, were hindered thereby from discerning the

[1] As much stronger, Matt. xxii. 43—45. Is not David's Lord, also, in Ps. cx., at the sametime—man and God?

spirit of the developed, glorified, perfected Judaism, in the (incarnate) *Personality of Christ.* They would allow only such spiritual *approximations* as those in which Jehovah, in strict *contradistinction* from man, comes near to His people through Moses and the Prophets—but never that God could become *One with* men." But the entire Old Testament, in fact, labours towards, and earnestly points to, this *becoming One* with man; and the approximations which we have mentioned are founded upon this great fact, and only through it intelligible.[1]

Vers. 34--36. In regard to the *declaration concerning His divinity*, which is thus enforced by stoning, He now asserts: --*first*, with that pacifying, yielding concealment of His full meaning which He so often adopted, that the form of speech which He used, externally considered, was not *blasphemous*; and *then*, merging this accommodation in the great truth, in vers. 37, 38, He exhibits the deep foundation of His assertion concerning *Himself* in its very different meaning from the phraseology quoted. As to the former, He lays down before the Scribes, accustomed to disputation, a *word of Scripture* as the foundation of every phraseology which might be admitted in Israel; and after having in ver. 35 explained and confirmed it, He applies this Scripture by the common conclusion a minori ad majus, to His own manner of expression, viewed also at first only externally. This last, nevertheless, spoken with the assumption of its deeper foundation—that He, sanctified of the Father, and sent into the world, was above all others that were called Elohim; and this leads to the exhibition of the works as its demonstration.

[1] So very beautifully Lange, in words with which, *rightly understood*, we heartily accord—"Here we learn that a golden thread of doctrine, concerning God and man becoming one, runs through the entire Old Testament; the typical gods precede the true Son of God in the Son of man." Liebner, too, more fully—"The *Old Testament* idea of God, in its full peculiar definiteness, is essentially the preparation for, the germ of, the expanded fulness of the Christian idea; and is clearly to be distinguished from the notion of God which *abstract Judaism* held." (Christol. I. 72.) Compare Martensen S. 275, and Nägelbach's last work—Der Gottmensch.

[2] "He cries peace into their stormy anger. Is it not written in your law? Now what will that mean? would be their thought." (Braune.)

It must not be overlooked, at the very outset, that He does not repudiate for Himself, directly and absolutely, the name *θεός*—which, however, *must* have been His *first* word for their pacification, and His own vindication from the supposed *βλασφημία*, if that name were not justly assumed by Him;[1] but that He rather commences His maintenance and defence of this *θεός εἰμι*, by an only *analogous θεοί ἐστε*. But His words commence with a pacificatory tone through the striking apparent harmonising of their differences. Your general position—a man cannot be called God without blasphemy—is *false!*[2] This method of replying strikes, and at the sametime disarms; it nullifies, while it holds fast the offensive truth. It attaches itself to an admitted point,—*almost* like the Apostle in Athens, who first allows the validity of the poet's saying—*Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμεν*; here, however, there is the difference that the divine *Scripture* is quoted. And here we have once more that immovable *ἡ γραφή*, in a phraseology which superficial exegesis misunderstands, attenuates, and would reduce to the level of heathenish forms of speech; but of which we shall be never weary of saying—"the true inspiration-theory must rest upon that centre from which this word sounds forth!" As we long ago said in another work[3] —"*The Scripture*—let many of our more recent orthodox theologians honestly test themselves whether they can simply repeat this little word after the Lord and His apostles." That is, when taken in connection with the appended *οὐ δύναται λυθῆναι*. Its word down to every and each *γεγραμμένον* and *γέγραπται* remains a *law* for ever for the rule of all man's words concerning divine truth; to explain as false, to abolish or remove one word in it, is a trespass, a punishable disobedience, just like the breaking of a commandment, ch. vii. 23 (or of the Sabbath, ch. v. 18). And no more than the law is abolished by breaking its precepts, can the Scripture in itself be *broken*, or proved to be false. It is the discipline of faith to submit to this fact; to expound Scripture with this absolute conviction, is the task of exegesis; to understand and to embrace this presupposition in faith, without

[1] In this case before His enemies, as afterwards before Thomas, who worships Him by this name.

[2] Was not Moses also called a God to Aaron, Ex. iv. 16; vii. 1?

[3] Andeutungen für gläub. Schriftverst. ii. S. 481.

seeking a foundation elsewhere, is the fundamental object of all systematic theology.[1]

In *your* law—this expression is in part to be received as we expounded it on ch. viii. 17, but here more definitely:—that law which is spoken to *you* sinners, which obliges and binds *you*, and in which ye make your boast in opposing Me, but which, as I will show, is *not* opposed to Me, and the testimony to Myself which ye have deemed blasphemous! Νόμος for a passage in the Psalms, is not to be explained by the wider use of that name for Scripture generally, but it is used with a special twofold reference:—first, because (as we have just said) all Scripture must be taken as the *norm* of all permissible and right language, and then, secondly, because the cited passage of the Psalm itself rests upon *Mosaic sentences*, which are therefore themselves actually at the same time quoted.

Who, then, are the θεοί or אֱלֹהִים of the eighty-second Psalm?[2] Most assuredly not heathen tyrants, as a recent perverted opinion imagines; for God never spake to them, and to them He never assigned the title and dignity of His own majesty. Nor are they Israelitish *kings* pre-eminently or exclusively. For, as we have elsewhere said, it is altogether a "new discovery, that kings are in the Old Testament Sons of God; we seek in vain for a single passage, in which a heathen king, or even an Israelitish king, excepting David and Solomon as types of the Messiah, received the honour of that name." Those who are declared to be Elohim, or representatives and images of God, are in this Psalm, as in the law of Moses, the *Judges* in Israel, which would then include the kings, of course, in as far as they might be said to judge supremely. For see it plainly stated in vers. 2—5 of the Psalm! De Wette and Gesenius (in the Thesaurus) groundlessly deny the *personal* reference of אֱלֹהִים to the Judges in Ex. xxi. 6, xxii. 8, 9, 28;[3] for the parallelism in ver. 28, and the

[1] Which would not, like Rothe recently, speculate as if there were no Scripture. And not merely arrange the scriptural views in prosegomena by themselves.

[2] Comp. here generally our Ausgewählten Psalmen ii. 174.

[3] According to them its meaning is just equivalent to לִפְנֵי יְהוָה, Deut. xix. 17!

אַתֶּם of the Psalm (here ἐκείνους), prove clearly the attribution of a title of honour to these official persons. *I have said*, Ye are gods; that is, should be so termed—this is manifestly in the Psalm a reference back to the Mosaic passages, or to the installation into office with which this title was associated. In the strong words wherewith the Lord closes, the λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ which came to them, can similarly mean no other than that same εἶπα. The words cannot refer to the whole people of Israel (as Ebrard says), for the ἐκείνοι are already singled out as special persons from the עֲדַת אֵל of ver. 1. And as little are prophets and pious men meant,[1] as having received a *revelation* from God (רִיבִי דְבַר יְהוָה אֲלֵיהֶם)—but no more no less than the judging, ruling officers among the people, to whom this name might come and did come from above—"Ye shall be called gods!" and de Wette rightly maintains against Olshausen that here, in the domain of the Old Testament types and shadows, there is not necessarily involved a real union of the personality with God, corresponding with the name. For God, who has reserved to Himself the prerogative of judging even these "gods," here first reproves them for their unrighteousness, and then goes on to announce and predict to them:—I have *truly* named you gods, *but* not the less on that account shall ye die (in your sins) like men! We should not, however, go too far on the other side, and regard the conclusion to which the Lord leads their minds, as only meaning—"If the mere *semblance* of the name is not to be treated with disrespect, should the thing itself, the nature and the Word of God be so?"[2] For it is most certain that wherever the name of an office had sunk into a mere lying semblance, the abolition or resumption of that title is foretold—and sooner or later most surely fulfilled. It is just *this* which gives so much significance to the Lord's words—though overlooked by most expositors—that He quotes a passage of Scripture which refers to these very Pharisees and Rulers of the people to whom He Himself was so obnoxious; at once conced-

[1] Bahrdt:—Such men as had become like God in their beneficence to man!

[2] Thus speaks Rudelsbach in the Predigtsammlung—Der Herr Kommt i. 455.

ing *to them* the theocratical dignity and predicting its loss as the judicial infliction of God. He does not expressly quote in detail *this* wider subject of the Psalm, but these students of Scripture would understand His allusion. We very often find in our Lord's citations such a warning, threatening undertone in the connection to which they silently refer.

Is it not written in *your* law, that God called *you* yourselves gods—ye should well know what is recorded there, and what follows from it. Thus the ὑμῶν derives a new meaning, which makes the ἐστέ of the quotation an immediate address to those who then heard Himself: for though not all those who took up stones were leaders of the people, the speakers of ver. 33 were such. Very far from true is it "that the Lord applied this declaration to Himself *in his need* against His imbittered enemies, who would on the spot stone Him to death."[1] Oh no, there is no question here of need, or of any refuge in a quotation which itself would break the Scripture by vaguely or incorrectly applying it;[2] his peaceful word, ver. 32, had already quelled the violence which would stone Him and reopened the controversy. But Meyer (Lichtbote ii. 181) has given us a correct view:—"Is it too high an assumption, He said with *that lofty irony* which He often used in dealing with their folly—Is it too much that I term Myself God; what if I show you out of Scripture that *ye yourselves* (sinners and false judges!), that *your forefathers* (in office) are called gods? May it not be allowed me, to regard Myself as equally great with *them*?"

The allusion to these present אֱלֹהִים in the congregation of God, to whom He was then speaking, He does indeed wisely leave in the background; and turns His application and deduces His conclusion, with reference to ἐκείνους, those whom the Psalm then addressed. There is now a twofold distinction and progression —*His* person is incomparably higher than they, and yet He has not plainly called Himself θεός, only υἱὸς θεοῦ. As the conclu-

[1] The excellent Kleuker thus speaks in a manner unworthy of himself! Johannes, Petrus, und Paulus als Christologen, p. 49.

[2] As Sepp:—According to these words of Scripture ye could not fasten any blame upon me, if I should sophistically explain them!!

sion from this—How can ye designate *blasphemy* the appropriation of the more humble *name* by the supremely higher *person?* Even in the Psalm בְּנֵי עֶלְיוֹן stands parallel with אֱלֹהִים as its explanation—this our Lord mentions not any more than that conversely *His* υἱὸς θεοῦ is indeed equivalent to θεός. But now what a difference of persons—this He makes on that account all the more prominent. Those—men, sinful men, mortals, upbraided with the denunciation of death, who only bore for a while in common with many the name of God because a word of communion had come πρὸς αὐτοὺς, unto them. He, on the other hand, is the One, *through whom* the Father speaketh to the world, Himself the *word* of God! Those only temporary, transitional, typically clothed with their dignity, which did not so cleave to their persons as that it could not be revoked and taken from them—He, on the contrary, one in whom "Being and office are one!" (As von Gerlach excellently says). They shamefully desecrated their office—He as the true Son of God is *sanctified* of the Father: that is, sanctified from His birth, rather *before* His birth sealed with the impress of pure holiness of the Father (see on ch. vi. 27), and, thus sealed, sent as the Holy One of God into an unholy world![1] And yet He had not once said—I am God! though with infinitely truer right, and in a very different sense, it belonged to Him to say so.

This progressive and cumulative contrast of His person with the ἐκείνοις, should have saved every intelligent and conscientious interpreter from so impairing His words as to make them signify —that He merely arrogated to Himself divine dignity in the sense of a title, not aiming to be Deus vel filius Dei dictitius! No truly, the λεγόμενοι θεοὶ in heaven and on earth (1 Cor. viii. 5, rulers, gods, angels, in the widest sense, as the first verse of Ps. lxxxii. touches the limits of them all) are only types and shadows which point to the one God, as to the Father, so also to His true Representative, essentially invested with all His greatness and supremacy, our Lord Jesus Christ! The אֱלֹהִים אַתֶּם וּבְנֵי עֶלְיוֹן כֻּלְּכֶם of the Psalm, yea even the

[1] With Augustine and Beza to refer this ἡγίασε to the eternal generation, is inappropriate: Yet is it not a mere separation, as Jer. i 5, and Gal. i. 15, but appears to precede the ἀπέστειλεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

בְּנֵי אֱלֹהִים, and the אֱלֹהִים of the angels, is much less than the singular בְּנִי אַתָּה of the *second* Psalm spoken of the King of kings, the בַּר simply and pre-eminently, whose wrath hurls into swift destruction. But *this* is assuredly the undertone of our Lord's argument, that any arrogation of the *name of God* was permitted to *men* at all; consequently that the phraseology of Holy Scripture itself must be termed blasphemous, *if* all such *typical* designation and dignity did not maintain its right and truth as prophetic of, and an aspiration of Scripture towards, a real communication of the Divine Majesty to human nature, and oneness with it. Neander says quite correctly: "Christ sought to prove it to their apprehension, that the idea of a communication of the Divine Majesty to human nature was by no means foreign to the revelations of the Old Testament. *If* the gulf between God and all things finite was infinite and impassable, it must have been blasphemy *in any sense* to attribute the name Elohim to mortal men." *So far* the Lord here gives to Israel, to whom the οὐ δύναται λυθῆναι ἡ γραφή still held good as an irrefragable axiom, a profound proof *for the existence of a God-man* out of the *inmost heart* of the Old Testament. Every fellowship of God with men which went so far as to attribute the divine attributes and prerogatives to such men, presupposes as a truth which should find its realization, a real union of God and man in the Person of Him who filled in Himself all offices, who was to come and make all names into essential realities. The Lord, consequently, here asserts the direct opposite of the position of Dorner before quoted; and expressly contradicts all who are constantly talking about the "rigid, absolute antithesis of God to all creature" in the Old Testament. As the despised Berlenberg Bible so well expresses it:—He shews them that if they know the Scriptures rightly, they would not oppose God and man to each other. Where is the foundation of offices upon earth? With respect to the office of the Messiah they are but shadowy offices, and yet the men who hold them are termed gods: *God thereby from the beginning would accustom your people to think in advance of more than that.*"

Vers. 37, 38. This whole argument from Scripture against the βλασφημία of ver. 33, and the contradiction of their assertion σὺ

ἄνθρωπος ὢν from which the ποιεῖς σεαυτὸν follows of course, —was, however, only *hypothetical*, for He only asked them: —"*Supposed*, that I am the Holy One, sanctified of the Father, and sent into the world, He who is actually so delineated, promised, and typified throughout your Old Testament—where is then the blasphemy in my testimony concerning My oneness with the Father?" Therefore the Lord spoke first of Himself in the third person, and then afterwards passed over to the first in His εἶπον. Hence it follows as a necessary conclusion—*And am I not He?* But in asserting this He still graciously condescends to them; not demanding of them that higher and better "belief *in Him* or His entire Personality, and especially His *word* as its most spiritual expression and utterance," which was found in those who were of God, and heard His voice. With the utmost moderation, as it were, He admits it as an unreproved supposition that they do *not* believe in Him: nay more, He declares in the imperative—If I do not the works of My Father, *believe Me not?* But by this He seizes them, and holds them fast, leaving them no way of escape; He simply repeats His frequent appeal to the testimony of His works, referring now in εἰ δὲ ποιῶ to their own tacit admission in ver. 33, in order that he may subvert and bring to nought their falsely asserted independence of His good works, and his blasphemous words. The last saying which is given them for their *perception* and faith—ὅτι ἐν ἐμοὶ ὁ πατὴρ, κἀγω ἐν αὐτῷ (or, after Lachm. and Tischend. ἐν τῷ πατρί)—is the *descending*, and yet true explanation of the rejected ἕν ἐσμεν.[1] I have not said—I and God: but merely—I and the *Father*; have called Myself the Son of God, in the sense, assuredly, of the oneness of divine nature. Chrysostom:—"I am no other than the Father, only that I remain the Son, and the Father remaineth the Father."

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[1] Therefore not, however, merely distinguished in the expression; so that the Jews here, ver. 33, and in ch. v. 18, might have *incorrectly* regarded the Son of God, and equality with God or being God, as one and the same. (Hofmann Schriftb. i. 116.) I confess that I do not understand what kind of exaggeration of Christ's divinity is here meant to be protested against.

The result even of this utterance, received by that unbelief which was rightly set against all His true words, and all His good works, was the same as it had hitherto been: demonstrating the truth of our Saviour's words, (ver. 26). Once more does St John record a πάλιν (ver. 39), even as ver. 19, and ver. 31. They have given up their design to stone Him; but they will lay hands on Him to bring Him to judgment and condemnation, and He—withdraws once more from their power, escapes their hands! Nothing more was to be done for them. Thus the stern conclusion of His public life and testimony, ch. xii. 37—40, is already here foreshadowed and prepared for.

Then does the Lord retire to the scene of His first public appearance, where the Baptist had prepared for Him, testified of Him, and pointed the multitudes to Him. There He *abode*; as if to bring that early time back to the people's minds, and, as it were, ready to begin anew with them the great work of His life. The Evangelist records that with accuracy, inasmuch as it serves his purpose as bringing back this preparatory conclusion of our Lord's ministry to its starting-point in his prologue, ch. i. 6, 7.[1]

Those who were in a sense believers, or inclined to believe; and who have been often mentioned as all together πολλοὶ in number, gather together around the Lord, having sought Him after His withdrawal. The expression which they use, as uttered before the approaching end, and therefore more significant, may be regarded as prophetic, or as testifying in the name of the whole people—John spake the truth, *This is He!* As Jews they cannot indeed forget the *miracles*, yet are they half unconsciously constrained to utter a great and remarkable truth to us:—the last and greatest Prophet before Christ, who compelled the whole people to an avowal of repentance, enforced from them also the acknowledgment that the *evidence of miracles for the acceptance of Himself was not absolutely* indispensable. (See our observations on ch. v. 33). The fulfilment of his—He will come after me! by

[1] Or was it withal (after Luthardt)—in order to place at the close the unbelief in the ample testimony of Jesus to Himself, in contrast with the faith of those who had received the Baptist's direction to Jesus? But we have nothing here said distinctively of a faith which had been from the beginning produced by the Baptist.

His actual coming after was his one great miracle or sign. (Deut. xviii. 21, 22). All things that John spake of *this man*—ἀληθῆ ἦν, that is, have approved themselves true; and faith now retrospectively sees the truth with shame for its unbelief—veritas est vera, etiam antequam agnoscatur (as Bengel most pertinently explains this ἦν.)

May this be the result in the case of every one for whom this prayer is applicable; that he may be gathered into the little company found in the midst of the mass of unbelieving people, of whom the Gospel can say for their encouragement and joy—*and many believed on Him!*

POSTSCRIPT.

During the publication of the first edition of this work on the Words of Jesus, Lange's Leben Jesu was making its simultaneous appearance, and consequently we had only the opportunity of an alternate transitory glance at each other's pages; and now, during the issue of the second edition, the same unfortunate coincidence has occurred in the case of Luthardt's work on the Gospel of St John. Reference has been made to this book no further than to the end of the fourth chapter, for the press could not wait for the issue of the second volume. Had it been otherwise, Luthardt's name would have often been quoted among other representatives of exegetical views; and many an observation commented on which cannot now be referred to in detail. Such as seem most pressingly to demand mention may be alluded to in the way of postscript. Luthardt has copiously referred to my Reden Jesu, and has thereby laid me under obligation; but there are many instances in which I cannot yield to his authority, or admit his corrections. It is needless to inflict upon the reader the whole collective points of difference between us in the section from ch. v. to ch. x.; nor shall I enter into the discussion of such points as his different arrangement of a whole theme (as p. 25, 33), or his modification of details (such as p. 19, *οἱ ἀκούσαντες*—p. 75, mockingly—p. 82 *διὰ τοῦτο*—p. 85, Irony or question—p. 107 *τὰ κάτω*—p. 158, 159, those who see).—But the following points I must be permitted to dilate upon, on account of the intrinsic importance of his work itself, as well as for the sake of the completeness of my own.

That the prosecution of my contemplation, upon ch. v. 19, 20, into the *mysterium trinitatis* should be condemned (p. 12) as passing beyond the immediate meaning of the text and its exegetical design, results from the fundamental difference between my relation to the Word and that of Luthardt as representing systematic

university theology. Whatever the sacred Word speaks to our thoughtful meditation abidingly exercised upon it, and to our "systematic theological thinking" quickened by its influence—I include within the range of pure exposition, as developing the principles and exhibiting the kernel of the word of God, or in scriptural language as opening the Scripture. Nor can I submit to sacrifice the backgrounds of deeper meaning which unfold speculative truth, to the system of *historical* hermeneutics, in any such manner as that which Hofmann has brought into vogue. As to this question, we cannot admit that in St John's Gospel the doctrine concerning the Father and the Son is to be confined within the rigorous bounds of the mere historical relation and significance of these terms in the scheme of salvation, and that no legitimate exposition can go beyond. If it is said that *the Son* is "the man who came forth from God, and is come into the world"—we maintain, on the other hand, that He is God also proceeding, and who hath proceeded forth from God, who hath become man, and is come into the world;—as is most expressly declared in ch. xvi. 28, xvii. 5. Luthardt's refusal to admit "an eternal going forth within the Being of God," springs from the arbitrariness of a restricted and prejudiced devotion to a system. Just as certainly as the economical Trinity must be developed in theology, all that is spoken concerning it must rest upon the deeper foundation of the immanent Trinity; we are therefore necessarily referred to this innermost application of the term, and required to make it prominent.

Elsewhere, as at p. 15 (touching the κρισις, ch. v. 22) the question of the maintenance of a full and deep meaning beyond the limits of the immediate and obvious meaning, is again discussed. For myself, I am firmly convinced that an "arbitrary limitation" may be alleged against the narrow school exegesis with at least as much propriety as an "arbitrary extension" may be alleged against me. And I am further persuaded that, as time rolls on, and the injurious influence of our past and present merely human school commentators declines, as decline it does and will, very many of the new race of school theologians, rejoicing in a living faith, will come to take a supreme delight in exploring the depth and fulness of the Words of God.

Before deciding that the θαυμάζειν, ch. v. 28. (p. 23) be-

tokened a merely unbelieving wonder, and not a state of mind suddenly affected for good, I would suggest that in ver. 28 our Lord continues His words with a somewhat more trusting and elevated apprehension on the part of His hearers. Stiff-necked unbelief is not represented throughout this Gospel as always and everywhere confronting our Saviour and His discourses, as Luthardt says. He is perfectly right in this general view, but too strenuous in carrying it into the detail: for we perceive occasionally the beginnings of faith, and fitful tendencies to listen attentively, which our Lord's words excite; and these must be carefully observed and estimated if we would understand this Gospel aright.

At p. 27 there is a misunderstanding, as if Bengel and myself referred the article in ὁ λύχνος, (ch. v. 35), immediately to Ecclus. xlviii. 1. Bengel says merely—innuit prædicta in V. T. de Johanne—and that is my meaning, with which Luthardt also agrees, "*the* light which should go before me." The reference to the passage as showing the fixed proverbial representation of the character of Elias is another point; but that we have λαμπάς and not λύχνος results from the Holy Spirit's principle of not carefully intervening apocryphal quotations in these latter.[1]

In referring ch. v. 37 still to the testimony of the *works*, and thereby introducing that of *the word* first in ver. 38, I am regarded (p. 30) as only making the matter more obscure. But I confidently point to the parallelism between the μεμαρτύρηκε and the previous ἔδωκε of ver. 36. The Lord does not place the witness of the works as "mediate" over against that of the Scripture as immediate, but rather as the "most immediate" testimony itself of the Father (long present since the manifestation of the Son); and to this statement I must adhere. Then follows in the *second* clause of ver. 37 the *transition*, giving the grounds of the unbelief in the works, to the testimony of the *word*; as it comes forward first, ver. 38, in τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ.

There is a misunderstanding also in p. 32, upon ch. v. 39, inasmuch as I concur with Luthardt in saying that the Lord educes the truth which still clung to the proud delusion of the

[1] My defence of the Apocrypha enters more fully upon this.

Jews in their blind and formal dependence on Holy Scripture. If my entire remarks had been carefully noted, I should not have been classed with Hilgenfeld against Hofmann, with whom in the second edition I have stated my perfect concurrence.

In ch. v. 42, I must insist (against p. 34) that the *love* of God in them, as the life, ver. 40, is primarily the love which God sheds in us. This seems to me alone appropriate, much more so certainly than "the due love to the God of Israel," which was wanting to them as "not Israelites indeed." The Lord's words penetrate everywhere in this connection into the inmost, most mystical principles; and love to God is only found wanting as the influence and result of *God's own love.*

The deep-thinking reader must decide whether (according to p. 38) the definition "writings" in ch. v. 47 for the word and testimony of Moses as opposed to the *words* of Jesus, is a matter of perfect indifference.

I cannot concede that in ch. vi. 51 (p 59) the weight of manuscripts preponderates for the omission of ἣν ἐγὼ δώσω against internal criticism. The declaration that this future *giving* has no reference whatever to the *death* of Christ, arbitrarily contradicts the fundamental spirit and principle of the whole discourse (which already in ver. 27 points to no other than that in the δώσει).

The plain testimony of the text, ch. vi. 64, against the "partaking of unbelievers," is weakened (p. 61) in a manner as subtle as that of Kahnis, an "*apparent*, unconditional, and ineffectual influence of the eating and drinking" is spoken of: but I must lament over this Lutheran prejudice, which hinders so many excellent men from reading the words in their simplicity. It is a strange refuge to fly to, that "the possible cases of exception are not to be taken account of;" this will not cause us to "lay down the weapons of our war against the Lutheran doctrine"—that is, will not constrain us to give up the plain words of Scripture for ecclesiastical dogmatics.

I never asserted that the seeking of the Jews, ch. vii. 11, was *only* hostile (p. 78), but connecting it with ver. 1, remarked upon it as *primarily* hostile, and discerned in it the transition to a general inquiry after the usual guest at the feast.

In ch. vii. 23 (p. 84) I am not contented with the contrast to

the *whole man* which is found in "the specific aspect of the body as the agent of propagation;" and I must hold, with Bengel and Olshausen, that not only must ὅλον ἄνθρωπον refer to body and *soul*, but that in circumcision there was a promising sign and seal of spiritual soundness.

I cannot understand why Luthardt, p. 89, takes no notice of my many reasons against the common exposition of chap vii. 37, 38; but must all the more urgently bespeak attention to them again.

The view of chap. viii. 25, given in p. 110, 111, which reads ὅτι and translates *that*, does not satisfy me, and indeed is almost incomprehensible.

On p. 114, 115, I must observe, that those who reply in chap. viii. 33 must be the πολλοί addressed before with ὑμεῖς; and that I cannot by any means think the continuation in ver. 37 "impossible," since those who fall back from the beginning of faith might again be included in the turba promiscua.

Similarly, the remark upon ch. viii. 33 (p. 117) that the Jews had interpreted the word *truth* (which they did *not* overlook) as the "true relation to God" is harsh and constrained. How would this accord with the *knowing* of the truth?

The protest against my exposition of chap. viii. 44 (p. 124) springs from a misunderstanding; since the *truth* must in both cases be "the objective truth of God," when it is said that the devil was not in it, or *it was not in him*. How the latter is only the "*ethical* being," I cannot understand. It is with this as with the "love of God" previously; but here Satan's not abiding in the truth of God is rather the reason wherefore it did not abide in him.

We must still maintain (against p. 142—144) that in chap. ix. 4 Jesus speaks of a night *for Himself*, in which He can no longer work as before; this is plainly expressed in the words, and not an addition of ours, for the "I must work" and "no man can work" plainly correspond. Thus the mere limitation to day or night "for the world" has the plain text opposed to it; and would not satisfy the "*for*," which, although not spoken, is plainly to be understood.

We will not contend about the more direct meaning of the Porter, ch. x. 3, as referred to p. 163. It is a matter of personal

feeling whether we will adhere strictly to the abstract idea in these similitudes (here the opening), or strive to find a deeper allusion; but I must protest against the assertion that no man *has a right* to the latter course.

As to the *πρὸ ἐμοῦ*, ch. x. 8, Besser has assented to my exposition, it must therefore be "conceivable." And what is there inconceivable in the premature rushing in before the right door is sought and found? That Christ speaks, between the door of ver. 7 and the door of ver. 9, of His own Person as the door, appears obvious, as we cannot suppose Him to have intermediately dropped the figure. The view taken by Luthardt, p. 167, 168,—placing Christ after themselves, preferring their own persons to Him,—appears to us to depart from the whole simile. And on account of this alone, not to mention other reasons, it cannot be received.

We must leave it to every accurate reader to determine, whether the *ἁρπάζειν* of ch. x. 28 (p. 186) can refer only to spiritual powers which imperil the inner life, and not rather to force from without, as here exhibited in specie of the wicked shepherds, and with allusion to ch. ix. 34, 35.

As to the rejection, p. 187, of my trinitarian dogmatics in the interpretation of ch x. 30, I must refer to what has been already said. I have asserted, and still assert, against Hofmann, that the qualified and lower formula of ver. 38 is not strictly one with that *ἕν ἐσμεν*.

That, finally, in ver. 35, the λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ must primarily mean the *εἶπα* of the Psalm (resting again upon earlier utterances), I did certainly assert; not, however, as intending it to refer to the address contained in the Psalm (p. 192), but to that which was *quoted* in this *εἶπα*, and exhibited in it as an earlier λόγος—ye are gods.

END OF VOLUME FIFTH.

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